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Short  history  of  the  Roma^.J'.fR"'*'' 


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A   SHORT    HISTORY 


OF   THE 


ROMAN    REPUBLIC 


CAMBRIDGE   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

Eonton:    FETTER  LANE,   E.G. 

C.  F.  CLAY,  Manager 


ffitimiiurgf):    loo,   PRINCES   STREET 
Berlin:  A.  ASHER  AND  CO. 
3Leipjis:   F.   A.   BROCKHAUS 

^eto  ?|orfe:     G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
ISomtag  anU  flTalmtta:  MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Ltd. 


All  rights  reserved 


"tk 


^6 

A  SHORT   HISTORY 


OF  THE 


ROMAN    REPUBLIC 


BY 

W.    E.    HEITLAND,    M.A. 


Cambridge  : 

at  the  University  Press 

191 1 


Camiiritrge : 

PRINTED   BY  JOHN   CLAY,    M.A. 
AT   THE    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 


PREFACE 

IN  preparing  a  short  history  of  the  Roman  Republic 
intended  for  junior  students,  I  have  not  been  contented 
with  a  mere  abridgement  of  my  larger  book  on  the  same 
subject.  Though  following  in  the  main  the  same  plan 
and  often  using  the  same  words  in  dealing  with  the  same 
matters,  I  have  rewritten  the  whole  as  a  new  book.  The 
necessary  compression  compels  omission  of  many  a  detail 
which  I  would  gladly  have  retained,  and  references  to 
authorities  must  be  wholly  abandoned.  In  the  text  I  have 
striven  to  avoid  mentioning  unimportant  persons  by  name 
wherever  I  could  do  so  without  obscuring  the  sense.  It 
has  been  my  endeavour  constantly  to  bear  in  mind  that 
the  story  of  republican  Rome  is  only  a  part  (a  very  signifi- 
cant part)  of  the  general  World-history  of  states  ancient 
and  modern.  Defective  though  our  tradition  often  is,  the 
leading  facts  of  the  narrative  are  well-established,  and  the 
story  they  tell  is  one  that  no  political  student  can  afford 
to  neglect. 

In  writing  for  junior  students  I  do  not  attempt  to  write 
down  to  a  supposed  childish  level  of  appr;  'lension.  Baby- 
talk  is  rightly  resented  by  young  readers  who  are  no  longer 
children,  even  in  England.  I  have  therefore  tried  to  say 
what  I  have  to  say  in  the  plainest  language,  only  avoiding 
extreme  technicalities.  As  in  my  larger  book,  such  words 
as  Assembly  (a  general  term  including  the  several  kinds  of 
Assemblies),  Allies  (the  Italian  socii),  Centuries  and  Tribes 
(the  Roman  groups  so  named),  are  printed  with  capital 
initial  letters  to  indicate  that,  where  thus  printed,  they  are 


VI 


Preface 


used  in  the  special  sense  here  given  in  brackets.  And  I  do 
not  employ  the  term  Oligarchy  at  all  in  speaking  of  Roman 
politics,  as  it  is  liable  to  convey  a  false  impression. 

The  division  of  the  matter  into  chapters  differs  some- 
what from  that  of  the  larger  book,  and  a  certain  amount 
of  new  matter  has  been  introduced  into  the  earlier  chapters. 
Of  maps,  some  are  repeated  from  the  larger  book,  and  a 
few  are  added.     The  pictures  of  coins  are  a  new  feature. 

I  take  this  opportunity  of  thanking  the  scholars  who 
have  reviewed  the  larger  book.  All  the  reviewers  who 
shew  a  knowledge  of  the  difficulties  of  the  subject  have 
given  me  much  encouragement.  They  know  how  hard  it 
is  to  deal  judicially  with  so  various  a  collection  of  evidence 
as  that  which  makes  up  our  record.  But  I  must  in  parti- 
cular acknowledge  the  private  generosity  of  Mr  J.  Wells 
of  Wadham  College,  Oxford,  who  has  kindly  sent  me  a 
number  of  notes  on  points  of  detail,  for  which  I  am  most 
grateful. 

A  few  notes  are  placed  at  the  foot  of  the  page  ;  in  most 
cases  they  are  cross-references  added  in  order  to  avoid 
repetitions.  But  it  is  in  the  Index  that  this  object  has 
principally  been  kept  in  view.  The  existence  of  Mr  P.  E. 
Matheson's  Skeleton  Outline  seems  to  make  the  addition  of 
a  full  Chronological  Table  unnecessary. 

The  coins  figured  in  the  plates  are  photographed  from 
casts  of  the  originals  in  the  British  Museum,  and  in 
selecting  and  describing  them  I  have  used  Dr  B.  V.  Head's 
Guide  to  the  Coins  of  the  Ancients  (1881).  In  one  case  I 
have  preferred  to  choose  a  coin  from  the  general  B.M. 
catalogue. 

W.  E.  H. 

February  191 1 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


CHAP. 

1.  Introductory.     §§  i — 5         .... 

2.  Early  Rome.     §§  6 — 17       .... 

3.  The  Regal  period.     §§  18 — 22    . 

4.  The  Republic  509 — 449  B.C.     §§  23 — 36    . 

5.  The  Republic  448—367  B.C.     §§  37—51     . 

6.  The  Republic  366 — 265  B.C.     §§  52—60    . 

7.  Conquest  of  Italy  366—265  B.C.     §§  61 — 79 

8.  Organization  of  Italy.     §§  80 — 83 

9.  Rome  and  the  Romans  366 — 265  B.C.     §§  84 — 90 

10.  Carthage.     §§91 — 96 

11.  First  Punic  War  264 — 241  B.C.     §§97 — 108 

12.  The  interval  241 — 218  B.C.     §§  109 — 118  . 

13.  Second  Punic  War  218 — 201  B.C.     §§  119 — 166 

14.  The  situation  created  by  the  war.     §§  167 — 178 

15.  Wars  and  policy  in  the  East  200 — 168  B.C.,  and  in  the  West 

200 — 194  B.C.     §§  179—232  . 

16.  Wars  and  policy  in  the  West  193 — 167  B.C.     §§  233 — 24 

17.  External  affairs  167 — 133  B.C.     §§  242 — 269 

18.  Internal  history  201 — 133  B.C.     §§  270 — 310 

19.  The  Sicilian  slave-war  134 — 132  B.C.     §§311 — 313 

20.  Tiberius  Gracchus  133  B.C.     §§  314 — 322  . 

21.  The  interval  132 — 123  B.C.     §§  323 — 332  . 

22.  Gaius  Gracchus  124 — 121  B.C.     §§  333 — 348 

23.  From  the  death  of  C.  Gracchus  to  the  end  of  the  Jugurthine 

War  121 — 105  B.C.     §§  349 — 367  .... 

24.  The  invasion  from  the  North  109 — loi  B.C.     §§  368 — 374 

25.  The  second  Sicilian  slave-war,  and  external  affairs  105 — 92  B.C 

§§  375—382 

26.  Internal  history  104 — 91  B.C.     §§  383 — 396        ... 

27.  The  great  Italian  or  Marsic  war  90 — 87  B.C.     §§  397 — 413 

28.  Marius  and  Cinna  87 — 86  B.C.     §§  414 — 418     . 

29.  Sulla  in  the  East  87 — 84  B.C.     §§  419 — 424 

30.  Cinna,  Carbo,  and  Sulla  85 — 82  B.C.     §§  425 — 429  . 


PAGE 
I 

7 
21 
27 

43 

58 
66 

83 
87 
92 

98 
108 
116 
146 

155 
193 
200 
217 
247 
249 

255 
261 

272 
286 

291 
297 

307 
321 

325 
330 


viii  Table  of  Contents 

CHAP,  PAGE 

31.  Sulla  82—78  B.C.     §§  430—448 334 

32.  Rome  and  Italy  78 — 70  B.C.     §§  449 — 459         .         .         .         .         348 

33.  Wars  abroad.     Sertorius  and  Mithradates.     79 — 67  B.C.     §§  460 

—469 357 

34.  Affairs  in  Rome  69 — 66  B.C.,  and  the  preeminence  of  Pompey 

67—62  B.C.     §§  470—482 365 

35.  Cicero  and  Catiline  66—63  B.C.     §§  483—501   •         •         •         •  375 

36.  The  years  of  uncertainty  62 — 60  B.C.     §§502 — 509  .         .         .  389 

37.  Caesar's  first  consulship  and  the  removal  of  Cicero  and  Cato 

59— 58  B.C.     §§510—521 395 

38.  Caesar  in  Gaul  58 — 56  B.C.     §§  522 — 530  ....        404 

39.  Affairs  in  Rome  58 — 55  B.C.      The  conference  of  Luca  56  B.C. 

§§  531—540 412 

40.  Caesar  in  Gaul  56 — 50  B.C.     §§  541 — 552  ....        420 

41.  Roman  affairs  from  the  conference  of  Luca  to  the  outbreak  of 

the  great  civil  war  55—49  B.C.     §§  553—573       ...         429 

42.  The  civil  war  to  the  battle  of  Thapsus  49 — 46  BX.     §§  574 — 

595 445 

43.  From  the  battle  of  Thapsus  to  the  death  of  Caesar  46 — 44  B.C. 

§§  596—615 460 

44.  Failure   of    the   attempt   to   restore   the    Republic    44 — 42  B.C. 

§§  616—637 474 

45.  Literature   and  Jurisprudence    as    illustrating    the    life    of   the 

revolutionary  period.     §§  638 — 654 490 

46.  From  Republic  to  Empire.     §§  655 — 671 501 

Index 513 


LIST    OF    PLATES 

Plate  I to  face  page  72 

1.  Coin  of  Tarentum  [Taras],  4th  cent.   B.C. 

2.  Coin  of  Massalia. 

3.  Coin  of  Carthage,  ?  late  4th  cent.  B.C. 

Plate  II „      „      104 

4.  Roman  silver  coins,  after  268  B.C. 

5.  Coin  of  Hiero  II  of  Syracuse,  3rd  cent.   B.C. 

Plate  III „      „      168 

6.  Coin  of  Philip  V  of  Macedon  (220—178  B.C.). 

7.  Coin  of  Aetolian  League  (?  192 — i  B.C.). 

8.  Coin  of  Rhodes,  about  200  B.C. 

Plate  IV „      „      184 

9.  Coin  of  Perseus  of  Macedon  (179 — 168  B.C.). 

10.  Coin   of   the    second  of   the    4    Macedonian    re- 

publics 167 — 146- 

11.  Coin  struck  by  Faustus  Sulla  about  62  B.C. 

Plate  V „      „     296 

12.  Coin  of  Mithradates  VI  Eupator,  75  B.C. 

13.  Coins  of  Italian  confederates,  90  B.C. 

Plate  VI „      „      408 

14.  Gaulish  gold   coin,   imitated  from   a   Macedonian 

stater. 

15.  Gold   coin   of  M.    Brutus,   coined   43 — 2  B.C.    by 

one  of  his  lieutenants. 

16.  Denarius  of  41  B.C. 


LIST    OF    MAPS 

1.  Map  of  early  Italian  peoples  (conjectural).     §  4. 

2.  Site  of  Rome.     §  6. 

3.  Neighbourhood  of  Rome.     §  32. 

4.  The  Southward  advance  of  Rome.     §  63. 

5.  Campania  and  Samnium.     §  70. 

6.  The  chief  Etrurian  cities.     §  72. 

7.  The  region  of  Magna  Graecia.     §  76. 

8.  Map  of  Sicily  for  the  Punic  Wars.     §  99. 

9.  Occupation  of  the  ager  Gallicus.     §  no. 

10.  Syracuse  in  214  B.C.     §  145. 

11.  Part  of  Sinus  Tarentinus.     §  148. 

12.  Map  of  Campania  in  the  Second  Punic  War.     §  149. 

13.  Sketch  map  of  Balkan  peninsula  200  B.C.     §  187. 

14.  Sketch  map  of  Balkan  peninsula  about  170  B.C.     §  227. 

15.  Outline  of  Carthage.     §  259. 

16.  Southern  Transalpine  Gaul.     §  353. 

17.  Cisalpine  Gaul  with  Liguria  about  100  B.C.     §  356. 

18.  Map  of  Italy  90  B.C.     §  400. 


CHAPTER    I 

INTRODUCTORY 

I.  The  history  of  Rome  first  meets  us  in  the  dim  legendary 
story  of  a  small  community  planted  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tiber.  We  can  fix  no  certain  date  for  its  beginning,  nor  is  it 
easy  to  say  when  it  ended.  It  is  not  the  history  of  a  nation, 
but  of  a  government.  The  last  remains  of  a  government  con- 
tinuously descended  from  that  of  ancient  Rome  did  not  disappear 
till  1453  A.D.,  when  Constantinople  was  taken  by  the  Turks. 
But  Roman  law,  the  supreme  product  of  Roman  government, 
is  still  living,  for  it  is  the  foundation  of  many  of  the  legal  systems 
still  in  force.  We  may  divide  Roman  history  for  convenience 
sake  into  periods  according  to  the  form  of  government  in  use. 

(i)  Regal  period,  our  knowledge  of  which  is  very  slight  and 
indirect. 

(2)  Republican  period. 

(3)  Imperial  period. 

It  is  with  the  second  of  these  that  we  are  concerned.  The 
states  of  the  ancient  world,  great  or  small,  seem  all  to  have  been 
originally  governed  by  kings,  and  the  rise  of  republics  was  not 
found  consistent  with  great  and  permanent  extension  of  territory. 
The  history  of  the  free  states  of  Greece  is  the  stock  instance  of 
politics  on  a  small  scale.  The  city-states  (TroXets)  of  Hellas  were 
weak  from  want  of  size  and  mutual  jealousy.  The  loose  cantonal 
unions  lacked  the  cohesion  necessary  for  exerting  joint  power 
with  effect.  No  large  political  unit  was  efficiently  organized  in 
the  Greek  world  until  the  rise  of  the  national  kingdom  of 
Macedon.  In  the  East  large  monarchies  were  the  rule.  The 
conquest  of  the  Persian  empire  by  Alexander  made  no  change 

H.  I 


2  Republics  [ch. 

in  this  respect,  and  the  vast  dominion  divided  at  his  death  fell 
into  the  great  monarchies  of  the  Successor  kings.  The  weakness 
of  a  popular  government  as  ruler  of  subjects  was  illustrated  in 
the  inability  of  imperial  Athens  to  secure  the  hearty  loyalty  of 
her  subordinate  allies.  The  empire  of  Carthage  was  essentially 
a  money-making  enterprise;  to  exploit,  rather  than  to  govern, 
was  its  chief  aim.  When  Carthage  had  to  assert  her  power,  she 
relied  mainly  on  mercenaries  hired  abroad,  having  no  solid 
empire  and  no  mass  of  loyal  allies  to  support  her  at  a  pinch. 
And,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  the  general  characteristic  of 
ancient  Republics  was  a  jealous  exclusiveness.  The  line  between 
citizen  and  alien  was  sharply  drawn,  and  admission  of  the  latter 
to  the  privileges  and  duties  of  the  former  was  extremely  rare. 
Thus  expansion  was  checked  in  the  several  states.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  was  no  necessary  limit  to  the  size  of  monarchies, 
but  their  strength  varied  with  the  character  of  the  monarch,  and 
the  mere  fact  of  subjection  to  a  single  ruler  was  not  enough  to 
give  cohesion  or  unity  of  sentiment  to  a  motley  aggregate  of 
various  peoples. 

2.  It  was  therefore  a  momentous  event  when  the  obscure 
community  by  the  Tiber  began  to  absorb  and  incorporate  its 
neighbours,  and  even  more  momentous  when  it  threw  off 
monarchic  government  and  still  continued  to  expand.  In  the 
case  of  a  city-state  this  was  a  new  thing,  for  it  was  not  by 
conquering,  but  by  keeping  her  conquests,  that  Rome  became 
great.  Among  the  ups  and  downs  of  her  early  struggles,  recorded 
only  in  untrustworthy  legends,  the  one  thing  certain  is  that  on 
the  whole  she  had  the  art  of  keeping  allies  and  incorporating 
conquered  communities  in  the  stable  organization  of  the  Roman 
state.  Progress  was  in  the  case  of  Rome  not  a  brilliant  over- 
running of  Italy  sword  in  hand.  It  was  the  slow  building-up 
of  a  fabric  able  to  endure  the  strain  of  disaster  and  gradually 
to  inspire  confidence  in  its  solidity.  The  character  of  its  progress 
was  determined  by  the  nature  of  its  government  aided  by  the 
condition  of  the  Italian  peoples  and  by  the  physical  configuration 
of  the  peninsula,  in  which  Rome  occupied  a  position  of  peculiar 
vantage.  In  ceasing  to  depend  for  leadership  on  one  able  in- 
dividual, Rome  passed  under  the  rule  of  an  aristocracy  with  its 
striking  merits  and  defects.  Tradition  represents  it  as  selfish 
and  jealous  of  privilege  and  power,  but  capable  of  concession 


I]  Italy  3 

in  order  to  avert  the  disruption  of  the  state.  Internal  strife  was 
thus  not  fatal,  and  the  cohesion  which  was  the  life  of  city-states 
was  not  destroyed.  External  policy  was  continuous  and  firm, 
guided  by  hard-fisted  aristocrats  whose  interests  coincided  with 
their  patriotism.  The  success  of  this  government,  so  long  as  the 
governing  class  remained  sound  and  uncorrupted ;  its  miserable 
failure,  once  they  became  seriously  corrupt ;  the  tedious  and 
bloody  process  by  which  the  inevitable  was  at  length  achieved, 
and  the  empire  brought  under  a  single  master : — these  are  the 
main  features  of  the  story  which  it  is  our  business  to  trace. 
Surely  the  history  of  the  Roman  Republic  is  the  most  wonderful 
phenomenon  of  the  ancient  world.  With  all  its  clumsiness  and 
blundering,  it  did  its  work  so  thoroughly  that  all  rivalry  had 
ceased,  and  all  the  peoples  round  the  Mediterranean  confessed 
the  supremacy  of  Rome.  The  character  of  the  aristocracy  might 
and  did  change  outwardly.  Inwardly  it  remained  practically  the 
same  to  the  last.  Democratic  movements  might  disturb  it,  but 
true  democracy  was  not  a  possible  form  of  government  at  Rome. 
The  suppression  of  the  government  virtually  aristocratic  meant 
the  coming  of  the  Empire. 

3.  Italy.  The  land.  Take  a  map  including  the  countries 
round  the  Mediterranean.  The  central  commanding  position  of 
the  Italian  peninsula  strikes  the  eye  at  once.  But  the  importance 
of  its  position  was  increased  by  the  fact  of  its  lying  between 
the  old  civilizations  of  the  East  and  the  undeveloped  resources 
of  the  ruder  West.  Then  take  a  map  of  Italy  shewing  the 
physical  features  of  the  peninsula.  The  leading  facts  are  these. 
The  long  Apennine  range  forms  a  backbone  roughly  dividing 
the  country,  while  its  spurs  in  many  parts  serve  to  mark  off 
districts.  Good  natural  harbours  are  singularly  few,  but  ancient 
shipping  was  able  to  use  many  spots  on  the  coast  inaccessible 
to  modern  vessels  of  deeper  draught.  And  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  coast-line  has  been  much  altered  in  the  course  of 
centuries  by  the  deposits  of  silt,  the  wastage  of  the  hills,  swept 
down  by  streams  into  a  practically  tideless  sea.  The  region  of 
the  Po  did  not  become  Italian  until  Italy  had  been  united  under 
the  leadership  of  Rome.  In  Italy  proper  there  were  no  easily 
navigable  rivers :  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Tiber  were  the  only 
waterway  of  the  kind  worth  mentioning.  Mountain  torrents, 
serving   rather   to   divide   than   to   unite,   were  the   commonest 


4  Rome  and  the  [ch. 

feature  of  the  land.  If  Italy  was  ever  to  be  organized  as  a 
whole,  and  thus  enabled  in  virtue  of  its  central  position  to  play 
a  leading  part  in  the  history  of  the  Mediterranean  world,  it 
was  necessary  to  make  or  improve  communications  between  the 
various  parts  of  the  peninsula.  To  control  the  coasts  was  not 
enough.  The  hill-barriers  must  be  pierced,  for  the  main  work 
of  consolidating  the  strength  of  Italy  had  to  be  done  inland. 
In  default  of  a  great  conqueror  to  weld  the  Italian  peoples  into 
one  great  monarchy,  the  task  was  only  possible  to  a  community 
itself  at  once  solid  and  able  to  expand  without  losing  its  cohesion. 
Loose  leagues  of  cities  or  cantons  were  insufficient  for  such  a 
work,  as  events  were  to  shew.  A  centre,  in  short  a  city,  must 
be  found,  to  serve  as  a  nucleus  for  the  gradual  concentration 
of  Italian  power.  And  among  all  the  civic  communities  of  Italy 
none  was  so  favoured  by  central  position,  and  by  ready  access 
to  both  land  and  sea,  as  the  city  on  the  Tiber. 

4.  Italy.  The  peoples.  But  the  union  of  Italy  could 
hardly  have  taken  place  in  the  way  it  did,  if  the  various  groups 
of  independent  communities  had  been  generally  alienated  from 
each  other  by  deep-seated  differences  of  race  customs  and 
language.  The  ethnology  of  ancient  Italy  is  still  matter  of 
dispute,  but  the  only  people  now  commonly  admitted  to  have 
been  foreign  intruders,  not  of  Indo-European  (Aryan)  origin, 
were  the  Etruscans.  In  the  early  twilight  of  Italian  history  we 
find  them  a  conquering  race,  settled  in  walled  towns  as  a  ruling 
aristocracy  of  warrior-nobles.  The  chief  seat  of  their  power  was 
the  fine  district  known  as  Etruria,  but  they  held  also  a  large 
part  of  the  northern  region  beyond  the  Apennine,  and  much  of 
Campania  in  the  South  :  that  they  were  at  some  time  over-lords 
in  a  good  deal  of  central  Italy  is  probable.  Whether  they  had 
entered  the  peninsula  by  sea  or  by  way  of  the  Alps  has  been 
disputed.  Tradition  said  that  they  came  from  Asia  Minor.  In  the 
mountain  district  of  the  North-West  were  the  Ligurians,  probably 
driven  back  into  the  hill-country,  having  once  occupied  a  far 
wider  area.  In  the  South-East,  an  arid  and  partly  unwholesome 
district,  were  the  people  known  as  lapygians  or  Messapians.  The 
race-affinities  of  both  these  groups  are  still  matters  of  some 
doubt,  but  it  seems  practically  certain  that  they  were  at  least 
nearer  to  the  Romans  than  to  the  Etruscans.  The  great  mass 
of  the  Italian  peoples,  settled  along  the  flanks  of  the  Apennine 


0 


Italian  Peoples 


range  and  spreading  into  the  lowlands,  were  more  or  less  nearly 
akin  to  each  other,  all  of  Aryan  origin.  In  the  North  were  the 
Umbrians ;  next  came  a  group  of  peoples  of  whom  the  Sabines 
were  the  most  important.  In  the  lower  country  reaching  to  the 
southern  coast  below  the  Tiber  were  the  Latins,  with  several 
smaller  peoples  to   East  and   South  of   them.     Following  the 


Map  of  early  Italian  peoples  (conjectural),     (g)  Outlying 
seats  of  Etruscan  power. 

Apennine  southwards,  the  rest  of  central  Italy  was  held  by 
kindred  tribes,  the  most  famous  group  of  which  were  known  by 
the  common  name  of  Samnites.  The  name  Sabellian  includes 
them  and  the  Sabines  and  others  as  well ;  their  dialect  was  called 
Oscan.  In  the  South  of  Italy  were  the  remains  of  weaker 
peoples  called  by  various  names,  probably  of  Aryan  race ;  among 


6  Local  independence  [ch.  i 

them  were  the  Itali,  from  whom  the  early  voyagers  are  said  to 
have  called  the  country  Italia.  The  Sicels  in  Sicily  belonged 
to  the  same  stock.  Of  the  Greek  colonies  on  the  coast  we 
shall  often  speak  below.  Their  wealth  and  splendour  caused 
the  southern  seaboard  to  be  called  the  Great  Greece.  Thus  the 
bulk  of  Italy  was  held  by  peoples  not  parted  off  from  each  other 
*  by  any  insuperable  difference.  A  conquering  power  of  kindred 
race  could  form  them  into  a  confederate  whole,  and  assimilate 
rather  than  exterminate  them  or  reduce  them  to  serfdom. 

5.  In  tracing  the  union  of  Italy  under  the  headship  of 
Rome  we  shall  find  the  extension  of  Roman  dominion  promoted 
by  the  general  attachment  of  communities  to  their  local  in- 
dependence. The  looseness  of  the  ties  that  bound  together 
the  various  leagues  or  groups  is  clearly  to  be  detected  in  their 
incapacity  for  continuous  common  action.  We  find  this  much 
the  same  in  the  case  of  Etruscan  cities  and  in  the  tribal  cantons 
of  the  Sabellians.  The  groups  recognized  some  community  of 
race  and  interests,  and  common  festivals  gave  expression  to  this 
feeling :  but,  so  far  as  we  know,  there  were  no  true  federal 
unions,  each  made  effective  by  possessing  a  central  directing 
authority.  It  was  the  possession  of  a  central  authority  in  Rome 
that  differentiated  the  Roman  confederacy,  even  in  its  humble 
beginnings,  from  the  ineflficient  unions  of  her  neighbours.  Rome 
furnished  the  necessary  Head,  the  firm  consistent  policy,  and 
the  far-sighted  diplomacy  which  won  more  certain  triumphs  than 
the  sword.  These  general  remarks  must  serve  to  introduce  a 
narrative  which  in  its  earlier  stages  can  only  be  an  outline 
sketch. 


CHAPTER    II 

EARLY   ROME 

6.     Rome.     The  city  of  Rome  was  formed  by  the  occupation 
of  some  low  hills  about  15  miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber, 
and   the   union  of  these  settlements  into  a  single  community. 
When  the  first  settlement  took  place  is  not  known ;  probably  it 
was  long  before  753  B.C.,  the  conventional  date  of  the  foundation 
of  Rome  according  to  the  calculation  of  a  Roman  antiquary. 
Nor  fe  it  known  under  wha^  conditions  the  settlements  coalesced 
or  hqw  long  the  process  took.      It  seems  that  the  first  point 
occupied  was  the  Palatine  hill,  and  that  the  settlers  were  all  or 
most  of  them  drawn  from  the  people  called  Latins,  whose  towns 
or  hamlets  were  scattered  over  the  low  country  east  of  the  Tiber, 
or   perched   on   the   Alban  hills    or   the   spurs   of    the    Sabine 
mountains.     These  were  presently  faced  by  a  second  settlement 
of  Sabine   origin   with   its   headquarters    on   the   Quirinal    hill. 
Somehow  these  two  communities  merged  in  one,  probably  after 
conflict,  in  which  the  warlike  Sabines  had  the  upper  hand.     The 
result  was  the  formation  of  the  city  Roma,  membership  of  which 
was  expressed  by  calling  the  men  of  Roma   Romani.     If  this 
account  be  correct,  we  have  already  the  picture  of  a  composite 
community,  and  are   led   to   expect  that  its  institutions  would 
shew  traces  of  the  mixture  that  had  taken  place.     Such  is  indeed 
the  case.     In  many  particulars,  mostly  connected  with  religion, 
modern  research  has  detected  Latin  and  Sabine  elements  existing 
side  by  side.     Tradition  asserted  that  at  one  time  the  kings  were 
alternately  Latin  and  Sabine,  and  it  is  known  that  a  number  of 
the  families  of  the  old  nobility  of  birth  boasted  Sabine  descent. 
Others  traced  their  origin  to  the  noble  houses  of  Latin  towns 
incorporated  by  Rome,  with  what  right  we  do  not  know.     It  is  at 


8 


populus 


[CH, 


all  events  significant  that  Romans  regarded  Rome  as  a  city  owing 
its  state-existence  from  the  first  to  compromise  and  combination. 
For  this  character  is  clearly  marked  in  the  tradition  of  the  early 
Republic,  only  dying  out  by  degrees  as  Rome  became  supreme  in 
Italy. 


V 


^11***' 


„..ii«>"""v 


»^'"■•'" 


peius?   I  '"     .  '•'"'^^   4,,, "nn..^    « 


Tarpeius?   t  "'"      ^'-'^'1  / 

.-^^-  ijf     Fagutal     fi?    §. 


%,rf--'" 


£>I;;^e#0^  Velia   l^"^-/: 


-^^alatium^     *  ''^ 


^  ■^''///(/l*"'''''        5 


.Mltii^ 


\  % 


i>-t,iii>'"' 


Site  of  Rome,  shewing  hills  and  swamp. 

7.  Populus  and  civitas.  The  regular  term  for  'community' 
was  populus.  It  seems  to  have  implied  that  the  community  had 
some  sort  of  town  as  a  stronghold  or  rallying-point,  a  centre  of 
its  common  life.  It  had  a  territory  {ager\  small  or  great,  and 
some  of  its  members  might  live  in  detached  hamlets,  but  as  a 
populus  they  had  only  one  centre.    A  league  of  such  communities 


ii]  Early  Rome  9 

was  not  a  populus  but  a  group  of  popuH.  Thus  there  was  no 
populus  LatinuSj  but  a  nomen  Latinum,  including  the  populi  who 
called  themselves  by  the  name  of  'Latins.'  But  Tusculum, 
a  Latin  town,  was  the  headquarters  of  a  populus  Tusculanus  and 
its  territory  was  ager  Tusculanus.  Belief  in  common  descent, 
indicated  by  a  common  name,  was  expressed  by  a  common 
worship.  Thus  the  Tusculans  took  part  with  other  Latins  in  the 
Latin  festival  (^feriae  Laiinae).  But  each  populus  was  an  inde- 
pendent unit,  and  common  action  was  a  matter  for  special 
agreement  of  two  or  more  communities  for  a  special  purpose. 
The  term  to  express  membership  of  a  community  was  civis', 
a,  man  was  cms  Tusculanus  or  Praenestinus  as  belonging  to 
Tusculum  or  Praeneste.  So  too  with  civis  Eomanus,  but  at 
Rome  we  find  traces  of  an  earlier  term  quiris,  probably  derived 
from  a  Sabine  word  meaning  '  spear.'  It  lived  on  in  the  custom 
of  addressing  a  Roman  meeting  as  quirites,  not  as  cives,  and 
in  certain  forms  of  expression.  The  civil  law  peculiar  to  Roman 
citizens  was  ius  quiritium.  The  quality  of  membership  was 
his  civitas  or  franchise,  which  gave  him  certain  rights  in  the  eye 
of  the  law.  These  rights  were  expressed  at  Rome  by  the  more 
ancient  term  caputs  his  'head'  or  legal  personality.  A  citizen 
could  lose  his  civic  rights,  wholly  or  partly,  by  legal  degradation, 
or  incidentally  by  loss  of  life.  A  slave  could  only  acquire  caput 
by  ceasing  to  be  a  slave,  when  his  owner  in  solemn  form  set  him 
free  from  his  control  (manu  mtszt).  It  is  important  to  note  that, 
while  all  citizens  had  civic  rights,  it  did  not  follow  that  all  enjoyed 
them  in  the  same  degree.  Civic  rights  did  not  carry  with  them 
what  we  should  call  political  rights.  This  was  marked  at  Rome 
by  the  distinction  between  'private'  rights  {zura  privata)  and 
'  public '  {iura  publico).  The  distinction  existed  elsewhere,  as  in 
Greece.     But  at  Rome  it  was  particularly  clear. 

8.  The  Roman  people.  That  the  early  Romans  were  before 
all  things  tillers  of  the  soil  and  keepers  of  flocks  and  herds  is 
a  probable  tradition.  The  same  was  doubtless  true  of  the  Italians 
in  general.  But  it  is  not  likely  that  the  presence  of  the  river  was 
without  effect  on  the  rise  of  the  city.  The  Latin  towns  appear  as 
united  in  a  League,  and  Rome  as  having  dealings  with  the  League. 
But  we  do  not  know  that  Rome  was  ever  a  mere  ordinary  member. 
At  all  events  she  was  able  at  a  very  early  date  to  displace  Alba 
Longa  from  the  presidency  of  the  League  and  to  become  herself 


lo  Clan  and  Family  [ch. 

the  leading  member.  The  record  of  Alba's  former  presidency 
remained  in  the  common  temple  of  Juppiter  Latiaris  on  the 
Alban  mount,  but  the  yearly  festival  held  there  was  conducted  by 
Rome.  It  would  seem  that  the  growth  of  Rome  was  far  more 
rapid  than  that  of  an  ordinary  Latin  town,  and  that  she  soon 
came  to  hold  an  exceptional  position  by  the  side  of  the  League. 
Now  tradition,  which  points  to  an  early  coalition  with  warlike 
Sabines  and  early  incorporation  of  neighbouring  towns  in  the 
Roman  state,  also  represents  the  mythical  founder  Romulus 
as  having  opened  a  refuge  for  outlaws  and  other  aliens,  and  as 
having  thus  strengthened  the  population  of  his  infant  city.  If 
this  legend  contains  any  kernel  of  fact,  it  must  surely  be  this, 
that  Rome  was  from  the  first  a  place  that  attracted  immigrants. 
And  this  is  not  hard  to  believe,  if  we  attach  any  importance  to 
the  river  as  a  means  of  intercourse  with  the  outer  world.  How- 
ever rudimentary  the  commerce  of  primitive  Rome  may  have 
been,  no  other  town  in  that  part  of  Italy  had  equal  opportunities : 
if  any  site  was  fitted  to  attract  a  mixed  population,  surely  it  was 
Rome.  Therefore  we  need  not  suppose  that  agriculture,  though 
no  doubt  the  main  industry  of  the  early  Romans,  was  the  sole 
occupation  of  the  people  gathered  together  on  the  spot. 

9.  Citizens  and  inhabitants.  But  we  must  always  bear  in 
mind  that  residence  did  not  confer  citizenship.  Naturalization 
and  acquisition  of  the  franchise  in  a  state  have  only  been  made 
easy  in  quite  recent  times.  In  ancient  communities  we  find 
the  line  of  true  membership,  carrying  with  it  rights  and  duties, 
most  strictly  drawn.  At  Rome  it  appears  that  originally  none 
but  the  members  of  recognized  clans  {gentes)  were  accounted  full 
citizens.  The  members  of  each  clan  all  bore  its  distinctive  name 
{^entile  nomen)  and  shared  its  peculiar  religious  rites,  and  originally 
its  common  property  also.  The  clan  consisted  of  a  number  of 
households  {familiae)  and  in  course  of  time  it  became  customary 
to  use  a  family  surname  (cognomen)  in  addition  to  the  gentile 
name.  Each  male  of  a  family  had  a  fore-name  {praenomen) 
of  his  own,  such  as  Marcus  Gaius  Lucius  Publius  Titus,  but 
of  these  fore-names  there  were  always  very  few  in  use.  A  man 
was  formally  described  by  adding  the  fore-name  of  his  father  (and 
often  of  his  grandfather)  after  his  gentile  name.  Thus  Lucius 
Quinctius  Luci  filius  Luci  nepos  Cincinnatus  shews  us  that  three 
successive  members  of  the  Quinctian   clan  bore   the   fore-name 


ii]  Patricians  and  Plebs  1 1 

Lucius^  and  that  the  last  of  them  at  least  had  the  surname 
Cincinnatus,  a  nickname  which  became  a  family  surname.  This 
clumsy  nomenclature  clearly  indicates  the  immense  importance 
of  families  and  clans,  and  the  hereditary  nature  of  membership 
in  the  primitive  community.  The  family  included  all  under  the 
government  of  the  head  or  Father  {paterfamilias)^  that  is,  wife 
children  slaves  and  the  family  estate.  Over  all  these  the  Father 
was  supreme  ruler,  with  power  even  of  life  and  death,  but  strictly 
as  Father,  not  as  an  individual.  The  maintenance  of  the  house- 
hold and  its  religious  observances  was  his  duty.  But  on  his  death 
the  succession  to  his  rights  and  duties  passed  to  the  next  successor 
in  the  male  line,  normally  to  his  eldest  son.  Sons  were  qualified 
to  succeed  their  father,  or  to  found  families  of  their  own. 
Daughters  were  always  subject  to  the  head  of  some  family  or 
other,  and  the  mother  or  unmarried  sister  (if  any)  were  in  the 
position  of  daughters  to  their  son  or  brother  when  he  became 
head  of  the  house.  But  tradition,  probably  with  truth,  represents 
the  subjection  of  women  as  consistent  with  high  respect  and 
domestic  dignity,  and  the  position  of  slaves  as  a  tolerable 
bondage,  very  different  from  the  cruel  brutality  of  later  times. 
10.  Patricians  and  Plebs.  The  existence  of  a  privileged 
class,  owners  of  all  or  most  of  the  land  and  monopolizing  what- 
ever political  rights  are  attached  to  citizenship,  is  a  common 
phenomenon  in  primitive  states.  This  institution,  generally  a 
trace  of  conquest,  was  sometimes  explained  by  a  claim  of  the 
nobles  to  be  descended  from  the  original  founders  of  the  state. 
Their  laws  and  customs  were  paramount,  including  their  religion. 
At  Rome  we  find  a  clearly-marked  class  of  this  kind,  the  '  men  of 
fathers'  {patricii)  whose  descent  was  proved  genuine  by  their 
membership  of  a  family  included  in  some  recognized  clan.  But 
that  these  Patricians  ever  formed  the  whole  population  of  Rome 
cannot  be  proved.  The  name  implies  distinction,  and  we  know 
of  no  Rome  in  which  there  were  not  other  inhabitants.  But 
these  others  were  politically  of  no  account ;  they  merely  helped 
to  '  fill  up,'  and  were  called  the  plebs  or  plebes,  a  name  suggesting 
the  notion  of  filling.  Thus  by  the  side  of  the  privileged  class 
there  was  a  mass  of  unprivileged  persons,  whom  we  may  call  the 
dependent  class.  In  order  to  carry  on  their  occupations  in 
security,  these  Plebeians  needed  the  protection  of  the  Patricians. 
Accordingly  we   hear  that  many  of  them  were  attached  to  the 


12  imperium  and  consiliu^n  [ch. 

Patrician  families  and  clans  as  dientes,  that  is  listeners  or  de- 
pendants. Some  of  them  were  perhaps  descended  from  persons 
settled  on  the  spot  from  very  early  times.  Some  would  be 
immigrants  attracted  by  the  prospects  of  a  growing  community. 
Tradition  adds  a  third  element,  the  lower  orders  of  towns 
conquered  and  destroyed  by  the  early  Romans,  forcibly  removed 
to  Rome.  It  is  supposed  that  these  last  were  in  the  regal  period 
not  clients  of  the  great  families,  but  directly  dependent  on  the 
ruling  king.  Be  this  as  it  may,  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt  the 
early  and  rapid  growth  of  a  dependent  population,  or  the  fact 
of  its  long  struggle  for  emancipation  and  equality.  Nor  need  we 
doubt  that  it  was  mainly  if  not  wholly  of  Latin  origin,  drawn 
from  the  country  near.  The  settlement  of  the  relations  between 
the  two  *  Orders '  was  the  making  of  Rome. 

II.  imperium,  consilium,  auctoritas.  Before  we  go  further,  it 
will  be  well  to  consider  certain  notions  that  underlay  the  structure 
of  Roman  society  and  powerfully  contributed  to  give  the  Roman 
state  its  peculiar  character.  They  expressed  themselves  in  terms 
for  which  it  is  hardly  possible  to  find  exact  equivalents.  The 
lawful  power  of  command,  implying  the  power  of  enforcing  com- 
mands, the  so-called  imperium,  was  a  notion  so  ample  and 
fundamental,  so  necessary  for  the  working  of  Roman  institutions, 
that  a  true  parallel  is  hardly  to  be  found  elsewhere.  The  power 
of  an  absolute  monarch  is  not  the  same  thing.  The  imperium  as 
we  hear  of  it  was  clearly  a  growth  from  within,  following  the 
lines  of  the  rule  of  the  Father  in  the  household.  In  ages  of 
conflict  such  a  power  easily  proved  its  utility.  It  appears  as 
strictly  impersonal,  but  of  course  vested  in  persons;  at  first 
in  a  King,  afterwards  in  magistrates,  always  as  the  effective  means 
of  directing  the  forces  of  the  state  to  definite  ends,  such  for 
instance  as  victory  in  war.  In  principle  the  imperium  was  subject 
to  no  limits,  and  so  liable  to  be  abused.  It  was  highly  character- 
istic of  Rome  that  the  check  on  its  abuse  was  found  in  the  force 
of  custom.  From  time  immemorial  Roman  custom  enjoined 
that  all  holders  of  sovran  power  should  not  take  a  final  irrevocable 
step  without  first  consulting  suitable  advisers.  The  head  of  a 
family  considered  important  decisions  with  the  help  of  relatives 
or  friends.  The  chief  magistrate  took  the  state-council,  the 
Senate,  into  his  confidence.  The  final  act  was  the  act  of  the 
individual  holder  of  power,  and  was  in  any  case  valid.     But  the 


n]  Religion  1 3 

moral  obligation  to  hear  the  views  of  a  consilium  was  so  strong 
that  to  act  without  it  was  felt  to  be  usurpation,  save  only  in  the 
case  of  military  command.  To  follow  the  advice  given  was  not 
necessary.  It  was  necessary  to  avoid  secret  and  ill-considered 
decisions.  So  much  was  required  by  the  ancestral  custom  {mos 
maiorum)  which,  so  long  as  the  Roman  state  remained  healthy,  it 
was  hardly  possible  to  ignore.  Tradition  represented  it  as  one  of 
the  chief  offences  of  the  last  King  that  he  passed  judgment  on 
citizens  without  employing  a  cotisilium.  Thus  sovran  power  was 
morally  limited  in  practice.  Of  any  earlier  state  of  things,  that  is 
absolute  monarchy,  we  know  nothing.  So  far  we  have  spoken 
only  of  the  understood  principle  that  holders  of  power  should 
exercise  it  in  a  formal  and  deliberate  way.  But  there  were 
departments  of  private  and  public  life  in  which  the  persons 
primarily  concerned  could  not  perform  a  valid  act  without  the 
sanction  or  guarantee  of  others  {auctoritas).  Thus  no  woman 
or  minor  could  act  without  the  consent  of  an  auctor^  that  is  the 
guardian  {tutor),  who  must  be  a  person  of  full  legal  capacity. 
And  in  early  Rome  we  find  that  many  public  acts  of  the  people 
in  Assembly  were  held  to  require  the  sanction  of  the  Fathers 
ipatres),  perhaps  the  originally  Patrician  Senate.  The  gradual 
change  in  the  relative  force  of  these  notions,  as  the  necessity 
of  the  *  sanction  of  the  Fathers '  died  out,  while  the  imperium  was 
weakened,  and  the  Senate  as  the  advisory  board  of  the  state 
{publicum  consilium)  more  and  more  took  the  real  direction  of 
affairs,  is  no  small  part  of  the  internal  history  of  Rome.  For  old 
notions  died  hard,  and  constitutional  changes  were  slow.  Old 
institutions  survived  long  after  they  had  lost  their  effect,  and 
Roman  public  life  was  full  of  make-believe.  Hence  the  gradual 
modifications  of  opinion  and  precedent  were  in  this  highly  con- 
servative community  far  more  politically  important  than  the  actual 
changes  of  constitutional  law. 

12.  Religion  and  Law.  Roman  religion  seems  originally  to 
have  been  the  simple  Nature- worship  common  among  primitive 
peoples.  When  we  first  come  upon  traces  of  it  in  use,  it  has 
become  the  worship  of  unseen  powers  or  influences  {numina) 
sometimes  still  supposed  to  reside  in  natural  objects.  To  avert 
the  ill-will  of  these  powers  is  the  purpose  of  worship,  which 
consists  in  the  exact  performance  of  special  rites.  Religion  is 
thus   essentially  a   bargain;    if  the  man  does  his  part  without 


14  numen.    prodigium  [ch. 

a  flaw,  it  is  assumed  that  the  power  addressed  will  grant  his 
favour.  But  the  god  is  attached  to  the  worshipper  rather  than 
the  worshipper  to  the  god.  There  are  gods  of  the  household,  of 
the  clan,  eventually  of  the  whole  community,  and  they  are 
expected  to  hear  only  those  entitled  to  address  them.  Hence, 
though  a  few  special  gods  had  each  a  special  priest  in  very  early 
times,  there  was  no  priestly  caste.  The  head  of  each  social 
group,  the  Father  in  the  house,  the  chief  magistrate  in  the  state, 
was  the  proper  representative  of  the  group  in  its  relations  to  the 
divine  powers.  The  members  of  the  group  were  alone  concerned 
to  see  that  their  religious  observances  {sacra)  were  not  allowed  to 
lapse.  When  Rome  conquered  and  destroyed  or  incorporated 
another  community,  it  was  usual  to  take  over  the  worships  of  the 
conquered.  In  besieging  a  town  it  was  usual  to  invite  its  local 
gods  to  come  over  to  the  Roman  side  and  accept  Roman  worship. 
For  the  gods  of  a  state  were  a  part  of  the  state,  and  its  capture, 
implying  their  favour  to  Rome,  made  that  favour  an  object 
of  Roman  care.  There  was  no  doubt  a  general  resemblance 
between  the  worships  of  Rome  and  the  Italian  peoples.  When 
the  gods  began  to  be  conceived  as  human  in  form,  we  do  not 
know.  Rude  images  of  divine  beings  early  took  the  place  of 
stocks  and  stones.  Rude  shrines  would  then  form  the  first 
temples.  The  impersonal  numen  was  then  passing  into  a  personal 
deus.  But  this  transition  only  became  complete  at  a  later  time 
when  the  imagination  and  art  of  Greece  took  hold  on  Rome. 
Among  the  beliefs  that  powerfully  influenced  the  Roman  mind 
was  the  notion  that  natural  phenomena  (thunder  and  lightning, 
rain,  earthquakes,  etc.)  were  the  outcome  of  divine  agency  and 
had  a  special  significance  for  mankind.  To  learn  the  meaning  of 
such  occurrences,  and  to  take  the  right  steps  to  propitiate  the 
divine  anger,  were  matters  of  importance.  This  department  of 
religion  was  largely  developed  under  Etruscan  influence,  for 
among  that  strange  people  this  form  of  superstition  had  been 
reduced  to  an  elaborate  system.  In  short,  any  event  out  of 
the  ordinary,  such  as  monstrous  births  or  unusual  behaviour 
of  animals,  might  be  regarded  as  a  prodigium^  probably  of  evil 
import :  in  times  of  nervous  strain  imagination  saw  prodigies 
everywhere.  Again,  the  desire  to  act  only  in  harmony  with  the 
divine  will  impelled  men  to  try  and  learn  it  before  acting.  This 
was  supposed  possible  in  various  ways,  chiefly  by  observing  the 


ii]  Auspices.      Law.     Marriage  15 

flight  of  birds;  this  was  done  in  accordance  with  precise  rules, 
and  was  the  duty  and  privilege  of  the  magistrate,  who  '  took  the 
auspices '  before  every  important  public  act^  The  hereditary 
character  of  religion  is  shewn  in  the  fact  that  at  first  only 
Patricians  were  entitled  to  take  auspices  on  behalf  of  the  state. 
Its  political  importance  long  consisted  in  the  consequent  limitation 
of  the  magistracy  to  Patricians.  -This  restriction  cost  long 
struggles  to  remove,  and  its  removal  was  a  momentous  change.  In 
general  we  may  say  that  Roman  religion  {religio  almost  -  'scruple '), 
if  not  exactly  a  spiritual  force,  was  at  least,  from  its  presence  in 
all  relations  of  life,  a  force  promoting  caution  formality  and 
order. 

13.  -.  Hand  in  hand  with  formal  religion  went  formal  law. 
The  two  were  closely  connected,  in  fact  parts  of  the  same  set  of 
notions,  as  seems  to  have  been  normally  the  case  in  ancient  civili- 
zations  The  exact  use  of  forms  of  words  and  performance  of 

symbolic  acts  was  far  more  important  than  the  known  intention 
of  the  actors.  -  In  the  conveyance  of  things  bought  and  sold,  and 
in  early  forms  of  contract,  all  turned  on  the  avoidance  of  any  flaw 
in  the  ceremonial  details.  "-  The  presence  of  competent  witnesses 
was  necessary  for  the  validity  of  any  legal  act,  and  in  the  days 
before  written  instruments  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  would  be 
the  record  of  the  transaction.  -  All  matters  affecting  the  family 
were  the  subject  of  peculiar  care.  <-  In  the  highest  form  of  Patrician 
marriage  religion  and  law  met  as  one.  -This  union  could  only  be 
dissolved  with  difficulty,  by  an  exact  reversal  of  the  solemn 
formalities.  -  Plebeian  marriages  were  a  simpler  matter  in  every 
way,  and  tended  to  supersede  the  Patrician  form  as  the  old  family 
and  clan  system  gradually  decayed.  -  Plebeians  it  is  true  appear 
in  the  historical  period  as  grouped  in  families  and  clans  more  or 
less  modelled  on  those  of  the  Patricians,  but  these  groups  had  no 
longer  the  direct  political  importance  of  the  olden  time.  ""The 
basis  of  society  was  changed :  the  strict  claims  of  descent,  confined 
to  the  Patrician  blood,  had  disappeared.  ~  Now  it  is  clear  that  the 
close  formal  bonds  of  religion  and  law  were  a  painful  check  on 
all  the  movements  of  life.  —  Some  device  was  needed  to  avoid 
constant  deadlocks.—  This  was  found  in  a  system  of  make-believe, 
common  in  primitive  societies,  and  carried  to  great  perfection  at 
Rome.—  Evasive  tricks  simpHfied  the  fulfilment  of  religious  duties, 
and  fictions  made  workable  the  niceties  of  law,-     To  pretend  that 


i6  Adoption.     The  Pontiffs  [ch. 

something  was  something  else,  that  one  place  was  some  other 
place,  that  a  clod  of  earth  from  a  field  was  the  field  itself,  and  so 
forth,  were  the  Roman  road  out  of  many  a  difficulty.  The  best 
instance  of  practical  fiction  is  found  in  the  sphere  of  the  family. 
This  is  adoption,  an  institution  not  peculiar  to  Rome,  but  of 
peculiar  importance  in  Roman  life.  The  reason  for  it  was  not 
sentimental.  It  was  simply  a  means  by  which  a  man  who  had  no 
son  provided  a  successor  to  himself  in  the  family  headship.  The 
extinction  of  a  family  was  a  calamity  to  be  averted.  Some  one 
had  to  be  found  to  take  the  position  of  the  Father,  a  successor 
(heres)  to  the  estate  and  the  rights  and  duties  connected  with  it. 
This  was  done  by  adopting  a  son  from  some  other  family.  The 
adopted  was  '  emancipated,'  that  is  freed  from  the  hand  or  control 
{manus)  of  his  natural  father,  and  thus  completely  severed  from 
his  former  family.  He  passed  into  the  '  hand '  of  the  adopting 
father,  and  was  thenceforth  on  exactly  the  same  footing  as  a 
natural  heir.  He  would  succeed  to  the  control  of  all  female 
members  of  the  family,  and  be  duly  qualified  to  approach  the 
family  gods.  It  was  the  emancipation  that  was  the  more  difficult 
part  of  the  process.  For  a  Father  to  divest  himself  of  his  power 
\patria  potestas)  over  a  son  was  no  light  matter  according  to 
Roman  notions.  Not  only  were  the  formalities  elaborate,  but 
it  was  a  step  not  to  be  taken  without  the  advice  of  the  family 
consilium. 

14.  Law  and  religion  were  thus  twined  together  at  every 
turn.  There  is  no  better  illustration  of  this  than  the  distinction 
between  lucky  and  unlucky  days  {fasti,  nefasti).  As  the  term  for 
law,  regarded  as  the  traditional  rule  of  right,  was  ius,  so  from  the 
point  of  view  of  religious  scruple  it  w3iS  fas.  Very  early  in  the 
history  of  Rome  a  religious  gild  of  Pontiffs  {collegium  pontificum) 
determined  the  character  of  days.  But  their  rules  were  kept 
secret  and  their  authoritative  calendar  also.  Now  legal  acts  could 
only  take  place  on  lucky  days.  Thus  the  pontiffs  not  only  fixed 
the  dates  of  religious  events  such  as  festivals,  but  had  a  direct 
influence  on  the  administration  of  law.  In  their  hands  too  were 
the  traditional  rules  for  the  formal  acts  and  phrases  necessary  to 
make  procedure  valid,  and  these  too  were  kept  secret.  These 
prerogatives  enabled  them  to  gain  enormous  power,  and  they  clung 
to  it  tenaciously.  Even  after  many  of  their  secrets  had  been 
made  public,  they  contrived  to  keep  their  position  as  great  lawyers, 


ii]  Appeals  17 

and  the  first  professional  jurists  were  all  pontiffs.  In  the  primitive 
age,  when  written  statutes  were  probably  unknown,  their  importance 
can  hardly  be  overrated.  As  witnesses  were  before  written  docu- 
ments, so  the  pontifical  tradition,  written  or  not,  was  before 
statutes.  The  treatment  of  what  we  should  call  Crimes  calls  for 
particular  notice.  There  was  no  general  conception  of  Crime, 
but  only  of  Wrong  requiring  redress.  Wrong  done  to  the  indivi- 
dual (robbery  violence  murder  etc.)  was  no  doubt  originally  righted 
by  the  private  revenge  of  the  wronged  person  or  his  relatives. 
This  first  found  recognition  in  the  traditional  rule  of  equivalent 
retribution  {talio^  an  eye  for  an  eye  etc.),  and  then  developed  into 
a  system  of  satisfaction  by  compensation.  But  many  Wrongs 
could  also  be  regarded  as  Sins,  breaches  oi  fas  rather  than  ius, 
and  from  this  point  of  view  could  only  be  righted  by  acts  of 
expiation,  which  it  was  the  province  of  the  pontiffs  to  prescribe, 
and  so  to  avert  the  divine  wrath.  Wrongs  done  to  the  community 
as  a  whole  (and  many  acts  might  be  so  interpreted)  were  dealt 
with  by  the  chief  magistrate  on  behalf  of  the  state,  in  virtue  of 
his  imperium.  But  he  could  allow  the  offender  to  appeal  to  the 
community  {provocare  ad  populum)  against  his  sentence.  To 
convert  this  permissive  appeal  into  a  legal  right,  assured  to  all 
citizens,  appears  in  tradition  as  one  of  the  first  and  most  important 
achievements  of  the  Roman  Republic.  The  procedure  was  in 
effect  the  taking  of  a  vote  of  the  assembled  people  on  the  particular 
case.  The  question  was  really  whether  they  did  or  did  not  mean 
to  treat  the  offender  as  a  public  enemy  (perduellis).  If  they  did, 
then  he  would  be  put  to  a  shameful  death;  if  not,  he  would 
go  free,  subject  to  expiation  as  required.  This  right  of  appeal 
remained  in  force  for  centuries,  and  was  never  formally  abolished. 
It  only  died  out  under  the  gradual  development  of  regular  courts 
of  penal  jurisdiction.  Each  appeal  led  to  a  separate  act  of  the 
Assembly,  as  independent  as  an  act  of  legislation;  but  strictly 
legislative  acts  were  beyond  doubt  very  rare  in  the  early  days  of 
Rome,  perhaps  rarer  than  appeals. 

15.  civis  and  hostis.  In  speaking  of  a  modern  state,  we 
think  of  its  government  under  three  heads.  Legislature  Judicature 
Executive.  At  Rome,  as  in  primitive  states  generally,  the  first 
and  second  of  these  were  only  rudimentary,  the  third  was  all- 
important.  The  internal  duty  of  the  Executive  was  chiefly  the 
maintenance   of  custom,  keeping   the   state   solid  within.     The 

H.  2 


1 8  fetiales.     civis.     hostis  [ch. 

means  of  slow  progressive  change  existed  in  fiction  and  creation 
of  precedents.  The  pressure  of  an  unprivileged  population, 
claiming  rights,  came  in  due  time.  Externally  the  chief  duty  of 
the  Executive  was  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  state.  This  meant 
that  the  relations  of  the  state  to  other  powers  must  be  satisfactory 
both  in  peace  and  war.  Success  in  war  meant  superiority  in 
peace.  To  attain  this  success  three  things  were  of  use,  military 
organization,  alliances,  and  divine  favour.  Discipline  and  diplo- 
macy were  early  and  lasting  growths  of  the  Roman  system.  But 
the  cause  of  Rome  must,  to  secure  divine  approval,  always  appear 
as  the  rightful  cause.  Hence  the  formalities  attending  a  declara- 
tion of  war  were  punctiliously  carried  out  under  precise  rules  of 
the  same  character  as  those  governing  the  relations  of  citizens  to 
each  other,  and  of  each  and  all  to  their  gods.  So  too  in  concluding 
peace  and  making  treaties.  These  matters  were  all  managed 
through  an  ancient  religious  gild  {collegium  fetialiuTn).  Other 
Italian  peoples  had  the  same  institution,  and  at  Rome  at  least 
there  was  an  elaborate  system  of  ius  fetiale.  The  Fetials  decided 
points  of  '  international '  law,  and  a  deputation  from  their  college 
went  to  the  frontier  to  perform  the  needful  acts.  The  spirit  of  all 
these  international  dealings  was  the  same  as  that  prevailing  at 
home,  the  aim  being  to  get  an  advantage  and  if  possible  to  put 
the  other  side  technically  in  the  wrong.  When  the  growth  of 
Rome  brought  her  into  contact  with  enemies  outside  Italy,  various 
difficulties  arose,  which  were  met  by  fiction  and  modification  of 
practice  to  suit  new  circumstances.  But  the  Fetials  and  Fetial 
law  lasted  far  into  the  days  of  the  Empire. 

1 6.  When  the  line  of  division  between  communities  was  so 
clearly  drawn,  and  their  relations  on  such  a  formal  footing,  it  was 
but  natural  that  Citizen  and  Alien  should  be  sharply  distinguished. 
So  we  find  on  the  one  hand  the  civis^  the  man  whose  position 
is  determined  by  the  rules  of  the  state  to  which  he  belongs,  on 
the  other  the  hostis^  the  man  who  has  no  part  in  that  state  or  its 
gods,  but  whose  allegiance  is  due  elsewhere.  In  Latin  the  word 
hostis  came  to  mean  '  enemy,'  and  the  technical  term  for  '  alien ' 
became  peregrinus ;  but  the  notion  of  '  alien  '  still  hung  about  the 
older  word.  The  stranger  had  no  rights  as  such  in  any  state. 
He  might  be  favoured  by  the  grant  of  privileges,  but  it  was  a  fixed 
rule  at  Rome,  and  probably  elsewhere  in  Italy,  that  a  man  could 
only  be  civis  in  one  state  at  a  time.    The  ancient  custom  of  guest- 


"]  foedus.     commercium.     conubium  19 

friendship  {hospitium)  between  members  of  different  communities 
no  doubt  helped  to  promote  intercourse,  but  each  hospes  would 
be  protector  of  his  friend  at  home  and  protected  abroad.  It  was 
a  further  step  in  civilization  when  one  state  guaranteed  free  access 
and  friendly  reception  to  all  citizens  of  another  state ;  this  was 
hospitium  publicum.  But  the  clearest  and  most  satisfactory  settle- 
ment was  reached  by  concluding  a  definite  treaty  {foedus) ;  this 
fixed  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  two  states  to  each  other,  and 
the  privileges  granted  to  citizens  of  each  state  in  the  other. 
Between  the  states  it  was  a  question  of  an  alliance,  offensive 
or  defensive  or  both.  What  affected  the  individual  citizens  was 
the  granting  or  withholding  of  two  important  privileges.  One 
was  the  right  to  buy  and  sell,  to  hold  and  inherit  property,  in  the 
state  with  which  their  own  had  made  a  treaty,  of  course  under 
the  legal  rules  of  that  state.  The  other  was  the  right  to  contract 
legal  marriages  on  equal  terms,  so  that  the  wife  would  become 
a  recognized  member  of  her  husband's  family,  and  the  children 
legitimate  under  the  rules  of  the  state  to  which  he  belonged. 
These  two  were  known  as  the  rights  of  commercium  and  conubium. 
To  the  citizen  in  his  own  state  they  were  a  birthright,  to  the  alien 
a  granted  privilege.  To  establish  reciprocity  of  this  kind  between 
two  states  tended  to  bind  them  together,  and  the  use  made  of  this 
fact  by  Roman  policy  had  an  immense  influence  on  the  history 
of  Italy.  For  if  state  A  were  thus  connected  with  states  BCD, 
while  no  such  reciprocity  existed  between  B  C  or  B  D  or  C  D, 
clearly  the  gainer  by  the  general  arrangement  was  A.  And,  the 
more  states  there  were  connected  with  A  but  isolated  from  each 
other,  the  greater  became  the  advantage  of  A  relatively  to  the  rest. 
Now  Rome  took  care  to  be  A,  and  this  policy  is  the  external 
history  of  Rome  in  a  nutshell.  Where  a  group  of  communities 
were  confederated,  however  loosely,  in  an  union  that  expressed 
itself  in  a  common  name,  such  as  Latini  Volsci  Hernici  Marsi 
etc.,  it  seems  that  reciprocal  privileges  of  some  kind  prevailed 
throughout  the  group.  This  was  a  part,  perhaps  the  chief  part, 
of  what  gave  them  cohesion.  Accordingly  to  make  use  of  the 
group  as  a  whole  so  long  as  it  served  her  purpose,  and  to  break  it 
up  when  it  became  troublesome,  was  the  consistent  method  of 
Rome  in  dealing  with  the  Italian  Leagues. 

17.     In  order  to  avoid  obscuring  the  following  narrative  with 
frequent  explanations  I  have  given  a  sketch   of  the   conditions 


20  Progress  In   Italy  [ch.  n 

prevailing  at  Rome  and  in  the  neighbourhood,  so  far  as  tradition, 
supported  by  traces  surviving  in  historical  times,  enables  us  to 
infer  them.  No  attempt  is  made  to  furnish  an  exact  chronology, 
the  materials  for  which  do  not  exist.  The  picture  is  neither  clear 
nor  brilliant.  In  the  arts  of  civilization  the  Italian  peoples  were 
undoubtedly  far  behind  the  Greeks,  whose  maritime  enterprises 
led  to  splendid  developments  in  many  lands.  From  the  ninth  to 
the  sixth  century  B.C.  Greek  colonies  were  springing  up  along  the 
coasts  of  Sicily  and  southern  Italy,  and  their  seaborne  commerce, 
largely  displacing  that  of  the  Phoenicians,  grew  in  proportion  to 
the  spread  of  their  settlements.  But  the  progress  of  the  Italians 
was  slow.  Their  greatness  was  only  achieved  by  unification 
gradually  effected  from  within,  a  colourless  and  prosaic  process. 
Rome  itself  long  remained  a  centre  of  simple  life,  the  men  mostly 
engaged  in  the  labours  of  the  field,  the  women  busy  with  the 
spindle  and  loom.  Value  was  reckoned  in  terms  of  domesticated 
animals,  such  as  sheep  oxen  or  swine.  Long  after  copper  came 
in  as  a  medium  of  exchange,  it  was  only  taken  by  weight.  A  real 
coinage  in  bronze  is  thought  to  have  begun  only  in  the  fifth 
century.  The  coarse  grain  spelt  {far)  was  the  staple  food  of  the 
people.  Wooden  huts  or  houses  of  sun-dried  bricks  {lateres)  were 
their  dwellings  :  earthworks  with  palisades,  and  walls  of  soft  local 
stone  rudely  hewn  in  squared  blocks,  seem  to  have  been  their 
fortification  according  to  the  nature  of  the  ground.  But  progress, 
if  slow,  was  sure.  It  was  surely  an  advantage  to  Rome  that  she 
was  not  too  civilized,  too  far  ahead  of  the  hardy  and  fertile  inland 
peoples,  ever  spreading  in  swarms  for  want  of  room.  She  was 
able  to  capture  and  organize  their  strength,  and  to  save  whatever 
Greek  cities  they  had  not  already  destroyed  in  the  South.  In  the 
North,  she  was  able  with  their  support  to  appear  as  champion 
of  Italy  against  invading  Gauls.  The  object  of  the  foregoing 
pages  is  to  give  in  brief  outline  some  notion  of  the  conditions 
under  which  the  Roman  community  started  on  its  wonderful 
career. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE   REGAL  PERIOD 

i8.  Regal  Rome.  The  first  stage  of  the  Roman  constitution 
recorded  by  tradition  is  one  in  which  a  sovran  guide  or  ruler  {rex) 
presides  over  the  state.  His  imperium  is  conferred  on  him  by 
vote  of  the  whole  community  in  Assembly  {coinifta),  and  held  for 
life.  But  the  Assembly  could  only  approve  or  disapprove.  There 
was  no  true  'election.'  A  name  was  submitted,  and  we  are  left 
to  infer  that  it  was  accepted.  The  Patrician  elders,  who  in  these 
days  formed  the  Senate,  nominated  a  '  between-king '  {interrex) 
who  proposed  a  name  to  the  people,  acting  doubtless  under 
instruction  of  the  elders.  Further  formalities  followed  the  people's 
approval,  and  the  new  ruler  was  made.  He  was  supreme  in 
religious  functions  on  the  state's  behalf,  supreme  judge,  supreme 
leader  in  war.  He  could  appoint  deputies  as  he  saw  fit.  The 
council  of  elders  is  represented  as  chosen  by  the  King  from  the 
Patricians,  members  of  the  ancient  clans.  The  community  in 
general,  the  populus,  appears  as  divided  into  curiae,  sometimes 
rendered  '  wards.'  These  Curies  were  the  only  divisions  that 
had  a  directly  political  character.  According  to  the  Roman 
system  of  voting,  each  Cury  would  count  as  one  group-vote, 
and  its  vote  would  be  decided  by  the  majority  within  the  group. 
As  the  number  of  Curies  was  an  even  one  (always  30),  an  equal 
division  was  possible.  It  was  not  until  later,  when  state  questions 
had  come  to  be  decided  by  a  popular  vote,  that  care  was  taken 
to  have  an  odd  number  of  voting-groups.  We  have  a  tradition 
of  a  time  when  the  whole  community  was  in  three  parts  {tribus), 
each  Tribe  containing  ten  Curies,  and  an  assumption  that  there 
were  ten  clans  {genfes)  to  each  curia,  ten  families  in  each^clan. 
This  assumption  could  only  be  an  ideal.     But  that  there  was 


2  2  The  early  Kingdom  [ch. 

an  ideal  scheme  seems  shewn  by  the  further  tradition  that  the 
primitive  army  consisted  of  3000  foot  and  300  horse.  Thus  the 
numbers  3  and  10  formed  the  traditional  basis  of  organization. 
What  was  the  origin  of  the  three  Tribes  {Titles  Ramnes  Luceres) 
is  doubtful.  So  too  is  the  composition  of  the  curiae.  They 
probably  contained  not  only  the  true  (Patrician)  members  of  the 
clans  but  the  dependent  clientes  (Plebeian)  attached  to  each  clan 
or  family.  Probably  there  were  other  Plebeians  not  so  attached, 
and  so  not  included,  for  subsequent  changes  are  more  satisfactorily 
accounted  for  on  this  supposition.  It  is  important  to  note  the 
tradition  as  to  the  division  of  the  land.  Roman  territory  was 
either  state-land,  over  which  the  state  retained  direct  control,  or 
private  land  {ager  publicus  or  privatus).  The  legend  was  that 
the  first  king  had  assigned  the  latter  in  equal  allotments  to  all 
citizens,  meaning  no  doubt  all  heads  of  families.  There  are 
traces,  very  slight,  of  land  owned  by  clans  once  upon  a  time. 
The  word  tribus  seems  from  the  first  to  have  had  a  territorial 
meaning,  but  about  the  three  primitive  Tribes  we  know  practically 
nothing. 

19.  Progress  in  regal  period.  Here  we  have  nothing  but 
traditions,  for  the  most  part  doubtful,  some  certainly  false. 
Perhaps  the  most  credible  is  that  of  the  occupation  of  the  river 
mouth  {ostium)  by  a  fortified  post.  This  was  a  colonia,  a  town 
of  settlers  each  having  an  allotment  of  land  {colonus,  from  colere). 
It  was  called  Ostia,  the  first  of  a  long  series  of  colonies.  The 
land  was  part  of  the  ager  Romanus^  and  the  colonists  citizens, 
who  remained  part  of  the  Roman  community.  We  hear  also 
of  the  conquest  of  small  towns  in  the  low  country  now  called 
the  Campagna,  which  appears  as  thickly  inhabited  in  early  times, 
and  presumably  healthy.  The  destruction  of  Alba  Longa,  and 
the  succession  of  Rome  to  the  presidency  of  the  Latin  League, 
referred  to  above,  are  also  attributed  to  the  time  of  the  Kings. 
The  tradition  that  the  conquered  people  were  in  many  cases 
removed  to  Rome,  and  the  leading  men  received  as  Patricians, 
will  account  for  the  growth  of  the  city,  which  it  is  clear  from 
the  sequel  took  place  somehow  or  other,  and  in  particular  for 
the  increase  of  the  Plebeians.  It  is  now  supposed  that  the  great 
works,  such  as  the  Main  Drain  {cloaca  maxima)  by  which  the 
swampy  ground  between  the  hills  of  Rome  was  cleared  of  water, 
and  the  so-called  '  Servian '  wall  enclosing  the  whole  city,  do  not 


in]  The  '  Servian  '  reform  23 

belong  to  the  Regal  period.  That  is,  the  existing  remains  are 
assigned  by  experts  to  a  later  date.  That  some  drainage  took 
place,  and  that  some  fortification  was  erected,  is  possible.  It  is 
said  that  a  fort  was  also  built  on  the  Janiculan  hill  on  the  right 
side  of  the  river,  and  access  provided  by  construction  of  the 
famous  pile-bridge  {pons  sublicius).  In  early  times  great  works 
seem  to  have  been  commonly  carried  out  under  single  rulers, 
and  we  cannot  assume  that  Rome  was  an  exception.  But  the 
most  famous  event  traditionally  connected  with  the  regal  period 
is  the  great  internal  reform  attributed  to  Servius  Tullius,  last  but 
one  of  the  traditional  kings. 

20.  Omitting  details,  this  change  appears  as  a  new  organiza- 
tion of  the  whole  community  for  military  purposes,  only  later 
becoming  invested  with  a  political  character.  Whatever  its  details 
and  date,  it  marks  a  great  step  in  the  transition  from  birth  to 
wealth  as  the  foundation  of  civic  importance.  We  are  left  to 
infer  that  the  original  miHtary  system  was  inadequate,  throwing 
on  members  of  the  ancient  clans  a  burden  greater  than  they 
could  well  bear.  Religion  would  forbid  interference  with  these 
clans,  so  a  new  principle  of  organization  had  to  be  applied,  if 
the  army  of  the  state  was  to  keep  pace  with  its  growth.  We 
must  assume  that  some  Plebeians  had  acquired  considerable 
property,  while  some  Patrician  families  may  have  become  poorer. 
The  notion  that  the  citizen  settled  on  the  land  {adsiduus)  was 
bound  to  bear  arms  for  the  state  was  probably  of  immemorial 
antiquity,  and  not  peculiar  to  Rome.  So  long  as  all  owners  of 
land  belonged  to  the  old  nobility  of  birth,  it  was  natural  that 
the  core  of  the  army,  serving  in  full  panoply,  should  consist  of 
Patrician  clansmen.  Plebeians  furnishing  at  most  a  body  of  light 
troops.  But  it  was  commonly  recognized  in  ancient  communities 
that  only  men  of  property  could  provide  for  themselves  a  suit  of 
armour  and  good  weapons.  We  find  this  distinction  in  Greece, 
and  it  has  been  thought  that  the  Servian  reform  was  partly  copied 
from  a  Greek  model.  The  Patricians  being  no  longer  the  sole 
landowners,  the  principle  of  the  change  was  to  provide  that 
owners  of  land,  Patrician  and  Plebeian  alike,  should  share  the 
duty  of  army  service  in  proportion  to  their  property.  For  this 
purpose  the  people  were  divided  into  five  'callings'  or  'summon- 
ings'  {classes)^  from  the  rich  in  the  first  class  (called  specially 
classici)  down  to  the  poor  in  the  fifth.     Those  who  had  nothing 


24 


The  Army,     legio  [ch. 


worth  taking  into  account  were  lumped  together  in  a  single  group 
and  were  not  liable  to  military  service.  The  richest  of  all  were 
those  able  to  afford  to  serve  on  horseback,  and  required  to  do 
so.  A  few  special  services,  artificers  and  musicians,  were  also 
provided  for.  The  military  nature  of  the  scheme  appears  in  the 
division  of  the  classes  into  Centuries.  The  word  centuria  (loo 
of  anything)  had  ceased  to  bear  its  primary  meaning,  as  is  clear 
from  the  fact  that  half  the  centuries  in  each  class  were  of  seniores 
(men  from  47  to  60),  half  of  iuniores  (men  1 7  to  46).  The  latter 
of  course  contained  more  men.  The  seniors  formed  the  home- 
army  or  garrison,  the  juniors  the  field-army.  Thus  beside  the 
distinction  based  on  property  there  was  that  based  on  age.  The 
number  of  centuries  in  the  several  classes  is  given  thus  i  (80) 
II  (20)  III  (20)  IV  (20)  V  (30)  =  170  of  infantry.  Add  4  for  the 
artificers  and  trumpeters,  and  18  centuries  of  cavalry  {equites), 
and  the  total  was  192.  The  mass  of  unqualified  poor  were 
counted  as  a  single  century,  making  the  final  total  193.  The 
equipment  of  the  combatant  centuries  varied  from  the  full  outfit 
of  the  first  class  down  to  that  of  the  fourth,  who  carried  spear 
and  javelin  only.  In  battle  order  the  first  class  stood  in  front, 
with  the  second  and  third  behind  them.  The  fourth  and  fifth 
seem  to  have  served  as  skirmishers,  the  latter  being  slingers. 
Thus  there  was  a  sort  of  solid  phalanx  of  heavy-armed  foot  with 
light  troops  moving  freely.  The  cavalry  according  to  tradition 
were  the  flower  of  the  army,  far  more  important  than  in  later 
times.  The  word  for  an  army  embodied  for  service  was  legio^  a 
*  picking '  or  '  levy.'  At  some  early  date  the  necessity  of  forming 
more  than  one  such  military  unit  caused  it  to  be  applied  to  two 
or  more  corps.  So  it  came  to  mean  a  'legion'  in  the  well- 
known  sense. 

21.  To  establish  such  a  system  as  this,  a  general  review 
of  the  people  and  their  estates  was  necessary.  Tradition  there- 
fore ascribed  to  Servius  the  institution  of  the  periodic  assessment 
{census)  which  was  a  notable  feature  of  Roman  public  life.  It  is 
most  probable  that  at  first  it  took  account  of  landed  property 
only.  Also  that  the  owning  of  land  up  to  a  given  amount  laid 
the  obligation  to  serve  in  a  given  class  on  all  members  of  the 
family  of  military  age.  We  hear  of  no  place  assigned  to  men 
over  60,  but  they  would  often  be  heads  of  families.  It  would 
seem  that  they  had  no  place   themselves,   but  their  sons  had. 


Ill]  census.      New  Tribes  25 

It  is  said  that  a  special  arrangement  was  made  to  meet  the 
expenses  of  the  cavalry-service.  The  state  found  horses,  but 
feeding  and  grooming  would  be  costly.  So  we  hear  of  a  tax 
laid  on  the  estates  of  women  and  minors  towards  this  outlay. 
These  cases  can  only  have  been  few,  for  such  persons  would 
nearly  always  be  under  the  power  of  some  head  of  a  family,  and 
so  have  no  estate  of  their  own.  Expensive  the  service  of  equites 
was  and  remained.  But  no  part  of  the  reform  was  more  important 
than  the  introduction  of  a  Tribe-system  wholly  different  from 
that  of  the  three  primitive  divisions.  Servius  is  said  to  have 
divided  the  community  into  parts  (fribus)  on  a  purely  local  basis, 
a  measure  represented  as  being  taken  for  the  convenience  of  the 
census.  We  hear  of  four  Tribes  in  the  city,  but  whether  this 
division  included  the  country  outside,  whether  the  four  are  meant 
to  be  the  total,  does  not  appear.  At  any  rate  the  principle  of 
locality  was  one  that  became  more  and  more  firmly  established 
as  time  went  on.  Tradition  adds  tha!t,  when  the  various  details 
of  the  new  scheme  were  complete,  the  king  held  a  grand  review 
of  the  whole  people  assembled  under  their  new  divisions  as  an 
army  {exercitus),  and  that  he  performed  a  solemn  religious  purifi- 
cation with  sacrifice.  This  ceremony,  the  lustratio,  was  always 
the  proper  conclusion  of  a  Roman  census,  and  the  presiding 
magistrate  was  said  first  censum  agere,  and  then  to  'put  by'  or 
complete  the  purification  {condere  lustrum).  Whether  the  origin 
of  this  reform  is  rightly  placed  in  the  regal  period  and  connected 
with  a  king  Servius  (whom  some  declare  to  be  a  mythical  figure), 
I  cannot  say.  It  is  at  all  events  ancient,  and  the  power  of 
organization  implied  in  it  is  fully  consistent  with  what  we  know 
of  Roman  growth.  For  it  was  surely  her  early  advance  in  respect 
of  systematic  organization  that  gave  Rome  a  permanent  advantage 
over  her  neighbours.  But  that  such  business  as  that  of  a  census 
could  be  carried  out  effectively  without  some  kind  of  written 
record  is  hardly  to  be  assumed. 

22.  End  of  the  Kingdom,  The  tradition  that  the  ancient 
monarchy  lasted  244  years  (753 — 510)  deserves  no  credit.  And 
the  legends  of  its  latter  days  are  mostly  wild  stories,  some  of 
them  directly  borrowed  from  the  Greek.  The  reigns  of  the  last 
three  kings,  Tarquin  the  Elder,  Servius  Tullius,  and  Tarquin 
the  Tyrant  {superbus),  are  made  to  appear  a  time  of  great  activity 
and  progress  at  home  and  abroad.     Some  have  thought  that  we 


26  End  of  the  Kingdom  [ch.  hi 

have  in  the  name  Tarquin  a  trace  of  an  Etruscan  (Tarchnd) 
dynasty,  but  this  is  very  doubtful.  The  accounts  of  the  growth 
of  the  city,  of  the  predominance  of  Rome  among  the  Latins,  of 
the  spread  of  Roman  power,  of  collision  with  other  groups, 
Rutuli  Volsci  Aequi,  to  the  South  and  East,  may  contain  some 
truth.  But  the  last  king  is  a  figure  modelled  on  that  of  a  Greek 
Tyrant,  a  work  of  imagination,  formed  to  account  for  his  ex- 
pulsion by  a  justly  enraged  people.  When  we  note  that  the 
fall  of  the  monarchy  was  followed  by  an  aristocracy  of  Patrician 
nobles,  it  appears  certain  that  the  portrait  of  Tarquin,  as  an 
usurper  who  disregarded  all  customary  rules  of  right  and  oppressed 
the  poor,  is  historically  worthless.  It  has  even  been  doubted 
whether  such  an  event  as  the  sudden  deposition  of  the  last  king 
ever  took  place.  But  the  suggestion  that  the  monarchy  died  out 
very  gradually,  functions  being  taken  from  the  kings  bit  by  bit, 
is  hardly  more  easy  to  believe.  We  have  in  short  a  drama  before 
us.  The  curtain  falls  on  the  single  ruler,  and  rises  again  on  a 
chief  magistracy  held  by  two  colleagues.  I  do  not  think  we  can 
with  reasonable  confidence  say  any  more.  The  circumstances  in 
which  the  election  of  consuls  first  took  place  are  no  less  fictitious 
than  the  tragedy  of  Lucretia.  Somehow  or  other  the  Patrician 
nobles  had  their  will.  >v 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE   REPUBLIC   509—449   B.C. 

23.  Magistracy.  Little  trust  can  be  placed  in  the  dates 
of  this  period,  and  they  are  given  for  whatever  the  tradition  may 
be  worth.  We  hear  that  the  sovran  imperium  was  now  held  by 
two  '  leaders '  {praetores)  at  once.  Both  had  it  in  full,  for  there 
was  no  division  of  function,  so  that  each  could  neutralize  at  will 
the  command  of  the  other.  Their  power  was  thus  in  effect 
limited  by  the  possibility  of  disagreement,  and  another  limit 
was  that  of  yearly  tenure.  We  do  hear  of  disagreements,  but 
as  rare  occurrences,  never  pushed  so  far  as  to  endanger  the  safety 
of  the  state.  Friction  was  lessened  by  the  growth  of  a  custom 
of  taking  turns  to  officiate.  One  praetor  took  duty  for  a  month, 
attended  by  his  I  beadles  {lictores)  bearing  the  bundles  of  rods 
(fasces)  which  were  the  sign  of  imperium.  His  partner  took  the 
next  month,  and  so  on  alternately.  At  the  end  of  the  year  there 
was  no  power  to  compel  them  to  resign  office  or  to  hold  an 
election  of  successors.  It  seems  that  custom,  created  by  general 
understanding,  was  enough.  Nor  need  we  doubt  that  common- 
sense  and  good  faith  sufficed  to  establish  a  wholesome  tradition 
in  the  early  Republic.  Aristocratic  governments,  ever  jealous  of 
individual  encroachment,  have  always  taken  care  to  keep  their 
magistrates  in  order.  And  the  moral  force  of  precedent  was  the 
soul  of  Roman  politics.  At  some  early  but  uncertain  date  the 
name  consules  (almost  =  *  colleagues ')  superseded  that  of  praetores 
as  the  title  of  the  chief  magistrates,  thus  laying  the  chief  stress 
on  their  equality.  Clear  traces  of  the  old  kingship  remained. 
A  titular  King  was  still  kept  {rex  sacrorum)  for  the  performance 
of  certain  religious  functions.     This  post,  of  no  poHtical  import- 


28  Senate  [ch. 

ance,  was  never  abolished,  and  was  held  to  the  last  by  Patricians 
only.  Moreover,  in  the  event  of  neither  consul  being  able  to 
hold  the  election  of  successors,  the  same  old  plan  was  followed 
as  on  a  vacancy  of  the  throne,  namely  the  appointment  of  an 
interrex  by  the  Patrician  senators,  with  a  temporary  imperium  for 
the  purpose.  When  the  consuls  had  to  assign  some  special 
function,  such  as  command  in  war,  to  one  of  the  two,  this  was 
done  either  by  voluntary  agreement  or  by  casting  lots.  Such  was 
Roman  unity  in  duality. 

24.  Senate.  The  Senate  of  this  period  was  a  continuation 
of  the  old  CounciPof  the  King,  but  the  choice  of  members  had 
■^ssed^o'  the  consuls.  The  normal  or  ideal  number  was  300. 
Senators  had  to  be  men  of  ripe  age,  at  all  events  over  46  years. 
In  practice  they  held  their  places  for  life,  unless  removed  on  the 
ground  of  acts  customarily  regarded  as  disgraceful.  Whether  any 
Plebeians  were  actually  included  in  their  number  has  been  doubted. 
In  any  case  they  must  have  been  very  few.  No  doubt  the  choice 
of  members  amounted  to  a  sort  of  rough  representation  of  the 
Patrician  clans.  The  House  seem  to  have  been  addressed 
collectively  as  paires^  for  after  the  admission  of  Plebeians  we 
hear  that  \}i\&  patres  and  those  enrolled  with  them  {conscripti)  were 
addressed  jointly  as  patres  conscripti.  Senators  soon,  if  not  from 
the  first,  came  to  be  allowed  a  foremost  place  on  all  public 
occasions,  and  certain  distinctions  of  dress.  Grades  of  rank 
soon  arose  among  the  members,  for  those  who  had  held  public 
office  continued  to  wear  the  semi-royal  gown  of  the  consul.  At 
first  no  doubt  the  Fathers  were  simply  the  Advisory  Board  of  the 
consuls,  but  as  a  permanent  body  by  the  side  of  changing 
magistrates  they  could  hardly  help  acquiring  more  and  more 
influence.  The  Senate  quickly  became  the  store-house  of  ex- 
perience, the  exponent  of  public  custom  and  precedent.  It  was 
able  to  meet  on  short  notice  and  give  advice  in  emergencies,  for 
the  members  normally  lived  in  the  city  or  within  easy  reach. 
The  right  to  make  proposals  {sententiam  dicere)  and  to  vote  by 
division  {discessio)  existed  early,  and  enabled  the  opinion  of  the 
majority  to  be  ascertained  with  ease.  But  the  power  of  the 
presiding  magistrate,  great  even  in  later  times,  was  probably 
dominant  at  first  to  an  extraordinary  degree.  It  lay  with  him 
to  put  a  question  to  the  House  or  not,  and  opinions  could  only 
be  expressed  at  his  invitation.     But  in  this  primitive  procedure 


iv]  Assemblies  29 

were  the  germs  of  the  senatorial  debates  of  a  later  age.  For  the 
present  we  need  only  remark  that  the  republican  Senate  began  its 
wonderful  career  as  the  organ  of  Patrician  conservatism,  the  head- 
quarters of  opposition  to  those  Plebeian  claims  of  which  tradition 
has  so  much  to  say  in  the  next  150  years. 

25.  Assemblies.  The  history  of  popular  Assemblies  in  the 
first  years  of  the  Republic  is  very  obscure.  Tradition  represents 
the  election  of  the  first  consuls  as  taking  place  in  the  Assembly 
by  Centuries.  This  cannot  be  trusted,  but  it  is  possible.  That 
military  organization  did  at  some  early  date  become  a  voting 
body,  but  we  do  not  know  when.  At  all  events  two  forms  of 
Assembly  existed  side  by  side,  that  meeting  by  Curies  and  that  by 
Centuries.  Both  alike  were  group-systems,  in  which  the  vote  of 
each  group,  large  or  small,  counted  as  one.  No  Assembly  voting 
by  heads  as  a  single  body  ever  existed  in  Rome.  The  only  body 
of  political  importance  in  which  account  was  taken  of  the 
majority  of  the  whole  number  of  those  present  arid  voting  was 
the  Senate.  Of  the  Curies  we  know  that  they  were  connected 
with  the  ancient  Patrician  organization  of  clans.  Whether  all 
Plebeia^is  were  included  in  them  we  do  not  know ;  probably  not. 
At  any  rate  many  of  the  Plebeians  were  clients  of  Patrician 
houses,  and  compelled  to  follow  the  lead  of  their  protectors 
{patroni).  But  all  men  of  military  age  were  included  in  the 
Centuries,  and  those  over  60  soon  found  a  place  there,  when 
once  the  civic  army  became  a  political  Assembly.  The  Curies 
were  based  on  the  hereditary  system  of  the  past,  the  Centuries  on 
the  property-standards  of  the  present.  The  transfer  of  power 
from  the  former  to  the  latter  was  probably  a  gradual  process, 
of  which  we  hear  nothing.  One  thing  is  clear.  The  revolution 
that  ended  the  old  monarchy  was  not  in  the  interest  of  the  mass 
of  poor  Plebeians.  By  the  arrangement  of  the  Centuries  the 
power  was  in  the  hands  of  the  wealthy,  for  the  first  Class  (80 
Centuries)  together  with  the  equites  (18  Centuries)  controlled 
more  than  half  of  the  total  (193  Centuries)  of  group-votes.  And 
these  wealthier  classes  voted  first,  and  seldom  disagreed,  so  that 
by  Roman  custom,  once  a  majority  of  Centuries  had  voted  one 
way,  voting  ceased,  and  the  rest  were  seldom  called  on  to  vote  at 
all.  It  is  plain  that  elections  could  be,  and  doubtless  were,  in 
practice  a  mere  matter  of  agreement  among  the  rich,  chiefly 
Patricians.     As  for  legislation   (probably  a  rare  event  in  these 


30  contio.     comitia.     Tribunate  [ch. 

days),  or  for  the  use  of  political  pressure,  to  remove  grievances 
and  better  the  condition  of  the  poorer  classes,  the  Assemblies 
provided  no  machinery  at  all.  If  any  movement  were  to  be  made 
in  this  direction,  some  new  machinery  must  be  devised.  It  was 
and  remained  a  fixed  rule  in  Roman  public  life  that  no  formal 
Assembly  could  do  anything  but  vote  for  or  against  a  proposal 
laid  before  it  by  the  presiding  magistrate.  There  could  be  no 
amendments  and  no  debate.  If  the  magistrate  wanted  to  address 
the  people  (surely  a  rare  thing  in  this  period),  he  spoke  to  an 
informal  meeting  {contio).  Once  the  people  broke  up  into  their 
voting-units,  the  stage  of  'groupings'  {comitia)  was  reached;  it 
was  an  Assembly.  And  the  power  of  the  magistrate  was  immense, 
even  at  an  election.  He  could  refuse  to  receive  votes  for  a 
candidate  if  he  thought  him  unfit.  And  all  public  formal  pro- 
ceedings began  with  taking  auspices  to  secure  the  approval  of  the 
gods.  This  reminded  all  men  of  the  sacred  character  which  the 
consul  inherited  from  the  king.  In  truth  we  may  say  that  in  these 
early  days  the  awe  inspired  by  the  consuls  as  men  accepted  by  the 
gods  was  more  important  than  the  fact  of  their  election  by  the 
votes  of  men.  They  were  Patricians,  nominees  of  Patricians, 
and  utterly  unlikely  to  take  part  in  any  movement  calculated 
to  lessen  the  privileges  attached  to  Patrician  birth.  To  gain 
anything,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Plebeians  to  find  a  means 
of  putting  forward  their  claims. 

26.  The  Tribunate.  Tradition  represents  the  cruel  law  of 
debt  as  the  main  grievance  of  the  Roman  Commons.  This  is 
credible  enough,  for  the  debt-question  appears  as  causing  trouble 
in  the  early  history  of  many  states.  A  good  instance  is  found  in 
ancient  Athens.  High  rates  of  interest  and  inability  to  pay, 
followed  by  the  loss  of  the  debtor's  land  and  bondage  of  his 
person,  pledged  to  the  creditor,  are  the  common  phenomena. 
At  Rome  we  hear  that  this  question  was  complicated  with  that  of 
the  state  domain-lands.  The  ager  publicus  was  being  more  and 
more  granted  to  the  rich,  chiefly  or  wholly  to  Patricians,  as 
tenants  of  the  state.  Poor  Plebeians  wanted  allotments,  but.  there 
was  now  no  king  able  if  willing  to  protect  their  interests.  So  the 
land  was  passing  more  and  more  into  Patrician  hands,  either 
under  the  pretext  of  reserving  state-domains  or  under  the  operation 
of  the  law  of  debt.  This  picture  is  probably  coloured  by  details 
borrowed  from  the  circumstances  of  a  later  age,  but  that  there 


iv]  secessio.     auxilium.     intercessio  31 

was  some  sort  of  land-question  already  is  likely  enough.  We  can 
also  believe  that  frequent  wars  led  to  the  devastation  of  farms, 
and  so  impoverished  many.  It  appears  also  that  one  who  had 
become  his  creditor's  bondman  still  remained  a  citizen  liable  to 
serve  in  war.  The  situation,  however  doubtful  the  details  may 
be,  was  intolerable,  and  the  only  means  of  extorting  any  con- 
cession from  the  ruling  class  was  to  refuse  army  service  under 
present  conditions.  Here  we  come  upon  the  famous  story  of  the 
first  *  withdrawal'  {secessio)  of  the  Plebs.  We  hear  that  they 
marched  out  in  a  body  to  a  spot  by  the  river  Anio,  the  'sacred 
mount'  {mons  sacer\  and  only  consented  to  return  under  con- 
ditions which  amounted  to  a  treaty  solemnly  sworn  to  by  both 
parts  of  the  state,  in  fact  to  a  recognition  of  the  Plebs  as  a 
separate  community  within  the  state.  The  story  is  made  up  of 
legendary  details ;  all  we  can  gather  from  it  is  that  the  Roman 
Commons  insisted  on  having  officers  of  their  own  to  look  after 
their  interests,  and  the  military  necessities  of  the  time  enabled 
them  to  carry  their  point.  These  officers  they  called  'tribe- 
leaders  '  {tribuni)  of  the  Commons  {plebis),  taking  the  name  from 
the  tribe-officers  of  the  army-system.  They  were  at  first  two 
in  number  (like  the  consuls),  but  were  soon  raised  to  five,  and 
afterwards  to  ten.  Their  duty  was  to  protect  the  Plebeians 
against  oppressive  use  of  the  imperium.  Theirs  was  a  negative 
power,  known  as  'succour'  {auxilium).  If  one  consul  gave  an 
order,  and  his  colleague  refused  to  interfere,  a  tribune  could 
*  come  between '  {intercessit)  and  block  proceedings.  This  power 
could  be  used  at  critical  moments  to  extort  further  concessions, 
and  so  it  was;  tradition  records  a  rapid  growth  of  Plebeian 
privileges  through  the  use  of  this  weapon.  The  power  of  the 
Tribunes  gradually  became  positive  as  well  as  negative.  Why 
then  did  it  not  supersede  that  of  the  consuls  and  completely 
dominate  the  state  ?  First,  it  carried  no  imperium.  The  tribune 
of  the  Plebs  could  not  command  the  army.  Secondly,  it  was 
confined  to  the  city  precinct.  The  tribune  could  not  block  the 
orders  of  the  consul  in  the  field.  Thirdly,  a  single  tribune  could 
block  the  proceedings  of  the  rest,  and  unanimity  was  not  always 
to  be  attained.  And  in  point  of  yearly  tenure  it  was  on  the  same 
footing  as  the  consulship,  while  it  lacked  the  awe  inspired  by  the 
consulship  in  virtue  of  its  religious  character  and  the  outward 
ensigns  of  magisterial   power.     Still  it  is  evident  that  we  have 


32  provocatio  [ch. 

before  us  a  fact  of  the  first  importance  in  the  knowledge  that  the 
long  political  conflict  between  these  two  offices  did  not  bring 
about  the  disruption  of  the  Roman  state.  We  may  call  this 
a  proof  of  the  political  genius  of  the  Roman  people,  thereby 
meaning  that  the  ruling  class,  with  all  their  stubbornness,  knew 
when  to  give  way  rather  than  push  opposition  to  fatal  extremes. 

27.  Imperium  and  provocation  In  connexion  with  the  begin- 
nings of  the  Tribunate  we  may  look  at  the  changes  which  the 
overthrow  of  the  kingdom  unavoidably  caused  in  the  powers  of 
the  chief  magistracy.  We  are  told  that  the  privilege  of  appealing 
{^provocatio)  against  the  magistrate's  sentence  was  made  a  general 
legal  right,  not  a  matter  of  special  leave.  But  appeal  was  to  the 
populus  in  Assembly,  and  no  Assembly  existed  in  which  the  Plebs 
had  effective  voting-power.  Moreover  it  did  not  avail  beyond  the 
city  precinct  as  against  the  decision  of  a  consul  commanding  an 
army  in  the  field.  In  short  a  marked  distinction  was  growing  up 
between  two  degrees  of  the  imperium^  the  apparently-regal  at 
home  {domi)  and  the  truly-regal  in  the  field  {militiae).  It  must 
have  begun  very  soon,  and  the  clear  limitations  of  the  right 
of  appeal  and  tribunician  auxilium  shew  how  firmly  it  took  root. 
The  distinction  was  a  thoroughly  sound  and  practical  one,  restoring 
unity  of  power  just  where  it  was  most  wanted,  in  war.  Not  less 
practical  was  the  arrangement  soon  developed  to  make  the  local 
distinction  work  efficiently.  The  so-called  pomerium,  a  sacred 
space  within  and  without  the  whole  line  of  the  city  wall,  was  the 
boundary  of  the  district  in  which  the  citizen  could  always  appeal 
and  the  tribune  interpose.  An  ideal  line  drawn  at  the  distance  of 
a  Roman  mile  beyond  the  wall,  probably  marked  in  some  way  on 
the  roads  leading  in  the  various  directions,  was  the  boundary 
beyond  which  the  imperium  of  the  consul  became  automatically 
regal,  subject  to  no  checks.  Between  these  bounds  was  a  space 
in  which  the  eff"ect  of  the  limitations  depended  on  circumstances. 
If  the  consul  had  duly  taken  the  auspices,  made  his  vows  to 
Capitoline  Jove,  and  solemnly  marched  out  arrayed  for  war,  then 
his  full  powers  as  general  began  the  moment  he  passed  the 
pomerium.  But  formal  acts  of  the  imperium^  such  as  the  holding 
of  a  military  levy  or  the  great  census-review,  could  take  place  in 
the  between-space.  In  the  city  they  were  not  allowed,  and  the 
review-ground  was  the  '  plain  of  Mars '  {campus  Martius)  to  the 
north  of  the  Capitoline  hill.     On  such  occasions  provocatio  and 


iv]  The  Executive  33 

auxilium  were  not  barred.  An  outward  sign  of  the  greater  or 
less  fullness  of  the  imperium  was  seen  in  the  fasces  borne  by 
the  consul's  lictors.  In  war-array  each  bundle  of  rods  had  an 
axe  in  the  middle  of  it  \  otherwise  he  was  escorted  with  the  rods 
alone. 

28.  Dictatorship.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Republic  Rome 
was  constantly  engaged  in  wars  with  her  neighbours.  The  consuls 
were  often  absent  in  the  field,  either  in  joint  command  of  the 
army,  or  operating  at  different  points  with  separate  forces.  To 
maintain  the  executive  in  vigour  at  home  was  meanwhile  a  necessity. 
It  was  natural  that  the  old  regal  power  of  delegating  authority 
should  pass  to  the  consuls,  and  custom  soon  regulated  the 
principles  of  its  use.  Only  the  absence  of  both  consuls  made  it 
necessary.  The  one  last  to  leave  the  city  then  appointed  a 
deputy  to  perform  the  functions  of  the  magistracy  at  home  until 
one  or  both  of  them  should  return.  The  deputy  was  '  set  over 
the  city '  {praefectus  urbi\  and  no  doubt  administration  of  justice 
was  his  chief  duty,  though  he  could  summon  the  Senate  and 
Assembly  at  need.  It  seems  to  have  been  the  rule  that  such 
delegation  of  powers  must  take  place  whenever  the  consuls  were 
going  beyond  the  frontier.  This  was  in  these  days  generally  a 
distance  of  about  six  miles,  more  or  less.  The  Alban  mount  was 
not  in  the  ager  Romanus,  so  a  prefect  was  appointed  during  the 
absence  of  the  consuls  at  the  Latin  festival.  Afterwards,  when 
the  executive  during  war  was  otherwise  provided  for,  the  custom 
of  leaving  a  formal  deputy  during  the  festival  still  remained. 
But,  apart  from  the  provision  to  meet  the  absence  of  consuls,  it 
was  sometimes  convenient  in  seasons  of  internal  trouble  or  external 
danger  to  place  the  sovran  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  one  man, 
and  thus  regain  for  a  time  the  unity  of  direction  lost  by  abolition 
of  monarchy.  Very  early  under  the  Republic  this  need  was  met. 
One  of  the  consuls  (chosen  by  lot  or  agreement)  solemnly  named 
a  particular  person  as  'sovran  of  the  community'  {magister populi). 
This  was  an  act  not  likely  to  be  undertaken  without  consulting 
the  Senate,  and  it  was  probably  in  connexion  with  such  emergen- 
cies that  the  influence  of  the  Senate  on  the  magistrates  became 
established.  The  new  supreme  magistrate  might  also  be  a  consul, 
and  the  acting  consul  not  seldom  did  name  his  colleague.  There 
was  no  form  of  popular  election.  But  even  in  the  city  the  axe 
appeared  among  the  rods,  and  the  right  of  appeal  and  the  succour 
H.  3 


34         Responsibility,  Initiative,  Nomination       [ch. 

of  tribunes  fell  into  abeyance  for  a  while.  The  appointment  was 
strictly  for  a  purpose ;  the  dictator,  as  he  was  afterwards  called, 
was  expected  to  lay  down  his  office  so  soon  as  his  work  was  done, 
and  in  any  case  not  to  hold  it  more  than  six  months,  a  term 
calculated  no  doubt  to  suffice  for  a  campaign,  war  being  waged 
only  in  the  milder  or  warmer  seasons  of  the  year.  He  was  in 
effect  a  temporary  King. 

29.      Working   of  government.      We    have   sketched    Magi- 
stracy Senate  and  People  and  considered  their  relations  to  each 
other.     It  remains  to  speak  of  three  important  departments  of 
public  life,  responsibility,  initiative,  and  what  we  may  call  nomi- 
nation.    The  Roman  constitution  at  no  time  found  room  for  an 
official  body  or  person  authorized  by  statute  to  supervise   the 
Magistrates  and  bring  them  to  account  for  misdeeds.     Nor  was 
there  any  power  to  force  the  present  holder  of  imperium  to  stand 
a  trial,  had  there  been  a  court  to  try  him.     Thus  while  in  office 
he  was  practically  irresponsible  for  his  acts.     On  leaving  office  he 
came  under  the  imperium  of  his  successors,  who  could  judge  him 
a   traitor   or  enemy  to  the  state,  leaving  him  to  appeal   to  the 
Assembly.      But  the  Assembly  by  Centuries,  which  now  heard 
these  appeals,  was  arranged  so  that  its  decisions  turned  on  the 
votes  of  the  rich,  mostly  his  brother  Patricians,  the  very  men  who 
had  previously  conferred  sovran  power  on  him  in  the  name  of  the 
sovran  people.      They  would  not  lightly  condemn  one  of  their 
own  order  to  the  loss  of  his  life  or  civic  existence  {caput).     More- 
over he  could  not  have  acted  without  at  least  the  acquiescence 
of  his  equal  colleague :  thus  the  moral  guilt  was  not  all  his  own. 
If  such  trials  ever  did  occur  (which  is  doubtful),  responsibility  so 
enforced  was  illusory.      Later  it  became  more  serious,  when  the 
tribunes  became  strong  enough  to  deal  with  offences  against  the 
Plebs.     For  the  present  it  was  practically  non-existent,  and  never 
became  regular  or  effective  under  the  Republic.     As  for  power  of 
initiative,  in  form  it  rested  with  the  Magistrate,  but  in  practice 
the  consultation  of  the  Senate  no  doubt  enabled  that  body  to 
influence  Magistrates  from  the  first.     So  too  in  matters  of  nomi- 
nation.    Either  in  meetings  of  the  Senate  or  in  private  gatherings, 
the  Patrician  elders  were  able  to  promote  the  choice  of  trustworthy 
candidates  for  office,  to  advise  a  consul  when  and  whom  to  name 
Dictator,  to  put  pressure  on  him  to  choose  a  suitable  man  to  serve 
under  him  in  the  subordinate  post  of  quaestor.   These  three  topics 


iv]  Progress  of  the  Plebs  35 

are  concerned  with  the  practical  working  of  the  constitution  rather 
than  its  outward  form.  We  have  no  tradition  of  any  value  to  help 
us,  but  imagination  may  perhaps  safely  venture  thus  far.  And  we 
must  not  forget  that  in  the  back-ground  of  public  life  was  the 
ever-present  force  of  religion,  directed  by  the  permanent  college 
of  pontiffs,  who  would  lose  no  opportunity  of  adding  to  their 
power. 

30.  Progress  under  the  Republic  509 — 449  B.C.  Tradition 
records  a  few  points,  but  neither  dates  nor  details  are  above 
suspicion.  As  to  the  land,  we  hear  of  its  being  divided  into 
21  parts  (iribus)  in  495.  That  there  were  21  such  divisions  (4 
in  city  and  1 7  in  country)  at  this  early  date  is  very  hard  to  believe. 
In  486  we  hear  that  the  consul  Spurius  Cassius  proposed  to 
distribute  some  land  in  allotments  to  the  poor  citizens  and  to  the 
Latin  Allies  who  had  helped  to  conquer  it.  The  story  adds  that 
he  was  defeated,  chiefly  owing  to  the  jealousy  of  the  Roman 
poor,  and  put  to  death  on  the  charge  that  his  aim  was  to  make 
himself  king.  This  is  surely  nothing  but  a  fancy  picture  made  up 
of  details  belonging  to  a  later  age.  But  that  there  was  land-hunger 
in  early  times  we  may  well  believe,  and  there  are  stories  of 
pestilence  and  famine.  In  456  it  is  said  that  the  Aventine  hill, 
hitherto  state-land,  was  allotted  in  parcels  to  poor  Plebeians  and 
became  a  regular  dwelling-place.  It  seems  too  that  the  Tribes 
were  felt  to  be  the  natural  basis  for  the  grouping  of  the  Plebs. 
In  471  we  hear  that  a  law  authorized  the  Plebs  to  hold  its  own 
meetings  {concilia)  arranged  by  Tribes.  Hitherto  they  are  sup- 
posed to  have  been  arranged  by  Curies.  In  any  case  they  were 
simply  meetings  of  the  Plebs,  not  Assemblies  of  the  whole  com- 
munity {comitia)  competent  to  make  laws.  The  result  of  their 
voting  was  a  '  resolution '  (scitum),  not  a  binding  statute  {lex), 
which  must  be  passed  by  the  populus.  But  the  tribunes  had  now 
a  powerful  lever  in  their  control  of  these  great  meetings.  Their 
persons  were  inviolable  {sacro-sancti)  in  virtue  of  the  solemn 
compact  sworn  to  in  494.  They  were  even  protected  from  inter- 
ruption when  addressing  the  Commons  by  a  law  or  compact  of 
492,  under  severe  penalties.  Thus  their  power  steadily  increased, 
for  as  presidents  of  the  ever-growing  Plebs  they  were  more  and 
more  supported  by  the  irresistible  force  of  numbers.  As  the 
consuls  had  their  subordinates  the  quaestors,  so  the  tribunes  had 
under  them  two  aediles.     The  tribune  claimed  the  power  to  arrest 

3—2 


36  ~  coloniae  [ch. 

and  fine  the  consul  himself  if  he  ventured  to  injure  Plebeian 
interests.  The  encroachment  was  no  doubt  gradual,  but  in  time 
the  Plebeian  officer  became  a  match  for  the  Patrician  magistrate 
in  civil  life,  and  the  Roman  community  openly  split  into  two 
antagonistic  sections.  ..   ; 

31.  How  far  the  planting  of  town  settlements  («'/<7;i/«^),  in 
which  each  colonus  received  an  allotment  of  land,  may"  have 
appeased  the  land-hunger  of  Roman  Plebeians,  is  an  obsture 
matter.  That  these  *  colonies '  were  primarily  garrisons  is  clear 
from  their  position.  AH  those  traditionally  referred  to  this  p^iod 
were  planted  in  the  country  of  the  Volsci  or  on  the  fringe  of  it^ 
thus  serving  to  hold  a  persistent  enemy  in  check.  It  appears 
that  they  were  founded  by  the  Latins. and  Romans  in, common, 
and  were  nominally  offshoots  of  the  League.  But  no  doubt  they 
were  in  practice  more  nearly  related  to  Rome  thaiL  to  any  single 
Latin  city,  and  the  chief  gainer  by  their  foundation  was  Rome. 
This  institution  >vas  greatly  developed  later.  Meanwhile  it  is 
probable  that  Roman  Plebeians  joined  these  garrison-settlements 
freely,  becoming  'Latins,'  citizens  of  the  towns  in  which  they 
settled.  Where  there  was  a  considerable  old  population,  as  at 
Antium  on  the  coast,  we  hear  of  difficulties.  Traditionally 
founded  in  467,  the  place  was  not  securely  held  by  Rome  till  338. 
This  matter  of  colonies,  closely  connected  with  foreign  policy, 
leads  us  to  the  wars  of  the  early  Republic,  of  which  we  can 
extract  but  a  very  hazy  story  from  a  mass  of  legends  and  fictions 
put  together  in  a  later  age  and  coloured  to  satisfy  Roman 
vanity. 

32.  The  legends  connected  with  the  fall  of  the  monarchy 
dwell  upon  the  wars  with  Etruscans,  and  Latins,  attribijting  them 
to  attempts  of  the  banished  Tarquins  to  recover  their  lost  king- 
dom. We  hear  of  a  great  Etruscan  invasion  under  Porsenna. 
It  seems  that  Rome  was  taken,  or  at  least  coriipelled  to  accept 
hard  terms,  a  truth  disguised  by  the  stories  of  Roman  heroism, 
Horatius  holding  the  bridge,  Scaevola  and  his  bumt-off  hand, 
Cloelia  and  her  maidens  swimming  the  Tiber.  The  Etruscan 
lords  in  their  strongholds  were  a  great  power,  whenever  the 
several  cities  chose  to  act  together,  and  their  friendship  with  the 
Phoenicians  of  Carthage  added  to  their  other  resources  the  control  '•■ 
of  the  sea.  But  their  cities  never  acted  together  for  long,  and  the 
danger  from  Etruria  died  down  into  a  rivalry  between  Rome  and 

f 


.V] 


Wars  of  the  early  Republic 


37 


the  Etruscan  city  of  Veii,  some  ten  miles  away.  The  legend  of 
the  destruction  of  the  306  Fabii,  the  males  of  a  Patrician  clan,  is 
an  ornamental  fiction  in  the  story  of  the  Veian  wars.  But  in 
474  the  first  great  blow  fell  on  the  Etruscan  power  south  of  the 
Apennine.  The  Greeks  of  Sicily  had  destroyed  a  Carthaginian 
force  which  invaded  the  island  in  480.  Led  by  Hiero  the  ruler 
of  Syracuse,  they  now  asserted  their  power  at  sea,  and  in  a  great 
battle  off  Cumae  in  Campania  they  defeated  the  Etruscan  navy. 
The  Etruscan  power  in  Campania  now  quickly  declined,  and  the 


Neighbourhood  of  Rome. 

blow  was  doubtless  felt  in  Etruria  also.  Turning  to  the  Latins, 
we  hear  of  a  coalition  of  the  League-cities  against  Rome,  and 
a  war  so  alarming  that  it  led  (501)  to  the  appointment  of  the  first 
Dictator.  This  was  ended  by  the  famous  battle  of  the  lake 
Regillus.  But  it  seems  that  Rome  and  the  Latins  needed  each 
other,  for  in  493  the  league  between  them  was  renewed  through 
the  consul  Sp.  Cassius.  In  487  we  hear  of  a  war  in  which  the 
Hernici  were  subdued  and,  as  usual  in  such  cases,  a  large  part 
(f)  of  their  territory  annexed.  But  the  League  of  Hernican 
communities  lay  in  a  position  of  great  strategic  value,  between 


38  Foreign  Policy.     The  Claudii  [ch. 

the  Volsci  and  Aequi,  the  two  peoples  especially  troublesome  to 
Rome  and  the  Latins  on  the  South  and  East.  So  the  Hernici 
were  admitted  or  compelled  to  join  the  alliance  of  Rome  and  the 
Latins.  This  is  the  first  instance  of  a  far-sighted  foreign  policy 
never  afterwards  neglected  by  Roman  diplomacy.  Wars  with 
Volsci  and  Aequi  were  chronic,  and  lasted  on  well  into  the  next 
period.  The  stories  of  Coriolanus  and  Cincinnatus  are  legendary 
episodes  of  the  long  struggle.  But  so  long  as  the  triple  alliance 
remained  unbroken  under  Roman  guidance  the  result  was  a 
certainty.  Another  characteristic  trait  of  Roman  policy  appears 
in  the  tradition  of  Rome's  relations  with  the  Sabines.  We  still 
hear  of  wars,  and  Roman  victories  are  claimed.  It  is  not  unlikely 
that  the  hill-men  wanted  more  room  for  their  surplus  population, 
and  that  Rome  had  to  resist  pressure  on  the  north-eastern  border. 
This  she  must  have  been  able  to  do,  for  the  expansion  of  the 
Sabines  and  other  Sabellian  peoples  was  diverted  to  the  South. 
But  tradition  speaks  of  them  as  troubled  by  internal  quarrels,  and 
in  504  a  chief  named  Attius  Clausus  is  said  to  have  migrated  with 
all  his  clan  and  clients,  and  to  have  been  received  as  an  accession 
to  the  Roman  state.  Land  was  assigned  them  beyond  the 
Anio,  where  they  held  the  border  for  Rome.  Under  the  name  of 
Appius  Claudius  the  chief  became  a  Roman  Patrician,  the  founder 
of  a  family  that  played  a  notable  part  in  Roman  history.  We 
must  bear  in  mind  that  many  of  the  Patrician  houses  were  con- 
fessedly of  Sabine  origin,  and  in  a  later  period  we  shall  find  an 
exceptional  readiness  to  admit  the  Sabine  communities  to  the  full 
franchise  of  Rome.  The  story  of  Clausus  seems  to  imply  that 
the  Roman  nobility  of  birth  kept  up  a  friendly  connexion  with 
the  nobles  elsewhere.  So  the  tradition  that  the  Tarquins  allied 
themselves  with  the  chief  men  of  other  states  finds  a  parallel.  In 
general,  the  traditional  picture  of  Rome's  external  relations  in 
this  period  is  consistent  and  probable.  The  weakness  that 
followed  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins  was  gradually  overcome  by 
the  wise  policy  of  the  aristocratic  leaders,  as  the  internal  troubles 
were  met  by  wise  concessions,  unwilling,  but  enough  to  avert  the 
disruption  of  the  state.  The  tradition  that  Rome  made  a  treaty 
with  Carthage  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  Republic  is  too  doubt- 
ful to  be  discussed  here. 

33.     The  Decemvirate.     In  the  latter  years  of  this  period  we 
hear  of  a  momentous  struggle,  which  must  be  treated  by  itself. 


iv]  The  Decemvirate 


39 


We  are  told  that  in  462  a  tribune,  C.  Terentilius  Harsa,  began  an 
attack  upon  the  imperium_  vested  in  the  consuls.  Their  power  of 
jurisdiction  was  the  chief  point  assailed.  It  was  very  great ;  and 
it  is  said  that  one  of  their  early  titles  was  that  of  iudices.  Their 
decisions  were  arbitrary,  for  there  was  no  written  law  to  control 
them.  The  tribune  proposed  that  a  commission  should  be  ap- 
pointed for  drafting  statutes  to  put  an  end  to  this  evil.  The 
details  of  what  followed  are  very  doubtful,  for  legends  soon 
formed  about  so  striking  an  event  as  the  change  to  written  law. 
Not  until  454  was  an  agreement  reached.  Three  envoys  were 
sent  to  Greece  to  study  the  laws  of  various  states,  in  particular 
those  of  Solon  at  Athens.  They  returned  in  452,  and  in  451, 
after  more  bickering,  the  constitution  was  suspended  by  the 
appointment  of  ten  commissioners  to  draw  up  statutes  {decemviri 
legibus  scribundis).  They  had  consular  imperium,  and  there  were 
meanwhile  to  be  neither  consuls  nor  tribunes.  Their  power  was 
absolute  during  their  year  of  office,  for  there  was  no  appeal 
against  their  decisions.  Plebeians,  it  is  said,  were  to  be  eligible, 
but  in  fact  only  Patricians  were  chosen.  Their  leader  was  Appius 
Claudius,  probably  son  of  the  Sabine  immigrant.  Their  year's 
work,  besides  a  popular  administration,  was  ten  tables  of  law, 
which  were  exposed  for  criticism  and,  after  some  amendment, 
passed  as  statutes  by  the  Centuriate  Assembly.  But  there  was 
still  enough  matter  left  to  fill  two  tables  more,  so  it  was  agreed  to 
appoint  Decemvirs  for  another  year  to  finish  the  work.  Appius 
now  appears  in  the  story  as  laying  aside  all  scruples.  He  procured 
by  various  arts  the  election  of  nine  insignificant  persons,  five  of 
them  probably  Plebeians,  all  amenable  to  his  influence,  and  in 
defiance  of  custom  (for  he  presided  at  the  election)  himself  as 
the  tenth.  After  this  he  threw  off  the  mask.  A  reign  of  terror 
followed,  and  men  soon  longed  for  the  restoration  of  the  old  form 
of  government.  The  treacherous  murder  of  the  popular  champion 
Siccius,  and  the  affair  of  the  maiden  Verginia,  are  episodes  in  the 
tradition  of  decemviral  tyranny.  As  usual  in  the  story  of  early 
Rome,  what  relieved  the  internal  distress  was  the  pressure  of 
external  war.  Two  armies  had  to  be  raised  to  meet  the  Sabines 
and  Aequi,  and  the  march  of  these  armies  on  the  city,  followed 
by  a  'secession'  of  Plebeians,  overthrew  the  Decemvirs.  The 
tribunate  and  the  consulship  were  restored,  and  two  Patricians  of 
popular   tendencies,   L.  Valerius  and  M.   Horatius,  were  made 


40  Law  of  the  Twelve  Tables  [ch. 

consuls.  The  two  supplementary  tables  were  passed,  and  the 
whole  set,  the  famous  Twelve,  engraved  on  bronze  tablets  and 
posted  up  in  public  view. 

34.     The  Twelve  Tables.     A  few  points  in  reference  to  these 
statutes  must  be  mentioned.     From  the  fragments  preserved  by 
later  writers  it  is  clear  that  they  were  drafted  in  a  brief  and  jerky 
style,    needing   comment   to   extract   the    meaning.     From    this 
necessity  arose  Roman  jurisprudence,  a  science  which  began  with 
explaining  the  intended  effect  of  the  clauses  in  relation  to  actual 
cases,  but  soon  felt  constrained  to  interpret  more  freely,  reading 
into  the  text  more  than  its  framers  had  intended.     It  appears  that 
the  laws  regulated  legal  procedure,  but  did  not  supply  the  verbal 
forms  on  which  the  validity  of  pleadings  generally  turned.     Thus 
a  most  important  part  of  the  procedure  still  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  pontiffs.     It  is  said  that  the  sums  of  fines  etc.  were  not 
stated  in  heads  of  stock  but  in  metallic  money,  a  striking  in- 
novation.    Whether  this  was  strictly  coin  (taken  by  the  piece)  or 
stamped  copper  or  bronze  (taken  by  weight)  is  not  certain,  but 
pecunia  took  the  place  of  pecus.     The  statutes  were  mainly  con- 
cerned with  the  law  of  property,  family  rights,  successions  (in- 
cluding a  limited  power  of  testamentary  disposition),  contracts 
(including  debt),  personal  wrongs  admitting  retaliation  or  compen- 
sation.   But  there  were  also  rules  for  upholding  good  customs  such 
as  simplicity  of  funeral  rites.    There  were  also  constitutional  rules, 
as  that  by  which  the  appeals  in  cases  affecting  a  man's  civic  ex- 
istence {caput)  were  reserved  to  the  Assembly  by  Centuries,  and 
that  by  which  it  was  forbidden  to  propose  laws  aimed  at  indi- 
viduals {prwilegta).      Two  notable  provisions  are  attributed  to 
the  supplementary  tables.     First,  the  refusal  to  legalize  marriage 
between  Patricians  and  Plebeians,  that  is  to  allow  the  children  of 
such  a  marriage  to  succeed  to  the  status  of  the  father.     Secondly, 
the  affirmation  of  the  principle  that  a  later  law  supersedes  an 
earlier  one  on  the  same  subject.     The  Twelve  Tables  as  a  whole 
may  be  said  to  have  contained  three  elements.    First,  Survivals, 
or  the  translation  of  old  customary  law  into  written  Statutes. 
Secondly,    simplifications    and    improvements.      Thirdly,    direct 
borrowings  from  foreign  systems.    Of  these  three  the  first  was  surely 
much  the  most  important.    And  the  mere  fact  of  having  something 
fixed  in  writing,  as  a  point  of  departure  for  future  development, 
was  perhaps  a  greater  achievement  than  any  immediate  gain. 


iv]  leges   Valeriae  Horatiae  41 

35.  The  Valerio-Horatian  Laws.  The  consulship  of  Valerius 
and  Horatius  (449)  was  in  later  days  held  to  have  marked  a  great 
advance  in  the  political  growth  of  Rome.  They  carried  laws 
which  were  famous  as  the  charter  of  the  recovered  rights  of 
the  Plebs.  One  of  these  enacted  that  the  Plebs  meeting  by 
Tribes  should  have  power  to  pass  resolutions  binding  on  the  whole 
community.  Probably  some  confirmation  of  these  was  required. 
It  is  suggested  that  a  regular  method  of  procuring  the  sanction  of 
the  Senate  or  the  Centuriate  Assembly,  or  both,  was  provided. 
The  tradition  is  incomplete.  But  it  seems  that  this  change  led 
to  the  institution  of  another  formal  legislative  Assembly  {comiHa 
tributd)  which  included  Patricians  as  well  as  Plebeians,  and  was 
grouped  by  Tribes.  The  number  of  Tribes  was  small  (not  more 
than  21),  the  members  of  each  were  landholders  enrolled  in  that 
Tribe ;  rich  or  poor,  each  man  had  an  equal  voice  in  determining 
the  vote  of  his  Tribe.  This  simple  grouping  had  been  used  in 
Plebeian  meetings  since  471.  But  the  steps  by  which  a  regular 
Assembly  of  the  popuhis  on  a  Tribe-basis  was  evolved  are  not 
known.  It  had  no  appeal-jurisdiction  in  cases  of  a  'capital'  kind. 
These  the  Twelve  Tables  reserved  to  the  Centuries,  perhaps  because 
tribunes  had  been  usurping  jurisdiction  over  opponents  of  Plebeian 
claims,  with  appeal  to  their  separate  Plebeian  meetings.  On  this 
supposition  the  Plebeians  now  lost  their  capital  jurisdiction,  retain- 
ing a  power  to  impose  fines,  while  they  gained  in  the  direction  of 
legislative  power.  This  latter  power  was  not  completely  freed  from 
restrictions  till  162  years  after.  Another  law  forbade  the  election  of 
any  magistrate  from  whose  judgment  there  should  be  no  appeal.  To 
make  this  rule  operative  the  responsibility  was  laid  on  the  presiding 
magistrate  guilty  of  declaring  such  an  election :  he  was  outlawed, 
and  might  be  put  to  death  with  impunity.  But  the  non-elective 
dictatorship,  and  the  sovran  power  of  the  consul  in  the  field,  were 
left  as  absolute  as  before.  To  this  law  a  corollary  was  added  in  a 
resolution  of  the  Plebs,  declaring  that  whosoever  '  left  the  Plebs 
without  tribunes'  should  be  scourged  and  put  to  death.  This  was 
a  direction  to  the  tribunes  to  provide  successors  in  their  office. 
No  Plebeian  institution  existed  corresponding  to  the  Patrician 
interregnum^  and  we  may  believe  that  by  this  time  the  Roman 
Commoners  had  learnt  the  impossibility  of  dispensing  with  the 
power  of  initiative  vested  in  regular  leaders.  The  Plebs  had 
now  recovered  its  hard-won  rights,  and  gained  something  more ; 


42  The  Republic  [ch.  iv 

and  the  scene  closes  dramatically  with  victories  over  the  Aequi 
and  Sabines. 

36.  Such  is  in  outline  the  picture  of  the  early  Republic  and 
its  progress  within  and  without  under  conditions  of  strain  and 
stress.  The  struggle  of  the  two  Orders  was  only  begun,  but  each 
concession  gave  the  Plebeians  a  lever  to  extort  more,  and  their 
growth  in  numbers  (and  probably  in  wealth)  foreshadowed  the 
inevitable  end.  The  extension  of  Roman  dominion  was  as  yet 
trivial,  but  the  avoidance  of  bloody  revolutions,  the  slow  consoli- 
dation of  the  state,  and  the  beginnings  of  a  far-sighted  foreign 
policy,  were  signs  of  something  hitherto  unknown  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  The  Roman  People  was  in  the  making,  growing 
from  within  and  incorporating  or  attacking  others  from  without, 
in  a  way  never  seen  before.  Among  all  the  legendary  corruption 
of  annals  composed  long  after  this  period,  of  which  we  have  but 
reports  at  second  or  third  hand,  without  any  statistics  to  check 
them,  this  much  may  I  think  safely  be  affirmed. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  REPUBLIC  448—367  B.C. 

37.  Magistracy.  In  a  period  of  just  over  80  years  the 
republican  system  now  took  a  form  which  later  generations  were 
to  modify  in  practice  but  not  professedly  to  reconstruct.  The 
development  of  the  Roman  magistracy  was  made  necessary  by  the 
growth  of  the  state,  but  it  was  carried  out  only  after  a  series  of 
concessions  and  evasions  which  make  up  the  long  struggle  of  the 
Orders.  The  first  consular  prerogative  to  go  was  the  right  of  the 
consul  to  appoint  his  own  quaestor.  In  447  we  hear  that  election 
took  the  place  of  nomination.  The  quaestors  would  be  elected  for 
the  following  year,  and  clearly  they  were  on  their  way  to  become 
real  magistrates.  In  421  their  number  wa^  raised  from  two  to 
four,  and  Plebeians  made  eligible.  In  445  a  proposal  of  the 
tribunes  to  throw  open  the  consulship'  to  Plebeians  was  met  by 
an  evasive  Patrician  scheme,  which  was  carried.  Each  year  there 
was  to  be  an  option.  The  chief  magistrates  might  be  either  two 
Patrician  consuls,  or  'tribunes  of  the  soldiers  with  consular  power,' 
who  might  be  Plebeians.  In  the  ensuing  78  years  we  hear  of  this 
makeshift  office  5 1  times.  The  number  of  these  consular  tribunes 
was  at  first  three,  then  four,  and  in  the  latter  part  of  the  period  six. 
The  increase  in  the  number  of  holders  of  imperium  was  an  impor- 
tant step,  perhaps  dictated  by  growing  needs.  The  advance  of  the 
Plebs  was  seen  in  the  election  of  the  first  Plebeian  to  this  office  in 
400.  Things  were  moving;  in  407  three  out  of  four  quaestors 
were  Plebeians.  In  443^  the  recent  proposal  (445)  in  regard  to 
the  consulship  probably  had  some  effect  in  hastening  the  reason- 
able transference  of  some  hitherto  consular  duties  to  new  officers. 

^  In  435  according  to  Mommsen. 


44  Censorship  [ch. 

These  duties  were  those  connected  with  the  census^  and  the  officials 
were  called  censores^  two  equal  colleagues,  charged  with  the  periodi- 
cal revision  of  the  register  of  citizens  and  their  properties.  The 
normal  revision-period  was  every  fourth  year,  the  fifth  by  the  old 
Roman  reckoning,  and  the  consuls  had  not  the  leisure  to  do  the 
work  regularly.  It  was  necessary  to  see  that  every  citizen  was 
placed  in  his  proper  Class  Century  and  Tribe,  in  order  to  deter- 
mine what  his  rights  and  duties  in  relation  to  the  state  were  to  be 
until  the  next  census.  This  involved  the  preparation  of  the  list  of 
senators,  and  that  of  the  equites  or  '  Knights '  liable  to  cavalry- 
service.  Such  functions,  at  first  regarded  as  subordinate  (the 
censor  had  no  imperzum),  were  likely  to  become  more  important  in 
time.  And  the  classification  of  citizens  according  to  property  was 
not  all.  It  was  the  censors'  duty  to  degrade  those  whose  behaviour 
in  peace  or  war  was  a  scandal  to  Roman  notions  of  right.  Thus 
they  had  to  inquire  into  men's  life  and  conduct  (mores)  judged  by 
the  standard  of  approved  Roman  practice  {disciplino)^  an  arbitrary 
jurisdiction  which  was  soon  held  to  include  the  right  of  interfer- 
ence in  matters  of  private  life.  That  the  powers  of  the  censorship 
grew  we  shall  see  later.  An  important  department  of  its  work  was 
the  supervision  of  state-contracts  {publico)^  whether  the  right  to 
collect  state  dues  was  granted  to  lessees  for  a  fixed  payment,  or 
public  works  let  to  contractors  at  a  fixed  price.  The  bargain  held 
good  until  the  next  census.  Under  this  farming-out  system  a 
regular  class  of  state-contractors  {publicani)  grew  up,  and  the 
censorship  became  the  chief  organ  of  finance.  No  responsibility 
attached  to  ex-censors  for  official  acts.  The  term  of  office  was  a 
year  and  a  half.  The  censorial  period  of  four  (afterwards  five) 
years  was  at  first  not  strictly  observed.  No  statute  seems  to  have 
confined  the  office  to  Patricians,  but  in  practice  it  was  so  confined 
till  351.  No  doubt  the  religious  function  of  the  closing  purifica- 
tion {lusfru?7i)  had  much  to  do  with  this,  for  no  Plebeian  censor 
performed  that  ceremony  till  280.  The  office  was  soon  regarded 
as  one  of  supreme  dignity,  only  to  be  held  by  ex-consuls,  in  short 
the  crown  of  an  official  career. 

38.  Thus  by  the  loss  of  certain  powers  and  functions  the 
consulship  was  steadily  becoming  less  regal  in  character.  But  it 
was  still  felt  to  be  the  normal  chief  magistracy,  and  the  Patricians 
clung  firmly  to  their  monopoly  of  it.  The  expedient  of  consular 
tribunes  was   a   temporary  one.     Once   Plebeians   began  to  be 


v]  The  struggle  of  the  Orders  45 

elected,  and  no  harm  came  of  it,  their  demand  to  share  the 
consulship  grew  stronger.  Another  Patrician  device  was  the 
appointment  of  dictators,  resorted  to  15  times  in  this  period, 
not  always  under  the  pressure  of  war.  M.  Furius  Camillus,  the 
great  man  of  the  time,  was  five  times  dictator.  But  this  plan  also 
was  one  that  could  not  be  in  constant  use,  for  fear  of  reviving  the 
monarchy.  Yet  the  Patricians  struggled  on.  It  seems  that  already 
there  was  a  division  of  interests  among  Plebeians,  and  that  the 
Tribunes  of  the  Commons  were  not  unanimous.  Thus  in  417 
we  hear  of  a  bill  {rogatio)  for  allotments  of  some  conquered  land, 
which  is  said  to  have  fallen  through  owing  to  some  tribunes 
blocking  the  proposal  made  by  others.  We  shall  see  below  how 
this  weakening  division  was  ended  and  the  Plebeians  won  the 
consulship.  Meanwhile  the  tribunate  was  steadily  gaining  ground. 
It  appears  that  the  tribunes  had  acquired  the  right  to  sit  by  the 
door  of  the  senate-house  and  watch  proceedings.  We  hear  of 
their  intercessio  against  decrees  of  the  House.  In  fact,  so  long  as 
they  pulled  together  and  had  the  whole  Plebs  to  support  them, 
there  was  no  way  of  resisting  their  obstructive  power. 

39.  Senate.  Two  sets  of  causes  affecting  the  position  of  the 
Senate  were  at  work  in  this  period ;  their  effects  become  manifest 
in  the  next.  On  the  one  hand,  great  emergencies  threw  the 
direction  of  state  policy  more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  a  body 
which  according  to  traditional  dates  (509,  449)  had  now  the 
authority  given  by  60  years  of  free  experience.  On  the  other,  the 
growth  of  the  Plebs  and  the  struggle  of  the  Orders  tended  to 
weaken  the  hands  of  a  body  still  in  the  main  Patrician.  That 
Plebeians  of  wealth  and  position  were  finding  their  way  into  the 
House  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  they  had  been  eligible 
for  the  Decemvirate  and  were  now  admitted  to  the  quaestorship 
and  consular  tribunate.  But  it  seems, certain  that  they  were  few. 
With  the  extinction  of  some  old  Patrician  houses  it  was  necessary 
to  strengthen  the  Senate  by  including  Plebeians,  but  the  men  of 
the  old  clans  were  slow  to  recognize  the  necessity.  It  was  probably 
in  this  period  that  the  procedure  of  the  House  took  its  regular 
form,  little  modified  in  later  times.  The  order  in  which  the 
presiding  magistrate  called  on  members  to  express  their  views, 
magistrates  and  ex-magistrates  having  the  precedence,  the  rules 
of  debate,  the  methods  of  division,  with  power  to  count  votes 
when  desired,  were  the  chief  features.     A  final  order  or  ruling  of 


46  Senate  [ch. 

the  House  was  a  *  conclusion  reached  in  common '  (called 
consultum) :  viewed  as  a  concurrence  in  the  magistrate's  order 
it  was  a  '  decision  '  (decretuvi).  The  two  terms  were  afterwards 
used  loosely  as  equivalents,  when  the  Senate  had  become  in 
practice  a  governing  body.  It  was  recorded  in  writing  at  the  end 
of  the  sitting,  and  the  correctness  of  the  draft  attested  by  adding 
the  names  of  those  senators  who  had  watched  its  preparation. 
But  a  magistrate  of  powers  equal  to  those  of  the  chairman  could 
interpose  a  Veto,  so  that  the  conclusion  became  invalid,  and  this 
right  was  in  this  period  successfully  claimed  by  tribunes  of  the 
Plebs.  In  these  circumstances  it  soon  became  the  custom  to 
record  the  conclusion  nevertheless.  It  was  not  a  formal  consultum 
but  a  '  resolution  of  the  House '  {senatus  auctoritas)  which  on 
removal  of  the  hindrance  might  be  agreed  to  as  a  final  order 
without  further  debate.  We  can  see  how  strong  the  power  of 
magistrates  still  was.  The  presiding  consul  decided  what  question 
he  would  put,  and  the  old  notion  that  the  Senate  was  his  Advisory 
Board  was  by  no  means  extinct.  In  bringing  the  matter  to 
a  vote  he  was  said  to  make  {facere)  an  order  of  the  Senate. 

40.  But  the  real  influence  of  the  Senate  was  certainly 
growing.  A  strong  dictator  backed  up  by  the  collective  wisdom 
of  the  Fathers  gave  Rome  at  a  critical  moment  six  months  of  the 
most  effective  government  known,  concentrated  power  and  moral 
force.  And  it  became  more  and  more  difficult  for  the  strongest 
magistrate  to  ignore  or  reject  the  opinion  of  the  House.  By 
degrees  it  was  getting  into  its  hands  all  matters  in  which  the 
policy  of  the  state,  rather  than  the  enactment  of  statutes,  was  in 
question.  Thus  it  dealt  with  public  religious  worships,  with 
jurisdiction  in  cases  where  a  precedent  had  to  be  created,  with 
the  provisions  for  raising  and  equipping  an  army.  Commanders 
sought  its  advice  on  doubtful  points,  and  received  from  it  the 
honours  that  rewarded  victory.  Dealings  with  Allies,  the  treat- 
ment of  conquests,  terms  of  peace  with  enemies,  and  external 
policy  generally,  came  before  the  Senate.  The  finance  of  the 
state  was  soon  brought  under  its  control,  and  this  enabled  the 
House  to  interfere  in  other  departments,  by  voting  or  refusing 
special  grants  of  money.  In  internal  administration,  such  as  the 
maintenance  of  order  or  provision  against  dearth,  it  became  the 
regular  custom  for  magistrates  to  seek  the  approval  of  the  Senate 
for  the  measures  necessary,  in  short  for  every  departure  from 


v]  Assemblies  47 

routine.  And  every  time  its  approval  was  thus  sought  one  more 
precedent  was  added  to  the  existing  heap,  till  the  weight  became 
irresistible.  For  the  present  magistrates  still  kept  some  indepen- 
dent power,  and  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  interfere  in  so  many 
various  departments  was  not  conferred  on  that  House  by  statute- 
law.  But  unwritten  custom  was  at  work,  slowly  converting  the 
power  of  '  sanction '  or  '  guarantee '  {auctoritas)  into  a  means  of 
controlling  the  whole  machinery  of  government.  It  was  only  the 
struggle  of  the  Orders  during  this  period  that  effectually  delayed 
th^  Senate's  attainment  of  such  a  control.  Let  the  Plebeian  once 
be  equalized  with  the  Patrician,  and  this  check  on  senatorial 
aggrandizement  would  be  removed. 

41.  Assemblies.  The  Assemblies  of  the  community  could 
now  be  held  in  three  forms,  by  Curies  Centuries  or  Tribes  {curtattm, 
centuriatim^  tributini).  The  first  method  was  in  practice  obsolete, 
save  for  certain  formal  and  religious  purposes.  The  second  was 
the  sovran  Assembly  for  legislation,  capital  appeal-trials,  and 
declaration  of  war.  The  third  was  new,  hardly  as  yet  in  full 
activity,  not  yet  possessed  of  final  legislative  power,  but  on  the 
way  to  gain  it.  Meanwhile  it  could  pass  resolutions,  and  the 
growth  of  the  Plebeian  majority  made  it  more  and  more  difficult 
for  the  Centuries  and  the  Senate  to  refuse  to  accept  and  confirm 
them.  These  three  were  comitia  of  the  populus,  and  it  was  recog- 
nized that  from  the  populus  all  sovran  power  was  derived.  The 
Assembly  by  Tribes  grew  out  of  the  '  meeting  of  the  Commons ' 
{concilium  plebis),  in  which  Patricians  had  no  part,  but  in  true 
Roman  fashion  the  development  of  the  comitia  tributa  did  not 
abolish  the  Plebeian  meeting.  Strange  it  is,  but  it  seems  certain, 
that  the  two  existed  side  by  side  to  the  last  age  of  the  Republic. 
As  the  ancient  clans  dwindled,  and  Patricians  became  few,  the 
composition  of  the  voting  Tribes  was  practically  the  same  in  both 
cases.  But  they  differed  in  respect  of  their  presiding  officers. 
For  regular  comitia  a  regular  magistrate  was  required,  but  the 
tribune  of  the  Commons,  not  as  yet  a  regular  magistrate  and 
never  possessed  of  imperium^  was  from  the  first  the  regular 
president  of  Plebeian  meetings,  and  it  was  in  these  meetings  that 
the  tribunes  were  elected.  Nor  did  they  stand  in  the  same 
relation  to  religion.  The  Plebeian  officer  could  not  as  such  take 
the  auspices  on  behalf  of  the  state  {publica)^  for  his  powers  were 
not  derived  from  the  populus,  so  the  exclusively  Plebeian  meeting 


48  lex  Canuleia  [ch. 

did  without  them.  This  does  not  mean  that  an  unlucky  sign  (an 
earthquake  etc.)  would  be  disregarded,  but  that  signs  from  birds 
would  not  be  looked  for,  or  only  as  a  personal  matter  {privata). 
The  number  of  Tribes  was  raised  in  this  period  (389)  from  21 
to  25. 

42.  Progress  under  the  Republic  448 — 367  B.C.  The  first 
serious  sign  of  the  coming  collapse  of  Patrician  opposition 
appeared  in  the  year  445,  when  the  tribune  Canuleius  succeeded 
in  having  his  proposal,  to  recognize  marriages  between  Patricians 
and  Plebeians  as  legal,  passed  into  law.  If  the  tradition  be 
sound,  he  would  seem  to  have  thus  procured  the  repeal  of  a  law 
of  the  Twelve  Tables.  Henceforth  the  child  of  a  mixed  marriage 
would  be  Patrician  or  Plebeian  according  to  the  status  of  the 
father  ;  the  child  of  a  Plebeian  mother  could  succeed  to  all  the 
religious  quality  hitherto  vested  solely  in  those  of  pure  Patrician 
blood.  This  change  clearly  points  to  a  recognition  of  the  simpler 
forms  of  a  Plebeian  marriage  as  valid  from  the  point  of  view 
of  Patrician  family  law.  Patricians  could  and  did  still  use  their 
elaborate  ancestral  forms  among  themselves,  and  a  few  old  priest- 
hoods were  still  reserved  to  the  offspring  of  such  marriages.  But 
the  door  was  opened  for  a  blending  of  the  Orders,  and  the  case 
for  Patrician  monopoly  of  imperium  and  auspicium  was  given  up 
from  the  religious  side,  just  as  it  was  from  the  political  side  by 
the  expedient  of  consular  tribunes.  The  capacity  of  the  Plebeians 
for  equal  rights  was  virtually  admitted,  and  the  tendency  of  the 
formal  Roman  religion  to  become  a  mere  political  instrument  no 
doubt  strengthened.  In  short,  we  are  at  the  beginning  of  a  new 
division  of  interests  in  the  state,  a  cleavage  marked  by  a  line 
between  Rich  and  Poor,  destined  to  shew  itself  clearly,  and  to 
become  permanent,  so  soon  as  the  struggle  of  the  Orders  came 
to  an  end.  The  frequent  wars  and  devastation  of  farms  would 
assuredly  cause  much  distress.  It  is  not  wonderful  that  we  hear 
of  a  great  dearth  of  food.  Tradition  tells  how  one  Sp.  Maelius 
tried  to  relieve  the  poor  by  doles  of  imported  corn,  and  was  put 
to  death  (439)  on  the  ground  that  he  aimed  at  monarchy  in  thus 
courting  popular  favour.  So  too  we  hear  of  the  pressure  of  debt, 
of  the  attempt  of  M.  Manlius  (the  defender  of  the  Capitol  against 
the  Gauls)  to  give  relief,  and  his  execution  (384)  on  the  same 
ground.  These  stories  are  coloured  by  later  imagination,  but  the 
picture  of  distress  is  probably  founded  on  fact,  and  it  helps  to 


v]  The  Army  49 

explain  the  long  agitation  at  the  end  of  this  period,  ending  in  the 
Licinian  laws. 

43.  In  a  state  where  Citizen  and  Soldier  were  the  same,  two 
characters  in  one  person,  where  the  Army  and  the  sovran  Assembly 
were  one,  in  an  age  when  the  sword  was  the  active  organ  of  foreign 
policy,  the  importance  of  a  good  military  system  was  naturally 
immense.  We  hear  that  in  406,  when  the  warfare  with  Veii 
entered  on  its  last  stage,  the  necessity  of  winter  operations  led  to 
a  change  in  the  conditions  of  service.  It  is  said  that  the  state- 
treasury  undertook  to  provide  pay.  The  details  of  the  change 
are  obscure,  but  it  is  enough  that  the  burdens  of  the  citizen 
drawn  away  from  his  civil  occupations  were  in  some  way  lightened. 
And  it  seems  fairly  certain  that  the  new  organization  of  the  field 
army,  which  was  in  working  order  during  the  next  period,  was  at 
least  begun  in  the  present,  and  probably  due  to  Camillus.  It  was 
partly  a  change  of  formation.  The  old  order  of  battle  consisted 
mainly  in  a  solid  phalanx  or  column  of  foot,  with  the  best-armed 
men  in  front.  It  must  have  been  very  clumsy,  and  hardly  to  be 
reformed  when  once  broken.  We  may  guess  that  in  390  it  had 
proved  a  failure  against  the  Gauls.  In  the  new  order  each  corps 
or  army-unit  {legio)  consisted  of  thirty  companies  or  '  handfuls ' 
{manipuli)^  and  each  maniple  was  divided  into  two  sections 
{centuriae).  There  were  three  fighting  lines.  First  stood  10 
maniples  (120  men  each)  of  hastati^  the  younger  men.  Next 
10  (120  each)  oi  principeSyVaen  of  ripe  manhood.  Behind  them 
were  10  (60  each)  of  triarii^  old  soldiers.  Their  special  functions, 
to  lead  the  attack,  to  push  it  home,  and  to  act  as  a  steady  reserve, 
are  obvious.  To  these  3000  infantry  of  the  line  were  added  1200 
light  troops  (velites)  and  300  cavalry,  and  the  combatant  legion 
was  complete.  The  foot  were  so  arranged  that  there  was  standing- 
room  for  a  maniple  between  each  two  maniples  of  the  same  line, 
while  those  of  the  next  line  stood  opposite  these  gaps.  Thus  the 
new  order  gave  great  freedom  of  movement,  and,  if  one  part  of  the 
line  was  thrown  into  disorder,  the  rest  of  the  companies,  trained 
to  act  as  separate  units,  need  not  lose  their  fighting  efficiency. 
Moreover,  the  skirmishers  could  retreat  through  the  gaps  without 
throwing  the  main  body  into  confusion.  The  horse,  in  this  period 
still  efficient,  fought  on  the  wings.  The  one  grave  defect  of  the 
manipular  legion  was  that  it  could  be  rolled  up  into  a  mass  by  a 
sudden  charge  of  cavalry. 

H.  4 


50  The  Legion.     Allied  contingents  [ch. 

44.  The  arms  and  armour  of  the  soldiers  were  also  improved. 
A  handy  sword,  good  for  thrusting,  was  introduced  now  or  soon 
after,  and  other  changes  made.  The  chief  of  these  was  that  the 
spear  {hasta)  was  used  by  the  triarii  only.  To  the  men  in  the 
first  and  second  lines  was  given  a  heavy  javelin  (pilum),  which 
was  hurled  at  the  enemy  and  followed  up  at  close  quarters  with 
the  sword.  This  method  of  attack,  perhaps  developed  by  expe- 
rience in  the  next  period,  became  the  characteristic  movement  of 
Roman  tactics.  When  the  regular  system  of  encampments,  with 
earthwork  and  palisade,  first  came  in,  is  not  known,  but  it  seems 
to  have  been  already  in  use,  and  the  spade  did  much  to  promote 
the  advance  of  Roman  power.  Of  officers  we  need  only  note  that 
each  legion  had  six  captains  {tribuni  militum),  and  each  maniple 
two  centurions  or  sergeants,  one  to  each  century.  On  the 
embodiment  of  a  legion  every  man  took  the  solemn  military  oath 
{sacr amentum)^  binding  him  to  obey  orders  and  flinch  from  no 
danger,  and  there  were  no  limits  to  the  power  of  a  general  in  the 
field.  Such  in  brief  outline  was  the  Roman  army.  But  we 
must  not  forget  the  Allies,  the  Latin  and  Hernican  contingents 
furnished  according  to  treaties.  No  doubt  they  were  good 
soldiers,  probably  equipped  and  organized  very  much  like  the 
Romans,  perhaps  not  with  quite  the  same-  uniformity.  And 
troops  drawn  from  a  number  of  scattered  communities  would 
hardly  attain  full  military  cohesion  in  the  course  of  a  short 
campaign.  But  on  the  whole  we  have  good  reason  to  believe 
that  no  combination  so  effective  and  so  capable  of  development 
as  that  of  Rome  and  her  Allies  existed  in  any  part  of  Italy.  It  is 
clear  that  the  tendency  of  the  Roman  army-reform  was  to  employ 
each  soldier-citizen  in  the  kind  of  work  for  which  he  was  best  fitted, 
discarding  obsolete  considerations  of  social  and  political  status. 
In  the  long  run  this  would  have  a  levelling  influence  on  politics. 
And  frequent  contact  with  the  Allies  as  comrades  in  arms  would 
surely  promote  some  assimilation,  enough  to  make  jealousies 
and  quarrels  less  bitter.  These  tendencies  should  be  borne  in 
mind,  for  they  were  working  powerfully  both  now  and  in  a  later 
age. 

45.  The  general  course  of  Roman  expansion  in  this  period 
is  to  be  traced  by  the  foundation  of  colonies  and  the  allotment 
of  land.  The  tradition  on  these  points  agrees  on  the  whole  with 
the  story  of  the  wars.     We  hear  of  five  '  Latin '  colonies,  Ardea 


v]  Colonies.     Land-allotments  51 

(442)  Satricum  (385)  and  Setia  (382)  in  the  land  of  the  Rutuli 
and  Volsci,  and  Sutrium  with  Nepete  (383)  in  Etruria.     These 
mark  the  advance  of   Rome  southwards  and  northwards.     The 
settlers  would  be  '  Latins,'  some  perhaps  drawn  from  the  Latin  or 
Hernican  Allies,  but  probably  most  of  them  Roman  Plebeians 
who  migrated  to  secure  plots  of   land,  giving   up  their  Roman 
citizenship.     We  also  hear  of  land  allotted  in  parcels  to  Roman 
citizens,  as  the  territory  of  conquered  Veii  (393)  and  some  of  the 
Pomptine  lowland  (383).     Whether  the  earlier  allotment  at  Labici 
(418  or  417)  took  the  form  of  founding  a  citizen-colony  is  doubt- 
ful.    But  in  any  case  it  seems  clear  that  a  considerable  relief  of 
land-hunger    took    place   without   a    corresponding   increase   of 
Plebeian  citizens.     This  was  surely  no   accident,  but  deliberate 
policy  guided  by  the  Senate.     In  387  there  were  four  new  Tribes 
formed  in  the  Veientine  district,  but  this  was  all.     That  the  land- 
hunger  was  not  at  an  end  we  shall  see  below.     It  is  also  clear  that 
the  removal   of   discontented  Plebeians   to  garrison-towns  both 
relieved  political  pressure  within  and  strengthened  the  hold  of 
Rome  on  her  own  territory.     The  first  shock  of  invasion,  and  the 
damage  of  border-raids,  would  fall  either  on  the  garrison  colonies 
or  on  the  Latin-Hernican  Allies,  while   the  old   ager  Romanus 
would  suffer  little.     The  stories  of  conflict  and  the  temporary  loss 
of  colonies,  which  had  to  be  recovered  or  reinforced,  particularly 
on  the  Volscian  seaboard,  serve  to  confirm  this  view.     We  must 
also  note  that  most  of  the  advance  of  Roman  posts  is  placed 
after  the  Gaulish  invasion  (traditional  date   390).     That  willing 
colonists  were  found  may  be  a  result  of  Roman  distress.     That 
posts  could  be  found  in  which  to  plant  them  may  be  a  sign  of  the 
extent  to  which  the  neighbouring  peoples  had  been  shaken  by  the 
coming  of  the  Gauls. 

46.  The  story  of  the  wars  of  Rome  is  still  full  of  legendary 
matter,  dressed  up  by  later  writers  to  please  the  Romans  and 
gratify  the  pride  of  great  houses.  A  few  points  are  fairly  certain. 
First,  the  Aequi  and  Volsci  had  by  the  end  of  this  period  ceased 
to  be  serious  rivals  of  Rome  and  her  Allies.  They  never  re- 
covered from  their  overthrow  in  the  war  of  431.  We  hear  of 
risings  in  389  and  385,  both  unsuccessful.  But  our  tradition 
says  that  in  these  later  wars  they  had  sympathy  and  secret  help  of 
volunteers  from  Roman  Allies.  This  tradition  is  not  to  be  ignored, 
for  about  this  time  the  relations  of  Rome  and  her  Allies  seem  to 

4—2 


52  Latins.     Etruscans  [ch. 

have  been  changed,  a  change  of  which  we  have  no  direct  account. 
It  is  inferred  that  Rome  put  a  stop  to  extensions  of  the  Latin 
League.  Henceforth  no  newly-founded  Latin  community  was 
admitted  a  member  of  the  League.  The  League  as  a  federal 
organization  was  left  on  its  present  footing,  to  become  more  and 
more  a  shadow.  The  new  Latin  colonies  were  connected  by 
reciprocity  of  private  rights  {commercium  and  conubium)  with 
Rome  only,  not  with  the  old  Latin  towns  or  with  each  other. 
This  ingenious  device,  doubtless  the  Senate's  work,  became  a  fixed 
principle  of  Roman  policy.  The  connecting  threads  formed  by 
the  blending  of  private  interests  were  meant  to  meet  in  Rome  as 
a  centre.  By  this  centralizing  influence,  always  operative,  Rome 
could  go  on  binding  new  communities  to  herself  over  a  wider  and 
wider  area,  without  sacrificing  her  position  as  their  natural  leader 
or  creating  rivals.  The  final  settlement  with  the  League  had  to 
wait  for  another  half-century,  but  the  present  change  of  policy 
foreshadowed  the  end.  Meanwhile  we  hear  of  war  between  Rome 
and  some  old  Latin  cities,  such  as  Praeneste  and  Tusculum. 
The  latter,  on  its  submission  in  381,  is  said  to  have  received  the 
Roman  franchise.  Whether  this  was  the  full  ctvitas,  including 
the  '  public  rights '  with  enrolment  in  a  Roman  Tribe,  or  the  half- 
franchise  (the  later  civitas  sine  suffragio),  is  not  certain.  In  either 
case  the  Tusculans  would  have  no  political  connexion  with  any 
other  power  than  Rome. 

47.  The  advance  of  Rome  northwards  is  a  strange  story, 
not  to  be  trusted  in  details,  but  its  general  truth  will  be  shewn  by 
explanations  given  below.  At  first  we  hear  of  border  warfare  as 
before.  Fidenae,  the  town  commanding  a  well-known  passage  of 
the  Tiber,  is  taken  and  retaken,  but  Veii,  backed  by  Capena, 
is  the  centre  of  Etruscan  resistance.  Then  comes  the  ten-years 
siege  of  Veii  (406 — 396)  full  of  edifying  legends,  in  short  a  later 
Roman  echo  of  the  tale  of  the  Trojan  war.  The  hero  is  Camillus. 
Rome  is  now  in  so  strong  a  position  that  Camillus,  charged  with 
embezzling  booty,  is  driven  into  exile.  The  Etruscans  of  Clusium 
in  391  appeal  to  her  for  aid  against  the  Gauls,  though  she  had 
been  striking  at  their  kinsmen  of  Falerii  and  Volsinii  since  Veii 
fell.  Rome  provokes  the  Gauls  by  an  injudicious  embassy,  and 
in  390  they  march  southwards  and  defeat  and  break  up  the 
Roman  army  by  the  river  Allia.  Rome  is  taken  and  burnt,  but 
amid  general  disaster  and  paralysis  the  Capitoline  citadel  holds 


v]  The  coming  of  the  Gauls  53 

out  for  more  than  six  months.  This  part  of  the  story  is  a  mass 
of  legends,  such  as  the  tale  how  M.  Manlius,  waked  by  the  sacred 
geese,  drove  off  a  surprise-party  of  the  besiegers.  Such  too  is  the 
dramatic  scene  when  Camillus,  recalled  from  banishment,  rescues 
Rome  just  when  a  ransom  was  being  paid  to  Brennus  the  Gaulish 
king.  No  doubt  the  Gauls,  unskilled  in  sieges  and  probably 
reduced  by  hunger  and  sickness,  agreed  to  go  on  payment  of 
a  ransom.  The  damage  done  to  the  power  of  Rome  was  surely 
exaggerated  in  a  later  age  as  a  background  for  pictures  of  Roman 
heroism.  The  burning  of  the  city  may  well  be  true,  and  with  it 
the  destruction  of  all  or  most  of  whatever  records  then  existed. 
We  hear  that  the  citizens  were  helped  by  the  state  to  rebuild  their 
houses,  but  no  care  was  taken  to  enforce  building  in  regular  streets. 
Some  modern  archaeologists  hold  that  this  was  the  time  when 
Rome  was  girt  with  the  great  line  of  fortification  commonly  called 
the  Servian  Wall.  After  the  departure  of  the  Gauls  we  have  an 
astounding  picture  of  the  Roman  revival.  We  have  already  seen 
her  advance  to  the  South  and  her  treatment  of  the  Latins.  But 
we  hear  also  of  her  pressing  on  into  the  district  of  Tarquinii,  one 
of  the  chief  Etruscan  cities,  and  becoming  so  dominant  in  southern 
Etruria  that  she  could  hold  her  fortress-colonies  in  the  teeth  of 
Etruscan  opposition. 

48.  We  must  now  look  far  beyond  the  Roman  borders, 
where  we  find  events  happening  that  account  for  most  of  the 
above  strange  story.  About  425  B.C.  the  power  of  the  Etruscans 
was  falling  fast.  In  the  North  it  had  been  hard  pressed  by  the 
Celtic  invasion  from  beyond  the  Alps.  Tribe  after  tribe  of  Gauls 
poured  into  the  lowlands,  and  by  396  they  were  practically  masters 
in  the  region  of  the  Po,  afterwards  known  as  Cisalpine  Gaul.  In 
the  South  the  Etruscan  hold  on  Campania  was  lost.  Their  chief 
city  Volturnum  (later  Capua)  was  taken  in  424  by  the  Samnites, 
who  soon  occupied  all  that  rich  country,  and  in  420  even  took  the 
Greek  city  of  Cumae.  The  Etruscan  system  was  clearly  out  of 
date.  The  lords  of  the  cities  of  Etruria  could  neither  assimilate 
their  serf-population  nor  act  effectively  in  concert  among  them- 
selves. Hence  Rome  had  been  able  to  hold  her  ground  against 
them,  and  the  pressure  of  the  Gauls  had  so  occupied  the  northern 
cities  that  they  now  allowed  southern  Etruria  to  fall  into  Roman 
hands.  When  the  Gauls  came  upon  them  from  beyond  the 
Apennine,  they  sought  Roman  aid  to  little  purpose.     When  the 


54 


The  Western  Greeks  [ch. 


remnant  of  the  barbarians,  after  burning  Rome,  withdrew  with 
their  booty  to  the  North,  the  disastrous  effect  of  their  invasion 
probably  left  the  cities  of  Etruria  exhausted.  They  were  evidently 
not  growing  communities  like  Rome,  and  so  Rome  was  for  the 
present  able  to  work  her  will.  It  is  said  that  one  reason  for  the 
retreat  of  the  Gauls  was  that  their  own  Cisalpine  homes  were 
threatened  by  an  invasion  of  the  Veneti,  an  amphibious  people 
dwelling  among  the  lagoons  and  mouths  of  the  Po.  Their 
presence  at  Rome  had  perhaps  had  another  effect.  Latins  and 
other  peoples  near  had  witnessed  the  fury  of  their  onset,  and  the 
impression  made  was  never  forgotten.  At  Rome  the  term  *  dis- 
turbance '  or  '  alarm '  {tumultus\  suggesting  sudden  peril  in  Italy, 
became  almost  the  technical  name  for  a  Gaulish  inroad.  And  the 
Gaulish  terror  was  not  confined  to  Rome.  Among  the  claims  of 
Rome  to  Italian  support  in  later  times  not  the  least  was  this,  that 
she  shewed  herself  the  only  competent  champion  of  Italy  against 
the  dreaded  Gauls. 

49.     Not  less  important  were  the  events  happening  in  the 
South,  though  their  effects  did  not  appear  clearly  until  the  next 
period.     The  Greek  cities  of  southern  Italy  and  Sicily  were  to 
suffer  for  their  splendid  isolation  and  their  quarrels.     In  Sicily  the 
utter  destruction  of  the  Athenian  expedition  (413)  had  lulled  them 
into  vain  security.     In  409  and  406  Carthage  took  her  revenge  for 
the  past.     Great  mercenary  armies  overran  most  of  the  island  and 
destroyed  several  of  the  chief  cities.     The  remnant  of   Greek 
power  was  only  saved   by   concentration  under  the  tyrarmy  of 
Dionysius  of  Syracuse.     He  waged  war  against  the  Carthaginians 
with  various  fortune,  but  his  efforts  to  create  a  Greek  empire  in 
southern  Italy  greatly  damaged  the  Greek  cities  there.     At  his 
death  (368  or  367)  Syracuse  was  strong  but  the  Greek  cause 
weakened.     Indeed  the  '  Great  Greece '  was  in  no  small  danger. 
The  southward  movement  of   the  fertile  and  warlike  Sabellian 
peoples  went  on  unchecked  all  through  the  fifth  century  B.C.     We 
have  seen  how  Samnites  conquered  Campania ;  only  a  few  spots 
such  as  the  Greek  Neapolis  kept  their  freedom.     Another  swarm 
pushed   on   and   conquered   the   district   known   after   them  as 
Lucania,    while   some   penetrated   almost  to   the   Sicilian  strait, 
and  were  known  as  Bruttians.     The  pressure  of  these  migrations 
was  fatal  to  some  of  the  smaller  Greek  cities;   the  larger  still 
existed,   but   became    subject   either   to   the    Lucanians    or    to 


v]  Sabellians.     leges  Liciniae  55 

Dionysius.  Tarentum  alone  was  strong  and  independent,  but 
its  danger  was  plain.  Western  Greek  civilization  was  sorely 
shaken  by  all  these  disasters,  and  in  some  coast-districts  the 
Greek  tongue  gave  way  to  Oscan.  But  it  was  not  in  the  West 
alone  that  the  gifted  Greeks  were  working  out  their  own  ruin. 
The  notable  fact  in  southern  Italy  was  the  spread  of  the  Sabellian 
peoples.  By  the  end  of  the  fifth  century  they  held  most  of  the 
country.  They  covered  a  much  larger  area  than  Rome  and  her 
Allies.  But  we  find  no  trace  of  any  common  purpose  or  direction. 
They  settled  down  in  separate  cantons  as  conquerors.  Those  in 
Campania  seem  to  have  lost  touch  with  their  kinsmen  of  Samnium. 
Modified  by  easier  life  in  a  genial  climate,  they  still  kept  their 
restless  and  warlike  character.  Mercenary  service  abroad  drew 
off  numbers  of  the  Campanian  and  Samnite  youth.  They  com- 
peted with  Gauls  and  Iberians  for  the  blood-wages  of  Carthage  or 
Syracuse,  according  to  the  demand.  In  short  their  progress  was 
a  striking  contrast  to  that  of  Rome. 

50.  The  Licinian  laws.  We  now  turn  to  the  great  political 
agitation  by  which  the  end  of  this  period  is  marked,  the  effect  of 
which  was  to  close  the  long  struggle  of  the  Orders  and  give  unity 
to  the  Roman  people.  Doubtful  details  do  not  discredit  the 
main  outlines  of  the  traditional  story.  Of  the  Plebeians,  the 
mass  were  poor.  But  there  were  also  men  of  substance.  The 
latter  doubtless  filled  all  or  most  of  the  Plebeian  offices,  and  had 
made  their  way  to  the  state-offices  of  the  quaestorship  and  the 
consular  tribunate.  But  they  had  set  their  hearts  upon  gaining 
the  consulship.  'And  they  saw  from  past  experience  that  they 
must  stand  out  for  a  reserved  right  to  one  place :  to  be  eligible 
and  not  elected  would  not  be  enough.  In  order  to  create  the 
popular  pressure  needed  for  their  purpose,  they  must  engage  the 
support  of  the  poor  Plebeians.  Now  what  the  poor  wanted  was 
more  land  and  relief  from  debt.  The  result  was  a  combined 
movement  uniting  the  claims  of  both  sections.  The  Plebeian 
leaders  were  C.  Licinius  Stolo  and  L.  Sextius,  tribunes  in  377. 
The  scheme  of  their  bills  was  as  follows.  First,  that  interest 
already  paid  should  be  deducted  from  the  principal  of  a  loan,  and 
the  balance  repaid  in  yearly  instalments  within  three  years. 
Secondly,  no  one  was  to  be  allowed  to  hold  as  tenant  of  the  state 
{possidere)  more  than  500  iugera  (over  300  acres)  of  public 
domain-land,  or  to  keep  (so  it  is  said)  more  than  a  certain  number 


56  The  struggle  for  equal  rights  [ch. 

of  cattle  or  sheep  on  the  part  devoted  to  pasture.  The  story 
that  there  was  a  proposal  to  compel  the  employment  of  a  certain 
minimum  of  free  labourers  on  farms  in  proportion  to  the  slaves  is 
surely  no  more  than  an  anticipation  of  a  much  later  time,  when 
great  slave-gangs  were  common.  Thirdly,  the  consulship  was  to 
be  restored  as  the  regular  chief  magistracy,  and  one  consul  was 
always  to  be  a  Plebeian.  The  first  was  a  temporary  measure  to 
relieve  an  intolerable  situation.  The  second  provided  no  allot- 
ments, but  it  offered  a  prospect  of  resuming  land  for  future  allot- 
ment. The  third  was  meant  to  confer  a  share  of  Patrician 
privileges,  and  to  bar  all  Patrician  attempts  to  nullify  the  con- 
cession in  practice.  To  carry  these  projects  into  law  needed 
a  stubborn  fight,  said  to  have  lasted  ten  years.  Year  after  year 
Licinius  and  Sextius  were  reelected  tribunes.  At  first  their  efforts 
were  foiled  by  the  'intercession'  of  some  of  their  colleagues, 
for  the  Patrician  nobles  bought  off  some  of  the  wealthier  Plebeians 
by  letting  them  share  the  'possession'  of  state-land.  The  two 
leaders  retorted  by  blocking  the  elections  of  the  regular  magistrates. 
Tradition  says  that  the  imperium  was  thus  held  in  abeyance  for 
five  years.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  struggle  was  evidently  an 
obstinate  one.  In  368  it  reached  its  height.  But  the  end  was  at 
hand.  The  credit  of  having  dealt  with  the  crisis  so  as  to  avert 
a  violent  revolution  is  given  to  Camillus.  The  bills  became  law 
in  367.  But  the  Patricians,  though  compelled  to  yield  on  the 
matter  of  the  consulship,  managed  to  extort  a  concession  of 
practical  importance.  The  ordinary  duties  of  civil  jurisdiction 
were  becoming  too  much  for  the  busy  chief  magistrates.  If 
Rome  was  henceforth  to  have  only  the  two  consuls,  not  six 
consular  tribunes,  there  was  good  reason  why  these  duties  should 
be  otherwise  provided  for.  It  was  agreed  to  create  a  special 
office  for  the  purpose.  The  new  magistrate  was  an  inferior 
colleague  of  the  consuls :  he  too  bore  the  title  of  praetor^  but 
their  imperium  was  superior  to  his.  Whether  the  new  office  was 
by  law  confined  to  Patricians  is  doubtful ;  at  all  events  it  remained 
in  their  hands  for  some  30  years.  Thus  the  sphere  of  the  consul- 
ship was  further  fimited,  and  the  office  lost  something  more  of  its 
regal  character.  At  the  same  time  two  '  curule '  aediles  were  to 
be  appointed,  officers  of  the  whole  populus  (not  of  the  Plebs  only) 
and  as  such  entitled  to  use  the  official  chair  of  state  {sella 
curulis).     These  were  also  meant  to  be  Patricians,  but  it  soon 


v]  The  result  57 

became  the  practice  for  them  to  be  Patrician  and  Plebeian  in 
alternate  years. 

51.  So  the  great  struggle  of  the  Orders  was  virtually  at  an 
end,  at  least  as  far  as  legislation  could  end  it.  To  pass  laws 
was  easier  than  to  get  them  carried  out.  The  richer  Plebeians 
had  fought  their  way  to  the  consulship,  and  all  other  offices 
were  in  time  sure  to  be  gained  also.  But  even  the  law  opening 
the  consulship  was  evaded  now  and  then  in  the  following  years. 
That  regulating  the  possession  of  public  land  was  found  not  easy 
to  enforce.  Among  those  who  evaded  it  and  were  fined  for  land- 
grabbing  shortly  after  (357)  was  Licinius  himself.  So  at  least  says 
our  tradition.  And  the  relief  of  debtors  was  temporary.  The 
general  result  then  was  that  the  rich  Plebeians  won  a  lasting 
advantage,  while  the  poor  did  not.  Improvement  in  the  condition 
of  the  poor  did  take  place  in  the  next  period,  but  it  was  mainly 
due  to  allotments  of  land  and  foundation  of  colonies  in  new 
territory  acquired  by  conquest. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE   REPUBLIC   366—265   B.C. 

52.  The  century  after  the  passing  of  the  Licinian  laws  may 
be  called  the  first  half  of  the  golden  age  of  Republican  Rome. 
The  vital  question  of  the  constitution  was  now  settled.  It  had 
only  to  develope  in  the  course  of  working,  as  its  various  parts 
gradually  found  their  places  in  relation  to  each  other.  In  this 
period  the  Roman  system,  clumsy  but  effective,  begins  clearly  to 
shew  its  superiority  to  other  governments,  and  Rome  acquires  the 
strength  which  was  to  prove  irresistible  in  the  course  of  the  next 
hundred  years. 

The  equalizing  of  the  Orders  was  in  progress.  The  new 
praetorship  was  first  held  by  a  Plebeian  in  337,  the  censorship  in 
351.  In  339  it  was  made  law  that  one  censor  must  be  a  Plebeian. 
The  dictatorship  was  held  by  a  Plebeian  as  early  as  356.  But 
the  struggle  for  actual  possession  of  the  consulship,  now  once 
more  the  normal  chief  magistracy,  was  not  yet  ended.  By  some 
means  or  other  the  Patricians  managed  to  secure  both  places  in 
several  of  the  years  between  356  and  342,  but  in  the  latter  year  a 
threat^  of  further  legislation  in  the  Plebeian  interest  put  an  end  to 
this  evasion.  There  was  evidently  a  difficulty  in  getting  the  poorer 
Plebeians  to  support  the  richer  continuously.  However,  in  the 
long  run  the  Licinian  law  was  observed.  And  the  strength  of  the 
levelling  movement  was  finally  proved  by  the  legislation^  of 
the  year  300,  when  the  number  of  members  of  the  great  religious 
colleges  was  raised,  and  Plebeians  admitted  to  these  strongholds 
of  the  Patrician  Order.  In  short,  the  old  nobiUty  of  birth  gave 
place  to  a  new  nobility  of  wealth  and   office.      Great  Plebeian 

^  See  §  63.  ^  lex  Ogulnia. 


CH.  vi]        The  new   Nobility.     Consulship  59 

families  grew  up.  Wealth  brought  them  to  the  front,  and  the 
attainment  of  offices  carrying  the  imperium  marked  their  members 
as  '  known '  or  *  men  of  mark '  {nobiles).  The  clan-system  took 
root  among  them,  and  they  soon  formed  a  powerful  class,  as  proud 
and  as  devoted  to  their  own  interests  as  their  Patrician  models. 
Only  ten  years  after  the  passing  of  the  Licinian  laws  we  hear  that 
Licinius  Stolo  himself  was  punished  for  an  evasion  of  the  rule 
limiting  the  amount  of  public  domain-land  that  could  legally  be 
*  possessed'  by  an  individual. 

53.  But  the  position  of  the  restored  consulship,  now  open 
to  both  Orders,  was  not  the  same  as  it  had  once  been.  On  the 
one  hand  its  range  of  functions  had  been  narrowed  by  assigning 
some  of  its  old  duties  to  the  censors  and  the  new  praetor. 
During  the  last  period  the  state  had  done  without  it  for  many 
years,  and  employed  a  substitute.  On  the  other  hand  the  vast 
expansion  of  Roman  activities  and  Roman  dominion  in  this  period 
undoubtedly  added  to  its  importance.  The  consuls  were  the 
normal  representatives  of  Rome  beyond  the  frontiers,  and  these 
hundred  years  366 — 265  include  the  conquest  of  Italy.  What 
with  campaigning  abroad  and  routine  duties  at  home,  they  had 
generally  quite  enough  to  do,  and  the  functions  of  military 
command  and  civic  presidency  were  just  those  most  held  in 
honour.  Thus  the  consulship  was  changed,  but  by  no  means 
degraded.  It  certainly  lost  somewhat  of  its  independent  initiative, 
as  the  Senate  more  and  more  assumed  direction  of  public  policy. 
But  the  influence  of  a  consul  was  still  great,  and  senatorial  control 
as  yet  only  beginning.  It  was  neither  possible  nor  desirable  to 
interfere  much  with  a  consul  commanding  in  the  field,  and  tradition 
represents  the  generals  as  acting  with  great  freedom.  In  327  a 
notable  step  was  taken  for  practical  reasons.  Neapolis  was  being 
besieged,  and  its  surrender  was  expected.  In  order  not  to  with- 
draw the  consul  in  charge  of  the  siege,  it  was  arranged^  that  he 
should  remain  at  his  post  '  in  a  consul's  stead '  {pro  consule)  until 
his  work  was  done.  This  device  gave  him  consular  imperium 
within  his  special  sphere  of  operations,  not  in  Rome.  This  inno- 
vation was  the  beginning  of  a  practice  which  became  common  in 
later  times.  The  so-called  Pro-magistracy,  an  extension  of  magi- 
sterial power  on  service  abroad,  was  one  of  the  most  important 
institutions  of  the  later  RepubHc. 

i  See  §  68, 


6o  Changed  position  of  [ch. 

54.     The  same  method  of  extension  was  soon  applied  to  the 
Praetorship  also.     For  the  frequent  need  of  generals  to  command 
detached  forces  acting  in  support  of  the  main  armies  led  to  the 
employment  of  praetors  in  the  field,  at  least  during  the  campaigning 
season,   and   it   was   not   always   convenient    to    supersede    an 
experienced  man  at  a  given  moment.      Judicial  business  must 
have  been  chiefly  despatched  in  the  winter  months.     The  strain 
of  wars  sometimes  prevented  either  consul  from  presiding  at  the 
consular  elections.     Then  it  was  necessary  to  proceed  either  by 
an  interregnum  or  by  appointment  of  a  dictator.     The  latter  plan 
was  feasible,  for  a  consul  could  make  the  nomination  at  his  own 
headquarters.      But  the   dictatorship,  like   the   consulship,  was 
gradually  changing  its  character.     We  begin  to  hear  of  dictators 
appointed  to  discharge  certain  formal  duties,  such  as  holding  an 
election  of  consuls,  and  not  with  a  view  to  revive  a  concentrated 
monarchic  power  for  military  purposes.     In  this  period  we  find 
dictators  of  both  kinds,  old  and  new.     This  exceptional  office  was 
evidently  no  longer  in  favour.     It  could  no  longer  be  used  as 
a  party  weapon  of  the  Patrician  nobility.    And,  as  the  two  Orders 
gradually  coalesced,  the  new  senatorial  nobility  more  and  more 
preferred  the  consular  system.      It  suited  the  aristocratic  ideal,  of 
sharing  preferment  among  the  members  of  a  limited  class,  better 
than  the  exceptional  autocracy  of  an  individual.      But  this  limita- 
tion of  a  dictator's  sphere  of  action  seems  to  have  been  enjoined 
by  moral  pressure  only ;  we  hear  of  no   statute  passed  for  the 
purpose.     It  is  possible  that  the  right  to  appeal  to  the  Assembly 
against  a  dictator's  sentence  (within  the  city  precinct)  may  have 
been  granted  in  this  period  by  a  lex  Valeria  of  the  year  300.     If 
so,  this  is  a  further  indication  of  the  tendency  to  weaken  the 
office.      For   the   present  it  remained  in  use  during  a  time  of 
great  wars,   but  in  the  next  period  we  shall  see  it   decay  and 
disappear. 

55.  The  censorship  was  steadily  rising  in  importance.  The 
spread  of  Roman  dominion  and  the  settlement  of  Roman  citizens 
on  conquered  territory  led  to  the  formation  of  new  Tribes  (two  in 
each  of  the  years  332,  318,  299,  bringing  the  total  to  33),  and 
there  was  also  the  admission  of  new  citizens.  There  was  also  on 
occasion  the  undertaking  of  great  public  works,  of  which  the  chief 
instances  were  the  great  road  and  aqueduct  named  after  Appius 
Claudius,  censor  in  312.     The  improvement  of  the  city  water- 


vi]  the  Magistracies  6i 

supply  was  a  great  boon.  The  via  Appia  was  a  solidly-built 
military  road  from  Rome  to  Capua  by  the  coast-route.  It  secured 
Roman  communications  with  Campania,  an  object  of  the  first 
importance  in  the  crisis  of  the  Samnite  wars.  But  it  was  the 
radical  policy  expressed  in  the  work  of  registration  that  made  the 
censorship  of  Appius  a  landmark  in  Roman  history.  He  placed 
on  the  senatorial  roll  a  number  of  his  own  supporters,  even  sons 
of  freedmen,  and  distributed  the  mass  of  city  handworkers^  among 
all  the  31  Tribes,  thus  leaving  the  rural  freeholders  liable  to  be 
outvoted  by  those  better  able  to  attend.  We^hear  of  much  indig- 
nation, and  it  is  said  that  his  list  of  the  Senate  was  even  disregarded. 
Tradition  attributed  to  him  further  acts  of  wilful  usurpation  :  it  is 
at  least  clear  that  the  Patrician  reformer  was  well  hated  by  the 
aristocratic  class  from  whom  the  Roman  annalists  were  drawn. 
The  leaders  who  looked  for  support  in  the  lower  ranks  never 
appear  to  advantage  in  the  traditions  of  Rome. 

56.  Of  the  minor  offices,  the  aediles,  once  subordinates  of  the 
tribunes,  were  now  more  independent.  Their  police  duties  in  the 
city,  supervision  of  markets,  repairs  of  public  buildings,  and  the 
duty  of  bringing  to  justice  all  breakers  of  the  public  law,  gave 
them  plenty  to  do.  And  they  were  already  charged  with  providing 
for  the  shows  held  on  public  festivals,  a  duty  destined  to  grow. 
In  short,  their  business  brought  them  more  into  contact  with 
consuls,  and  sometimes  perhaps  with  censors,  than  with  the 
tribunes.  The  quaestorship  was  much  as  before,  but  the  wars, 
carried  on  now  at  a  greater  distance  from  Rome,  probably  made 
it  more  important.  Besides  the  charge  of  the  military  chest,  the 
quaestor  attached  to  a  consul  in  the  field  had  often  to  act  under 
his  chief  in  operations  of  war,  and  so  enjoyed  opportunities  of 
distinction.  We  also  hear  of  legionary  officers  {tribuni  militum)^ 
some  of  them  chosen  by  the  people,  and  of  two  officers  appointed 
now  and  then  to  superintend  the  fitting-out  of  a  fleet  when 
required.  But  of  the  beginnings  of  a  Roman  navy  little  is 
known. 

57.  The  tribunate  of  the  Commons  has  been  kept  to  the 
last,  because  it  is  best  considered  in  connexion  with  the  Senate. 
Its  original  work,  the  championship  of  the  Plebeian   Order  as 

^  These  no  doubt  were  many  of  them  freedmen.  The  censors  of  304 
upset  this  arrangement  by  placing  the  '  rabble  of  the  Forum '  in  the  four  city 
Tribes  only.     See  §111. 


62  Few  magistrates  [ch. 

such,  was  now  for  the  most  part  done.     Patrician  supremacy  was 
at  an  end,  and  a  crude  embodiment  of  negative  power  was  no 
longer  needed.      But  the  office  remained,  and  the  right  of  any 
tribune  to  thwart  the  wishes  of  the  rest  was  enough  to  prevent 
serious  trouble  arising  from  official  agitators.     Its  position  rapidly 
changed.     It  became  normally  the  tool  of  the  wealthy  Plebeians 
now  passing  freely  into  the  Senate.     As  the  Patricio-Plebeian 
nobility  became  a  more  united  body,  it  was  to  the  tribunes  that 
the  Senate  more  and  more  looked  for  the  means  of  enforcing  its 
will     For  about  two  centuries,  in  spite  of  occasional  outbreaks  of 
independence,  the  tribunate  normally  served  the  Senate  as  a  check 
on  other  magistracies.      It  appears  now  as  a  magistracy  of  the 
community ;    at  what  date  first  so  regarded,   is   uncertain,  but 
tribunes  now  sat  in  the  Senate.     It  is  however  clear  that  it  was 
still  so  far  devoted  to  the  interests  of  the  Plebeian  Order  that,  in 
case  of  friction  between  the  leading  Plebeians  and  the  Patricians, 
the  tribunes  took  the  side  of  the  former.     But  hostility  to  Patri- 
cians as  such  seems  to  have  passed  away.    As  a  distinctly  civilian 
office  the  tribunate  was  naturally  jealous  of  the  military  power. 
When  in  357  a  consul  held  an  Assembly  in  his  camp  and  passed 
a  law,  the  tribunes  announced  that  they  would  in  future  treat  such 
an  act  as  a  *  capital '  matter.     For  they  were  now  the  regular 
accusers  in  cases  of  a  political  nature,  and  public  trials  before  the 
Assembly  were  the  only  means  of  punishing  offences  against  the 
state.    But  instances  of  men  being  brought  to  trial  for  misconduct 
while  in  office  were  at  present  very  rare. 

58.  In  general  the  most  striking  fact  about  the  Roman 
magistracy  is  the  smallness  of  the  numbers.  The  censorship  was 
intermittent,  the  dictatorship  exceptional.  The  yearly  officials  for 
the  work  of  peace  and  war  were — consuls  (2),  praetor  (i),  aediles 
(4),  quaestors  (4),  in  all  11.  Adding  the  tribunes  (10),  we  have 
only  21,  but  we  can  hardly  class  the  tribunes  as  administrative 
officers.  That  so  small  an  administrative  staff  sufficed  for  the 
work  of  the  state  in  a  period  of  rapid  expansion  is  indeed  wonder- 
ful. When  we  reflect  that  the  power  of  colleagues  was  equal  and 
a  deadlock  possible  at  any  moment,  that  the  assignment  of  special 
spheres  of  duty  was  left  to  private  arrangement  {comparatid)  or 
the  working  of  the  lot  (sortitio),  our  wonder  is  increased.  More- 
over, there  were  no  official  salaries,  and,  if  we  may  trust  tradition, 
honesty  and  devotion  to  public  duty  were  normal  with  hardly  an 


vi]  Senate  63 

exception.  The  clashing  of  official  colleagues  seems  to  have  been, 
indeed  must  have  been,  extremely  rare.  This  long-continued 
exhibition  of  patriotism  and  good  sense  may  remind  us  that  moral 
force  was  the  secret  of  Roman  government  and  Roman  success. 
And  the  moral  force  of  Rome  in  the  golden  age  found  its  most 
effective  expression  in  the  Senate. 

59.     We  have  already  noted  the  permanence  of  the  Senate, 
its  steady  accumulation  of  experience,  and  the  residence  of  its 
members,  as  causes  of  its  acquisition  of  power.     Its  ranks  were 
now  being  more  and  more  recruited  by  admission  of  leading 
Plebeians.      In  fact  a  senatorial  Order  was  beginning  to  form. 
Patricians   and    Plebeians   in   the    House  were   assimilating   as 
common   aims  and   sympathies,  not   to   mention  intermarriage, 
overcame  old  jealousy.     Naturally  its  power  grew.      The  times 
called  for  much  intelligent  direction  of  foreign  policy,  and  con- 
spicuous success  justified  the  Senate's  management.     It  was  not 
itself  the  Executive,  but  to  the  magistrates  it  was  a  prudent  guide. 
It  was  not  a  Legislature,  but  a  harmonious  Senate  could  exercise 
much  influence  in  promoting  or  checking  legislation.      Indeed 
most  of  its  powers  were  the  product  of  circumstances,  assumed 
under  stress  of  real   or  apparent   necessity.      Precedents   once 
created  hardened  into  custom,  and  became  a  part  of  the  constitu- 
tion for  lack  of  challenge.    Thus  the  growing  power  of  the  Senate 
rested  on  no  statute  ;  the  Assembly  had  not  abdicated  its  sovranty, 
and  a  later  age  was  to  learn  that  the  powers  usurped  in  days  when 
the  Roman  People  were  a  sound  community  could  be  resumed 
by  the  people  in  the  days  of  their  corruption.      No  doubt  the 
leading  men  in  the  Senate  were  mostly  ex-magistrates,  who   in 
their  term  of  office  had  been  largely  guided  by  the  advice  of  the 
great  Council,  and  would  expect  to  exercise  the  same  influence 
on  their  successors.     These  men  would   tend   to   promote   the 
growth  of  the  Senate's  power  at  the  expense  of  the  magistrates. 
And  so  guidance  would  tend  to  become  control,  as  we  shall  see  it 
did.      Two  old  survivals  may  be  noted  in  connexion   with   the 
Senate.     In  the  event  of  an  interregnum  the  Interreges  were  still 
Patrician.      And  the  formal  '  sanction  of  the  Fathers '  was  still  a 
step  in  completing  legislation  and  elections.     Who  these  patres 
were  is  not  quite  certain,  but  they  were  either  the  whole  Senate 
or  its  Patrician  members.      As  their  auctoritas  was  clearly  a  relic 
of  the  past,  and  was  in  this  period  turned  into  a  meaningless  form. 


64  Assemblies  [ch. 

it  is  more  probable  that  the  Patricians  alone  are  meant,  and  that 
the  custom  was  a  survival  from  the  time  when  the  ancient  clans 
were  a  political  power. 

60.  A  change  was  coming  over  the  popular  Assemblies. 
Both  the  Centuries  and  the  Tribes  appear  in  this  period  as  sovran 
legislative  bodies.  Both  were  presided  over  by  regular  magistrates 
with  imperium^  being  Assemblies  of  the  whole  people.  But  in 
practice  legislation  was  more  and  more  passing  into  the  hands  of 
the  Tribe-Assembly.  Its  simplicity  may  have  been  partly  the 
reason  for  this,  but  Plebeian  magistrates  may  have  preferred  the 
Tribe-grouping  for  its  own  sake.  No  legislative  sanction  seems  to 
have  been  required  for  the  change :  the  comiiia  tributa  was  a  law- 
ful Assembly,  and  its  right  to  give  a  final  answer  to  the  question 
put  by  a  regular  magistrate  seems  to  have  been  admitted.  It 
became  in  course  of  time  the  ordinary  Assembly  for  general 
purposes.  In  election  the  Centuries  held  their  ground.  They 
elected  consuls  praetors  and  censors,  the  Tribes  only  curule 
aediles,  quaestors,  and  some  minor  officials.  Beside  these 
Assemblies  it  is  strange,  but  apparently  the  fact,  that  the  separate 
Meeting  of  the  Plebs  still  went  on.  It  elected  tribunes  and 
Plebeian  aediles,  and  its  proper  president  was  a  tribune.  This 
last  fact  was  probably  the  chief  cause  of  its  continuance,  for  the 
tribunes  would  not  readily  give  up  the  meetings  in  which  they 
played  the  chief  part.  The  vigour  of  the  concilium  plebis  is  shewn 
in  this  period  by  the  final  removal  (287)  of  all  restrictions  on  its 
capacity  for  legislation.  Tradition  loosely  asserts  that  Resolutions 
of  the  Commons  {plebi  scita)  were  made  binding  on  the  whole 
populus  by  a  Valerio-Horatian  law  of  449,  a  Publilian  law  of  339, 
and  a  Hortensian  law  of  287.  This  was  either  a  case  of  reenact- 
ing  a  rule  that  had  been  evaded,  or  (more  probably)  restrictions 
still  remaining  were  successively  removed  by  the  later  laws.  At 
all  events  after  287  the  Plebs  by  itself  was  free  to  legislate  for  all. 
The  Plebeian  dictator  Hortensius  is  said  to  have  been  appointed 
to  deal  with  a  crisis  arising  from  debt  and  distress.  The  sedition 
had  even  got  so  far  that  a  '  secession  of  the  Plebs '  took  place  in 
the  old  style,  and  the  result  was  some  concession  of  their  claims. 
With  the  attainment  of  this  full  right  of  concurrent  legislation  by 
the  Plebs  the  Roman  Republic  had  outwardly  reached  its  complete 
form,  a  mass  of  inconsistencies  and  makeshifts.  But  the  new 
nobility  understood  how  to  make  the  clumsy  machine  work  :  the 


vi]  Policy  of  the  new  nobility  65 

checks  and  causes  of  friction  were  overcome  somehow,  and  the 
ship  of  state  went  ahead.  Beyond  all  doubt  one  of  their  chief 
cares  was  to  prevent  the  election  of  self-willed  and  refractory 
tribunes.  Another  was  to  see  that,  in  appointing  members  of  the 
sacred  colleges,  suitable  men  were  chosen,  that  the  scruples  of 
religion  might  at  least  not  be  used  to  impede  the  policy  of  the 
Senate. 


H. 


CHAPTER   VII 

CONQUEST   OF   ITALY,   366—265   B.C. 

61.  In  order  to  keep  this  book  within  moderate  limits  it  is 
necessary  to  give  a  very  brief  outline  of  the  Roman  wars.  And 
the  wars  by  which  Rome  became  the  mistress  of  Italy  cannot 
be  described  with  any  fulness  and  certainty,  for  our  record, 
chiefly  preserved  in  Livy,  is  far  from  trustworthy.  The  annalists 
whom  Livy  followed  wrote  with  a  patriotic  bias,  and  family 
traditions  tending  to  glorify  ancestors  of  great  houses  have  un- 
doubtedly corrupted  the  story.  Some  of  its  main  features  are 
sufficiently  clear  to  be  stated  with  confidence.  The  conquest 
falls  naturally  into  four  periods  or  stages  in  the  advance  of 
Rome. 

62.  First  stage,  366 — 338.  The  interest  centres  chiefly  on 
two  points,  the  failure  of  hostile  powers  to  the  North,  and  the 
spread  of  Roman  influence  and  organization  to  the  South-East. 
The  second  was  made  possible  by  the  first.  We  hear  of  two 
wars  with  the  Gauls,  361  to  358  and  350  to  349,  in  both  of 
which  the  advantage  is  claimed  for  Rome.  Single  combats  are 
recorded  in  both  cases ;  in  the  former  a  Manlius  wins  the 
honourable  nickname  Torquatus  from  the  golden  collar  {torquis) 
of  the  slain  Gaulish  champion ;  in  the  latter  a  Valerius  is  helped 
at  a  pinch  by  a  raven  perching  on  his  helmet  and  disconcerting 
the  Gaul.  Hence  Corvus  became  an  after-name  of  his  Valerian 
house.  Such  stories  perhaps  indicate  that  the  victories  in  these 
wars  were  hardly  won,  and  that  the  repulse  of  invading  swarms 
seeking  easy  conquest  and  plunder  was  the  net  result.  Between 
these  two  wars  is  placed  one  with  some  of  the  Etruscan  cities, 
ending  in  Roman  victory  and  a  long  truce  with  Tarquinii  and 


CH.  vii]  Rome  and  her  Allies  67 

Falerii,  two  of  the  leading  cities  of  southern  Etruria.  Caere, 
which  lay  nearer  to  hand  and  had  for  some  time  been  on  friendly 
terms  with  Rome,  was  in  351  incorporated  on  special  conditions. 
The  Caerites  became  Roman  citizens  without  the  '  public '  rights 
of  voting  or  holding  office.  It  seems  that  they  retained  self- 
government  for  strictly  local  affairs,  but  they  were  not  enrolled 
in  any  of  the  Roman  Tribes.  This  arrangement  left  them 
subject  to  the  Roman  government  in  all  external  relations,  and 
bound  to  bear  all  the  burdens  of  citizenship.  It  was  found  a 
convenient  plan  for  keeping  certain  communities  in  a  state  of 
dependence,  and  the  precedent  was  often  followed  afterwards. 
But  more  important  for  Rome  than  even  these  wars  were  the 
strained  relations  with  their  own  Allies.  A  Hernican  revolt  is 
dimly  recorded  as  suppressed,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  terms 
of  their  treaty  were  now  revised  in  favour  of  Rome.  The 
wavering  of  the  Latins  was  far  more  serious.  It  seems  that 
they  did  not  stand  firmly  by  Rome  against  the  Gauls  :  Tibur 
is  even  charged  with  helping  the  enemy.  But  some  revision  of 
the  terms  of  the  confederacy  took  place,  and  the  help  of  Latin 
contingents  enabled  Rome  to  end  the  war.  The  discontents 
however  revived  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy,  and  after 
the  second  repulse  of  the  Gauls  matters  came  to  a  head. 
The  rupture  between  Rome  and  the  League  was  inevitable. 
We  hear  that  Rome  had  made  an  alliance  with  the  Samnites, 
and  that  the  Volsci  intrigued  with  the  Latins.  In  349  the  Latins 
refused  contingents  for  the  Gaulish  war,  but  for  some  reason  did 
not  immediately  rise  in  arms. 

63.  During  the  years  345  to  341  Rome  was  pushing  south- 
wards. Our  confused  tradition  tells  of  the  occupation  of  the 
district  between  the  Volsci  and  Campania.  The  Roman  policy 
seems  to  have  been  to  cut  the  Volsci  off  from  the  sea.  So  the 
small  peoples,  Aurunci  and  Sidicini,  were  subdued,  and  Rome 
came  into  touch  with  Campania.  The  Samnites  settled  there, 
threatened  by  an  invasion  of  their  kinsmen  in  Samnium,  sought 
Roman  protection.  This  brought  Rome  and  the  hill- Samnites 
to  blows.  We  hear  of  a  Samnite  war  343 — i,  followed  by 
renewal  of  their  treaty.  But  it  was  fortunate  for  Rome  that 
Latins  and  Samnites  did  not  draw  together.  Tradition  even 
said  that  when  Rome  made  peace  the  Latins  carried  on  the 
war  themselves,  a  doubtful   story.     In   340   the   Latins   openly 

5—2 


68 


The  great  Latin  war 


[CH. 


demanded  equality  with  Rome,  claiming  it  is  said  that  one 
consul  should  be  a  Latin.  Union  on  these  terms  was  refused, 
and  Rome  had  to  face  a  great  Latin  war  (340,  339),  in  which 
her  adversaries  had  Volscian  and  Campanian  aid.  The  story 
of  this  war  is  a  confused  mass  of  legends.  There  is  some  reason 
to  think  that  more  perfect  unanimity  promptitude  and  discipline 
were  the  true  causes  of  the  Roman  victories.  This  is  the  war 
in  which  were  placed  two  heroic  episodes.  Manlius  Torquatus 
the  consul  put  to  death  his  son,  who  had  slain  a  Latin  champion 


ETR  V  R  I  A 


o  Namia 

S  a  b  i  n  i 


Vsst.rni 
Sutrimn  ^  Marrucin'r 

''  Nepete  Caraeoli      Pae I'lgn'i 


Aequi  Alba 

Marsi 

HernicI   Aeser-jiia     oBovianum 
« Sora     ° 

MuituFnae 

Galea  "  <?  ^ 

•Capua    " BeneventMm 
Nola 

Nuoeria 


'     PaestAJin 


Venuaia 


The  Southward  advance  of  Rome. 

in  single  combat,  for  disobeying  the  order  forbidding  acceptance 
of  such  challenges.  His  Plebeian  colleague  P.  Decius  Mus,  in 
obedience  to  divine  warnings,  devoted  himself  to  certain  death 
in  battle  when  his  part  of  the  army  was  giving  way,  and  with 
the  help  of  the  gods  restored  the  fortune  of  the  field.  The 
stories,  true  or  not,  suggest  a  record  favouring  the  Plebeian 
nobility :  it  is  remarkable  that  the  Patrician  attempts  to  recover 
their  lost  monopoly  of  the  consulship  were  only  repressed  by  the 
Plebeian  resistance^  two  years  before,  and  that  the  need  of  active 
harmony  between  the  Orders  was  in  this  present  crisis  supreme. 


1  See  §  52. 


vii]  Roman  organization  69 

64.  But  it  was  not  by  valour  and  victories  that  Rome 
became  mistress  of  Italy.  It  was  the  politic  settlements  made 
in  the  hour  of  triumph  that  enabled  her  to  secure  her  gains  as 
no  other  power  had  hitherto  done.  The  year  338  saw  one  of 
her  masterpieces.  The  Latins  were  reorganized  to  suit  Roman 
purposes.  Some  communities  were  merged  in  the  Roman  people, 
with  the  full  Roman  franchise.  Others  remained  Allies^  nominally 
free,  but  placed  in  relation  to  Rome,  and  isolated  from  each  other, 
by  new  treaties.  Each  treaty-state  enjoyed  the  rights  (spoken  of 
above)  of  conubium  and  commercium  with  Rome  only,  but  Rome 
with  them  all.  Thus  the  Latins  were  either  made  Romans,  or 
placed  in  a  position  where  their  connexion  with  Rome  must  ever 
tend  to  grow  more  close  through  the  steady  operation  of  private 
intercourse  in  time  of  peace.  The  old  League,  with  its  meetings 
and  mutual  rights  between  city  and  city,  was  ended.  The  Latin 
festival,  already  under  Roman  presidency,  remained  as  a  religious 
function  only.  The  Volscian  League  was  further  weakened  by 
the  loss  of  the  coast-district.  Rome  now  took  over  the  trouble- 
some Antium  and  planted  a  colony  of  citizens  there.  In  Campania 
the  revolted  Allies  were  dealt  with  after  the  precedent  of  Caere. 
They  were  made  half-citizens  of  Rome  with  only  the  *  private' 
rights.  Thus  business-connexions  and  intermarriage  were  left 
gradually  to  attach  them  to  Rome,  while  the  Roman  government 
could  interfere  as  it  saw  fit.  This  half-franchise  seems  to  have 
been  specially  suited  to  peoples  not  closely  related  to  Rome  by 
race  and  language.  In  Campania  Oscan  and  Greek  were  spoken, 
and  some  Etruscan  may  still  have  lingered  in  parts.  We  hear 
also  of  a  policy  destined  to  be  often  repeated  in  later  times. 
The  'knights'  of  Capua  {equites  Campani\  evidently  a  warrior- 
aristocracy  of  Samnite  origin,  had  been  faithful  to  Rome  in 
the  recent  troubles.  They  were  now  confirmed  in  a  privileged 
position.  The  principle  was  a  simple  one ;  the  wealthy  minority 
who  had  something  to  lose  were  more  likely  to  be  true  to  the 
Roman  connexion  than  the  poorer  majority.  So  a  pro-Roman 
party  was  kept  alive  by  self-interest  in  all  inferior  communities 
connected  with  Rome. 

65.  All  the  conquered  peoples  were  required  to  cede  a 
portion  of  their  territory,  and  all  classes  of  Romans  benefited 
thereby  in  some  degree.  The  rich  no  doubt  profited  largely  as 
lessees  of  the  lands  reserved  for  state-domain.     The  allotments 


70  The  Romans  in  Campania  [ch. 

of  land  in  private  ownership  served  to  relieve  the  necessities  of 
the  poor,  and  to  place  districts  of  strategic  value  in  the  firm 
grasp  of  Rome.  Thus  the  rich  Falernian  country  was  occupied 
by  Roman  settlers,  and  others  were  planted  on  land  taken  from 
Latin  and  Volscian  communities.  The  distinction  between  Latin 
and  Volscian  districts  was  disappearing  as  the  latter  became 
merged  in  an  extended  Latium.  The  remaining  Volscians  were 
now  hemmed  in  by  Rome  on  most  sides,  for  the  Aurunci  to  the 
South  submitted  to  Roman  overlordship.  Rome  had  now  fairly 
started  on  her  imperial  career.  There  could  be  no  turning  back. 
To  conquer  or  be  conquered  was  the  only  choice.  Already  she 
was  a  considerable  Italian  power,  and  we  hear  of  her  importance 
being  recognized  by  the  visits  of  embassies  from  Carthage.  The 
first,  in  348,  is  said  to  have  led  to  a  treaty,  perhaps  the  renewal 
of  an  earlier  one.  The  second,  in  343,  is  represented  as  a 
formal  visit  to  congratulate  the  Romans  on  successes  against  the 
Samnites.  But  the  relations  between  the  two  powers  were  at 
present  only  agreements  to  define  the  facilities  offered  for 
commerce  and  the  restrictions  imposed  on  such  intercourse. 
Campania  was  a  Carthaginian  market,  and  it  was  probably  the 
interest  of  the  great  trading  city  to  be  on  good  terms  with  the 
new  masters  of  that  wealthy  land. 

66.  Second  stage,  337 — 303.  The  early  years  of  this  period 
were  comparatively  quiet,  but  further  pacification  of  the  districts 
to  the  South-East  was  soon  necessary.  In  330  a  revolt  of  the 
Volscian  town  Privernum  gave  a  pretext  for  putting  an  end  to 
the  last  relics  of  Volscian  independence.  The  plan  followed  was 
to  give  the  half-franchise  to  the  conquered,  and  to  plant  full 
citizens  on  some  forfeited  land.  The  intention  of  Rome  to 
control  communications  with  the  South  had  been  recently  shewn 
by  subjugating  the  Aurunci  more  completely,  and  by  founding 
the  Latin  colony  of  Cales  (334)  between  the  Liris  and  Volturnus 
to  command  the  inland  route  to  Capua.  Now  a  citizen  colony 
on  the  coast  at  Anxur  (329)  and  a  Latin  colony  at  Fregellae  on 
the  Liris  (328)  served  to  command  both  routes  at  points  nearer 
Rome,  and  to  secure  the  new  territory.  The  Latin  colonies  are 
to  be  noted  as  the  first  founded  by  Rome  since  the  suppression 
of  the  Latin  League.  There  was  now  no  pretence  of  cooperation 
in  founding  these  colonies.  They  were  strictly  coloniae  Latinae 
populi    Romania    fortress-towns    holding    strategic   positions    for 


vii]  The  western  Greeks  71 

Rome.  The  status  of  the  settlers  as  'Latins'  marked  them 
out  as  different  from  ordinary  Allies.  They  were  part  of  the 
'  Latin  name '  as  much  as  old  Latin  cities  like  Praeneste  or 
Tibur. 

67.  We  must  now  turn  to  Rome's  dealings  with  the  Greeks 
and  Samnites,  for  the  two  ran  together  with  momentous  results. 
Let  us  first  note  that  the  old  Hellas  was  now  under  the  new 
Macedonian  power.  Alexander  the  Great  ran  his  career  in 
336 — 323.  The  eyes  of  most  of  the  Greek  world  were  turned 
to  the  East.  In  the  West  Syracuse  still  held  part  of  Sicily, 
though  weakened  by  internal  troubles.  The  pressure  of  Carthage, 
successfully  repelled  for  a  time  under  the  guidance  of  Timoleon 
(344 — 337),  again  was  felt  under  a  weaker  government.  In  317 
the  ruffian  Agathocles  became  tyrant,  and  ruled  in  blood  till  289, 
the  terror  alike  of  Carthage  and  the  western  Greeks.  In  Italy 
many  Greek  cities  had  either  disappeared  or  become  'barbarized,' 
losing  their  Greek  character  by  conquest  or  forced  union  with 
Bruttian  or  Lucanian  masters.  Tarentum  alone  stood  strong  in 
a  position  of  exceptional  vantage  and  wealth  gained  by  commerce. 
But  she  too  was  affected  by  the  degeneracy  widespread  in  the 
Greek  world  of  this  age,  unable  to  use  freedom  with  judgment, 
and  to  allow  for  changed  circumstances.  The  scale  of  states 
was  larger  than  in  the  great  age  of  Greece,  and  the  city-state  on 
old  Greek  lines  was  out  of  date.  To  withstand  the  advance  of 
Samnites  and  Lucanians  needed  a  military  strength  such  as  the 
easygoing  Tarentines  could  not  or  would  not  create  by  their  own 
exertions.  They  looked  for  champions  to  defend  them.  First 
came  king  Archidamus  of  Sparta  (338),  only  to  fall  in  battle 
against  the  Lucanians.  A  few  years  later  Alexander  of  Epirus, 
king  of  the  Molossi,  landed  in  southern  Italy  to  uphold  the 
Greek  cause,  but  evidently  with  imperial  designs.  He  won 
victories  over  Samnites  Lucanians  and  Bruttians,  and  saved  some 
Greek  cities  for  a  time.  He  is  said  to  have  come  to  a  friendly 
understanding  with  Rome.  But  he  was  murdered  by  a  Lucanian, 
and  so  ended,  in  the  year  327.  Nothing  effectual  had  been 
achieved  by  these  means  in  the  way  of  averting  disaster  from 
the  Greeks,  but  for  Rome  they  had  done  much.  The  attention 
of  the  Samnites  was  diverted  to  the  South,  while  Roman  organiza- 
tion was  taking  root  in  newly-acquired  districts.  For  the  strength 
of  Rome  was  built  up  by  sure  and  silent  development  in  times  of 


72  Neapolis  [ch. 

peace.     It  was  now  that  she  got  a  grip  of  the  upper  valley  of  the 
Liris,  which  the  Samnites  claimed  as  their  own. 

68.  The  remnant  of  Greeks  in  Campania  were  in  as  bad 
plight  as  the  rest.  Their  strength  was  centred  in  the  city  of 
Neapolis.  This  was  still  Greek,  but  had  in  it  Campanians  also, 
probably  confined  to  a  quarter  walled  off  from  the  rest.  Somehow 
they  quarrelled  with  Rome,  now  mistress  of  most  of  Campania. 
They  looked  round  for  help.  Tarentum  failed  them,  but  they 
received  a  Samnite  garrison  and  stood  a  siege.  This  was  in  327. 
The  great  importance  attached  to  winning  Neapolis  is  shewn  by 
the  retention^  of  Q.  Publilius  Philo  in  command  as  pro  consule. 
In  326  some  of  the  chief  Neapolitans  betrayed  the  town  to  Rome. 
It  was  granted  favourable  terms,  and  became  an  Ally,  the  prin- 
cipal condition  of  its  treaty  being  the  provision  of  a  naval  con- 
tingent. Neapolis  had  really  found  a  protector.  The  decay  of 
Greek  civilization  was  so  far  stayed  that  300  years  later  the  city 
still  kept  a  Greek  character.  It  was  more  than  ever  the  local 
centre  of  Greek  influences,  holding  a  territory  of  its  own,  and 
steadily  loyal  to  Rome  from  the  time  of  its  alliance.  But  mean- 
while war  had  broken  out  between  the  Romans  and  the  Samnites, 
who  were  now  free  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  North.  Our 
traditions  of  this  struggle,  known  as  the  second  or  great  Samnite 
war,  are  hopelessly  corrupted  by  the  bias  of  Roman  annalists  and 
family  legends.  But  we  can  detect  the  advantage  enjoyed  by 
Rome  in  the  more  effective  organization  of  her  forces,  the  concen- 
tration of  authority,  and  in  the  far-sighted  guidance  of  a  tenacious 
policy.  It  was  doubtless  not  easy  to  maintain  cooperation  among 
the  cantons  of  independent  dalesmen  for  any  length  of  time 
under  direction  of  a  single  leader.  Personal  bravery  was  not 
enough,  and  the  fine  temper  of  Roman  discipline  was  probably 
never  attained  in  Samnite  armies.  Nor  had  the  armies  at  their 
back  any  such  wise  and  permanent  body  as  the  Roman  Senate, 
consistently  keen  to  turn  circumstances  to  account.  The  general 
impression  left  by  our  imperfect  record  is  this.  To  the  Samnites 
the  war  was  mainly  a  matter  of  military  effort,  with  a  certain  con- 
sciousness that  victory  would  leave  them  lords  of  Italy.  To  the 
Romans,  that  is  to  the  Senate,  it  was  more  a  matter  of  business. 
It  was  skilful  diplomacy,  and  the  pains  taken  to  secure  new 
acquisitions,  that   brought   about  their  final  triumph,  far  more 

^  See  §  63. 


Plate    I 


I.     Coin  of  Tarentum  [Taras],   4th  cent.  B.C. 
obv.    Horseman. 

rev.    Tiiras  on  dolphin.     TAP  AS. 
See  §  67. 


Coin  of  Massalia. 

obv.    Artemis  with  sprigs  of  olive  in  hair. 

rev.    Lion.     MA2SA. 

See  §  79. 


Coin  of  Carthage,  ?  late  4th  cent.   B.C. 

obv.    Head  of  Persephone,  copied  from  coins  of  Syracuse. 

rev.    Horse  and  palm  tree. 

The  work  of  a  Greek  artist. 

See  §  92. 


vii]  Great  Samnite  war  73 

than  clever  strategy  of  commanders  or  enthusiasm  in  the  rank 
and  file. 

69.  The  war  lasted  from  327  to  304,  with  a  temporary  truce 
in  318.  The  stories  of  Roman  victories  cannot  be  trusted.  The 
most  famous  episode  was  the  entrapping  of  two  consuls  and  their 
armies  (321)  in  a  defile  known  as  the  Caudine  Forks.  Pontius 
the  Samnite  is  said  to  have  exacted  severe  terms  and  then  to 
have  let  the  Romans  go,  first  degrading  them  by  making  the 
whole  force  pass  beneath  the  so-called  '  yoke.'  But  the  consuls 
had  no  power  to  make  final  concessions,  and  the  Roman  govern- 
ment disowned  the  compact.  The  chief  Roman  heroes  of  the 
war  were  L.  Papirius  Cursor  and  Q.  Fabius  Rullianus.  The 
strength  of  Roman  discipline  is  illustrated  by  the  determination 
of  the  former  when  dictator  to  put  Fabius  his  master  of  horse  to 
death  for  disregard  of  orders,  and  the  extreme  difficulty  with 
which  his  wrath  was  appeased  by  the  entreaties  of  the  people  at 
large.  In  such  traditions  the  Romans  portray  the  quibbling 
legality  and  the  sternness  which  were  confessedly  marked  traits  in 
their  character.  Traces  of  the  true  story  of  this  great  struggle 
appear  in  the  notices  of  Roman  relations  with  the  Apulians  and 
Lucanians.  The  Apulian  country,  lying  beyond  the  Apennine, 
was  strategically  important  as  a  position  from  which  to  threaten 
the  rear  of  the  Samnite  confederacy.  Of  the  peoples  dwelling 
there  the  Dauni  in  the  North  were  at  present  chiefly  concerned, 
but  all  were  probably  willing  to  secure  the  help  of  Rome  against 
their  aggressive  neighbours.  Rome  came  to  terms  with  them, 
but  communications  with  them  were  not  easy,  and  the  alliance 
seems  to  have  been  interrupted  for  a  time  by  fear  of  the  Samnites. 
In  Lucania  there  seems  to  have  been  disunion,  the  leading  men 
favouring  Rome.  But  the  Greeks  of  Tarentum  were  now  more 
afraid  of  the  Romans  than  of  the  Samnites,  and  alarmed  at  the 
fall  of  Neapolis.  Their  agents  contrived  to  effect  a  democratic 
revolution  and  detached  the  Lucanians  from  Rome.  Roman 
efforts  were  now  directed  to  getting  a  firm  footing  in  Apulia, 
where  they  established  a  strong  post  at  Luceria,  a  much-contested 
city  in  the  course  of  the  war.  Clearly  the  Samnites  had  a  hard 
task,  for  the  other  Sabellian  groups  did  little.  The  Vestini  seem 
to  have  made  a  small  diversion  in  their  favour,  soon  suppressed, 
but  at  present  the  northern  peoples  mostly  stood  aloof.  After 
319  the  war  continued  in  obscure  campaigns,  but  on  the  whole 


74 


Roman  progress 


[CH. 


Rome  held  what  she  had  won,  and  improved  her  organization  in 
the  Campanian  district. 

70.  In  the  course  of  the  war  (320)  the  Tarentines  had  tried 
to  dictate  peace  to  the  armies  facing  each  other  in  ApuHa,  but  a 
vain  threat  of  intervention  was  disregarded.  In  the  following  years 
Rome  gained  the  upper  hand  in  that  region  and  in  314  occupied 
Luceria  with  a  strong  Latin  colony.  A  victory  over  the  Samnite 
Frentani  opened  another  route  to  northern  Apulia.  Lucania  too 
was  invaded.  The  warfare  in  Campania  314 — 310  was  also  in 
favour  of  Rome.  Nola  and  Nuceria  were  taken,  and  became 
Roman  AUies,  with  arrangements  placing  the  richer  citizens  in 


PAELlGNi         .'" 
M  A  R  S  1 

7^ — "            j 

V,^,^^        ,.'' 

C 

\      Aeseruia 

Phrt  of  the 
extended       ' 

^ 

Arpi        / 

Luceria           "              { 
0                                     1 

Latium 

\ 

At              ^\.^^ 

\ 

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V              0          ^ 

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Beneventuja 
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Venuaia 
0 

^0^     ^ 

\ 

oi- 

1r-^^-^^\y^ 

^   0    C    A    N     1     ^ 

AoPaes 

turn 

Campania  and  Samnium. 

power.  Meanwhile  a  vigorous  advance  of  the  Samnites  was 
repelled  and  Roman  dominion  forcibly  asserted  in  the  valley  of 
the  Liris.  Further  planting  of  Latin  colonies  proved  the  intention 
of  Rome  to  hold  the  disputed  borders,  Suessa  and  Saticula  313, 
Interamna  312.  Another  was  sent  to  the  Pontian  islands  in  313. 
The  ways  to  Campania  were  to  be  in  Roman  control  by  land  and 
sea.  The  improvement  of  the  coast-route  by  construction  of  the 
solid  via  Appia  has  been  mentioned  above.  When  the  Romans 
were  able  to  strengthen  their  position  by  these  means,  and  the 
Samnites  could  not  keep  them  out  of  Apulia,  it  is  manifest  that 
the   Samnite   cause   was   already   failing.     It   was   probably  the 


vii]  and  consolidation  75 

striking  superiority  of  Rome,  and  the  fear  of  falling  under  Roman 
dominion,  that  led  to  a  number  of  risings  in  various  parts  of  Italy. 
To  overcome  these  immense  efforts  were  necessary,  but  the 
soundness  of  the  Roman  system  was  equal  to  the  strain. 

71.  In  311  we  hear  of  an  Etruscan  invasion.  The  war 
lasted  about  three  years.  Roman  victories  were  followed  up  by 
an  advance  into  the  heart  of  Etruria  through  the  Ciminian  forest, 
hitherto  a  barrier,  and  also  into  Umbria,  where  resistance  was  soon 
overcome.  In  308  quiet  was  restored  in  these  parts,  and  the 
Sabellian  Marsi  and  Paeligni  forced  to  submit  to  Rome  or  at 
least  abandon  the  Samnites.  It  is  clear  that  the  northern  peoples, 
not  at  present  threatened  by  the  Gauls,  were  alarmed  at  the  growth 
of  Rome,  but  that  their  attempt  to  check  it  was  made  without 
proper  combination  and  too  late.  Next  came  the  turn  of  Rome's 
old  Allies  the  Hernici.  Among  the  Samnite  prisoners  (for  war 
was  going  on  in  Samnium)  Hernican  volunteers  were  found. 
Rome  required  explanations,  and  part  of  the  Hernican  League 
rose  in  rebellion.  The  rising  was  promptly  put  down.  The  rebel 
towns  received  the  half-franchise,  the  loyal  were  left  as  Allies 
with  all  their  old  privileges,  and  we  hear  no  more  of  the  Hernici. 
While  this  settlement  was  going  on  (306)  the  Samnites  made 
further  efforts,  but  in  vain.  A  truce  in  304  led  to  a  peace  and 
renewal  of  their  old  treaty  with  Rome.  Rome,  it  seems,  had  had 
enough  of  them  for  the  present.  But  the  regular  work  of  con- 
solidation went  on.  In  304  the  remnant  of  the  Aequi  were 
crushed,  and  a  strong  Latin  colony  at  Alba  (303)  near  the  lake 
Fucinus  asserted  the  sovranty  of  Rome  in  that  district.  Another 
at  Sora,  beyond  the  Hernici,  held  an  important  position  on  the 
direct  line  between  Rome  and  Samnium.  The  Marsi  and  Paeligni 
were  compelled  to  become  Roman  Allies,  and  order  was  restored 
in  Umbria.  The  rise  of  Rome  is  very  manifest  at  this  stage.  It 
surely  had  not  escaped  the  notice  of  foreign  powers.  In  306 
came  another  embassy  from  Carthage  and  a  new  treaty  was  the 
result.  And  about  the  same  time  friendly  relations,  not  a  treaty, 
were  established  between  Rome  and  the  honourable  island-republic 
of  Rhodes. 

72.  Third  stage,  302 — 282.  The  advance  of  Rome  had  for 
some  time  caused  uneasiness  at  Tarentum.  It  was  no  doubt 
Greek  intrigues  that  had  promoted  a  rising  in  the  lapygian  or 
Sallentine  country,  the  heel  of  Italy,  in  307.    The  Tarentines  now 


76 


The  Romans  in  the  North 


[CH. 


(302)  induced  the  Spartan  prince  Cleonymus  to  land  in  Italy. 
His  freebooting  expeditions  with  mercenary  forces  did  no  good, 
and  only  left  the  Greek  interest  weaker.  But  it  seems  that  Rome 
acted  as  protector  of  the  Sallentine  district.  She  was  in  truth 
claiming  to  be  the  leader  of  Italy.  In  the  North  she  intervened 
in  the  affairs  of  Etruria,  and  pacified  the  smaller  Sabellian  peoples, 
Marsi  Paeligni  Vestini  Marrucini,  who  were  still  restless.  Force 
was  used  where  necessary,  as  with  the  Aequi,  who  drop  out  of 
history :  a  Latin  colony  at  Carseoli  (298  or  302)  strengthened  the 
hold  of  Rome  on  these  parts,  and  another  at  Narnia  (299, 
formerly  Nequinum)  in  southern  Umbria  commanded  the  route 
to  the  North  along  the  line  of  the  Nar.  An  Umbrian  rising  was 
put   down,  and  a  treaty  made  with  the   Picentes.     Rome  was 


<;■■■■■■■..,  ... 

\ 

\  ■ .. 

oFaesulae.       ^                         \«. 

oPis&e       ^ 

:       ^                     X 

\                 -^                     !         <?                     ^^^               1 

\ 

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\    Volaterrae    ^                                            -»                                  \                1 

\     ' 

vv                    Cortona.                                                  \ 

S  •     Populonia 

Clusiuin          °   .                                       <^      \ 

^      I 

V-^^       '^'~\ 

oRuaellae                VdlsViiJ                  \                          jp  V 

1 

^  oVeUilonia(7)                       "•._      ^                                             > 

cO 

r oVdoi                                  /'    o 

<J                  <ij 

'"S.                           Pbleni-,              * 

A              Vrarquinij.^.  •,#•>        ; 

\lS'"^         .Capena     AEQVI 

T/*,Caere    oVeii.'' 

^V°            .o'Bdenac 

Y'SRoiaa 

The  chief  Etrurian  cities. 


beginning  to  look  towards  the  Adriatic,  while  her  citizens  were 
elsewhere  spreading  over  a  wider  area.  Between  318  and  295 
four  new  Tribes  were  formed  of  Romans  settled  on  confiscated 
land.  But  a  desperate  struggle  was  coming.  Hitherto,  thanks 
to  diplomacy  and  good  fortune,  Rome  had  been  able  to  deal  with 
her  enemies  one  by  one  or  in  small  ineffective  combinations.  It 
remained  to  be  seen  whether  she  could  withstand  a  widespread 
coalition,  able  to  bring  into  the  field  great  armies  working  for  a 


vii]  War  with  the  great  coalition  77 

common  end.  We  shall  see  that  she  was  equal  to  the  task.  Our 
tradition  incidentally  betrays  the  secret  of  her  success,  when  we 
hear  that  her  legions  were  supported  by  strong  contingents  of 
Latins  and  other  Allies.  That  is,  the  peoples  who  had  sufficient 
experience  of  the  Roman  alliance  were  persuaded  of  two  things. 
They  could  not  stand  alone,  and  no  other  connexion  seemed  to 
offer  them  a  better  alternative.  Moreover  the  merits  of  Rome  were 
recalled  to  the  minds  of  men  by  the  reappearance  of  the  Gauls. 

73.  Under  the  year  299  we  hear  of  Gauls  threatening 
Etruria,  and  an  attempt  to  hire  their  services  for  a  war  with 
Rome.  But  they  treated  the  bribe  as  a  ransom,  and  withdrew. 
Meanwhile  war  broke  out  again,  but  soon  shifted  to  the  South, 
where  the  Samnites  were  busy  in  Lucania  and  Apulia.  In  both 
these  districts  Roman  intervention  was  necessary,  but  it  was  not 
until  296  that  a  serious  crisis  was  reached.  Samnite  forces  had 
to  be  driven  out  of  the  Aurunco-Campanian  borderland,  and 
citizen  colonies  were  planted  at  Minturnae  and  Sinuessa  to  guard 
the  coast-route.  Other  Samnite  armies  were  beaten  in  Samnium. 
But  now  a  sudden  change  took  place.  The  bulk  of  the  Samnite 
forces  marched  off  to  Etruria,  where  an  army  of  Gauls  was  in  the 
field.  Rome  now  had  to  face  a  grand  coalition  of  Etruscans 
Umbrians  Samnites  and  Gauls.  But  the  failing  Etruscans  were 
drawn  off  by  an  invasion  of  their  country,  while  the  main  army  of 
Rome  and  her  Allies  routed  that  of  the  confederates  in  the  great 
battle  of  Sentinum  (295)  in  Umbria.  The  consul  Decius  is  said 
to  have  devoted  himself  to  death,  as  his  father  had  done  in  the 
Latin  war,  to  restore  the  fortune  of  the  day.  The  great  coalition 
had  failed,  and  the  cities  of  the  North  had  to  submit  for  the  time 
on  various  terms.  The  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Samnites  went 
on  for  a  time^  but  they  were  exhausted.  In  292  their  great  leader 
Pontius  was  taken  and  beheaded  after  the  consul's  triumph.  In 
291  Roman  supremacy  in  the  South  was  declared  by  the  founda- 
tion of  the  great  Latin  colony  of  Venusia  in  the  Daunian  country, 
a  fortress  to  watch  Apulia  and  Lucania  in  the  rear  of  Samnium. 
Then  in  290  we  hear  that  the  Samnites  sued  for  peace  and 
obtained  again  renewal  of  their  old  treaty.  This  may  be  true,  for 
Rome  was  weary,  and  could  afford  to  wait  the  effect  of  time. 

74.  At  this  point  the  Sabines,  who  had  apparently  held 
aloof  from  the  struggles  of  the  age,  are  suddenly  mentioned  as 
at  war  with  Rome.     We  hear  of  their  being  subdued  and  made 


78  Mafnertini.     Tarentum  [ch. 

Roman  half-citizens,  but  the  record  is  incomplete.  The  next 
business  was  in  the  South.  Agathocles  of  Syracuse,  whose 
activities  had  extended  from  Carthage  to  Corcyra,  died  in  289, 
and  a  change  came  over  the  fortunes  of  the  Western  Greeks. 
In  Sicily  the  Carthaginians  soon  began  to  recover  lost  ground, 
and  a  body  of  mercenaries,  paid  off  after  the  tyrant's  death, 
treacherously  seized  Messana,  killing  the  men  and  taking  their 
wives  and  properties.  They  were  Campanian  Samnites,  and, 
rather  than  return  to  their  homes  under  Roman  rule,  they  formed 
themselves  into  a  new  robber-state.  They  called  themselves 
Mamertini  (sons  of  Mamers  or  Mars),  and  ravaged  much  of 
Sicily  to  the  injury  of  the  Greek  interest.  But  in  Italy  the 
Greeks,  relieved  from  the  fear  of  Agathocles,  breathed  more 
freely,  and  hopes  of  expansion  revived  in  Tarentum.  Rome 
however  was  now  free  to  turn  her  attention  to  the  South.  She 
intervened  in  Lucania,  where  the  Greek  town  of  Thurii  was  in 
danger,  and  compelled  the  Lucanians  to  cease  their  attacks. 
For  some  years  (289 — 282)  she  had  to  keep  watch  in  these  parts 
and  chastise  both  the  Lucanians  and  the  Bruttians  beyond  them. 
The  Tarentines  were  busy  making  trouble  for  Rome  in  southern 
Italy,  for  they  did  not  want  to  see  the  Greek  cities  pass  under 
Roman  protection.  At  last  in  282  the  inevitable  collision  took 
place.  A  squadron  of  Roman  ships  appeared  north  of  the 
Lacinian  foreland,  in  contravention  of  a  treaty.  A  Tarentine 
fleet  put  to  sea  and  captured  them ;  but,  instead  of  making  com- 
plaint at  Rome,  the  Greek  government  put  to  death  or  enslaved 
the  prisoners.  A  Roman  embassy  sent  to  demand  satisfaction 
was  insulted.     The  sequel  will  be  described  below. 

75.  Meanwhile  in  the  years  285 — 283  there  had  been  war 
on  a  large  scale  in  the  North,  of  which  we  have  a  very  dim  record. 
Internal  quarrels  in  Etruria  led  to  the  invitation  of  Gaulish  aid 
against  Roman  intervention.  Two  Gaulish  tribes  responded  to 
the  call.  The  Senones  were  cut  to  pieces  in  battle.  Their 
territory,  a  strip  of  land  in  the  coast-district  of  northern  Umbria, 
was  invaded  and  cleared  by  exterminating  the  rest  of  the  tribe. 
In  this  district  a  citizen  colony  was  planted  on  the  coast  at  Sena 
Gallica  (283)  and  the  whole  strip,  known  henceforth  as  ager 
Gallicus,  annexed  by  Rome.  The  Boii  also  suffered  severely 
in  the  fighting,  and  were  driven  back  into  their  own  territory  in 
the  region  of  the  Po.     The  Roman  government  had  now  taken 


vii]  ager  Gallicus,     Pyrrhus  79 

a  long  stride  towards  the  ever-menacing  Gauls,  and  for  more  than 
forty  years  there  was  peace  on  the  northern  frontier.  The  district 
along  the  Adriatic  south  of  the  ager  Gallicus^  known  as  Picenum, 
had  not  been  overlooked.  A  Latin  colony  had  been  planted  at 
Hatria  in  289,  and  was  now  followed  by  a  citizen  colony  at 
Castrum  Novum  in  283.  The  Roman  heroes  of  this  latter  part 
of  the  period  of  conquest  were  Manius  Curius  Dentatus  and 
Gaius  Fabricius  Luscinus,  names  renowned  in  Roman  tradition, 
not  only  for  military  success,  but  as  classic  patterns  of  public 
virtue  and  frugal  simplicity  of  life. 

76.     Fourth  stage,  281 — 265.     The  Tarentines  found  them- 
selves at  war  with  Rome,  and  under  a  new  protector.     This  was 
Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  the  Molossian  king,  one  of  the  most  adven- 
turous and  brilliant  figures  among  the  younger  Successors  of  the 
great  Alexander.     In  defying  Rome  their  trust  was  in  him  and  in 
a  hoped-for  rising  of  the  southern  Sabellians.      The  democratic 
party  came   into  power.      But  when  Pyrrhus   arrived,   with  his 
Epirotes   and   Greek    mercenaries   trained   on   the   Macedonian 
model,  he  found  the  citizens  indisposed  to  submit  to  his  drilling, 
and  had  to  act  as  an  autocrat.     Hence  there  was  discontent  with 
the  new  deliverer,  and  the  Sabellian  peoples  were  not  eager  to 
back  him.     But  he  added  to  his  army,  and  his  battle-elephants 
were  an  alarming  force,   new  in  Italian  warfare.     Meanwhile  a 
Roman  consul  was  despatched  with  an  army  to  watch  him,  and 
a  Roman  garrison,  chiefly  Campanians,  posted  at  Rhegium  to 
guard  the   strait   commanded  by  the  Mamertines   of  Messana. 
This  garrison  mutinied,  seized  Rhegium  for  themselves  in  imita- 
tion of  their  neighbours,  and  for  about  ten  years  lived  as  a  robber- 
state.    Pyrrhus  gained  a  victory  over  the  Romans  in  Lucania  (280) 
at  Heraclea,  and  pushed  on  into  Campania,  and  even  into  the 
Hernican  country,  not  far  from  Rome.      But  the  Romans  had 
now  two  armies  to  meet  him,  for  a  local  rising  in  Etruria  had 
been  suppressed.     Already  aware  of  the  magnitude  of  his  under- 
taking, he  made  proposals  of  peace,  but  was  told  that  he  must 
first  leave  Italy.      He   fell  back   on   Tarentum   to  prepare   for 
another  campaign.     But  the  Samnite  and  Lucanian  auxiliaries, 
of  whom  his  victory  had  led  numbers   to  join  him,  were  less 
forward  since  his  retreat.     In  279  he  entered  Apulia  and  again 
defeated  the  Romans  at  Ausculum.     But  his  losses  were  again 
heavy.     His  Epirotes  were  thinned  out,  and  troubles  in  Epirus 


8o 


Pyrrhus  in  Sicily 


[CH. 


stopped  the  supply.  The  resources  of  Rome  were  too  great. 
Above  all  (so  Roman  tradition  boasted)  offers  of  bribes,  a  normal 
engine  of  Greek  and  Oriental  war,  did  not  buy  him  the  help  of 
Roman  traitors.  His  allies  were  selfish,  and  he  could  not  find 
trusty  garrisons  to  hold  the  Greek  towns.  So  he  withdrew  to 
Tarentum  once  more,  and  shortly  sailed  for  Syracuse,  on  an 
invitation  to  expel  the  Carthaginian  forces  now  overrunning  the 


QymeV.j\Neapoli8 

X 

o       p 

»->. 

"  '^Aj'oseidonia    Metaponbum/ 

^.^-^J^renbum   K. 

A        ™           Heracleao/ 

^V          \ 

W.  Elea                      Y 

P           ( 

N                                                                       VX\                      ) 

\^        1 

V"^  ^                                                           \    Thurii/ 

^O 

^^^                                                          \            '\ 

\^*                                  I         V 

^^                 \    ^ 

X 

^'^'^                              \ 

oOjroton 

""^  .  J  c 

\            Hippqirnuni         V 

^      ^         ]         J 

\^    / 

/S7    C"*^                                 ^-./-^ /^^^^k-       aA^ocn 

y^W         ^>._^.-_^^-^'^**y   \R^e0/un. 

"i^-    Agrigentum                        / 

S^                       Leontini  a  y 

^-'- V                     \Sypacu9ae 

The  region  of  Magna  Graecia.     Only  those  cities  that  play  a  considerable 
part  in  Roman  history  are  marked. 

island.  This  move  was  not  wholly  unexpected.  In  279  Rome 
and  Carthage  concluded  a  special  treaty  for  defence  against  the 
invader.  But  not  much  came  of  this,  owing  to  the  jealousy  of 
the  two  parties.  In  about  two  years  Pyrrhus  conquered  all  Sicily 
save  Lilybaeum  and  Messana.  He  could  neither  force  his  terms 
upon  Carthage  nor  induce  the  Greeks  to  make  further  sacrifices. 
Nobody  wanted  him  now,  so  he  fought  his  way  back  by  sea  and 
land,   assailed   by   Carthaginians   Mamertines   and  the   men   at 


vii]  Rome  Head  of  Italy  8i 

Rhegium,  to  his  depot  at  Tarentum  some  time  in  276.  Next 
year  he  marched  into  Samnium  for  one  more  effort,  but  was 
badly  beaten  by  M'.  Curius  near  Beneventum.  The  game  was  up. 
He  left  Italy  for  Greece,  where  he  fell  in  a  street-fight  (272)  at  the 
siege  of  Argos. 

77.  Samnites  Lucanians  Bruttians,  all  had  been  punished 
by  Roman  armies  while  Pyrrhus  was  in  Sicily.  They  had  now 
only  to  submit  and  become  Allies,  with  their  swords  at  the  service 
of  Rome.  The  mutineers  at  Rhegium  were  then  dealt  with.  The 
town  fell  in  271  and  no  mercy  was  shewn.  At  Syracuse  a  young 
soldier  named  Hiero  had  come  into  power.  He  attacked  the 
Mamertine  ruffians,  but  they  were  saved  by  Carthage,  and  Messana 
was  held  by  a  Punic  garrison.  Things  were  becoming  complicated 
in  those  parts,  with  two  great  powers  each  wishing  to  command 
the  strait.  Hiero  wished  to  be  at  peace  with  both,  but  he  helped 
the  Romans  at  Rhegium.  That  city  was  now  refounded  as  a 
Greek  Ally  of  Rome,  and  the  surviving  exiles  restored.  Rome 
was  now  the  patron  of  the  Italiot  Greeks.  At  Tarentum  Milo 
an  officer  of  Pyrrhus  held  the  citadel  for  about  three  years.  After 
his  master's  death  he  came  to  terms  with  the  Romans  and  with- 
drew, leaving  them  the  fortress.  A  Punic  fleet  cruising  off  the 
city  had  to  withdraw  also,  and  Carthage  had  to  explain  its  presence 
as  a  friendly  design.  A  few  outlying  districts  only  remained  to 
be  brought  under  Roman  dominion  more  effectively.  A  small 
Samnite  rising  was  quelled,  the  northern  Umbrians  and  the 
Picentes  finally  subdued,  and  a  part  of  the  latter  transplanted 
to  southern  Campania.  When  the  Sallentini  of  the  far  South- 
East  had  shared  the  common  fate,  Italy  from  the  Gaulish  frontier 
to  the  Sicilian  strait  was  united  under  the  headship  of  Rome. 

78.  The  closing  years  of  the  conquest  saw  the  foundation 
of  a  number  of  Latin  colonies.  Of  these,  Cosa  on  the  Etrurian 
coast  (273)  watched  a  district  now  obedient  to  Rome.  The  last 
Etruscan  rising  was  put  down  in  280,  and  Rome  now  only  inter- 
fered (as  at  Volsinii  in  265)  to  keep  the  decaying  aristocracies  in 
power.  Paestum,  a  revival  (273)  of  the  Greek  Poseidonia,  was  on 
the  western  coast  of  Lucania.  Ariminum  (268),  on  the  northern 
coast  of  the  Ager  Gallicus^  watched  the  frontier.  Beneventum 
(268),  in  the  heart  of  Samnium,  served  to  watch  and  divide 
Rome's  most  stubborn  adversaries.  In  263  it  was  followed  by 
Aesernia,  doing  the  same  for  the  northern  Samnite  cantons. 
H.  6 


82  New  position  of  Rome  [ch.  vii 

Another  was  planted  at  Firmum  in  Picenum  (264)  to  secure 
a  district  recently  disturbed.  Thus  Roman  fortresses,  holding 
important  points,  were  spread  over  a  wider  area,  and  roads  con- 
necting them,  improved  as  time  went  on,  gave  ready  communication 
with  every  part  of  Italy.  Moreover  Rome  now  held  not  only  the 
Campanian  harbours  but  the  two  best  ports  of  the  South-East, 
Tarentum  and  Brundisium.  All  the  Greek  nautical  skill  remaining 
in  the  ports  of  the  South  was  at  her  disposal.  Rhegium  Locri 
Croton  and  other  towns  could  regain  some  of  their  old  prosperity 
under  her  protection.  And  the  actual  territory  of  the  Republic, 
the  ager  Romanus,  had  been  greatly  extended  in  the  course  of 
a  century  of  conquest  by  the  annexation  of  forfeited  lands.  Her 
beaten  enemies,  now  her  Allies,  were  split  up  by  colonies  (each 
with  its  territory)  or  by  wedges  of  Roman  land  driven  in  between 
them.  Samnium  in  particular  was  so  reduced  and  broken  up  that 
an  effective  revival  of  the  Samnite  confederacy  was  hardly  possible. 
But  in  order  to  rule  Italy  with  any  comfort  it  was  desirable  to 
increase  the  number  of  full  Roman  citizens.  This  was  probably 
the  reason  why  the  full  franchise  was  in  268  granted  to  the  Sabines. 
We  have  seen  that  many  of  the  old  Patrician  families  claimed  a 
Sabine  origin,  and  there  was  probably  little  to  be  done  in  the  way 
of  assimilation. 

79.  But  supremacy  in  Italy  brought  with  it  a  wider  outlook 
in  foreign  relations.  As  a  protector  of  Greeks  Rome  came  into 
touch  with  the  outer  world  far  more  than  she  had  done  hitherto. 
Her  alliance  with  Massalia  was  of  very  old  standing,  and  she  was 
also  on  friendly  terms  with  Rhodes  and  with  ApoUonia  on  the 
Adriatic.  And  now  her  new  position  as  a  Mediterranean  power 
was  strikingly  recognized.  In  273  an  embassy  came  from  the 
court  of  Alexandria.  Ptolemy  II  Philadelphus  had  grasped  the 
meaning  of  events,  and  it  seems  that  his  proposals  were  well 
received  and  a  treaty  made.  But  Egypt  was  thriving  under 
the  Macedonian  dynasty  largely  at  the  expense  of  the  cities  of 
Phoenicia.  Fear  of  Carthage  (for  the  Cyrenaic  province  of  Egypt 
bordered  on  Punic  territory)  was  felt  at  Alexandria  as  well  as  by 
the  western  Greeks.  There  was  thus  a  prospect  of  a  conflict 
between  the  two  great  powers  watching  each  other  across  the 
Sicilian  strait,  and  a  certainty  that  in  it  Greeks  would  bear  a  part 
and  be  deeply  interested  in  the  result. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ORGANIZATION   OF   ITALY 

80.  The  main  causes  of  Roman  supremacy  in  Italy  are  not 
far  to  seek.  A  superior  military  organization  did  much,  a  con- 
sistent policy  did  more.  The  divisions  of  her  opponents  and  her 
own  central  position  enabled  her  to  profit  by  useful  alliances  and 
to  operate  on  *  inner  lines.'  Moreover  there  was  enough  affinity 
of  race  between  the  Romans  and  most  of  the  Italian  peoples  to 
make  a  general  union,  and  eventually  a  blending,  not  too  difficult. 
But  all  these  advantages  would  hardly  have  sufficed,  had  not  the 
Roman  headship  rested  on  a  moral  superiority.  Without  a  leader, 
Italy  might  well  have  been  parcelled  out,  like  the  East,  under 
royal  dynasties,  rising  and  falling  with  the  personal  qualities  of 
the  rulers,  or  overrun  by  the  barbarians  from  the  North.  Now 
Rome  was  the  best  leader  to  be  had  in  the  age  of  which  we  have 
been  speaking.  Clumsy  as  the  republican  government  was,  it  had 
gone  far  towards  inventing  a  machinery  effective  in  maintaining 
order  and  promoting  unity,  without  a  precarious  dependence  on 
the  virtues  of  a  single  ruler.  Roman  rule  was  hard,  but  on  the 
whole  just.  Above  all,  it  was  not  wavering  or  capricious.  And 
her  protectorate  was  real.  It  was  not  Rome  that  invited  Gaulish 
tribes  or  Epirote  kings  into  Italy :  and  her  dealings  with  these 
invaders  were  to  foreigners  as  well  as  Italians  an  object-lesson 
not  to  be  mistaken.  That  '  Italy  for  Italians '  meant  Italy  under 
Rome,  was  the  practical  logic  of  circumstances.  As  things  stood, 
to  object  to  it  was  idle. 

81.  Let  us  briefly  consider  the  organization  of  Italy,  reaching 
from  Ariminum  down  to  Rhegium.    Connexion  with  Rome  rested 

6—2 


84  cives  and  socii  [ch. 

either  on  citizenship  {civitas)  or  treaties  {foedera).  That  is,  all 
free  men  were  in  some  sense  either  cives  or  socii.  We  may 
tabulate  them  thus 

A.  cives  with  full  rights,  domiciled  {a)  in  Rome  {b)  on  the 

ager  Romanus  (c)  in  the  citizen  colonies. 
cives  with  *  private '  rights  only,  domiciled  (a)  in  municipia 
with   or  without   local   government   {U)  as  a  sub- 
ordinate class  in  the  citizen  colonies. 

B.  socii  of  the  *  Latin  name,'  domiciled  (a)  in  old  Latin 

towns  ip)  in  Latin  colonies,  on  various  terms. 
socii   not    of    Latin    status,    domiciled    in    treaty-states 

{civitates  foederatae),  on  various  terms. 
In  group  A  there  was  only  one  civitas,  that  of  Rome.  But  it 
differed  in  degree,  according  as  the  holders  were  enrolled  in 
Roman  tribes  and  enjoyed  the  'public'  rights,  or  were  placed 
on  a  separate  list  and  so  excluded  from  the  Assemblies  and  from 
office.  In  group  B  each  community  had  a  civitas  of  its  own,  and 
was  technically  a  state  {civitas  in  the  concrete  sense),  nominally 
independent.  But  its  sovranty  was  limited  by  the  terms  of  its 
treaty ;  for  the  charter  (lex)  of  a  Latin  colony  was  virtually  equi- 
valent to  difoedus  creating  a  new  civitas.  The  territory  of  group  A 
was  ager  Romanus^  and  it  was  under  Roman  law.  Even  in  the 
communities  of  half-citizens  {municipes)  the  local  laws  were  gradually 
superseded  by  Roman,  as  the  jurisdiction  of  circuit-judges  (praefecti) 
sent  from  Rome  got  into  working  order.  The  territories  of  group  B 
were  all  ager  peregrinus,  and  the  laws  those  of  the  several  states, 
unless  any  community  by  its  own  act  chose  with  the  leave  of 
Rome  to  adopt  Roman  law.  The  one  restriction  common  to 
them  all  was  that  they  could  have  no  foreign  policy.  From  this 
point  of  view  Rome  was  Italy^  and  the  mark  of  Allies  (in  this 
period  all  Italian  save  perhaps  Massalia)  was  that  they  were  by 
treaty  bound  to  furnish  contingents  to  Roman  armies  or  fleets, 
while  Friends  (amici,  such  as  Rhodes)  were  not.  But  the  con- 
tingents furnished  by  the  socii  were  clearly  distinguished  from  the 
citizen  troops  of  Rome.  They  were  organized  in  smaller  bodies, 
commanded  by  their  own  local  officers  of  subordinate  position, 
and  equipped  and  paid  by  their  several  states.  The  maximum 
number  due  from  each  state  was  fixed  by  a  schedule  {formula), 
but  it  would  seldom  be  necessary  for  the  consuls  when  raising  an 
army  to  call  out  all  the  available  forces  at  once. 


viii]  The  Allies  85 

82.  It  would  seem  that  the  ItaHan  Allies,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  mere  defence,  got  powerful  protection  at  a  very  moderate 
price.  No  doubt  they  did,  and  there  is  reason  to  think  that  in 
the  golden  age  of  the  Roman  Republic  treaties  were  faithfully 
observed  and  interpreted  with  strict  and  formal  justice.  But 
all  subordination  of  state  to  state  is  apt  to  gall  the  weaker  party 
to  a  compact.  The  system  of  graduated  privilege,  which  made 
some  communities  fear  to  lose  their  present  advantages,  while 
others  might  hope  to  better  their  position,  was  a  masterpiece  of 
Roman  statecraft.  The  yoke  probably  pressed  most  severely  on 
the  Roman  half-citizens,  but  they  had  the  best  prospect  of  pro- 
motion. The  main  differences  in  the  status  of  the  Allies  lay  in 
the  degree  of  dependence  on  Rome  required  by  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  in  each  case.  If  the  two  contracting  parties  were  mutually 
bound  by  the  same  conditions,  the  treaty  was  '  level '  (aequuni) ; 
if  one  was  in  some  respect  bound  while  the  other  remained  free, 
it  was  '  uphill '  or  '  unfair '  {iniquuni)  to  the  inferior  party.  At  its 
best,  the  sovranty  of  an  Ally  included  the  right  to  receive  Roman 
exiles  and  protect  them.  This  reciprocity  existed  between  Rome 
and  a  few  favoured  cities  such  as  Tibur  Praeneste  and  Neapolis. 
At  its  worst,  it  left  a  local  government,  but  reserved  the  citadel 
for  a  Roman  garrison,  as  at  Tarentum.  Few  details  are  known, 
but  the  lines  of  the  system  are  clear.  Of  the  Latin  colonies  we 
may  say  that  they  took  the  place  of  the  old  League  as  a  favoured 
class  of  Allies.  But  there  was  no  League,  nor  anything  to  connect 
them  with  each  other,  any  more  than  in  the  case  of  other  Allies. 
Their  connexion  with  Rome  was  direct,  at  first  including  the  rights 
of  conubium  and  commerdum,  and  a  '  Latin '  colonist  could  migrate 
to  Rome  and  become  a  Roman,  provided  he  left  a  son  behind 
able  to  fill  his  place.  There  is  reason  to  think  that  in  the 
later  colonies,  from  268  onward,  some  of  these  privileges  were 
reduced.  The  military  character  of  the  Latin  colonies  was 
marked  in  the  ceremonies  of  foundation,  and  we  must  not  forget 
that  the  poorer  class  of  Romans  supplied  some,  perhaps  many,  of 
the  coloni.  For  in  them  the  allotments  of  land  were  substantial 
farms,  while  the  Roman  franchise  was  not  as  yet  valued  for 
exemptions  and  perquisites  attached  to  it.  Others  were  drawn 
from  the  Treaty-states,  and  so  the  total  was  made  up,  generally 
a  large  one.  We  hear  of  20000  sent  to  Venusia,  but  2500,  4000, 
6000,  are  the  ordinary  figures. 


86  The  Treaty-states  [ch.  viii 

83.  The  Latin  colonies  were  as  a  rule  planted  inland,  and 
the  citizen  colonies  always  on  the  seaboard.  Such  at  least  was 
the  practice  in  this  period.  Concerning  the  Treaty-states  it  may 
be  remarked  that  they  were  very  various  in  structure,  and  that  the 
Roman  government  wisely  took  them  for  what  they  were.  If 
they  were  detached  cities  (such  as  the  Greek  or  Etruscan),  the 
city  was  the  unit  dealt  with  in  a  treaty.  If  they  were  cantonal 
groups  of  hamlets  (as  in  Samnium  and  other  Sabellian  lands),  the 
canton-group  was  treated  as  a  whole.  If  a  city  stood  at  the  head 
of  some  confederate  towns  (as  Nuceria),  that  group  formed  the 
unit.  In  short  there  was  the  least  possible  interference  consistent 
with  efficiency.  We  must  not  suppose  that,  when  open  resistance 
came  to  an  end,  Rome  at  once  stepped  into  the  position  of  a 
proud  imperial  mistress  in  a  conquered  Italy.  Her  statesmen 
knew  better  than  to  act  thus,  and  the  system  established  by  their 
judgment,  after  enduring  the  uttermost  strains  of  war  and  the 
internal  wrongs  of  a  later  age,  was  not  finally  overthrown  for 
nearly  200  years. 


CHAPTER    IX 

ROME   AND   THE   ROMANS   366—265  B.C. 

84.  I  have  spoken  of  this  period  as  the  first  half  of  Rome's 
golden  age.  It  was  surely  the  better  half^  for  the  spread  of  Roman 
power  beyond  Italy,  while  giving  her  imperial  grandeur,  under- 
mined the  moral  strength  necessary  for  the  Republic,  and  led  in 
due  course  to  the  conversion  of  the  state  into  an  imperial  machine. 
For  moral  force  was  the  backbone  of  the  whole  Roman  system. 
The  Italian  confederacy  had  no  true  Federal  Government,  but 
a  strong  Head,  whose  place  no  other  power  was  competent  to 
take.  Rome  herself  was  under  no  Oligarchy  on  a  Greek  model, 
but  all  the  chief  items  of  state  policy  were  in  practice  settled  by 
a  small  body  of  leading  men,  whose  fitness  for  the  work  none 
could  deny.  By  brute  force  Rome  could  not  have  ruled  in  Italy 
or  the  Senate  in  Rome. 

85.  The  qualities  summed  up  under  the  term  'moral  strength' 
were  both  the  cause  and  the  effect  of  a  sound  private  life,  passed 
in  the  wholesome  atmosphere  of  the  Roman  home.  The  power 
and  responsibility  of  the  Father,  the  dignified  domestic  position 
of  the  Mother,  the  apprenticeship  of  the  sons  to  the  former  and 
the  daughters  to  the  latter,  were  the  main  features  of  the  family 
world.  The  system  was  good  for  both  old  and  young  :  so  far  as 
it  went,  it  could  hardly  have  been  bettered.  Its  weak  point  was 
its  narrowness,  for  it  tended  to  keep  men  in  a  groove.  This  defect 
was  destined  to  do  serious  harm  in  later  times,  but  for  the  age 
of  Italian  conquest  the  old  training  sufficed.  Slaves  there  were, 
human  chattels  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  but  probably  not  in  great 
number.  The  slave  was  generally  speaking  a  mere  personal 
helper,  often  highly  trusted,  a  bondman  with  a  good  prospect 


88  Roman  life  [ch. 

of  freedom  as  the  reward  of  useful  service.  Tradition,  probably 
with  truth,  represents  the  typical  Roman  home  as  the  seat  of  order 
and  obedience,  and  the  ways  of  life  as  simple  and  frugal.  The 
meals,  mostly  of  vegetable  food,  were  taken  sitting.  Wine  was 
little  drunk  by  men,  by  women  not  at  all.  Silver  plate  was  hardly 
in  use.  Fabricius  when  censor  is  said  to  have  struck  an  ex-consul 
off  the  roll  of  the  Senate  for  keeping  some.  Thrift  was  a  virtue 
in  high  esteem,  and  the  duty  of  keeping  careful  accounts  was 
always  a  part  of  Roman  ideals  of  life.  A  close-fisted  people,  the 
Romans  expected  a  man  to  keep  what  he  inherited  and  if  possible 
to  add  to  it.  Vain  display  was  discouraged,  and  even  the  Twelve 
Tables  had  forbidden  extravagant  funerals.  But  a  funeral  in  a  great 
family  was  a  solemn  affair.  The  ancestors  of  the  dead,  represented 
by  men  wearing  their  portrait-masks,  were  in  attendance,  and  the 
head  of  the  house  held  forth  to  those  present  in  the  Forum  on 
the  virtues  of  the  late  departed.  So  the  feeling  of  continuity  was 
maintained,  and  the  young  generation,  ever  reminded  of  the  past, 
were  invited  to  share  and  extend  their  fathers'  renown. 

86.  If  I  speak  mainly  of  the  great  houses,  it  is  because  in 
social  matters  the  great  houses  were  Rome,  and  we  have  little  or 
no  knowledge  of  the  ways  and  feelings  of  the  poor.  It  would 
seem  that  their  first  object  was  to  keep  out  of  debt  and  the 
clutches  of  the  laws  that  bore  hardly  on  the  debtor.  Connected 
with  this  was  the  constant  land-hunger,  much  relieved  in  this 
period  of  conquest  by  allotments  of  land  forfeited  to  Rome.  But 
we  hear  of  attempts  to  limit  the  rate  of  interest  or  even  to  get  rid 
of  it  altogether,  and  of  restrictions  on  the  power  of  the  creditor. 
The  story  of  the  'secession'  of  287  has  been  referred  to  above. 
Clearly  there  were  discontents  in  Rome,  and  it  is  a  reasonable 
inference  that  the  removal  of  clamorous  Plebeians  to  colonies  or 
distant  farms  left  the  new  nobility  a  free  hand  to  carry  on  the 
government  and  deal  with  problems  of  policy  as  they  arose.  The 
agitations  leading  to  the  Valerian  legislation  of  300  and  the 
Hortensian  of  287  were  temporary  ripples  on  a  generally  quiet 
surface  of  public  life.  As  a  rule  the  Roman  Assemblies  did  what 
the  governing  class,  whose  organ  was  the  Senate,  told  them  to  do. 
But  they  did  not  surrender  their  sovran  power.  The  Senate  had 
to  humour  them,  and  did.  Thus  the  Roman  constitution,  out- 
wardly a  balance  of  monarchic  aristocratic  and  popular  forces, 
was   in   practice   steadily  becoming   a   veiled  aristocracy.      The 


ix]  Agriculture.     Dress.     The  city  89 

Commons  had  their  votes,  and  in  moments  of  excitement  they 
could  rally  and  enforce  their  will.  Meanwhile  the  real  direction 
of  the  state  was  in  the  hands  of  the  men  most  competent  to 
guide  it. 

87.  Agriculture  was  still  the  chief  industry,  and  it  was  in 
a  thriving  condition.  Pyrrhus  is  said  to  have  been  impressed  by 
the  discipline  and  bravery  of  Roman  soldiers,  and  also  by  the 
good  cultivation  of  Roman  farms.  The  two  things  were  in  truth 
the  same,  for  the  average  soldier  of  the  legions  was  a  yeoman 
tilling  his  land  in  time  of  peace.  The  age  of  farmer-heroes,  rightly 
honoured  in  Roman  literature,  was  not  yet  gone :  Manius  Curius 
is  a  successor  of  the  half-legendary  Cincinnatus,  a  historical  figure, 
and  on  a  larger  scale.  Among  the  domestic  duties  of  women  the 
weaving  of  wool  still  held  an  important  place,  for  woollen  clothing, 
from  the  jersey  {tunica)  to  the  gown  {toga),  was  the  ordinary  wear. 
Of  these  two  articles,  the  former  was  worn  by  all.  The  latter  was 
by  custom  indispensable  on  all  public  occasions.  The  farmer 
doffed  it  in  his  working  hours,  and  donned  it  to  attend  an 
Assembly  or  when  called  to  arms.  The  soldier  wore  it  girt  up 
in  a  special  way,  if  it  be  true  that  it  was  worn  in  the  field.  But 
the  sagum,  which  eventually  superseded  it  as  the  military  uniform, 
is  mentioned  in  this  period.  The  Italian  Allies  had  the  right  to 
wear  the  gown,  and  the  register  according  to  which  their  con- 
tingents were  called  out  for  service  was  styled  formula  togatorum. 
In  Rome  and  other  towns  there  was  a  population  engaged  in  the 
manual  trades  suited  to  the  requirements  of  common  life.  What 
were  their  numbers,  and  what  proportion  of  them  were  freemen, 
we  do  not  know.  The  sedentary  trades  were  not  highly  esteemed, 
and  we  hear  that  persons  of  this  class  were  only  enrolled  for  army- 
service  in  great  emergencies. 

88.  Rome  itself  was  not  a  splendid  city.  Narrow  streets 
and  low  houses  seem  to  have  been  the  rule.  Public  buildings 
other  than  temples  must  have  been  few  and  small;  and  the 
temples,  even  that  of  Capitoline  Juppiter,  were  chiefly  built  of 
wood.  Wooden  shingles  were  still  used  for  roofing  houses,  and 
the  quantity  of  wood  present  in  beams  rafters  doors,  not  to 
mention  the  numerous  shops  and  booths,  made  fire  an  ever- 
present  danger.  Unbaked  bricks  {lateres)  were  a  common 
material  for  walls,  and  were  liable  to  give  way  when  reached 
by  a  Tiber  flood.     The  stone  in  use  was  all  or  mostly  of  soft 


90  Dwellings.     Arts.     Works  [ch. 

kinds,  easily  cut,  but  unsuited  for  columns  and  too  weak  to  supply 
architraves.  The  houses  even  of  great  men  were  humble  dwellings. 
The  chief  feature  was  the  atrium^  a  small  court  into  which  various 
rooms  opened.  The  roof  sloped  inwards,  dripping,  when  rain  fell, 
into  a  central  tank  or  cistern  {impluvium).  No  windows  opened 
on  the  street.  This  exclusive  privacy  was  one  of  the  most  charac- 
teristic points  about  Roman  houses  of  importance.  Shrines,  small 
chapels,  and  other  sacred  spots  abounded  in  the  city,  some  of 
them  very  ancient,  and  in  every  house  there  was  a  place  for  the 
household  gods.  Public  business  was  transacted  in  the  open  air. 
The  Senate  alone  met  under  cover.  Hence  it  was  easy  to  know 
what  was  going  on.  To  listen  to  speakers  addressing  informal 
meetings  {contiones)^  to  watch  the  proceedings  in  law-courts. 
Assemblies,  and  business-transactions  of  all  sorts,  was  no  small 
part  of  a  young  Roman's  education. 

89.  The  arts  seem  to  have  been  in  a  very  rudimentary  state. 
We  hear  of  statues  set  up  in  public  places,  and  of  a  painting  on 
a  temple  wall.  But  at  present  Etruscan  influences  were  prevalent 
in  matters  of  decoration,  and  no  doubt  the  works  were  rude. 
Gold  ornaments  are  said  to  have  been  worn  by  ladies,  but  men 
only  wore  gold  rings  when  acting  as  ambassadors  abroad.  As  in 
the  city,  so  in  the  people,  a  plain  exterior  was  the  rule.  Silver, 
long  used  by  weight,  was  first  coined  at  Rome  in  269.  Rome  was 
now  in  direct  relations  with  the  Italian  Greeks,  and  the  new 
standard  coin,  the  'tenner'  {denarius  =  lo  asses\^d,?,  equivalent 
to  the  Attic  drachma,  widely  current  in  Mediterranean  commerce. 
For  the  present  the  old  copper  and  new  silver  currencies  went  on 
side  by  side  as  legal  tender,  silver  no  doubt  gaining  ground  as 
more  convenient.  But  if  Rome  lagged  behind  in  these  respects, 
there  were  matters  of  public  utility  in  which  she  had  made  a  good 
beginning.  How  far  the  sewers  {cloacae)  served  to  carry  oif  filth 
as  well  as  flood-water  and  rain,  is  not  easy  to  say.  The  open 
drains  were  converted  into  arched  culverts ;  when,  is  uncertain, 
but  this  step  is  probably  to  be  connected  with  a  gradual  raising 
of  the  level  of  the  Forum.  The  most  striking  and  useful  of  the 
public  works  of  this  period  were  the  two  aqueducts,  aqua  Appia 
(312),  already  referred  to,  and  the  Anio^  led  from  the  upper  waters 
of  that  stream  in  a  circuitous  course  of  43  miles.  The  latter  was 
begun  by  Manius  Curius  in  272,  and  the  spoils  of  the  Pyrrhic  war 
applied  towards  the  cost,  but  was  not  finished  till  about  ten  years 


ix]         Character.     Flavius  and  the  lawyers  91 

later.  These  works  did  something  to  improve  the  water-supply, 
hitherto  confined  to  rain  water  and  surface-wells.  That  we  hear 
less  of  pestilences  may  be  partly  due  to  an  improvement  of  public 
health  from  this  cause. 

90.  Compared  with  any  of  the  great  Greek  or  Graeco- 
oriental  cities,  such  as  Syracuse  Tarentum  or  Alexandria,  Rome 
would  no  doubt  have  seemed  commonplace  or  even  mean.  Nor 
were  the  Romans  a  brilliant  people,  impressive  to  a  casual  observer. 
Greek  writers  seem  already  to  have  included  Rome  in  the  fictions 
that  professed  to  continue  the  tale  of  Troy.  But  there  is  little 
reason  to  think  that  the  significance  of  the  rise  of  Rome  was  as 
yet  understood  by  the  Greek  literary  world.  The  gallery  of  Roman 
worthies  was  not  a  showy  series  :  the  greatness  of  the  Roman  state 
was  a  new  phenomenon,  a  new  experiment  in  government,  and  its 
testing  was  yet  to  come.  Among  the  Roman  figures  of  this  period 
Appius  Claudius  the  bold  reformer  occupies  a  notable  place.  His 
censorship  and  his  public  works  have  been  noticed  above.  Another 
enterprise  with  which  he  was  connected  will  bear  mention  at  the 
end  of  this  chapter.  In  the  work  of  the  Roman  law-courts  two 
points  were  all-important;  first,  the  knowledge  of  the  days  left 
free  for  legal  proceedings  by  the  religious  rules  of  the  calendar, 
and  secondly,  the  observance  of  minute  correctness  in  the  forms 
of  pleading  (actiones)  by  which  alone  legal  remedies  could  be 
secured.  Both  these  details  were  in  possession  of  the  Pontiffs, 
and  this  gave  them  excessive  power.  We  hear  that  a  certain 
Gnaeus  Flavius  patiently  acquired  the  necessary  knowledge  by 
attendance  in  court,  consultation  of  the  pontifical  lawyers,  and 
carefully  noting  down  the  details  as  learnt.  At  length  in  304 
he  was  able  to  publish  a  sort  of  handbook  of  court-days  and 
pleading-forms,  and  so  to  break  the  monopoly  of  the  pontiffs. 
The  man  was  son  of  a  freedman,  and  a  dependant  of  Appius 
Claudius,  under  encouragement  from  whom  he  is  said  to  have 
ventured  on  this  bold  step.  The  pontiffs  did  not  cease  to  supply 
most  of  the  legal  skill  of  Rome,  but  the  rise  of  a  class  of  non- 
pontifical  lawyers  was  now  possible.  The  way  in  which  this 
reform  was  carried  out  was  clumsy ;  but  it  was  better  than  a  great 
agitation,  and  the  thing  was  done. 


CHAPTER    X 


CARTHAGE 


91.  From  their  cities,  Tyre  Sidon  and  others,  planted  in  a 
little  strip  of  land  on  the  Syrian  coast,  the  Phoenician  navigators 
sailed  to  foreign  countries,  and  in  early  times  most  of  the  seaborne 
commerce  was  in  their  hands.  As  Greek  competition  developed, 
they  were  driven  to  turn  their  attention  mainly  to  the  West.  Their 
habit  was  to  occupy  fortified  posts  on  the  seaboard  as  centres  of 
trade,  and  islands  in  convenient  positions.  In  working  westwards 
they  pitched  on  the  North  of  Africa  as  a  suitable  region  for  their 
purposes,  and  held  the  island  of  Malta,  with  stations  on  the  coast 
of  Sicily.  Among  their  colonies  in  northern  Africa  was  Carthage, 
the  advantageous  site  of  which  caused  it  to  grow  into  a  great  city. 
Tradition  placed  its  foundation  in  the  ninth  century  B.C.  As  the 
need  of  holding  their  ground  against  barbarian  neighbours,  and 
the  Western  expansion  of  the  Greeks,  became  pressing,  the  Phoe- 
nicians ceased  to  be  purely  commercial  and  became  imperial.  A 
concentration  of  their  power  took  place  in  the  form  of  an  alliance 
of  the  western  Phoenician  colonies,  and  the  disproportionate 
growth  of  Carthage  converted  this  into  a  Carthaginian  empire. 
But  conquest  was  not  the  object  of  the  Phoenicians.  As  they 
kept  their  Semitic  language  and  their  eastern  religion,  so  wealth 
gained  by  commerce  was  still  their  aim.  They  spread  westward 
along  the  African  coast,  and  their  far-off  colony  of  Gades  shews 
their  firm  determination  to  find  markets  in  Spain.  Their  posts 
on  the  seaboard  were  numerous,  and  no  effort  was  spared  to 
prevent  intruders  from  interfering  with  their  monopoly  of  com- 
mercial exploitation.  In  the  fourth  century  B.C.  three  great 
movements  seriously  affected  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Medi- 
terranean world.     The  free  Greek  states  were  weakened  by  their 


CH.  x]  Carthaginian  empire  93 

long-continued  quarrels.  The  rise  of  the  Macedonian  kingdom 
was  followed  by  the  eastern  conquests  of  Alexander.  The  union 
of  Italy  under  the  headship  of  Rome  was  in  full  progress.  Thus 
Greek  rivalry  in  its  old  form  no  longer  menaced  Phoenician 
commercialism.  But  the  parent-cities  of  Phoenicia  were  either 
ruined  or  passed  under  an  imperial  power  less  easy-going  than 
the  old  Persian  monarchy :  moreover  a  strong  competitor  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean  appeared  in  the  rising  city  of  Alexandria. 
In  the  West,  if  the  Greeks  were  weaker,  the  growth  of  an  imperial 
power  in  Italy  changed  the  situation,  how  greatly,  none  could  tell. 
Then  came  the  expedition  of  Pyrrhus,  which  left  Rome  stronger 
than  it  found  her,  and  revealed  the  fact  that  neither  of  the  western 
rivals  could  afford  to  leave  the  other  in  possession  of  Sicily. 

92.  Events  had  made  Carthage  the  real  centre  of  Phoenician 
power,  and  the  wealthiest  city  in  the  world  of  that  age.  Her 
dominion  included  (a)  the  home-province,  which  the  Romans 
called  Africa,  (d)  a  long  strip  of  land  reaching  eastwards  along 
the  coast  some  600  miles  to  the  Cyrenaic  frontier,  and  (r)  a 
great  part  at  least  of  the  seaboard  westwards  up  to  and  beyond 
the  Pillars  of  Hercules.  Her  control  over  the  various  districts 
varied  in  degree,  from  supremacy  over  trading  colonies  and  their 
territories  to  friendly  relations  with  local  chiefs  and  tribes.  The 
western  islands  were  held  for  her,  and  in  Sardinia  and  Corsica 
she  was  mistress  by  her  occupation  of  the  ports.  In  short  her 
empire  was  a  great  commercial  concern,  and  it  was  only  in  the 
interest  of  her  commerce  that  she  resorted  to  the  use  of  force. 
In  Sicily  her  position  was  peculiar.  Over  and  over  again  the 
Greeks  had  rallied  under  some  great  leader  and  won  great 
victories  over  the  Punic  armies,  but  had  never  been  able  to 
expel  them  altogether.  Carthage  always  kept  some  foothold, 
from  which  her  forces  in  due  time  advanced  to  win  back  all  she 
had  lost,  and  more.  The  failure  of  Pyrrhus  before  Lilybaeum 
had  left  her  free  to  reoccupy  the  greater  part  of  the  island. 
Some  even  of  the  Greeks,  worn  out  with  fruitless  warfare,  were 
ready  to  accept  her  yoke:  it  was  less  wretched  to  be  exploited 
by  Carthage  than  to  go  on  indefinitely  suffering  the  miseries 
entailed  by  the  political  futility  of  their  own  race.  Unable  to 
act  in  effective  concert  save  under  pressure  of  danger  from 
without,  and  even  then  only  under  the  irregular  despotism  of 
a   Tyrant,    they   could    never    find    strength   in   a   free   Union. 


94  Constitution  [ch. 

Syracuse  alone  had  never  succumbed  to  Carthaginian  attacks, 
and  even  Syracuse  now  had  a  population  no  longer  purely  Greek. 
The  weakness  following  the  withdrawal  of  Pyrrhus  was  ended  by 
the  rise  to  power  of  a  young  soldier  named  Hiero,  who  built  up 
a  Syracusan  kingdom  in  south-eastern  Sicily  and  ruled  it  well. 
But  its  prosperity  was  only  that  of  a  minor  power,  and  the  king 
wisely  strove  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  mighty  neighbours. 
We  have  seen  that  Messana  was  held  by  the  Mamertine  robbers. 
The  rest  of  the  island  owned  the  supremacy  of  Carthage,  and 
the  policy  of  Carthage  was  to  avoid  provoking  rebellions  by  gross 
misgovernment. 

93.  But  if  Carthaginian  rule  was  at  its  best  in  Sicily,  we 
have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  was  anywhere  utterly  bad. 
Its  weak  point  seems  to  have  been  the  absence  of  sympathy 
between  rulers  and  ruled.  The  differences  of  race  and  religion 
were  too  great.  The  eastern  civilization  of  the  Phoenicians  gave 
them  an  advantage  over  rude  peoples,  but  it  did  not  promote  the 
blending  of  conquerors  and  conquered.  We  have  no  trace  of 
any  institutions  such  as  the  incorporations  and  alliances  by  which 
Rome  built  up  her  Italian  confederacy.  In  the  third  century  B.C. 
ruling  power  was  centralized  at  Carthage  to  a  degree  then  unknown 
in  Rome.  And  what  little  is  known  of  the  constitution  of  Carthage 
agrees  with  the  narrow-minded  and  jealous  policy  traditionally 
imputed  to  its  Home  Government.  We  hear  of  two  Suffets, 
yearly  magistrates,  compared  with  the  Roman  consuls  in  many 
respects,  of  a  Senate,  and  of  a  popular  Assembly,  apparently 
more  like  a  Greek  Ecclesia  than  the  group- Assemblies  of  Rome. 
We  also  hear  of  the  excessive  influence  of  great  families  from 
time  to  time,  and  of  the  creation  of  a  special  supreme  court  or 
committee  to  hold  such  influences  in  check.  The  jealousy  of 
the  Punic  merchant-princes  was  evidently  as  active  as  that  of 
Roman  nobles  a  century  later.  But  the  characteristic  and  vital 
force  in  Carthaginian  politics  was  before  all  things  money.  The 
fortunes  of  the  rich  were  colossal,  and  bribery,  the  sheer  purchase 
of  official  power,  was  normal.  In  a  population  chiefly  devoted  to 
buying  and  selling,  many  of  them  often  absent  at  sea,  this  traffic 
in  the  interests  of  the  state  easily  took  root,  with  fatal  results.  We 
are  not  to  suppose  that  the  Assembly  was  often  called  together  to 
vote  for  any  other  purpose  than  elections.  If  the  two  Suflets  and 
the  Senate  agreed,  their  decision  was  final,  and  the  Assembly  was 


x]  People  and  army  95 

only  appealed  to  in  case  of  their  not  agreeing.  Thus  a  chief 
magistrate  of  strong  views  could  in  the  last  resort  seek  the  support 
of  the  popular  body,  and  perhaps  carry  through  his  designs.  Such 
cases  were  most  likely  rare.  To  effect  anything  considerable,  a 
Suffet  would  have  to  secure  his  own  reelection  (which  seems  to 
have  been  allowed)  and  also  to  keep  the  favour  of  the  Assembly 
at  his  back.  But  the  government  as  conducted  by  a  clique  of 
millionaires  did  at  times  arouse  general  discontent,  and  we  shall 
see  that,  when  Carthage  came  to  blows  with  Rome,  a  kind  of 
democratic  movement  in  support  of  great  leaders  gave  a  peculiar 
character  to  the  Punic  wars. 

94.     If  it  be  true  that  the  population  of  Carthage  in  149  B.C. 
was  700,000,  after  all  her  disasters,  it  may  well  have  been  over  a 
million  in  265,  at  the  height  of  her  prosperity.     What  percentage 
of  the  whole  were  Phoenician  citizens  we  do  not  know.    Probably 
there  were  many  aliens,  certainly  many  slaves.     The  number  of 
hands  employed  in  the  labour  of  the  port  must  have  been  very 
great,  for  it  was  the  policy  of  the  government  to  centralize  all 
foreign   sea-borne   trade   at  Carthage   itself.     Carthage  was   the 
headquarters  of  the  navy,  and  the  centre  of  military  organization. 
But  her  means  of  waging  war  were  in  striking  contrast  to  those 
of  Rome.     There  was  a  citizen  army,  once  perhaps  efficient,  but 
in  these  days  only  embodied  for  service  in  great  emergencies. 
Arms   and   armour,  engines,  and   service-elephants,  in  short  all 
materials  of  war,  were  kept  ready,  and  the  vast  fortifications  of 
the  city  defied  a  sudden  attack.    A  standing  army  was  not  needed, 
and  for  wars  abroad  Carthage  depended  mostly  on  mercenaries. 
Contingents   were   furnished   by   her   subjects,    Liby-Phoenician 
crossbreeds  and  Libyan  tribesmen.     But  the  allegiance  of  these 
subject  allies  was  not  trustworthy  enough  to  make  it  safe  to  rely 
on  them  alone.     Money  was  the  foundation  of  a  Punic  army.     It 
hired  men  of  warlike  races,  Gauls,  Iberians,  Ligurians,  Campanian 
Samnites,  and  for  special  services  a  few  Greeks,  whose  skill  was 
worth  a  good  price.     Carthage  supplied  a  commander  and  the 
higher  officers,  probably  also  a  bodyguard  at  headquarters.     The 
general's  business  was  to  make  an  army  out  of  his  motley  forces, 
and  to  conquer  at  all  costs.     He  had  ample  powers,  and  the  blood 
of  hirelings  was  of  no  account.     Failure  made  him  liable  to  cruci- 
fixion.    So  the  wars  of  Carthage  were  apt  to  be  carried  on  with 
great  brutality  and  bloodshed,  of  which  the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily 


96  Navy  [ch. 

had  had  awful  experience.  Of  the  navy  we  know  that  ships  of 
war,  oars  and  tackle,  stores  of  timber  and  so  forth,  were  kept 
ready  in  great  quantity.  The  docks  and  arsenal  were  famous 
models  of  their  kind,  and  the  post  of  High  Admiral  was  one 
of  great  importance.  Of  skilled  navigators  there  were  plenty : 
the  merchant  captains  of  Carthage  were  of  the  best,  and  as 
explorers  they  were  unrivalled. 

95.  It  is  therefore  remarkable  that  we  hear  of  no  signal 
achievements  of  the  Punic  navy  in  war,  either  in  the  past  or  in 
the  time  now  coming.  There  must  be  some  good  reason  for  this. 
Now  we  do  not  hear  that  the  fleet  of  war-ships  was  kept  in  com- 
mission, indeed  it  is  practically  certain  that  it  was  not.  Vessels 
of  war  were  manoeuvred  by  means  of  rowing,  and  in  the  third 
century  B.C.  the  prevailing  type  of  battle-ship  was  large  and 
clumsy.  Even  great  maritime  communities  found  their  own 
citizens  averse  to  the  labours  of  the  oar.  Slaves,  bought  or  cap- 
tured, were  regularly  employed  for  this  service.  Hired  oarsmen 
were  probably  few  in  all  navies  of  the  time.  When  the  lower 
classes  of  the  local  population,  such  as  freedmen,  served  as  rowers, 
it  was  under  compulsion  in  all  or  most  cases.  Polybius  reckons 
the  normal  rowing  crew  at  300  men,  and  we  hear  of  over  300  ships 
in  a  single  fleet.  None  but  strong  men  were  of  use  as  oarsmen, 
and  to  control  a  vast  throng  of  sturdy  pressed-men,  if  kept  in  and 
about  the  port,  would  have  needed  a  standing  army.  No  wonder 
then  that  we  find  the  Punic  war-fleet  laid  up  in  time  of  peace,  and 
hastily  manned  with  crews  drawn  from  any  and  every  quarter  on 
the  outbreak  of  war.  Once  afloat,  the  unarmed  rowers  were  at 
the  mercy  of  the  fighting  crew  of  120  men  per  ship.  The  officers 
were  Carthaginians,  perhaps  also  some  of  the  fighting  men,  but 
mercenaries  in  the  pay  of  Carthage  seem  to  have  been  the 
majority.  Under  such  conditions  it  is  clear  that  the  mobilization 
of  a  Punic  fleet  would  take  no  small  time,  and  that  to  make  it 
thoroughly  efficient  as  a  fighting  force  would  be  a  long  business. 
From  the  subsequent  course  of  events  it  is  equally  clear  that  the 
inherent  difficulties  of  the  system  were  never  fully  overcome. 
That  Carthage  was  a  great  naval  power,  a  true  ruler  of  the  waves, 
like  Athens  in  the  fifth  century,  is  surely  a  notion  unwarranted  by 
facts.  Even  in  nautical  skill  as  applied  to  warfare  it  is  not  clear 
that  her  seamen  were  superior  to  those  of  the  western  Greeks, 
who  had  on  the  whole  held  their  own  on  the  water.     The  one 


x]  Carthaginian  politics  97 

marked  advantage  of  the   Phoenician  power  in  a  conflict  with 
Rome  lay  in  its  prodigious  wealth. 

96.     Perhaps  the  most  wonderful  characteristic  of  Carthage 
was  that  which  drew  the  attention  of  the  greatest  of  Greek  poli- 
tical observers.     Aristotle  speaks  of  the  remarkable  stability  of 
the  government,  though  in   criticizing  the  constitution  he  finds 
far  more  to  blame  than  to  praise.     Carthage  had  been  free  from 
revolutionary  faction  and  from  Tyranny  to  an  extent  quite  amazing 
to  one  who  judged  by  Greek  experience.     Nor  does  the  later 
history  of  Carthage  seem  to  have  followed  a  different  course. 
Many  causes  may  have  contributed  to  this  general  stability.     It 
was  not  by  pushing  principles  to  an  extreme  in  pursuit  of  a  logical 
perfection  that  the  Carthaginian  plutocrats  retained  their  political 
power.      It  was  by  keeping  their  trading  population  in  general 
good  humour.     No  doubt  a  large  percentage  of  the  citizens  were 
constantly  on  the  move.     What  with  bribes  at  home,  and  oppor- 
tunities of  gain  abroad  as  traders  or  colonists,  their  desires  were 
fairly  well  satisfied.     Politics  afforded  sufficient  scope  for  party 
struggles  and  individual  ambitions,  provided  only  that  sufficient 
money  were  forthcoming.     The  rich  might  use  power  selfishly  in 
their  own  interest,  but  their  interest  would  seldom  be  directly 
opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  state.     And  so  Carthage  was  able 
to  'muddle  along.'      Such  is  the  explanation  to  which  the  few 
facts  at  our  disposal  seem  to  guide  us.     No  doubt  Phoenician 
blood  and  Phoenician  traditions,  and  in  particular  the  mysterious 
force  of  their  religion,  contributed  to  keep  up  a  certain  continuity 
in  Carthaginian  public  life.    But  our  knowledge  of  these  influences 
is  too  scanty  to  enable  us  to  trace  their  effects  with  any  confidence. 
From  a  political  point  of  view  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  as  Carthage 
was  to  Aristotle  a  specimen  of  a  'mixed'  constitution,  so  was 
Rome  to  Polybius.      That  is,  neither  could  be  classified  as  a 
government  of  One  or  the  Few  or  the  Many,  according  to  the 
political  philosophy  of  Greece.    In  Greece  the  mixed  constitution 
of  Sparta  was  felt  to  be  abnormal.     But  it  was  just  this  mixture, 
with  all  its  imperfections,  that  enabled  the  various  parts  of  the 
state  to  act  at  a  pinch,  to  check  each  other  so  far  as  to  stave  off" 
revolutions,  and  to  keep  the  machine  working  somehow.    Gradual 
change  was  possible,  and  the  political  career  of  the  city-states 
of  Carthage  and  Rome  was  more  permanently  successful  than 
that  of  the  city-states  modelled  by  the  far  more  gifted  Greeks. 
H.  7 


CHAPTER  XI 

FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.     264—241  B.C. 

97.  Outbreak  of  war  264  B.C.  The  inevitable  war  for  pos- 
session of  Sicily  was  at  last  brought  about  by  that  troublesome 
community  of  robbers,  the  Mamertines  of  Messana.  The  story 
is  very  obscure.  Neither  Carthage  nor  Hiero  of  Syracuse  could 
put  up  with  their  aggressions;  the  two  powers  combined  to 
chastise  the  freebooters.  Rome  could  not  sit  still  and  see 
Messana  added  (as  it  surely  would  be)  to  the  dominion  of 
Carthage,  unless  she  meant  to  let  all  Sicily  fall  into  her  rival's 
hand.  The  pressure  of  circumstances  drove  her  to  accept  the 
invitation  of  a  party  among  the  Mamertines,  and  undertake 
the  relief  of  Messana.  A  Roman  army  was  suddenly  landed 
near  the  city.  The  besieging  forces  were  defeated  and  the  siege 
raised.  Rome  was  now  at  war  with  two  powers  with  whom  she 
had  hitherto  been  on  terms  of  friendship.  But  in  263  Hiero 
made  peace  with  Rome,  and  became  her  faithful  ally.  The 
long  and  mismanaged  struggle  of  the  next  22  years  was  with 
Carthage.  The  Latin  name  for  Phoenicians  was  Poeni,  and  the 
war  was  called  by  Romans  the  first  Poenic  or  Punic  war. 

98.  First  stage,  263 — 260  B.C.  Rome  had  now  two  strong 
bases  at  Messana  and  Syracuse.  Carthage  raised  a  great  mer- 
cenary army,  the  headquarters  of  which  were  at  Agrigentum. 
She  had  naval  bases  in  the  harbours  of  Drepana  (Trapani)  and 
Panhormus  (Palermo),  but  her  strongest  post  was  at  Lilybaeum 
(Marsala).  The  Romans  pushed  on  to  the  West,  receiving  the 
submission  of  a  number  of  towns,  and  laid  siege  to  Agrigentum 
in  262.  After  a  long  siege  the  town  fell.  The  Punic  army 
escaped,  and  left  the  helpless  citizens  to  the  mercy  of  Rome. 


CH.  xi]  Rome  and  sea-power  99 

They  were  barbarously  sold  as  slaves,  a  blunder  which  brought 
its  own  punishment.  The  war  dragged  heavily,  and  the  only 
hope  of  making  progress  seemed  to  lie  in  creating  a  fleet  and 
ceasing  to  leave  Carthage  the  unchallenged  ruler  of  the  western 
seas.  Our  tradition  records  how  this  task  was  undertaken,  how 
vessels  of  war  were  built  with  surprising  speed  on  the  model  of 
a  stranded  Punic  ship,  how  crews  of  oarsmen  were  meanwhile 
taught  to  swing  together  in  skeleton  ships,  great  stages  or  frames 
erected  on  dry  land.  But  it  was  not  likely  that  landsmen  new 
to  the  work  would  at  once  rival  the  skill  of  a  seafaring  people 
in  naval  evolutions.  Therefore  the  Roman  aim  was  to  reproduce 
as  far  as  possible  on  the  water  the  fighting  conditions  of  a  battle 
on  land.  A  kind  of  moveable  gangway  was  invented  for  the 
purpose.  When  two  ships  met,  the  Roman  let  the  gangway  fall 
on  the  enemy's  vessel,  and  Roman  soldiers  were  thus  enabled 
to  board  her  and  fight  hand  to  hand.  Thus  the  Carthaginian 
superiority  in  manoeuvring  was  neutralized,  and  the  superiority 
of  the  Roman  fighting -crews  could  make  itself  felt.  The  value 
of  this  device  was  seen  in  the  first  great  naval  action,  fought 
off  Mylae  in  260,  when  the  bold  use  of  these  gangways  resulted 
in  a  great  victory  for  Rome.  This  story  of  the  sudden  appearance 
of  Rome  as  a  great  naval  power  is  not  so  miraculous  as  it  might 
seem.  Roman  tradition  was  seldom  generous  in  recognizing  the 
services  of  the  allies  whose  help  the  Roman  government  so  un- 
sparingly employed.  Rome  had  at  her  disposal  all  the  maritime 
resources  of  the  western  Greeks.  Those  in  Italy  belonged  to  the 
Italian  confederacy  of  which  Rome  was  the  head.  Massalia  was 
her  old  and  faithful  ally;  Syracuse,  lately  won,  was  zealous  in  her 
cause.  The  old  enmity  of  Greek  and  Phoenician  told  strongly  in 
favour  of  Rome.  All  that  was  most  efficient  in  the  Roman  fleet 
was  probably  Greek  in  design.  The  seamanship  was  Greek,  and 
the  great  disasters  that  occurred  in  the  course  of  the  war  were  in 
general  due  to  the  stupidity  of  Roman  admirals,  wilfully  deaf  to 
the  warnings  of  their  Greek  nautical  advisers. 

99.  Second  stage  259 — 255.  The  Romans  were  now  em- 
boldened to  attempt  larger  enterprises.  We  hear  of  an  expedition 
against  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  and  some  successes.  But  to  keep 
up  the  naval  service  was  no  easy  matter.  Each  quinquereme  or 
ship  of  the  line  needed  300  rowers,  and  to  make  up  the  numbers 
required  for  fleets  composed  of  some  hundreds  of  ships  was  very 

7—2 


lOO 


Naval  war 


[CH. 


difficult.  The  service  was  hated,  and  in  default  of  sufficient  slaves 
it  seems  to  have  been  found  necessary  to  press  Italian  Allies  for 
the  work.  This  led  to  discontent,  perhaps  to  mutiny.  But  the 
difficulty  was  somehow  overcome,  and  great  fleets  were  main- 
tained. In  257  we  hear  of  an  indecisive  sea-fight  off  the  north 
coast  of  Sicily.  Meanwhile  the  war  on  land  dragged  on  slowly, 
and  the  position  of  Carthage  in  the  West  of  the  island  was  as 


i  Heir-cte 


Drepana^  , 

HieraU         (;^ 
Aeguasa 

Jilvbaeum 


Liparaeae   insulae 

■'*  ^         "'essaua'? 


-fo 


C*', 


&<^f^ 


\t 


|es,'' 


Hermaeum, 
Pr-ojTL. 


<\  Cossyra 


Ecnomus 


'achynuii 


-"l^f 


<h 


t'^' 


Melita 


Map  of  Sicily  for  the  Punic  Wars. 


strong  as  ever.  Great  preparations  were  made  for  the  campaign 
of  256.  The  Roman  plan  was  to  invade  Africa  in  force,  while 
the  Carthaginians  hoped  to  confine  the  land-war  to  Sicily  by 
gaining  a  great  victory  at  sea.  Near  Ecnomus  on  the  south  coast 
of  Sicily  the  two  fleets  met.  We  read  of  350  Punic  ships  of  war 
and  330  Roman,  with  transports  in  addition,  of  a  battle  clumsy 
and  confused,  and  of  another  Roman  victory  won  by  boarding 
in  the  same  style  as  at  Mylae.  So  the  Romans  went  on,  and 
landed  near  Clupea  in  Africa.  At  this  point  a  bold  advance  with 
their  whole  army  might  perhaps  have  ended  the  war.  But  the 
Senate  misjudged  the  situation.     Roman  armies  were  meant  to 


xi]  Regulus.     Panhormus  loi 

be  changed  yearly,  like  the  consuls  who  commanded  them,  and 
even  in  a  war  beyond  Italy  it  was  not  thought  desirable  to  keep 
troops  in  the  field  longer  than  was  absolutely  necessary.  So 
one  consul  was  recalled,  with  the  bulk  of  the  army;  the  other, 
M.  Atilius  R^^ulus.  was  left  well  posted  in  Africa,  but  with  wholly 
inadequate  forces.  Still  the  weakness  of  Carthage  in  her  Home- 
province  was  so  pitiful  that  Regulus  made  a  most  successful 
campaign.  Immense  booty  was  gained  in  a  rich  and  defenceless 
country,  the  Punic  generals  were  defeated  in  a  battle,  and  Carthage 
seemed  lost.  The  traditional  story  is  that  Regulus  now  offered 
to  treat  for  peace,  wishing  to  keep  the  credit  of  his  successes  to 
himself  rather  than  leave  his  expected  successor  to  reap  the  fruit 
of  his  victory.  But  he  is  said  to  have  spoilt  his  own  chances  by 
demanding  terms  that  nerved  the  Carthaginians  to  a  desperate 
resistance.  Just  then  a  body  of  mercenaries,  hired  for  Carthage 
in  Greece,  arrived.  Their  chief,  the  Spartan  Xanthippus,  gained 
the  confidence  of  the  Punic  government,  and  soon  turned  the 
tables  on  Regulus.  Few  of  the  Roman  army  escaped  from  their 
defeat.  Regulus  was  taken  prisoner.  But  the  naval  superiority 
of  the  Romans  enabled  them  to  beat  a  Carthaginian  fleet  and 
bring  off  the  remnant  of  their  troops.  Nautical  skill  alone  was 
required  to  complete  the  homeward  voyage ;  but  the  Roman 
consuls  would  not  heed  the  warnings  of  their  Greek  skippers. 
A  storm  caught  them  before  they  could  double  cape  Pachynus, 
and  three  quarters  of  their  fleet  were  wrecked  on  the  southern 
coast  of  Sicily. 

100.  Third  stage,  254 — 250.  There  was  now  little  prospect 
of  an  early  peace.  New  fleets  were  built,  and  new  expeditions 
undertaken,  but  no  great  sea-fight  is  recorded.  A  Roman  fleet 
sailed  to  ravage  the  African  coast,  but  narrowly  escaped  utter 
destruction  through  ignorance  of  the  perils  of  navigation  in  those 
waters.  On  the  voyage  home  half  their  number  perished  in  a 
storm.  At  sea  Carthage  now  had  the  advantage,  but  as  usual 
nothing  came  of  it.  The  chief  events  of  the  war  in  these  years 
were  connected  with  Panhormus.  This  important  fortress  and 
naval  station  was  taken  by  the  Romans  in  254  and  held  with  a 
garrison.  A  good  base  of  operations  in  western  Sicily,  in  easy 
communication  with  Italian  ports,  was  thus  secured.  In  251 
Hasdrubal  the  Punic  commander  felt  strong  enough  to  attempt 
the   recovery   of  the   place,    and   led   a   great    army,   including 


I02  Lllybaeum  [ch. 

elephants,  to  besiege  it.  The  Roman  consul  L.  Caecilius  Metellus 
made  a  stout  defence,  and  early  in  250  utterly  defeated  the  be- 
siegers in  a  battle  which  broke  up  the  chief  Punic  army  for  the 
time.  But  the  money  no  longer  needed  to  pay  those  captured 
or  slain  could  be  used  to  engage  new  mercenaries.  The  resources 
of  Carthage  were  not  seriously  impaired  by  the  disaster  of  Pan- 
hormus.  Roman  confidence  revived,  and  shipbuilding,  neglected 
since  the  late  losses  at  sea,  was  by  order  of  the  Senate  resumed. 
The  exhibition  of  captive  elephants  signalized  the  triumph  of 
Metellus,  and  mint-masters  of  that  famous  family  in  later  times 
were  proud  to  stamp  the  figure  of  an  elephant  on  their  coins. 

loi.  Fourth  stage,  249 — 241.  Fourteen  years  of  war  waged 
without  consistent  strategy  had  produced  small  results.  Still 
Rome  had  gained  ground.  But  it  was  clear  that  a  peaceful 
possession  of  Sicily,  not  necessitating  the  presence  of  a  Roman 
army,  was  impossible  so  long  as  Carthage  retained  a  firm  footing 
in  the  island.  This  footing  was  the  maritime  fortress  of  Lilybaeum. 
As  its  walls  had  defied  Pyrrhus,  so  they  now  foiled  all  the  vast 
efforts  of  the  Romans.  Year  after  year  the  fruitless  siege  went 
on.  The  approach  from  the  sea  was  difficult,  owing  to  reefs; 
but  the  seamanship  of  Phoenician  skippers  and  Greeks  in  the 
Punic  service  was  equal  to  the  task  of  revictualling  the  town. 
Even  when  repeated  disasters  had  compelled  the  Romans  to  turn 
the  siege  into  a  blockade,  food  still  found  its  way  in.  All  the 
movements  of  the  last  nine  weary  years  of  the  war  were  conducted 
with  reference  to  the  winning  or  keeping  of  the  western  strong- 
hold. A  Punic  fleet  lay  at  Drepana,  which  was  no  doubt  a  station 
of  blockade-runners.  In  249  the  consul  P.  Claudius  Pulcher 
attempted  to  surprise  and  destroy  this  fleets  but  was  outman- 
oeuvred by  Adherbal  and  defeated  with  the  loss  of  most  of  his 
force.  At  last  a  Carthaginian  admiral  seemed  to  know  his  busi- 
ness. Roman  ships  off  Lilybaeum  were  taken  or  burnt.  Roman 
convoys  off  the  southern  coast  were  chased  and  driven  to  perish 
in  a  storm.  Only  the  land-route  was  open  to  send  food  to  the 
besiegers  of  Lilybaeum.  Still  the  Romans  doggedly  kept  up  the 
war  in  the  West.  But  their  financial  resources  were  failing.  For 
some  four  or  five  years  they  seem  to  have  given  up  the  naval  war 
and  built  no  ships.  Here  was  the  opportunity  of  Carthage.  But 
it  was  missed,  no  doubt  owing  to  the  blindness  or  jealousy  of  her 
rulers,  and  it  did  not  come  again. 


xi]  Aegussa.     Peace  103 

102.  In  247,  while  the  Romans  with  Hiero's  help  still 
watched  Lilybaeum,  a  strong  man  was  sent  from  Carthage  to  face 
them  in  Sicily.  This  was  Hamilcar,  of  the  great  family  of  Barcas. 
He  was  not  properly  backed  up  by  the  government  at  home.  But 
he  saw  the  most  ejEfective  way  of  using  his  mercenary  troops,  by 
avoiding  pitched  battles,  and  harassing  the  Romans  in  irregular 
warfare  by  sea  and  land.  He  made  sudden  descents  on  the 
Italian  coast.  At  last  he  ventured  to  seize  a  rocky  stronghold 
near  Panhormus,  and  here  he  held  his  ground  for  years,  raiding 
the  rich  country  as  he  chose,  and  defying  the  power  of  Rome. 
As  time  went  by,  he  grew  more  enterprising,  and  weakened  the 
position  of  the  Romans  in  western  Sicily.  It  became  clear  that 
the  war  could  only  be  ended  by  one  side  winning  the  command 
of  the  sea.  Tradition  records  that  Roman  patriotism  solved  the 
problem.  A  fleet  of  200  ships  was  provided  by  the  voluntary 
generosity  of  the  wealthier  citizens,  and  every  care  was  taken  to 
make  it  thoroughly  efficient.  The  main  object  was  to  destroy  a 
Punic  fleet,  on  its  way  with  supplies  for  their  western  garrisons. 
The  consul  C.  Lutatius  Catulus  (whose  year  ran  from  ist  May 
242)  won  a  great  victory  over  this  fleet,  ill  equipped  for  a  battle, 
off  the  island  of  Aegussa  in  March  241.  Rome  had  now  the 
mastery  at  sea,  and  the  end  was  in  sight.  Carthage  sued  for 
peace,  and  left  Hamilcar  to  make  the  best  terms  he  could. 
Rome  was  exhausted,  and  Catulus  eager  to  have  the  credit  of 
ending  the  war. 

103.  Peace.  The  terms  agreed  upon  by  the  commanders 
were  that  Carthage  should  evacuate  Sicily,  make  no  war  upon 
Syracuse,  give  up  all  Roman  prisoners,  and  pay  to  Rome  2200 
talents  (over  ;!^5oo,ooo)  in  20  yearly  instalments.  Ten  commis- 
sioners sent  from  Rome  with  full  powers  insisted  on  the  evacuation 
of  all  the  smaller  islands  between  Sicily  and  Italy,  and  made  the 
indemnity  3200  talents  payable  in  10  years.  Carthage  submitted. 
Her  hireling  troops  were  shipped  off  in  batches  to  Africa,  to  be 
paid  off  and  rewarded  for  their  great  services,  and  Rome  took 
over  the  fortress  of  Lilybaeum.  The  position  in  Sicily  was  now 
this.  The  Syracusan  kingdom,  in  area  about  ^  or  ^  of  the  island, 
was  of  course  undisturbed.  The  much  larger  part  fell  to  Rome 
as  the  successor  of  Carthage.  Rome  had  no  experience  in 
governing  subjects,  and  the  arrangements  of  the  Italian  con- 
federacy were  not  thought  suitable  to  be  applied  outside  Italy. 


I04  The  new  provincia  [ch. 

But  it  was  necessary  to  find  some  method  of  asserting  the 
sovranty  of  Rome  in  her  newly-acquired  territory.  The  Senate 
found  a  way  of  doing  this  by  an  extension  of  old  Roman  prin- 
ciples. Each  state  official  had  a  sphere  or  department  {provincia) 
in  which  he  acted.  So  Roman  Sicily  was  made  the  '  province '  of 
a  Roman  Governor,  a  yearly  officer,  endowed  with  ample  powers, 
charged  with  the  general  superintendence  of  the  administration. 
The  details  of  his  appointment  are  obscure.  Local  precedent 
was  followed  in  the  important  matter  of  revenue.  Hence  came 
the  tithes^  of  yearly  produce  and  the  customs  dues,  which  were 
the  normal  imposts  levied  in  Sicily.  Thus  Rome  began  a  new 
experiment,  the  taxation  of  subjects  for  her  own  benefit.  The 
so-called  allies  {socii)  in  Sicily  were  thus  on  a  different  footing 
from  the  Italian  Allies,  whose  obligation  to  the  leading  power 
consisted  in  furnishing  and  paying  fixed  military  contingents. 
They  were  subjects  of  Rome  as  they  had  been  of  Carthage.  In 
peace  or  war,  they  were  tributary,  save  in  so  far  as  exemptions 
were  specially  granted  to  a  few  favoured  communities.  The  old 
Roman  policy  of  isolating  the  towns  by  graduation  of  privileges 
seems  to  have  been  employed  in  Sicily.  In  particular  the  right 
of  acquiring  property  outside  a  man's  own  township  (the  commer- 
cium  enjoyed  by  Roman  citizens)  was  only  granted  in  a  very  few 
cases.  The  several  towns  were  left  free  to  manage  their  internal 
affairs  under  local  governments,  but  care  was  taken  to  place  the 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  wealthier  burgesses.  Of  course  the 
communities  that  had  resisted  longest  were  placed  in  the  most 
unfavourable  position.  But  we  have  no  reason  to  think  that  the 
province  was  harshly  governed  in  its  early  days.  The  miseries  of 
Roman  Sicily  belong  to  a  later  time. 

104.  The  combatant  powers.  Polybius  well  remarks  that  the 
different  character  and  resources  of  Rome  and  Carthage  are  best 
displayed  in  the  story  of  this  war.  From  her  own  citizens  and 
from  her  Italian  confederates  Rome  could  draw  an  inexhaustible 
supply  of  loyal  soldiers,  an  indigenous  army  of  fairly  uniform 
quality,  amenable  to  discipline,  and  able  to  bear  up  under  the 
strain  of  waiting  and  hardship,  even  of  repeated  disasters.  But 
they  were  a  raw  militia,  not  a  standing  army,  and  in  Italian  war- 
fare the  custom  had  been  to  raise  fresh  legions  year  by  year.  In 
Sicily  the  men  must  some  of  them  at  least  have  been  kept  under 

1  See  §  288. 


Plate    II 


(a) 


(^) 


W 


4.     Roman  silver  coins,  after  268  B.C. 

{a)    dejiariiis  [x]     "^    obv.    Roma  in  winged  helmet. 
(1^)    quinarhis  [v]    V  rev.    The  Twin  Brethren,  mounted,  charg- 
(r)    sestertius  [lis]  J  ing.     ROMA. 

See  §§  89,  104,  175. 


5.     Coin  of  Hiero  II  of  Syracuse,   3rd  cent.   E.G. 
obv.    Head  of  Hiero  with  diadem. 
rev.    Nike  in  chariot.     BASIAEOS  lEPfiNO^ 


See  §§  77,  97. 


xi]  The  combatants  compared  105 

arms  for  more  than  one  campaign.  If  the  soldiers  were  not 
regular  professionals,  the  generals  were  even  less  so.  Year  by 
year  new  consuls  took  over  the  command,  untrained  in  the  art 
of  war,  and  seldom  able  to  use  with  effect  the  fine  material 
abundant  in  the  ranks.  Moreover  the  Romans  were  in  great 
straits  for  want  of  ready  money.  Their  financial  system  was 
still  very  rude.  A  silver  coinage  had  only  begun  in  268.  During 
the  war  the  clumsy  bronze  coin  (the  as),  already  reduced  far  below 
its  original  weight,  was  further'  lowered.  We  have  seen  with  what 
difficulty  the  cost  of  keeping  up  a  navy  was  met.  There  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  the  tradition  that  only  patriotic  devotion  to  duty 
enabled  the  financial  burdens  to  be  borne.  In  general  the  Roman 
people  was  still  simple  and  sound.  The  constitution  was  a  lum- 
bering machine,  but  it  worked  somehow,  thanks  to  the  guidance 
of  the  Senate.  The  citizen  body,  uncorrupted  as  yet  by  faction 
and  bribery,  were  of  one  mind  in  devotion  to  the  state.  Beside 
them  stood  the  Allies,  of  whom  we  hear  little  in  our  record.  But 
it  was  their  support  that  made  the  Rome  of  this  period  a  power  of 
the  first  rank,  and  their  loyalty  that  was  the  surest  proof  of  the 
merits  of  the  Roman  system. 

105.  Carthage,  to  judge  from  such  evidence  as  has  reached 
us,  presented  a  very  different  picture.  No  confederacy  of  loyal 
allies  stood  at  her  back.  Her  armies,  bought  with  pay  or  pro- 
mises, seem  generally  to  have  held  to  their  bargain,  and  they 
could  be  kept  in  the  field  continuously,  till  they  became  pro- 
fessional soldiers.  But  the  faith  of  mercenaries  has  never  been 
an  effective  substitute  for  a  patriotic  sense  of  duty  in  enabling 
men  to  bear  discouragement  and  defeat.  Late  in  the  war  we 
hear  of  mutiny  in  a  Punic  fleet  and  desertions  from  the  Punic 
army.  And  worse  was  soon  to  come.  Nor  was  the  navy  a  credit 
to  a  great  maritime  state.  The  reasons  for  its  disgraceful  in- 
efficiency, which  the  war  exposed,  have  been  discussed  above. 
Carthage  had  good  admirals,  but  she  did  not  give  them  a  fair 
chance;  when  she  might  have  seized  command  of  the  sea,  she 
left  Rome  time  to  revive.  The  one  merit  of  her  war-policy  was 
that  she  kept  a  good  general  in  command  for  years  together. 
But  when  Hamilcar  did  great  things  in  western  Sicily,  he  appears 
to  have  been  left  without  sufficient  reinforcements  or  pay  for  his 

^  For  this  difficult  question  see  Mr  G.  F.  Hill's  Historical  Roman  Coins, 
pp.  28—33. 


io6  Place  of  the  Greeks  [ch. 

troops,  and  the  final  effort  to  send  in  supplies  was  mismanaged. 
It  is  almost  certain  that  the  state  of  Carthaginian  politics  was  to 
blame  for  most  of  this  blundering.  The  government  was  in  the 
hands  of  a  clique  of  wealthy  nobles,  who  controlled  the  senate. 
Party-spirit  ran  high  in  Carthage,  and  the  Barcid  family,  to  which 
Hamilcar  belonged,  leant  on  the  support  of  the  popular  Assembly. 
The  noble  clique  led  by  Hanno  (the  '  Great '  as  he  was  called) 
seem  to  have  been  more  concerned  to  keep  their  opponents  out 
of  power  at  home  than  to  do  the  best  for  their  country  abroad. 
In  short  Carthage,  wealthier  by  far  than  Rome,  but  already 
corrupt  and  factious,  was  no  match  for  her  poorer  rival.  Her 
weakness  in  iVfrica  was  shewn  in  the  campaign  of  Regulus. 
Only  the  clumsiness  of  the  Roman  system  enabled  her  to 
make  a  fight  of  it  so  long,  while  using  but  a  part  of  her  re- 
sources. 

io6.  That  this  comparison  of  the  two  combatants  is  a  fair 
one  I  think  the  sequel  will  shew.  The  help  derived  from  Greek 
skill  by  both  sides  has  been  noted.  It  was  the  destiny  of  that 
brilliant  race  to  serve  peoples  intellectually  inferior  to  themselves, 
not  to  build  up  a  great  Greek  empire  and  rule  it  according  to 
Greek  ideas.  Why  they  could  not  turn  their  cleverness  to  account 
in  imperial  politics  on  their  own  behalf,  is  a  question  not  within 
the  scope  of  this  book.  The  fact  remains,  and  is  worth  noting, 
that  great  empire-states  were  formed,  not  Greek,  and  that  Greek 
influences  penetrated  them,  inspiring  or  corrupting,  sowing  seeds 
of  good  and  evil.  As  seeker  creator  teacher  and  critic  the  Greek 
was  unrivalled  and  irresistible.  We  shall  see  Rome  become 
supreme  in  the  civilized  world  only  to  become  dependent  on 
Greek  leading  in  Art  and  Literature,  and  in  all  progressive  de- 
partments of  thought.  Such  was  the  power  of  a  subject  race, 
whom  the  Romans  had  some  excuse  for  despising.  So  profound 
is  the  difference  between  intellectual  brilliancy  and  the  duller 
qualities  that  go  to  make  up  what  we  call  political  capacity. 

107.  During  the  first  Punic  war  the  public  life  of  Rome 
seems  to  have  moved  on  the  old  lines.  A  Plebeian  chief  pontiff 
in  252  reminds  us  that  the  blending  of  the  two  Orders  was 
practically  complete.  On  his  death  Metellus  the  victor  of  Pan- 
hormus  succeeded  to  the  post.  He  was  the  typical  hero  of  the 
period,  a  man  distinguished  in  all  things  in  which  a  Roman  noble 
loved  to  excel.     Another  honoured  figure  was  C.  Duilius,  the 


xi]  Roman  progress  107 

victor  in  the  sea-fight  of  Mylae.  Simple  privileges  granted  to 
such  men  still  sufficed  to  shew  Roman  appreciation  of  merit. 
The  first  appearance  of  gladiators  as  a  show  at  a  funeral,  a 
horrible  spectacle  of  bloodshed  destined  to  become  common  at 
Rome,  is  placed  in  264.  The  custom  is  said  to  have  been  bor- 
rowed from  Etruria,  but  Roman  society  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
shocked  by  it.  In  politics  we  hear  of  the  appointment  (in  243) 
of  a  second  praetor,  for  jurisdiction  in  legal  disputes  in  which 
aliens  {peregrim)  were  concerned.  This  increase  of  the  magis- 
tracy was  a  good  thing,  and  it  points  to  the  growth  of  legal 
business.  But  at  first  the  new  officer  was  wanted  for  military 
duties.  Indeed  it  happened  that  the  consul  Catulus  was  laid  up 
with  a  wound,  and  the  new  praetor  commanded  the  fleet  in  the 
final  battle  of  the  war. 

108.  Meanwhile  the  founding  of  colonies,  to  guard  the 
coasts  and  secure  the  hold  of  Rome  on  Italy,  went  on  in  spite 
of  the  war,  partly  because  of  the  war.  Citizen-colonies  occupied 
the  coast  of  southern  Etruria,  threatened  by  Punic  fleets.  Colonies 
in  Umbria  seem  to  be  a  preparation  for  dealing  with  the  Gauls  in 
the  North.  In  the  South-East  a  Latin  Colony  was  planted  at 
Brundisium  in  244.  Thus  the  best  harbour  on  the  Adriatic  was 
held  by  a  Roman  fortress,  and  was  destined  to  become  more  and 
more  important  as  Rome  became  interested  in  the  peoples  and 
questions  of  the  East.  In  short,  even  the  exhausting  struggle 
with  Carthage  did  not  interrupt  the  steady  consolidation  of  Roman 
power.  This  was  the  work  of  the  Senate,  the  Standing  Committee 
for  watching  over  the  interests  of  Rome.  The  efficiency  of  this 
wonderful  body  in  the  third  century  B.C.  was  at  its  height.  It 
could  neither  pass  a  law,  nor  elect  a  magistrate,  nor  judge  an 
offender,  nor  declare  war.  Yet  its  moral  force  was  the  mainspring 
of  the  political  machine,  and  the  fact  that  moral  force  was  able  to 
guide  public  policy  is  the  simplest  and  truest  explanation  of  the 
greatness  of  Rome. 


CHAPTER   XII 

THE    INTERVAL   241—218   B.C. 

109.  The  first  Punic  war  lasted  23  years  :  23  years  only 
passed  before  Rome  and  Carthage  were  again  actually  at  war. 
The  difference  between  the  two  powers  shewed  itself  more  clearly 
than  ever  in  their  several  experiences  during  this  interval. 

Carthage.  The  Punic  government  was  shortsighted  enough  to 
concentrate  all  its  returned  mercenaries  in  one  place  and  then 
mean  enough  to  try  and  cheat  them  of  part  of  their  promised  pay. 
The  revolt  provoked  by  this  criminal  folly  came  near  to  being  the 
ruin  of  Carthage.  For  about  three  years  Africa  was  the  scene  of 
a  war  in  which  no  quarter  was  given,  waged  with  ever-increasing 
barbarity  on  both  sides.  The  warlike  mercenaries,  drawn  from 
various  races,  had  no  common  language  and  no  one  supreme 
leader.  But  Hanno  and  the  government  forces  could  make  no 
head  against  them  ;  only  the  employment  of  Hamilcar  saved  the 
state  when  all  seemed  lost.  Mercy  was  of  course  out  of  the 
question.  But  prompt  and  generous  payment  would  probably 
have  been  far  less  costly  than  the  horrible  struggle  in  which  they 
were  at  length  exterminated.  Moreover  new  mercenaries  had  to 
be  employed  for  their  suppression,  and  doubtless  well  paid.  This 
revolt  had  not  been  encouraged  by  foreign  powers.  Both  Rome 
and  Syracuse  in  various  ways  helped  the  Carthaginian  government. 
Rome  did  not  occupy  Sardinia  when  a  revolt  of  the  Punic  merce- 
naries there  left  the  island  at  her  mercy.  But  in  238,  when 
Carthage  at  last  felt  able  to  reassert  her  control  of  Sardinia  and 
Corsica,  Roman  jealousy  forbade  it,  and  even  extorted  a  further 
indemnity  as  the  price  of  abstaining  from  war.  Rome  herself 
annexed  the  islands   as  a   province,  occupied  some   ports,  and 


CH.  XIl] 


Carthage  and  Rome 


109 


appointed  a  governor.  So  the  near  presence  of  Punic  garrisons 
was  prevented,  but  Rome  was  busy  in  Italy,  and  the  effective 
conquest  of  the  new  territories  was  not  completed  for  many  years. 
At  Carthage  the  popular  party,  headed  by  the  Barcid  family,  now 
got  the  upper  hand.  Their  policy  was  to  increase  the  resources 
of  the  state  with  a  view  to  settling  scores  with  Rome.  After  the 
recent  losses  there  still  remained  one  land  in  which  Carthage 
already  had  a  footing,  and  in  which  it  was  possible  to  build  up  a 
new  Punic  empire.  In  Spain  Hamilcar  hoped  to  find  the  means 
of  avenging  his  country's  sufferings.  But  before  he  left  for  the 
West  he  had  to  organize  means  for  holding  in  check  the  peace- 
party  at  home.  They  had^  when  in  power,  never  loyally  supported 
him  in  Sicily,  and  he  could  not  trust  them  now. 

no.     Rome.     From  241  to  231  the  record  is  very  meagre. 
It  seems  that  there  was  war  with  the  Ligurian  hillmen  on  the 


G 

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Co 

Occupation  of  the  ager  Gallicus. 

northern  frontier  of  Etruria,  probably  in  connexion  with  the 
annexation  of  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  where  there  was  also  fighting. 
But  the  chief  move  in  Italy  was  directed  against  the  Gauls.  They 
were  restless  and  menacing,  but  seldom  able  to  act  together  for 
long.  They  wanted  to  win  back  the  strip  of  land  from  which 
Rome  had  expelled  the  Senones  in  283,  but  an  expedition  for 
this  purpose  in  236  was  a  failure.     The  Romans  soon  shewed 


I  lo  Roman  Policy.     Flaminius  [ch. 

their  intention  to  keep  the  territory,  the  so-called  ager  Gallicus. 
In  232  the  tribune  C.  Flaminius  carried  a  law  for  assigning  this 
land  in  allotments  to  Roman  citizens.  Of  the  war  provoked  by 
this  challenge  we  shall  speak  below.  But  Roman  policy  was  now 
beginning  to  look  beyond  Italy.  Rome  and  her  Allies  were  now 
interested  in  the  Adriatic,  and  the  nuisance  of  Illyrian  piracy 
could  not  be  endured.  An  embassy  to  the  court  at  Scodra  was 
refused  redress.  War  followed  in  230 — 228.  The  defeat  and 
submission  of  the  Illyrians  put  an  end  to  their  raids  for  the  time. 
But  the  chief  importance  of  this  little  war  was  that  it  brought 
Rome  into  touch  with  a  number  of  the  Greek  states  beyond  the 
sea.  Some  cities  on  the  seaboard  of  Illyria  and  Epirus  became 
'  friends '  of  Rome,  and  some  inland  tribes  also.  To  the  republics 
and  federations  of  Greece  proper  the  suppression  of  piracy  was 
most  welcome,  and  they  expressed  their  gratitude  in  various  ways. 
But  there  was  another  side  to  the  picture.  The  present  king  of 
Macedon,  Antigonus  Doson,  resented  the  interference  of  Rome 
in  Greek  affairs.  It  might  be  a  bar  to  his  regaining  the  practical 
control  of  the  Greek  states  that  had  been  enjoyed  by  some  of  his 
predecessors.  So  from  this  time  onward  persons  hostile  to  Rome 
were  received  with  favour  at  the  Macedonian  court. 

III.  The  period  between  the  two  great  Punic  wars  was  one 
of  great  internal  activity  at  Rome.  After  the  peace  of  241  we 
find  the  formation  of  new  Tribes  resumed.  The  two  then  added 
brought  up  the  number  to  35,  and  this  total  was  never  exceeded. 
Why,  we  do  not  know.  Districts  continued  to  be  added  to 
Roman  territory,  but  the  citizens  settled  there  were  enrolled  in 
existing  Tribes,  which  thus  no  longer  stood  for  local  units,  their 
members  being  scattered.  And  it  cannot  have  been  long  after 
this  that  a  great  change  was  made  in  the  Assembly  by  Centuries. 
All  we  know  is  that  in  some  way  Centuries  and  Tribes  were 
brought  into  connexion,  so  that  a  Century  was  in  future  a  part  of 
a  Tribe.  The  details  of  the  reform  and  the  process  by  which  it 
was  carried  out  are  alike  obscure.  It  seems  that  changes  in  the 
order  of  voting  and  the  distribution  of  voting-power  both  tended 
to  lessen  the  great  advantage  hitherto  enjoyed  by  the  rich,  and 
that  the  movement  was  presumably  of  a  popular  character.  The 
great  popular  leader  of  this  period  was  Gains  Flaminius,  and  he 
may  have  been  the  moving  spirit,  but  we  do  not  know.  The 
clumsiness  of  the  Centuriate  Assembly  was  not  lessened,  perhaps 


xii]  Freedmen.     New  praetors  iii 

even  increased.  But  this  Assembly  was  now  seldom  employed  for 
anything  but  elections  ;  for  passing  laws  the  people  were  generally 
summoned  by  Tribes.  In  this  period  we  meet  with  a  question 
that  afterwards  became  one  of  the  great  troubles  of  the  Roman 
Republic.  When  a  slave  was  set  free  by  his  owner  {dominus),  he 
ceased  to  be  servus,  and  became  the  freedman  ilibertus)  of  his 
former  master  as  protector  {patronus).  But  his  position  in  the 
state  was  that  of  a  free  man  bearing  a  taint  of  former  slavery. 
As  a  citizen  he  was  not  recognized  as  an  equal  of  the  free-born 
{ingenuus).  How  were  such  persons  to  be  admitted  as  citizens 
and  yet  not  treated  as  equals  ?  This  question  was  answered  by 
reviving  the  old  distinction^  between  country-Tribes  and  city- 
Tribes.  The  latter  were  only  four  in  all,  the  former  were  31. 
By  enrolling  citizens  of  servile  extraction  {libertini)  only  in  the 
city-Tribes  they  would  only  have  a  share  in  determining  four 
Tribe-votes.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  poHcy  of  the  Roman 
reform-party,  carried  out  by  Flaminius  as  censor  in  220.  The 
object  was  to  put  all  free-born  Romans  as  far  as  possible  on  a 
level,  not  to  equalize  Romans  born  and  citizens  of  alien  birth. 

112.  The  same  jealous  spirit,  and  the  absence  of  levelling 
ideas,  were  shewn  in  a  law  {lex  Claudia  of  218)  forbidding  a 
senator  to  own  more  than  one  ship  of  burden.  Its  effect  was  to 
shut  out  the  active  governing  class  from  taking  a  direct  part  in 
commerce.  Thus  they  were  practically  compelled,  so  far  as  law 
could  make  them,  to  invest  their  growing  fortunes  in  land,  and 
become  more  than  ever  a  nobility  of  great  landlords.  The  need 
of  providing  for  the  government  of  Rome's  new  acquisitions  led  to 
an  increase  of  the  magistracy.  About  227  the  number  of  praetors 
was  raised  from  two  to  four.  The  two  new  posts  were  for  the 
charge  of  the  Sicilian  and  Sardinian  departments  {provinciae\ 
and  with  them  began  the  regular  series  of  provincial  governors. 
That  is,  Roman  magistrates  were  set  to  rule  subject  peoples,  and 
Rome  took  up  an  imperial  position  outside  Italy,  different  from 
that  which  she  held  as  head  of  the  Italian  confederacy.  In  the 
inner  life  of  Rome  we  hear  of  a  few  details,  the  first  signs  of 
things  destined  to  become  important  later  on.  Such  was  a  free 
distribution  of  corn  in  the  city,  the  bounty  of  Hiero  of  Syracuse 
when  he  visited  Rome.  A  story  of  a  citizen  divorcing  his  wife 
for  barrenness  is  recorded  as  a  notable  fact  in  those  days.     The 

'  See  §  55. 


112  Livius  and  Naevius.     Spain  [ch. 

first  free  foreigner  (a  Greek)  to  settle  in  Rome  as  a  practising 
surgeon  is  said  to  have  come  in  the  year  219.  Greek  specialists 
in  this  and  other  professions  were  generally  slaves  or  freedmen. 
The  rude  beginnings  of  a  written  Roman  literature  also  belong  to 
this  period.  A  Greek  named  Andronicus,  brought  as  a  slave 
from  Tarentum,  took  the  name  Livius  from  the  master  who 
emancipated  him,  and  kept  a  school.  He  translated  the  Odyssey 
and  some  Greek  tragedies  into  Latin.  Younger  than  Livius  was 
Cn.  Naevius,  a  Campanian.  Beside  versions  from  the  Greek,  he 
attempted  original  poetry  on  the  model  of  the  native  songs  of 
Italy.  Very  little  is  known  of  either  of  these  men.  But  the 
mere  fact  of  a  beginning  being  made  is  worth  noting  as  a  sign 
of  the  development  of  Rome  during  the  interval  of  the  Punic 
wars. 

113.  The  Barcids  in  Spain.  For  nine  or  ten  years  Hamil- 
car  worked  hard,  fighting  and  negotiating.  He  brought  a  number 
of  the  southern  tribes  to  accept  the  overlordship  of  Carthage. 
He  raised  a  strong  force  of  native  troops,  but  the  army  thus 
formed  was  quite  different  from  the  mercenary  hosts  of  the  old 
model.  The  men  were  not  simply  hired  for  a  campaign,  but  kept 
on  the  regular  establishment,  drawing  Carthaginian  pay  year  after 
year,  and  becoming  a  professional  standing  army,  proud  of  their 
great  leader.  With  these  and  his  African  troops,  he  was  well  able 
to  make  Carthage  respected,  and  the  resources  of  the  country 
supplied  him  with  money.  In  228  he  fell  in  battle.  His  son-in- 
law  and  successor  Hasdrubal  maintained  the  Punic  cause  by 
diplomacy  and  skilful  management.  He  took  a  great  step  forward 
in  shifting  the  headquarters  from  the  old  Phoenician  city  of  Gades 
(Cadiz)  in  the  far  South- West  to  a  point  on  the  South-East  coast. 
Here  he  founded  a  '  New  Carthage '  (Carthagena)  and  fortified  it 
strongly.  The  new  civil  and  military  centre  was  in  fact  a  challenge 
to  Rome.  But  neither  side  was  as  yet  ready  for  war.  A  Roman 
embassy  visited  Hasdrubal,  and  an  agreement  was  come  to,  by 
which  the  river  Iberus  (Ebro)  was  to  be  the  boundary  between 
the  spheres  of  the  two  powers.  But  after  this  the  Roman  govern- 
ment did  not  take  possession  of  northern  Spain.  They  only 
formed  alliances  with  some  towns  on  the  seaboard,  and  one  of 
these  towns,  Saguntum,  was  South  of  the  Ebro.  And  it  is  not 
certain  that  the  agreement  with  Hasdrubal  was  ever  officially 
approved  by  the  government  of  Carthage. 


xii]  Hannibal  113 

114.  Hasdrubal  was  assassinated  in  221,  and  Hannibal  the 
eldest  son  of  Hamilcar,  then  26  years  old,  succeeded  him.  He 
was  already  a  thorough  soldier,  and  both  the  natives  and  the 
Punic  officers  in  Spain  could  see  in  him  a  chief  of  exceptional 
powers.  But  what  gave  the  young  man  his  chance  of  putting  his 
father's  designs  in  practice  was  the  fact  that  the  popular  party  led 
by  the  Barcids  was  in  power  at  Carthage.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  no  easy  matter  to  hold  that  party  together  for  a  length  of 
time,  and  so  to  give  effectual  support  to  an  absent  leader  on 
whose  success  the  fate  of  Carthage  depended.  Hannibal  needed 
a  great  loyal  statesman  at  home  to  cooperate  with  him  in  his 
efforts  abroad.  Now  we  hear  of  no  Barcid  partisan  equal  to  the 
task.  Our  tradition  is  all  from  the  Roman  side,  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  its  truth  when  it  represents  Hannibal  as  being 
thwarted  and  crippled  by  the  folly  of  the  Home  government  in 
the  critical  moments  of  the  second  Punic  war.  That  is,  the  rich 
merchant-princes  of  the  peace-party  stood  their  ground,  and 
regained  enough  power  to  make  the  policy  of  Carthage  weak  and 
wavering.  Meanwhile  Hannibal  was  wholly  possessed  by  the 
resolve  to  humble  his  country's  great  foe,  and  he  went  ahead  with 
an  intensity  that  seems  to  have  blinded  him  to  the  real  strength 
of  Rome.  To  a  Carthaginian  it  was  perhaps  impossible  to 
believe  that  the  AlHes  of  the  Italian  confederacy  had  good 
reasons  for  loyalty  to  their  Head,  and  would  hesitate  to  rebel 
unless  sure  of  bettering  their  condition.  Certainly  no  such  bond 
of  common  interest  existed  between  Carthage  and  her  subjects  in 
Punic  Africa. 

115.  For  about  two  years  Hannibal  was  busy  consolidating 
and  extending  the  Carthaginian  power  in  Spain,  perfecting  his 
army,  filling  his  war-chest ;  in  short,  preparing  for  his  great  enter- 
prise. In  219  he  felt  ready  for  war,  and  Rome  was  engaged 
elsewhere.  So  he  picked  a  quarrel  with  the  Saguntines  and  laid 
siege  to  the  city,  though  allied  with  Rome.  The  Roman  Senate 
vainly  hoped  to  save  Saguntum  by  negotiations  and  protests, 
addressed  first  to  Hannibal  and  then  to  the  government  at 
Carthage.  But  the  Punic  government  did  not  repudiate  Hanni- 
bal's action.  Saguntum  fell  early  in  218.  The  prestige  of  Rome 
was  broken.  Carthage  had  defied  her  former  conqueror,  and  the 
rival  powers  were  once  more  openly  at  war.  We  must  now  turn 
and  see  what  had  lately  been  occupying  the  attention  of  the 

H.  8 


114  Rome  busy  [ch. 

Roman  government  and  causing  it  to  display  such  feeble  indecision 
in  its  foreign  policy  in  the  West. 

ii6.  Rome  and  the  Gauls.  The  truth  is  that  one  of  Rome's 
chief  claims  to  the  support  of  her  Allies  was  her  employing  the 
forces  of  united  Italy  to  keep  at  bay  the  restless  Gauls,  and  that 
this  part  of  her  task  was  incomplete.  A  forward  policy  in  the 
North  was  necessary,  for  not  to  go  forward  was,  in  dealing  with 
such  warlike  tribes,  the  same  as  going  backward.  The  Gauls  saw 
that  it  was  time  for  a  great  effort  to  stop  the  Roman  advance. 
So  they  called  to  their  aid  a  number  of  their  kinsmen  beyond  the 
Alps,  and  in  226  an  immense  host  of  them  poured  into  Etruria. 
Irresistible  at  first  in  the  open  field,  the  barbarians  ruined  them- 
selves by  stupid  strategy,  and  in  225  were  destroyed  at  the  great 
battle  of  Telamon.  The  Romans  now  pushed  on  boldly  to 
occupy  the  region  of  the  Po.  They  had  long  been  friends  with 
the  Veneti  who  held  the  mouths  of  the  great  river,  and  had  lately 
made  terms  with  the  Gaulish  Cenomani.  The  years  224 — 222 
were  employed  in  conquering  the  two  chief  tribes  of  hostile  Gauls, 
the  Boii  and  Insubres.  In  223  the  popular  leader  Flaminius  was 
consul,  in  222  M.  Claudius  Marcellus,  the  dashing  soldier  after- 
wards famous  for  his  services  in  the  second  Punic  war.  In  221  a 
campaign  in  Istria  quieted  some  restless  local  tribes.  Rome 
clearly  meant  to  be  supreme  in  the  country  called  Cisalpine  or 
*  hither  '  Gaul,  and  to  extend  Italy  up  to  the  Alps.  The  northern 
way  to  Ariminum  was  turned  into  a  great  military  road  in  220  by 
the  censor  Flaminius,  and  in  218  two  strong  Latin  colonies, 
Placentia  (Piacenza)  and  Cremona,  were  founded  on  the  Po. 
But  the  conquest  of  the  country  was  far  from  complete,  and  the 
beaten  Gauls  were  longing  for  their  revenge. 

117.  Polybius  tells  us  that  at  the  time  of  this  struggle  with 
the  Gauls  the  forces  at  the  disposal  of  Rome  were  officially 
reckoned  at  700,000  foot  and  70,000  horse.  He  also  records 
that  in  the  pressure  of  danger  the  Allies  eagerly  came  forward  to 
back  up  their  Head  in  a  common  cause.  Evidently  their  terror 
of  the  Gauls  was  a  powerful  stimulant  to  their  loyalty  :  this  we 
must  bear  in  mind.  But  the  victories  over  the  barbarians  were 
mainly  due  to  the  superiority  of  Roman  discipline  and  Roman 
weapons.  They  were  '  soldiers'  battles.'  The  strategy  of  the 
civil  magistrates  who  commanded  in  the  field  was  very  crude, 
and  they  trusted  to  their  men  to  *  pull  them  through '  at  a  pinch. 


xii]  elsewhere  1 1 5 

No  Roman  general  understood  the  art  of  handling  large  bodies  of 
troops  with  effect.  And  the  government  seems  to  have  been  quite 
unaware  that  this  deficiency  was  a  serious  danger  in  the  face  of 
the  great  general  and  the  highly-trained  army  now  on  the  march 
from  Spain. 

118.  But  it  was  not  only  the  war  with  the  Gauls  that  had 
kept  Rome  from  asserting  herself  in  the  West.  In  219  the  Illyrian 
war  broke  out  again.  It  is  true  that  the  pirates  were  promptly  put 
down  and  order  restored.  But  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  the  adven- 
turer who  had  caused  the  trouble,  escaped  to  Macedon,  where  he 
was  received  by  king  Philip,  who  had  lately  succeeded  to  the 
throne.  At  this  time  the  Macedonian  kingdom  was  more  pre- 
dominant in  Greece  than  it  had  been  for  many  years ;  and  the 
young  king  was  especially  desirous  to  expel  the  Romans  from 
their  foothold  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Adriatic.  Their  presence 
was  a  check  to  his  ambition.  So  he  was  watching  for  an  opportu- 
nity, and  Demetrius  remained  at  the  Macedonian  court,  intriguing 
against  Rome.  On  the  other  hand  the  Aetolians,  whom  Philip 
had  defeated  in  war,  were  longing  to  be  revenged  on  him.  Thus 
there  were  the  materials  for  a  fresh  conflict  in  the  Greek  peninsula. 
But  in  the  middle  of  the  year  218  there  was  no  obvious  reason  for 
alarm  in  Italy.  Nobody  imagined  that  the  approach  of  Hannibal 
could  mean  actual  fighting  south  of  the  Alps  before  the  end  of 
the  year.  Even  were  this  possible,  the  Roman  government,  with 
its  vast  numbers  of  brave  men  at  disposal,  seemed  able  to  crush 
an  invader  at  once.  We  shall  see  that  the  masters  of  Italy  had 
still  much  to  learn. 


8-2 


CHAPTER    XIII 

SECOND   PUNIC   WAR   218—201  B.C. 

119.  Importance  of  the  war.  The  Hannibalic  or  second 
Punic  war  was  the  turning-point  in  the  history  of  Rome  both 
internal  and  external.  Internally  it  found  the  Senate  powerful, 
it  is  true.  But  the  close  of  the  war  left  the  Senate  so  much  more 
powerful  that  it  became  for  a  long  period  the  virtual  government 
of  Rome.  The  constitution  stood  nominally  unchanged,  but  its 
working  was  different.  In  the  course  of  this  war  many  things 
happened  that  were  foreshadowings  of  the  coming  supremacy  of 
the  Senate :  there  were  also  a  few  signs  of  popular  discontents 
by  which  individual  leaders  rose  for  a  time  to  power.  In  these 
leaders  we  may  see  the  early  fore-runners  of  the  great  anti- 
senatorial  movement,  the  revolution  in  which  the  Republic 
(again  without  ostensible  change)  became  a  mere  name,  an 
unconfessed  but  real  monarchy.  Externally  Rome  began  the 
war  as  Head  of  Italy,  sovran  of  the  greater  part  of  Sicily,  and 
over-lord  of  Sardinia  Corsica  and  the  N.W.  part  of  Spain.  But 
none  of  the  last  three  countries  were  as  yet  conquered :  Rome 
had  just  enough  hold  on  them  to  keep  out  a  rival.  When  the 
war  ended,  the  overthrow  of  Carthage  left  Rome  supreme  in  the 
western  Mediterranean,  and  practically  committed  to  a  struggle 
with  the  eastern  powers.  Less  than  forty  years  of  wars  and 
diplomacy  were  then  enough  to  destroy  her  opponents  one  by  one 
and  leave  her  the  one  Great  Power  in  the  Mediterranean  world. 
That  the  process  took  so  long  was  largely  due  to  the  obstinate 
reluctance  of  the  Roman  aristocracy  to  profit  by  the  military 
lessons  of  the  second  Punic  war. 


CH.  xiii]  The  combatant  powers  1 1 7 

120.  Factors  in  the  struggle.  We  have  seen  what  enormous 
numbers  of  men  were  at  the  disposal  of  Rome.  But  we  must 
bear  in  mind  that  these  forces  were  a  raw  militia,  brave  but 
untrained,  and  that  the  cavalry  was  always  a  weak  point  in  the 
Roman  armies.  On  the  other  hand  the  army  of  Hannibal  was 
no  longer  a  mere  mercenary  force  hastily  got  together,  like  the 
old  Carthaginian  armies,  but  a  highly-trained  force,  used  to  war- 
fare and  accustomed  to  follow  a  great  leader  in  whom  they  had 
full  trust.  The  cavalry  was  particularly  efficient,  as  events  were 
to  prove.  The  elephants  may  be  ignored,  as  they  were  of  no 
service.  Hannibal's  greatest  advantage  was  in  his  own  genius 
and  independent  control  of  his  army.  Roman  generals  were  a 
succession  of  honest  soldiers,  who  had  not  learnt  to  handle  large 
bodies  of  troops  with  effect,  and  who  were  on  the  Roman  system 
superseded  just  when  they  were  beginning  to  learn.  The  strain 
of  the  war  forced  the  Roman  government  to  give  up  this  system 
of  constant  changes  for  the  time,  but  it  was  revived  after  the  war. 
On  the  other  hand  the  citizen-generals  were  backed  up  by  Rome 
with  all  available  resources,  while  Hannibal  received  hardly  any 
support  from  Carthage.  Hannibal's  party  at  home  could  prevent 
concessions  to  Rome  and  so  virtually  declare  war.  But  they  seem 
to  have  been  unable  or  even  unwilling  to  carry  on  the  government 
in  exact  accord  with  the  instructions  of  their  absent  leader.  And 
so  it  came  that  the  resources  of  Carthage  were  not,  as  they  needed 
to  be,  effectively  directed  by  a  single  mind.  The  mismanagement 
that  resulted  from  this  is  clearly  shewn  in  the  Carthaginian  naval 
policy.  The  war  was  not  a  naval  war.  Not  a  single  great  sea-fight 
occurred  in  the  course  of  it.  But  it  was  surely  of  the  first  import- 
ance to  gain  the  mastery  at  sea  and  to  keep  in  touch  with  the 
Punic  leader  in  Italy.  The  sea  was  not  swept  by  Roman  fleets 
able  to  stop  a  great  armada  from  Carthage.  That  Hannibal  was 
able  to  communicate  with  Carthage  by  sea  shews  that  it  would 
have  been  possible  to  send  him  men  and  money  enough,  if  the 
Punic  government  had  only  chosen  to  do  so. 

121.  But  we  shall  see  that  the  Punic  government  chose  to 
judge  for  themselves  rather  than  follow  the  better  judgment  of 
Hannibal,  and  with  fatal  results.  There  was  however  a  weak 
point  in  the  calculations  of  Hannibal  also.  In  boldly  invading 
Italy  he  reckoned  on  finding  support  from  two  quarters.  By 
representing  himself  as  come  to  put  an  end  to  Roman  supremacy 


ii8  Gauls  and  Italians  [ch. 

he  hoped  to  induce  Rome's  Italian  Allies  to  rise  against  the  Head 
of  the  Confederacy,  and  at  the  same  time  to  procure  the  numbers 
necessary  for  his  undertaking  by  enlisting  great  forces  of  Gauls. 
He  had  yet  to  learn  that  these  two  hopes  were  inconsistent  with 
each  other.  To  lead  Gauls  into  Italy  was  a  step  certain  to  alarm 
the  Italian  Allies  :  fear  of  the  Gauls  would  check  secession.  More- 
over the  Gauls  were  not  to  be  trusted.  Whether  the  advantages 
of  employing  them  would  be  so  great  as  to  outweigh  the  dis- 
advantages was  the  question ;  a  question  which,  looking  back  on 
the  past,  we  may  answer  in  the  negative.  How  was  Hannibal  led 
into  this  miscalculation  ?  Surely  by  information  falsely  coloured. 
He  took  vast  pains  to  learn  the  facts  bearing  on  his  enterprise. 
But  he  was  misled  by  an  influence  that  is  always  present  when 
two  or  more  forces  try  to  cooperate  against  one.  His  aim  was  to 
use  Gauls  and  Italians  against  Rome,  while  they  wanted  to  use 
him.  Each  partner  would  expect  too  much  from  the  other,  and 
give  too  little.  Accordingly  both  Gauls  and  Italians  were  willing 
to  be  relieved  by  Hannibal  from  the  yoke  of  Rome,  and  his  spies 
brought  encouraging  reports.  But  neither  Italians  nor  Gauls 
desired  to  set  up  a  Carthaginian  empire  in  Italy.  They  wanted 
him  to  set  them  free  and  then  withdraw,  and  this  state  of  mind 
made  them  unwilling  to  submit  to  his  control.  He  was  never  in 
a  position  to  give  them  freedom,  even  if  he  wished  it,  without 
great  sacrifices  on  their  part.  Thus  in  Italy  he  was  leaning  on 
a  broken  reed,  while  he  was  never  properly  backed  up  by  the 
people  at  home. 

122.  Meanwhile  the  power  ^of  placing  great  armies  in  the 
field  was  only  a  part  of  the  defence  of  Italy.  All  the  best  harbours 
and  landing-places  in  the  long  seaboard  were  guarded  by  fortified 
colonies  or  allied  cities.  Many  of  the  cities  were  Greek,  and  the 
western  Greeks  were  true  to  Rome,  their  protector  against  their 
old  Phoenician  enemy.  The  inland  peoples  were  some  of  them 
very  willing  to  see  Rome  humbled.  But  they  were  watched  by 
fortresses  planted  in  carefully  chosen  spots,  the  Latin  colonies, 
which  for  their  own  security  against  hostile  neighbours  depended 
on  their  connexion  with  Rome.  To  them  no  invader  could  be 
welcome,  and  these  fortresses  formed  invaluable  bases  for  the 
operations  of  Roman  armies.  They  could  only  be  taken  by  siege, 
and  Hannibal's  forces,  excellently  fitted  for  movements  in  the 
field,  were  wholly  unfitted  for  the  strain  of  siege-works  or  the 


xiii]  Authorities  119 

slow  patience  of  a  blockade.  Hannibal  in  short  had  to  carry 
Italy  with  a  rush  or  to  be  baffled  by  circumstances ;  and  this 
is  the  simple  story  of  the  second  Punic  war. 

123.  The  three  stages  of  the  war.  We  may  divide  the  war 
into  three  parts,  {a)  218 — 216  B.C.,  ending  with  the  defection  of 
certain  Allies  that  followed  the  great  disaster  of  Cannae,  {h)  215 — 
209  B.C.,  ending  with  the  recovery  of  Tarentum  by  the  Romans, 
{c)  208 — 201  B.C.,  ending  with  the  collapse  of  Carthage.  The 
first  left  Rome  apparently  prostrate,  the  second  ruined  Hannibal's 
projects  by  proving  that  he  could  not  protect  those  who  joined 
him,  the  third  is  a  series  of  vain  efforts  to  avert  the  final  defeat 
already  certain. 

Authorities,  We  have  the  whole  narrative  comprised  in  ten 
books  of  Livy's  History,  written  about  200  years  after  the  war; 
also  considerable  fragments  of  the  History  of  the  Greek  statesman 
Polybius,  who  wrote  about  50  years  after  the  war,  and  had  con- 
versed with  survivors.  Both  these,  our  chief  authorities,  write 
from  the  Roman  side.  For  Polybius  was  long  resident  in  Rome, 
and  became  a  great  admirer  of  Roman  institutions.  He  enjoyed 
the  favour  of  the  noble  family  of  the  Scipios,  and  doubtless  made 
the  most  of  their  exploits.  The  other  authorities  are  of  less  im- 
portance, and  also  represent  the  Roman  tradition.  Two  Roman 
writers  left  contemporary  accounts,  used  by  their  successors. 
These  were  Q.  Fabius  Pictor  and  L.  Cincius  Alimentus.  Both 
wrote  in  Greek,  the  dominant  literary  language  of  the  civilized 
world.  A  single  fragment  (Greek)  of  a  writer  on  the  other  side 
only  serves  to  shew  that  Greeks  were  as  usual  to  the  fore  in 
Roman  naval  operations.  A  narrative  of  this  war  must  therefore 
be  given  with  hesitation  for  whatever  it  may  be  worth.  The 
general  outlines  do  not  admit  a  serious  doubt,  but  the  personal 
details  are  certainly  coloured  by  patriotic  bias  and  the  partiality 
of  Roman  tradition  in  glorifying  certain  great  families. 

124.  First  stage,  218 — 216  B.C.  In  218  Hannibal  crossed 
the  Ebro  and  quickly  occupied  the  part  of  northern  Spain  that 
belonged  to  the  Roman  sphere.  He  left  his  brother  Hasdrubal 
in  charge  of  Spain  and  entered  Transalpine  Gaul,  where  he  had 
already  secured  friends  among  the  local  tribes.  He  skilfully 
forced  the  passage  of  the  Rhone,  and  made  his  way  with  the 
help  of  friendly  Gauls  to  an  Alpine  pass.  Winter  was  coming 
on,  but  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  of  the  march  and  the  hostility 


I20 


Trebia  [ch. 


of  the  mountain  tribes  he  brought  his  army  safely  down  into  Italy, 
that  is  Cisalpine  Gaul.  He  was  soon  joined  by  large  numbers  of 
Gauls.  After  leaving  behind  him  an  army  in  Spain,  and  after  the 
losses  incurred  on  his  journey,  his  force  was  probably  from  20,000 
to  30,000  strong.  In  training  it  was  immeasurably  superior  to  any 
troops  that  Rome  could  bring  against  it.  But  it  was  too  small  to 
support  the  wastage  of  war  for  any  length  of  time.  It  was  there- 
fore Hannibal's  policy  to  economize  such  valuable  lives.  He 
contrived  that  the  losses  in  battle  should  fall  mainly  on  the 
auxiliary  Gauls,  of  whom  there  was  a  plentiful  supply.  His 
troubles  with  these  fickle  and  quarrelsome  -  allies  seem  to  have 
begun  early.  But  they  were  on  the  whole  ready  to  back  him  up, 
for  the  Romans  by  confiscating  lands  and  founding  colonies  had 
shewn  that  they  meant  to  be  masters  in  the  region  of  the  Po. 

125.  Meanwhile  the  Roman  government  had  been  expecting 
the  conflict  to  take  place  in  Africa  and  Spain,  and  was  in  no 
hurry.  The  consul  Sempronius  with  a  fleet  and  army  was  to 
assail  Carthage  at  home,  while  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  met  Hannibal 
south  of  the  Pyrenees.  A  Punic  naval  expedition  against  Sicily 
was  feebly  conducted,  and  easily  beaten  off.  Sempronius  took 
Melita  (Malta)  and  was  in  a  fair  way  to  carry  out  his  plans,  when 
he  was  recalled  with  his  army  to  take  part  in  the  defence  o^ 
northern  Italy.  All  the  Roman  arrangements  had  been  upset 
by  the  movements  of  Hannibal.  Scipio,  delayed  by  the  diversion 
of  some  of  his  force  to  meet  a  Gaulish  rising  in  the  North,  had 
started  too  late.  At  Massalia  he  learnt  that  the  Punic  general 
had  crossed  the  Rhone,  and  he  could  not  force  him  to  give  battle. 
So  the  consul  sent  on  his  army  to  Spain  with  his  brother  Gnaeus 
Scipio  in  command,  and  returned  to  meet  Hannibal  in  the  North 
with  the  forces  already  posted  there.  The  first  battle  was  an  aflair 
of  cavalry  on  the  Alpine  stream  Ticinus,  in  which  the  Romans 
were  beaten  and  Scipio  badly  wounded.  When  Sempronius 
came  up  he  took  command.  Hannibal  soon  lured  him  into 
a  general  engagement  on  the  river  Trebia  and  defeated  him  with 
great  loss.  By  this  time  the  Gauls  had  practically  all  revolted 
from  Rome  and  joined  the  Punic  deliverer.  Yet  Rome  still 
kept  a  hold  on  Cisalpine  Gaul.  The  fortresses  of  Placentia  and 
Cremona,  and  other  posts  along  the  Po,  were  victualled  by  way 
of  the  river  :  for  the  Veneti,  who  held  the  mouths,  were  in  alliance 
with  Rome.     Hannibal  wintered  in  Liguria,  much  worried  by  the 


xiii]  Trasimene  121 

tiresome  Gauls,  who  were  anxious  that  the  conqueror  and  his 
army  should  move  on. 

126.  Early  in  217  he  crossed  the  Apennine  into  Etruria. 
At  Rome  the  people  were  angry  at  the  news  of  defeat,  and  had 
made  the  great  reformer  C.  Flaminius  a  second  time  consul. 
His  colleague  Servilius  went  to  command  in  the  North,  while 
Flaminius  faced  Hannibal  in  Etruria.  The  reformer  was  even 
less  successful  than  the  nobles  whom  he  had  blamed.  On  the 
northern  edge  of  the  Trasimene  lake  he  was  entrapped  by 
Hannibal  and  destroyed  with  most  of  his  army.  It  was  said 
that  he  had  neglected  due  formalities,  particularly  in  matters  of 
religion.  At  all  events  his  rashness  had  lost  a  great  army,  and 
left  Hannibal,  after  a  signal  victory,  posted  between  Rome  and 
the  other  consul's  army  in  the  North.  The  alarm  in  Rome  was 
extreme.  It  was  decided  to  place  supreme  power  in  the  hands 
of  a  dictator,  and,  as  no  consul  was  within  reach,  to  appoint  the 
dictator  by  election.  This  was  a  departure  from  precedent,  justi- 
fied by  necessity.  The  Senate  managed  to  secure  the  election  of 
Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  a  noble  with  a  reputation  for  firmness  and 
caution.  He  performed  the  observances  of  religion  with  precise 
care,  and  raised  a  fresh  army.  Fabius  was  the  first  among  the 
Roman  commanders  to  perceive  that  he  had  to  deal  with  a  general 
and  an  army  wholly  different  in  kind  from  the  adversaries  hitherto 
encountered  by  Rome. 

127.  We  must  turn  for  a  moment  to  the  war  in  the  West. 
Cn.  Scipio  had  to  recover  the  footing  of  Rome  in  Spain,  and  he 
appears  to  have  done  so  speedily.  The  hold  of  Carthage  on  the 
Roman  sphere  was  destroyed,  and  naval  operations  in  217  were 
all  to  the  advantage  of  Rome,  helped  by  the  Greeks  of  Massalia. 
Another  fleet  sent  from  Carthage  effected  nothing.  Meanwhile 
P.  Scipio  was  sent  out  as  proconsul  to  take  the  chief  command 
with  additional  forces,  and  the  two  brothers  began  a  series  of 
successful  campaigns.  The  Celtiberian  tribes  (of  mixed  Gaulish 
and  Iberian  blood),  who  held  most  of  central  Spain,  were  hostile 
to  the  Carthaginian  power.  A  number  of  hostages,  detained  in 
the  interest  of  the  Punic  government,  were  betrayed  by  a  trusted 
Spaniard  to  the  Scipios.  This  chance  enabled  the  Roman  leaders 
to  win  the  help  of  many  tribes  by  sending  the  boys  home.  The 
importance  of  the  Spanish  war  was  understood  at  Rome,  for  the 
military  resources  of  Carthage  were   largely   dependent  on   the 


122  Fabius  [ch. 

control  of  her  empire  in  Spain.  Hence  we  find  both  sides 
earnestly  set  upon  winning  the  upper  hand  in  that  country. 
For  the  present  the  Romans  were  gaining  ground. 

128.  Hannibal  had  from  the  first  treated  Italian  prisoners 
with  special  favour,  Roman  citizens  with  severity,  hoping  to 
induce  the  Italian  Allies  to  rise  against  Rome.  After  Trasimene 
he  set  the  Italian  captives  free.  But  when  he  entered  Umbria 
he  met  with  a  disappointment.  The  Latin  colony  of  Spoletium 
refused  to  admit  him,  and  repulsed  an  assault.  Checked  by  a 
fortress  that  he  was  not  prepared  to  besiege,  he  moved  eastward 
to  the  Adriatic  and  passed  on  towards  southern  Italy,  laying  waste 
the  country  in  his  leisurely  march.  He  re-armed  his  African 
troops  with  captured  Roman  armour,  and  generally  improved 
his  army.  But  the  expected  support  of  Latins  and  other  Roman 
Allies  was  not  forthcoming.  He  reached  Apulia,  unopposed  but 
unwelcomed.  Evidently  there  was  no  belief  in  his  offers  of  free- 
dom :  an  invader  bringing  with  him  Gauls  was  not  wanted  in  Italy. 
At  Carthage  the  news  of  his  victories  was  received  with  joy,  and 
reinforcements  voted,  but  for  the  present  nothing  seems  to  have 
been  done. 

129.  When  his  army  was  ready,  the  dictator  set  out  to  find 
the  enemy ;  not  to  give  him  battle  with  raw  troops,  but  to  watch 
and  annoy  him,  while  he  trained  his  own  army.  He  played  a 
waiting  game  with  such  extreme  caution  that  he  earned  the 
nickname  of  Slow-goer  or  Dawdler  {cunctator).  He  followed 
Hannibal  as  he  moved  from  Apulia  into  Samnium  and  from 
Samnium  into  the  rich  district  of  Campania.  Hannibal  could 
neither  shake  him  off  nor  beat  him,  and  the  great  city  of  Capua 
was  for  the  present  saved  to  Rome.  But  in  an  attempt  to  entrap 
Hannibal's  army  in  the  mountains  Fabius  failed,  and  the  enemy 
got  safely  back  to  winter  in  Apulia.  The  discontent  both  in  the 
army  and  at  Rome  was  great,  for  even  now  men  had  not  learnt 
that  in  pitched  battles  they  had  no  chance  against  Hannibal. 
The  dictator's  second  in  command,  Minucius,  blamed  the  strategy 
of  Fabius.  He  claimed  a  victory  in  a  trifling  engagement  fought 
while  Fabius  was  in  Rome  for  a  temporary  duty.  Soon  the 
popular  leaders  in  Rome  induced  the  Assembly  to  give  the 
Master  of  the  Horse  equal  powers  with  the  dictator.  There 
were  thus  two  dictators,  which  was  an  absurdity,  for  the  use  of 
the  office  consisted  in  its  being  held  by  a  single  person.     The 


xiii]  Cannae  123 

story  goes  on  to  say  that  Minucius  soon  proved  his  own  incapacity, 
and  was  only  saved  from  a  great  disaster  by  Fabius.  We  cannot 
trust  the  details,  but  it  seems  that  Fabius  resumed  the  supreme 
command  and  avoided  defeat  as  before.  The  effect  of  this  affair 
was  to  weaken  the  dictatorship,  for  the  advantage  of  having  a 
single  ruler,  to  deal  with  urgent  dangers  calling  for  united  action, 
could  no  longer  be  relied  on. 

130.  Defeats  and  losses  had  not  driven  the  Senate  to 
despair.  Embassies  were  sent  to  uphold  the  claims  and  interests 
of  Rome  abroad.  And  the  loyalty  of  her  Greek  allies  was 
attested  by  some  deputations  offering  gifts.  Money  was  at 
present  declined  with  thanks,  but  military  aid  in  corn  and  light 
troops  sent  by  Hiero  of  Syracuse  was  accepted.  The  Senate 
however  was  not  Rome.  The  popular  irritation  at  the  delay  and 
sacrifices  of  the  war  shewed  itself  in  the  election  of  consuls  for 
the  next  (216)  year.  After  much  friction  the  popular  leader 
C.  Terentius  Varro  was  elected,  and  the  nobles  had  to  be  content 
with  carrying  L.  Aemilius  Paullus  as  his  colleague.  Varro  was 
certainly  not  the  mere  demagogue  that  tradition  depicts  him, 
but  he  seems  to  have  had  little  or  no  military  experience.  Vast 
preparations  were  made  for  the  coming  campaign,  and  care  taken 
to  keep  the  armies  efficient  in  northern  Italy,  Sicily,  and  Spain. 
It  should  also  be  remembered  that  in  all  seasons  of  great  nervous 
excitement  the  Romans  were  deeply  affected  by  religious  terrors. 
Any  occurrence,  however  trivial,  that  did  not  lend  itself  to  im- 
mediate explanation  in  the  present  state  of  knowledge,  was 
regarded  as  a  '  prodigy,'  an  event  foreboding  some  evil  to  come. 
There  were  means  employed,  under  the  direction  of  the  college 
of  pontiffs,  for  appeasing  the  supposed  wrath  of  the  gods  and 
so  averting  calamities.  Thus  the  popular  nervousness  was  calmed. 
In  all  the  great  crises  of  the  second  Punic  war  these  outbreaks 
of  superstitious  fears  occurred.  Indeed  they  form  no  small  part 
of  the  Roman  story  of  the  war  as  told  at  length  by  Livy. 

131.  In  the  summer  of  216  we  find  the  consuls  Varro  and 
Paullus  with  an  army  of  some  80,000  men  facing  Hannibal  with 
about  50,000  in  Apulia.  Hannibal  drew  the  Romans  after  him 
into  country  suited  to  the  operations  of  his  superior  cavalry.  It 
was  near  the  little  town  of  Cannae  on  the  river  Aufidus  that  the 
armies  met.  The  consuls  were  under  instructions  to  fight,  and 
Varro  was  eager  to  do  so.     They  were  taking  command  in  turns, 


124  New  strategy  [ch. 

so  that  Paullus,  who  preferred  to  wait  for  a  good  opportunity, 
was  not  able  to  prevent  his  colleague  from  giving  battle.  The 
tactics  of  Hannibal  made  the  Roman  numbers  useless.  He 
routed  the  Roman  cavalry,  and  rolled  the  bodies  of  foot  into 
one  great  helpless  mass  :  only  the  men  on  the  edges  could  use 
their  weapons.  Few  escaped  the  butchery  that  followed.  The 
Roman  losses  seem  to  have  been  about  50,000 ;  Hannibal's  about 
6000  or  7000,  the  greater  part  of  whom  were  Gauls.  Paullus 
and  a  number  of  noble  Romans  were  among  the  dead.  We 
hear  of  survivors  some  15,000  or  more,  who  escaped  to  Canusium 
or  Venusia.  After  a  few  days  of  utter  despair,  when  a  party  of 
young  nobles  are  said  to  have  thought  of  flying  from  Italy  and 
taking  service  with  one  of  the  eastern  kings,  the  remnants  of 
the  beaten  army  were  collected,  and  Varro  resumed  command. 
The  disaster  of  Cannae  was  one  of  the  blackest  spots  in  the 
history  of  Rome.  But  the  story  abounds  in  exaggerations  and 
doubtful  legends.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Roman  tradition 
painted  it  in  the  darkest  colours,  that  the  wonderful  recovery  of 
Rome  might  stand  out  all  the  more  glorious  by  the  contrast. 

132.  For  the  Roman  system  was  not  destroyed  even  by 
the  blow  of  Cannae.  The  Italian  confederacy  was  not  broken 
up,  and  the  Senate  in  Rome,  led  by  Fabius,  and  now  supported 
by  the  people,  took  matters  in  hand.  All  possible  precautions 
were  taken  to  prevent  a  panic  at  home.  Forces  meant  for  other 
service  were  sent  to  the  front.  New  troops  were  raised,  and 
even  slaves  enlisted  as  volunteers,  and  allowed  so  to  earn  their 
freedom.  An  army  had  to  be  kept  in  the  field  at  all  costs.  But 
for  the  moment  Sicily,  menaced  by  hostile  fleets,  had  to  be  left 
to  shift  for  itself.  As  usual,  the  Punic  commanders  did  not  use 
their  chance  vigorously,  while  old  Hiero  stood  firmly  by  Rome, 
and  the  island  was  saved.  The  return  of  Varro,  recalled  to 
Rome,  is  the  subject  of  a  famous  story.  Citizens  poured  out  to 
meet  the  unlucky  consul,  and  the  Senate  thanked  him  for  not 
having  despaired  of  the  commonwealth.  Such,  said  Roman 
tradition,  was  the  patriotic  resolve  to  pull  together  and  save  the 
state.  And  indeed  we  find  Varro  afterwards  entrusted  with 
important  public  duties.  But  the  policy  of  Fabius  is  seen  in 
the  changed  conduct  of  the  war.  Pitched  battles  were  avoided, 
and  the  young-  troops  allowed  time  to  learn  their  business.  It 
was  clear  that  the  war  could  not  be  ended  in  a  hurry,  and  that 


xiii]  Defections  in  the  South  125 

mere  numbers  were  of  no  avail  against  a  trained  force  under  a 
Hannibal.  Tradition  also  records  a  story  to  illustrate  Roman 
constancy.  Hannibal  offered  to  let  the  Romans  redeem  the 
prisoners,  of  whom  he  had  now  many,  at  a  price.  This  the 
Senate  refused.  Rather  than  make  a  precedent  for  approving 
the  surrender  of  Roman  soldiers,  they  would  buy  slaves  from 
their  owners  to  fill  the  ranks.  Of  the  truth  of  such  stories  we 
cannot  judge :  they  served  at  least  to  edify  young  Romans  in  a 
later  age,  and  we  need  not  wholly  disbelieve  them. 

133.  The  fear  that  Hannibal  would  march  on  Rome  passed 
away;  he  knew  better  than  to  attempt  a  great  siege.  But  the 
day  of  Cannae  had  a  powerful  effect  in  southern  Italy.  The 
South  had  been  conquered  and  brought  into  the  confederacy 
later  than  the  rest  of  Italy,  and  the  Samnites  in  particular  were 
willing  to  shake  off  the  supremacy  of  Rome.  Roman  influence 
was  largely  maintained  by  keeping  the  local  governments  of  the 
several  communities  in  the  hands  of  the  wealthier  members. 
The  poorer  folk,  who  had  little  or  nothing  to  lose,  saw  their 
chance  of  power  by  gaining  the  help  of  Hannibal.  The  move- 
ment spread,  and  soon  the  bulk  of  southern  and  south-eastern 
Italy  joined  the  invader.  But  even  in  this  dark  time  the  Latin 
Colonies  and  the  Greek  cities  on  the  coast  remained  true  to 
Rome,  a  most  significant  fact.  Hannibal  had  nothing  to  offer 
that  it  was  worth  their  while  to  accept.  If  he  went  away,  who 
would  protect  them  against  Rome  ?  If  he  were  come  to  stay, 
who  was  willing  to  be  a  subject  of  Carthage  ?  Surely  not  those 
whose  interests  were  bound  up  with  those  of  Rome,  and  who 
found  in  her  confederacy  a  freedom  far  greater  than  Carthage 
allowed  to  her  subjects  in  Africa.  And  those  Italians  who  did 
join  Hannibal  wanted  protection  and  freedom.  Now  he  had 
not  troops  enough  to  protect  them  without  their  own  hearty 
cooperation.  This  burden  it  was  their  tendency  to  shirk;  and, 
if  he  forced  them  to  bear  it,  what  became  of  their  freedom  ?  So 
the  first  stage  of  the  war  ended  with  great  losses  to  Rome.  But 
what  was  lost  to  Rome  was  by  no  means  clear  gain  to  Hannibal. 
And  the  Punic  government  seems  never  to  have  grasped  the 
truth  that,  if  their  champion's  victories  were  to  be  turned  to 
account,  they  must  at  once  reinforce  him. 

134.  Second  stage  215 — 209  b.c.  That  the  Roman  Senate 
had   at   least   learnt   something   from   defeat,  is   shewn   by   the 


1 26  Capua  [cH. 

new  strategy.  The  attempt  to  crush  the  invader  was  given  up, 
the  new  method  was  to  wear  him  out.  Smaller  armies  were 
employed,  and  more  of  them.  While  one  force  faced  Hannibal, 
but  avoided  a  battle,  other  forces  could  do  useful  work  in  other 
quarters.  The  great  enemy  could  not  be  everywhere.  For 
Hannibal  the  most  pressing  need  was  to  get  possession  of  a 
good  harbour  within  easy  sail  of  Carthage,  that  he  might  be 
in  constant  communication  with  the  Punic  government.  For 
the  present  Tarentum  was  not  to  be  had,  so  he  naturally  looked 
toward  the  Campanian  coast,  the  most  convenient  seaport  on 
which  was  Neapolis.  Into  Campania  he  therefore  marched,  but 
he  could  make  no  impression  on  the  walled  Greek  city.  At  this 
juncture  he  was  helped  by  one  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  Roman 
system.  There  was  much  discontent  in  the  great  city  of  Capua, 
which  commanded  the  ,rich  Campanian  plain.  The  people  were 
not  Allies,  but  Roman  citizens  of  the  inferior  class  (the  so-called 
'  half-citizens '),  bearing  the  burdens  of  Roman  citizenship,  but 
only  sharing  a  part  of  its  privileges.  The  Roman  government 
saw  to  it  that  the  local  government  of  Capua  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  '  knights '  or  men  of  property.  The  poorer  classes  got 
no  benefit  from  the  connexion  with  Rome,  and  a  democratic 
revolution  placed  the  city  in  the  power  of  Hannibal.  The 
leaders  are  said  to  have  hoped  that  with  his  aid  they  might  raise 
Capua  to  the  headship  of  Italy  in  the  stead  of  Rome.  But  they 
were  not  inclined  to  be  his  obedient  subjects.  He  was  driven 
to  use  arbitrary  measures,  and  it  soon  appeared  that  he  and  his 
new  allies  had  very  different  ends  in  view.  Meanwhile  the  Punic 
government,  roused  by  the  report  of  his  victories,  voted  to  send 
him  fresh  troops,  but  for  the  present  no  reinforcements  reached 
him,  while  his  responsibilities  were  growing  and  his  army  wasting. 
135.  The  period  of  great  defeats  was  over.  Religious 
matters  had  been  carefully  attended  to,  partly  in  consequence 
of  a  message  brought  back  from  the  Greek  oracle  at  Delphi, 
and  Roman  confidence  was  reviving.  By  the  side  of  Fabius 
M.  Claudius  Marcellus  plays  a  great  part  in  the  war.  He  was 
a  prompt  and  enterprising  soldier,  ready  to  seize  opportunities 
of  acting  on  the  offensive.  But  the  traditions  of  the  war  in 
Campania  during  the  winter  of  216 — 5  are  very  obscure  and 
defective.  Hannibal  gained  ground,  but  the  important  town 
of  Nola  was  saved   for  Rome   by   Marcellus.     The  fortress   of 


xiii]  Spain.     New  senators  127 

Casilinum  on  the  Volturnus  was  stoutly  defended  by  a  garrison 
of  Roman  Allies,  and  only  surrendered  after  a  blockade.  Some 
of  them  were  Latins.  It  is  said  that  these  declined  the  offer 
of  Roman  citizenship  made  to  them  as  part  of  the  reward  of 
loyalty;  so  well  content  were  they  with  their  present  condition. 
If  this  be  true,  Hannibal  had  indeed  misunderstood  the  nature 
of  the  Italian  confederacy.  That  he  won  over  a  few  of  the 
Greek  or  half-Greek  towns  in  the  far  South,  such  as  Croton  and 
Locri,  gave  him  one  or  two  second-rate  harbours.  And  some 
reinforcement  seems  to  have  reached  him  from  Carthage,  but 
not  enough  for  the  work  in  hand.  The  main  fabric  of  the 
confederacy  was  as  yet  hardly  shaken.  It  is  at  this  time  that 
our  confused  tradition  brings  in  the  story  of  the  demoralization 
of  Hannibal's  army.  It  is  said  that  he  put  the  bulk  of  his  force 
into  winter-quarters  at  Capua,  and  that  they  were  never  again 
equal  to  their  old  reputation  in  the  field,  enervated  by  debauchery 
and  ease.     This  is  almost  certainly  an  exaggerated  moral  tale. 

136.  Outside  Italy  the  war  dragged  on.  Rome  was  so  far 
exhausted  that  she  could  not  act  effectively  in  Sicily  or  Sardinia. 
In  Spain  Hasdrubal  under  orders  from  Carthage  tried  to  lead 
an  army  to  support  his  brother  in  Italy.  But  the  power  of 
Carthage  was  not  what  it  had  been  in  Spain.  Hasdrubal  was 
met  and  utterly  defeated  by  the  Scipios.  Roman  fears  were 
relieved,  and  Carthage  had  to  make  great  efforts  to  keep  her 
footing  in  the  country.  A  number  of  Spanish  tribes  now  went 
over  to  Rome.  On  the  other  hand  a  Roman  force  was  waylaid 
and  destroyed  in  Cisalpine  Gaul.  Meanwhile  important  things 
were  happening  at  Rome  during  the  winter  months. 

137.  The  treasury  was  empty,  and  exceptional  measures 
of  finance  were  needed.  But  the  chief  business  was  the  filling 
up  of  vacancies  in  the  Senate.  Many  members  had  fallen  in 
the  war,  and  the  numbers  were  far  below  the  normal  300.  A 
remarkable  proposal  was  made  in  the  House.  It  was  that  from 
each  Latin  town  two  members  of  the  local  senate  should  be 
made  Roman  citizens  and  put  into  the  Senate  of  Rome.  The 
proposal  came  from  a  man  connected  in  politics  with  the  reformer 
Flaminius.  The  House,  led  by  Fabius,  rejected  it  as  likely  to 
unsettle  the  ordinary  Allies  rather  than  gratify  the  communities 
now  enjoying  the  '  Latin  right,'  probably ^  about  36  at  this  time. 

1  See  §§  154,  171. 


128  Great  efforts  of  Rome  [ch. 

The  choice  of  new  senators  was  not  left  to  censors.  The  senior 
ex-censor  was  nominated  dictator  for  this  purpose  only.  He 
added  to  the  roll  ex-magistrates  as  usual,  but  the  majority  had 
to  be  freely  chosen  on  the  ground  of  military  merit.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  there  was  already  a  dictator  commanding  an  army  in 
the  field.  The  appointment  of  a  second  dictator  for  a  special 
purpose  is  a  clear  sign  that  this  great  office  was  decaying.  At  the 
election  of  consuls  for  215  L.  Postumius  and  Tiberius  Sempronius 
Gracchus  were  chosen.  The  former  was  absent  in  the  North. 
News  soon  came  of  his  death  in  battle,  and  a  successor  had 
to  be  elected.  Marcellus  was  then  chosen,  but  a  thunderclap 
followed.  The  augurs  declared  this  an  evil  omen,  and  he  resigned 
office.  Religious  precautions  were  receiving  special  attention. 
The  vacancy  was  filled  by  the  election  of  old  Fabius. 

138.  The  strain  on  the  resources  of  Rome  was  now  extreme. 
The  war-tax  {tributwii)  had  to  be  doubled,  and  of  its  repayment 
(for  it  was  a  loan)  there  was  at  present  no  prospect.  Armies  of 
various  strengths  were  maintained  at  all  points  of  the  theatre  of 
war.  Three  were  in  Campania,  one  in  Apulia.  Another  was  at 
Tarentum,  with  a  fleet  cruising  to  watch  the  Adriatic  coast  up  to 
Brundisium.  A  force  in  Picenum  was  on  guard  in  the  North. 
Troubles  in  Sardinia  kept  another  army  and  fleet  employed. 
There  seems  to  have  been  a  second  northern  army  at  Ariminum 
to  hold  back  the  Gauls  in  the  Cisalpine.  To  Sicily  a  force  of 
inferior  quality,  in  which  were  the  survivors  of  Cannae,  was  sent; 
there  was  also  a  fleet,  with  its  base  at  Lilybaeum.  And  beside 
all  these  there  were  the  army  and  fleet  under  the  Scipios  in 
Spain.  Nor  was  Rome  itself  wholly  denuded  of  troops,  for  the 
practice  was  to  keep  two  new  legions  at  home  in  training  for  later 
service  in  the  field.  We  have  no  trustworthy  statistics  as  to  the 
exact  numbers  under  arms,  how  they  were  fed  and  communi- 
cations kept  up.  But  we  can  form  some  faint  notion  of  the 
greatness  of  the  task.  And  some  at  least  of  the  garrisons  of 
fortresses  consisted  of  the  men  on  the  spot,  not  mobilized  for 
campaigns. 

139.  The  meaning  of  these  great  scattered  efforts  is  plain. 
The  blunder  of  Cannae  was  not  to  be  repeated.  Hannibal  was 
to  be  watched,  and  foiled  by  declining  battle:  meanwhile  chances 
would  occur  of  gaining  successes  at  other  points.  This  was  a 
sound   policy,     The   interest  of  Carthage   was  to   defeat  it   by 


xiii]  Philip  and  Hannibal  129 

concentrating  her  forces  in  Italy,  where  they  could  and  would 
be  turned  to  the  best  account.  Roman  power  once  destroyed 
in  Italy,  it  would  fall  of  itself  outside  Italy.  But  the  Punic 
government  made  a  fatal  blunder.  News  came  of  the  disaster 
in  Spain,  and  the  force  made  ready  to  support  Hannibal  was 
diverted  to  support  Hasdrubal  in  the  West.  Another  force  was 
raised  to  recover  Sardinia.  Thus  the  war  in  Italy  was  left  to 
languish,  and  time  was  telling  in  favour  of  Rome. 

140.  The  futile  warfare  in  Greece  had  ended  in  217,  and  the 
king  of  Macedon  was  free  to  resent  the  interference  of  Rome 
in  Illyria.  The  news  of  Hannibal's  great  victories  led  him  to 
send  envoys  and  propose  an  alliance  against  Rome.  Those  sent 
in  216  were  captured  on  their  way  home  by  Roman  cruisers, 
but  in  215  the  alliance  was  actually  concluded.  Whatever  were 
the  terms  of  the  compact,  it  is  clear  that  the  first  necessity  was 
for  Philip  to  support  Hannibal  at  once  in  Italy,  that  Hannibal 
might  be  free  to  support  Philip  in  Greece.  But  Philip  was  too 
much  occupied  with  his  own  designs  to  act  thus  boldly.  The 
Romans  had  time  to  strengthen  their  fleet  and  army  at  Tarentum, 
and  with  little  additional  effort  to  provide  for  keeping  the  king 
of  Macedon  employed  at  home.  The  failure  of  the  Punic 
expedition  against  Sardinia,  and  a  victory  over  the  Sards,  removed 
an  anxiety  and  left  the  island  in  the  power  of  Rome. 

141.  In  the  season  of  215  no  great  events  occurred  in 
Italy.  But  a  number  of  minor  operations  proved  that  the 
Roman  forces  were  alive,  and  various  successes  were  gained. 
The  duty  of  protecting  his  allies  was  too  much  even  for  Hannibal, 
with  his  insufficient  forces.  When  he  drove  back  one  Roman 
army,  another  took  advantage  of  his  absence.  To  guard  Capua 
he  had  a  camp  on  mount  Tifata.  But  even  the  Campanian  plain 
was  ravaged  by  the  Romans.  And  he  could  not  take  Nola,  still 
less  Neapolis.  The  long  awaited  reinforcements  from  Carthage 
are  said  to  have  joined  him,  and  shared  his  repulse  from  Nola. 
We  hear  also  of  desertions  from  his  army.  But  all  these  stories 
are  doubtful.  At  last  he  withdrew  to  winter-quarters  in  Apulia. 
The  Romans  were  now  free  to  post  their  armies  as  suited  their 
needs,  and  to  prepare  for  the  coming  year.  Their  chief  difficulty 
was  to  get  money  for  the  costs  of  the  war  in  Spain.  We  read 
that  the  publicani^  the  capitalists  who  undertook  state  contracts 
{publico),  consented  to  furnish  supplies  and  wait  for  their  payment 

H.  9 


130  Death  of  Hiero.     Roman  policy  [ch. 

till  better  times.  But  they  made  a  hard  bargain,  insisting  on 
being  indemnified  by  the  state  for  all  losses  at  sea.  We  shall 
see  that  this  led  to  great  abuses.  However,  the  government 
made  shift  to  clothe  and  feed  the  armies. 

142.  At  this  point  in  the  war  the  Roman  cause  received  a 
serious  blow.  In  2 1 5  old  Hiero  of  Syracuse  died.  He  had  been 
a  most  loyal  and  helpful  ally,  and  would  in  any  case  have  been 
sadly  missed.  Under  him  Syracuse  had  flourished  wonderfully. 
As  a  fortress  it  was  stronger  than  ever ;  for  to  the  walls  of  Diony- 
sius  were  now  added  the  ingenious  machines  of  the  mathematician 
Archimedes.  But  the  old  Greek  population  was  now  mixed  with 
all  manner  of  aliens,  mercenary  soldiers,  runaway  slaves,  and  de- 
serters from  Roman  fleets.  Hieronymus,  Hiero's  grandson,  who 
succeeded  him,  was  a  lad  of  15,  wholly  unfit  to  rule  this  mongrel 
mass.  He  fell  under  the  influence  of  agents  sent  by  Hannibal. 
After  a  short  spell  of  misrule,  he  was  assassinated  in  214.  Re- 
volution and  utter  confusion  followed.  War  was  declared  against 
Rome.  The  two  Punic  agents  were  the  real  chiefs  of  the  city,  and 
instead  of  a  valuable  ally  Rome,  already  exhausted  by  the  war,  had 
another  dangerous  enemy. 

143.  And  yet  the  position  of  Rome  was  not  really  worse.  It 
was  her  own  blundering  that  had  brought  her  disaster.  It  was 
wiser  management  that  enabled  her  to  hold  her  ground  now,  and 
to  wear  out  her  enemies  by  her  superior  strength.  The  consuls 
for  214  had  both  held  office  before,  and  were  elected  on  the 
ground  of  former  good  service.  The  same  principle  guided  other 
elections  and  appointments.  Good  officers  were  kept  on  in  various 
commands  as  proconsuls  or  propraetors,  and  this  not  only  in  Spain. 
Thus  experience  was  turned  to  account.  Till  the  end  of  the  war 
it  became  the  normal  practice  to  continue  generals  of  tried  capacity 
in  their  commands,  either  by  reelecting  them  as  magistrates  or  by 
continuing  them  as  pro-magistrates.  The  forces  employed  were 
as  large  as  before,  or  larger.  In  order  to  man  the  great  fleets,  the 
wealthier  citizens  were  called  upon  to  provide  slaves  as  oarsmen, 
and  they  did.  The  tradition  of  this  time  is  a  scene  of  patriotic 
economy  and  sacrifice,  perhaps  not  much  exaggerated.  It  includes 
a  sumptuary  law  {/ex  Oppia)^  passed  to  restrict  the  dress  and 
ornaments  of  Roman  ladies  in  this  season  of  sore  need.  In  short, 
Rome  was  not  yet  beaten,  and  did  not  mean  to  be.  We  are  told 
that  in  the  army  the  cavalry  and  centurions  agreed  to  wait  for  their 


xiii]  Capua.     Tarentum.     Sicily  131 

pay;  also  that  capitalists  again  offered  to  let  their  claims  stand  over. 
The  last,  if  the  story  be  true,  were  probably  keen  unsentimental 
judges  of  the  final  result  of  the  war. 

144.  Hannibal  was  bound  to  protect  Capua,  where  the  de- 
termined attitude  of  Rome  caused  alarm.  But  his  campaign  of 
214  in  Campania  was  barren.  An  attempt  to  gain  the  rising 
seaport  of  Puteoli  was  a  failure,  Fabius  having  fortified  the  place. 
Cumae  Neapolis  and  Nola  were  strongly  held  for  Rome,  and 
CasiHnum  threatened.  And  while  Hannibal  was  kept  occupied 
in  Campania  some  of  his  other  forces  were  defeated  on  their  way 
to  join  him.  Samnium  Lucania  and  Apulia  began  to  suffer  from 
the  vengeance  of  Rome,  while  he  was  tied  by  Capua.  At  last  he 
moved  away,  tempted  by  an  offer  of  some  Tarentine  democrats  to 
betray  their  city.  Tarentum  was  the  very  place  to  suit  his  require- 
ments, particularly  with  a  view  to  his  receiving  aid  from  Philip. 
But  the  Roman  garrison  had  been  reinforced  and  the  plan  failed. 
So  he  was  compelled  to  retire  and  find  winter-quarters  in  Apulia 
once  more. 

145.  Late  in  214  the  consul  Marcellus  reached  Sicily  and 
began  his  difficult   task  with   the   help  of  the   praetor   Appius 
Claudius.     Syracuse  could  not  be  taken  by  storm,  and  it  could 
easily  be  victualled  by  sea.     The  siege  lasted  the  greater  part 
of  two  years,  in  spite  of  extraordinary  efforts  of  the  besiegers.' 
For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  city  the  besieging  forces 
did  not  melt  away  by  pestilence  through  encamping  in  the  neigh- 
bouring swamp.     We  cannot  here  discuss  this  interesting  siege  in 
detail.    It  was  the  lack  of  discipline  and  loyalty  within  that  in  the 
end  caused  the  fall  of  Syracuse.    Attacks  on  the  walls  by  land  and 
sea  were  utterly  foiled  by  the  machines  of  Archimedes.    The  delay 
enabled  a  Punic  force  to  stir  up  a  rebellion  in  other  parts  of  Sicily. 
But  the  most  important  posts,  above  all  Lilybaeum,  were  held  by 
Rome,  and  no  real  conquest  was  possible.    And  Carthage  as  usual 
conducted  naval  operations  weakly.    Supplies  of  food  were  thrown 
into  the  city,  for  an  effective  blockade  could  not  be  maintained 
day  and  night  in  all  weathers.     But  there  was  no  fighting  at  sea. 
At  last  Marcellus  got  news  of  a  great  religious  feast  on  a  fixed  day, 
when  the  sentinels  would  probably  be  careless ;  and  a  party  of  his 
men  scaled  the  northern  wall  by  night.    Thus  he  won  the  western 
part  of  the  city,  but  Achradina  and  the  Island  (Ortygia)  held  out, 
for  the  garrison  were  a  desperate  band,  deserters  many  of  them. 

9 — 2 


132 


Siege  of  Syracuse 


[CH. 


An  army  attempted  to  relieve  the  place,  but  were  compelled  to 
encamp  on  the  swampy  ground,  and  wasted  away.  The  last 
convoy  of  food-ships  was  driven  off  by  the  Roman  fleet.  The 
Punic  admiral  had  more  vessels  of  war  than  Marcellus,  but  did 
not  dare  to  risk  a  battle.  The  Island  was  soon  betrayed  by  a 
Spanish  captain  of  mercenaries,  and  the  surrender  of  Achradina 
followed.     The  sack  of  the  city  so  long  Rome's  faithful  ally,  the 


/^    jThapsus 

Eixryalus^^ 

^/                      Uycha 
Epipolae      \ 

o 

-i 
0) 
Q. 

3 

to 

\ 

\NeapoIis\ 
\^  Swamp- 1 1  n  ~  / 

Olympieirra    ^^ 

i 

r 

lOrtygia 

Syracuse  in  214  B.C. 


carrying  away  of  the  glorious  works  of  art  with  which  it  abounded, 
the  death  of  Archimedes,  killed  it  is  said  by  mistake,  all  made  the 
siege  and  fall  of  Syracuse  an  impressive  and  shameful  story.  But 
the  feeble  policy  of  Carthage,  and  the  danger  of  trusting  to  her  for 
protection,  were  no  doubt  far  more  impressive  to  contemporaries 
than  the  greater  or  less  brutality  of  Rome. 

146.  In  these  years  (214 — 212)  the  fortune  of  war  varied. 
To  the  East,  a  vigorous  officer  took  the  offensive  against  Philip 
in  the  Adriatic,  and  upset  the  king's  plans.     Roman  allies  on  the 


xiii]  Spain.      Numidla.     The  capitalists         133 

Illyrian  coast  were  protected  and  no  invasion  of  Italy  was  now 
possible.  In  the  West,  Syphax  king  of  western  Numidia  was 
induced  to  join  Rome,  but  was  defeated  by  the  king  of  eastern 
Numidia,  an  ally  of  Carthage.  Rome  thus  gained  no  foothold 
in  Africa.  In  Spain  things  were  worse.  The  Carthaginian  army 
there  had  been  reinforced ;  while  the  Scipios  seem  to  have  trusted 
too  much  to  the  support  of  the  native  tribes,  who  were  not  heartily 
attached  to  either  Rome  or  Carthage.  In  212  the  two  brothers, 
each  at  the  head  of  an  army,  were  in  turn  defeated  and  destroyed. 
A  brave  officer  collected  the  remnants  of  the  beaten  armies,  and 
kept  some  hold  on  northern  Spain.  But  for  the  time  the  power 
of  Rome  in  the  peninsula  was  broken.  In  this  campaign  a  body 
of  Numidian  cavalry  did  good  service  for  Carthage,  as  their  coun- 
trymen had  done  in  Italy  under  Hannibal.  Their  leader  was 
Masinissa,  son  of  Gala,  king  of  eastern  Numidia.  He  was  one 
of  the  most  notable  men  of  the  age. 

147.  The  situation  in  Italy  remained  unfavourable  to  Han- 
nibal. Roman  Allies  no  longer  came  over  to  him ;  a  few  returned 
to  the  Roman  alliance.  Roman  armies  kept  the  field  and  took 
advantage  of  opportunities.  They  interfered  with  the  supply  of 
Gaulish  recruits  by  blocking  the  way  from  the  North.  The  result 
of  minor  engagements  was  various,  but  the  losses  on  the  whole  told 
against  the  side  weaker  in  numbers.  The  change  in  the  character 
of  the  war  is  seen  in  this,  that  the  chief  object  of  each  side  was 
now  to  gain  a  city.  The  Romans  wanted  to  retake  Capua,  Han- 
nibal to  become  master  of  Tarentum.  But  at  this  stage  of  the 
war  Rome  appears  to  have  suffered  from  internal  troubles,  which 
shew  that  all  was  not  well  within.  We  hear  of  a  great  outbreak 
of  '  superstition,'  that  is  following  after  strange  gods  and  foreign 
rites.  With  some  difficulty  this  was  checked.  Public  festivals 
were  celebrated  with  peculiar  care.  The  duties  of  the  two  praetors 
concerned  with  jurisdiction  {urbanus  aiudperegrinus)  were  entrusted 
to  one  individual,  thus  setting  more  praetors  free  for  military 
duties.  Special  measures  were  found  necessary  for  raising  suffi- 
cient recruits  to  keep  up  the  strength  of  the  armies.  These 
however  were  old  troubles.  The  collision  with  the  capitalists 
was  far  more  serious.  Great  frauds  had  been  committed  by 
contractors  engaged  in  supplying  the  forces.  Old  hulks  laden 
with  rubbish  had  been  scuttled,  and  the  state  held  liable  for  the 
loss  of  sound  ships  and  good  cargoes.     The  trial  of  a  notorious 


134 


Roman  severity 


[CH. 


offender  before  the  popular  Assembly  was  broken  up  by  a  riotous 
attack  from  the  publicani  and  their  friends.  The  end  of  the  affair 
was  that  the  chief  offender  and  his  associates  had  to  go  into  exile 
to  escape  the  penalties  of  high  treason  {perduellio).  But  the  power 
and  audacity  of  the  Roman  capitalists  had  been  revealed.  Their 
mischievous  influence  was  destined  to  grow  and  to  become  the 
worst  instrument  in  the  later  corruption  of  Roman  policy. 

148.  It  was  of  course  the  power  of  this  greedy  and  selfish  class 
that  had  prevented  the  Senate  from  bringing  offenders  to  justice 
before.     Soldiers  were  dealt  with  severely  enough.     The  survivors 


Y 

PORTVS    TARENTINVS 

V 

^\ 

03 

1 

V 

^« /^                           N 

^ 

^''          Site  of  the             \ 

- 

*     s.          city  of  Tarentum 

"T             \ 

Part  of  Sinus 

\ 

Tarentinus 

\ 

The  outer  roadstead  is  sheltered  by  two  islands.  The  old  entrance  to  the 
inner  harbour  was  spanned  by  a  bridge,  probably  in  part  a  drawbridge, 
in  ancient  times.  The  citadel  is  marked  in  black.  AB  is  the  line  of  the 
artificial  cut,  dating  from  the  15th  century  of  our  era,  enlarged  in  the 
18th,  and  recently  adapted  to  admit  the  largest  vessels  of  war.  See  Nissen, 
Italische  Landeskunde^  II  pp.  865 — 70. 

of  Cannae,  cooped  up  in  Sicilian  garrisons,  begged  to  be  allowed 
once  more  a  place  in  the  line  of  battle.  Whatever  concession  was 
made,  it  is  said  that  at  least  they  were  still  disqualified  for  any 
rewards  of  valour.  Roman  tradition  always  represented  the  men 
of  this  great  generation  as  hard.     Soon  after,  the  hostages  held  to 


XIIl] 


Tarentum 


135 


insure  the  fidelity  of  certain  Greek  cities  tried  to  escape,  but  were 
caught  and  put  to  death.  No  mercy  was  shewn,  though  there  was 
good  reason  for  conciliating  the  Allies.  Disaffection  was  suspected 
in  Etruria,  and  a  Roman  force  was  actually  watching  that  district. 
But  nothing  that  looked  like  giving  way  to  pressure  seemed  wise 
to  the  Roman  government.  It  happened  that  one  of  the  Greek 
cities  affected  by  the  recent  severity  was  Tarentum.  The  news 
strengthened  the  anti-Roman  democrats.  A  plot  for  betraying 
the  city  to  Hannibal  now  succeeded.     But  the  citadel  was  still 


Fal< 


)Cale 


Nfe^ 


inuessa         Vi^,  Appia 


Stellatis  CaiaUa 


I'^^ 


*i> 


b 


^;f^^''^^"^\ 

/. 
^ 

Ager 
Cam  panus 

Atella  c 

Suesaula            ^~~"^'r~~22^«<»i 
Accrra.  j                   Al)e]la        '\ 

Litemum 

,-'     '•'°^..- •—■'         ONOLA 

Cutnae         ,•'    NBA 
C~\Riteoli, /"■ 

-\...---w— " i 

\J       ^"^^                       >.   Herculaneujn                                                  "•, 

^oPompen             oNVCERIA; 

v^Stabiaa      _••' 

Salernum 

Map  of  Campania  in  the  second  Punic  war.  Only  the  chief  roads,  mountains, 
etc.  are  shewn.  The  territories  of  three  Roman  Allies  are  indicated  (after 
Beloch)  by  dotted  lines:  (i)  Neapolis,  (2)  Nola  with  Abella,  (3)  the 
confederation  of  the  four  towns  headed  by  Nuceria. 

held  by  a  Roman  garrison,  and  it  commanded  the  mouth  of  the 
great  inner  harbour,  which  it  was  Hannibal's  chief  object  to  secure. 
Nor  could  he  ever  win  the  citadel,  which  was  revictualled  by  sea, 
for  all  his  efforts.  Without  it,  he  was  only  in  possession  of  one 
more  city  which  he  was  bound  to  defend.  And  the  people  of 
Tarentum  soon  tired  of  obedience  and  discipline.  As  their  fathers 
had  treated  Pyrrhus,  so  they  treated  Hannibal. 

149.     We  must  bear  in  mind  that  in  this  year  occurred  two 


136  Capua  [cH. 

other  great  events,  the  disaster  in  Spain  and  the  taking  of  Syra- 
cuse. The  exact  chronology  is  not  known,  but  this  was  clearly 
one  of  the  most  momentous  years  of  the  war.  In  Italy  several 
minor  battles  were  fought,  some  victories  for  Rome,  some  defeats. 
But  the  revival  of  Rome  was  marked  by  the  persistent  effort  to 
retake  Capua.  Casilinum  had  been  recovered,  and  great  prepara- 
tions made.  The  armies  closed  in  on  Capua,  and  began  the  siege. 
Hannibal  appeared  and  relieved  the  place.  But  he  withdrew  to 
carry  on  operations  against  Brundisium  and  the  Tarentine  citadel. 
As  yet  he  had  received  no  help  from  Philip  of  Macedon,  and  the 
need  of  a  good  harbour  was  urgent.  But  he  failed  at  both  points, 
and  meanwhile  the  Roman  forces  closed  in  again  on  Capua. 
Three  great  camps  were  formed,  and  double  lines  of  palisaded 
earthworks  constructed  to  unite  the  camps  and  complete  the 
blockade.  Hannibal  promised  to  come  again  in  time  to  scatter 
the  Roman  armies.  But  the  months  went  by;  the  Roman 
generals,  continued  in  command,  completed  the  circuit  of  the 
siege-works,  and  kept  a  tight  grip  upon  the  town  through  the 
winter.  Could  Hannibal  save  his  allies  ?  That  was  the  question, 
in  which  Italians  generally  were  deeply  interested. 

150.  To  finish  the  story  of  Capua.  In  211  a  last  appeal 
came  from  the  starving  city,  and  Hannibal  was  forced  to  give  up 
operations  at  Tarentum  and  march  to  its  relief.  But  it  was  too 
late,  and  he  could  not  force  the  Roman  lines.  The  only  chance 
left  was  to  draw  off  the  siege  armies  by  marching  on  Rome.  But 
his  design  leaked  out  through  deserters,  and  it  was  found  possible 
to  provide  for  the  defence  of  Rome  without  slackening  the  blockade 
of  Capua.  The  walls  of  Rome  had  lately  been  repaired,  and  with 
the  help  of  a  corps  from  Capua  there  were  plenty  of  troops  to  man 
them.  He  could  not  besiege  the  city,  and  withdrew  again  to  the 
South.  A  Roman  army  pursued  him,  only  to  be  soundly  beaten. 
For  on  the  battlefield  he  was  still  supreme.  But  he  did  not  turn 
aside  into  Campania.  He  hurried  southwards  in  hope  to  surprise 
Rhegium,  but  was  once  more  too  late.  Abandoned  Capua  soon 
fell,  and  the  Romans  made  it  an  object-lesson  to  Italy.  Those  of 
the  local  senate  who  did  not  take  their  own  lives  were  scourged 
and  beheaded.  The  mass  of  the  people  were  sold  for  slaves.  The 
city  of  Capua  was  left  for  the  convenience  of  its  buildings,  but  it 
was  to  be  a  mere  group  of  buildings,  not  a  city.  No  civic  institu- 
tions were  allowed  to  exist :  justice  was  to  be  administered  by  an 


xiii]  Greece.     Spain.     Scipio  137 

officer  from  Rome.  The  whole  territory  of  Capua  and  its  depen- 
dent towns  (the  ager  Campanus)  became  state  property  of  Rome. 
It  was  farmed  out  to  state  tenants,  the  rents  from  whom  were 
afterwards  a  mainstay  of  the  Roman  treasury.  Such  in  brief 
were  the  consequences  of  putting  trust  in  the  great  Carthaginian. 
The  prestige  of  Hannibal  in  Italy  never  recovered  from  this  blow. 

151.  No  help  came  to  Hannibal  from  Philip.  The  naval 
activity  of  Rome  in  the  Adriatic^  and  her  skilful  diplomacy,  were 
enough  to  prevent  it.  In  2 1 1  the  warHke  Aetolians  were  induced 
to  join  Romcj-^nd  some  other  Greek  states  soon  after.  In  parti- 
cular, Attalus  king  of  Pergamum  was  a  hearty  ally,  fearing  that 
Philip  had  designs  on  his  kingdom.  Philip  was  kept  more  than 
busy,  for  when  he  marched  into  Greece  Macedonia  was  raided  by 
Thracian  and  Illyrian  chiefs  stirred  up  by  Rome.  From  him  then 
there  was  no  prospect  of  aid.  In  Sicily  too  the  rebellion  fostered 
by  Carthage  was  gradually  put  down  after  the  fall  of  Syracuse. 
The  year  210  saw  peace  restored  in  the  island,  and  Rome  could 
withdraw  a  part  of  her  forces  for  other  service.  In  Spain  the 
Romans  kept  a  footing,  but  at  present  not  much  more.  Till 
the  fall  of  Capua  in  211  little  was  done  to  regain  the  ground 
lost  by  the  disaster  of  the  Scipios.  The  commander  now  sent 
out,  C.  Claudius  Nero,  is  said  to  have  done  no  great  things  in 
Campania.  Nor  did  he  do  much  in  Spain,  but  he  distinguished 
himself  greatly  later  on,  if  our  record  is  to  be  trusted.  The 
importance  of  the  war  in  the  West  was  well  understood,  for  no 
one  could  tell  what  might  happen  if  Hasdrubal  were  free  to 
bring  a  second  highly-trained  army  to  join  his  brother  in  Italy. 

152.  Publius  Scipio  who  fell  in  Spain  had  left  a  son  of  the 
same  name.  The  young  man  had  served  in  Italy  with  distinction. 
He  was  now  only  24  years  of  age,  but  we  find  that  he  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  in  Spain  as  proconsul.  To  account  for 
so  strange  a  fact,  a  number  of  fictitious  stories  were  handed  down 
by  later  writers.  These  stories  doubtless  come  from  the  family 
traditions  of  the  Scipios,  who  were  a  powerful  family  belonging  to 
the  great  Cornelian  clan.  The  new  proconsul  was  a  man  popular 
energetic  ambitious  and  proud,  but  he  would  hardly  have  been 
promoted  to  so  great  a  charge  had  he  not  been  a  Cornelius.  In 
210  he  reached  Spain  with  a  fleet  and  army.  As  usual,  the  Greeks 
of  Massalia  were  helpful  allies.  He  learnt  that  the  three  Punic 
armies  were  none  of  them  within  easy  reach  of  their  great  naval 


138  Navy.     The  recusant  colonies  [ch. 

and  military  base,  New  Carthage.  Early  in  209  he  made  a  sudden 
attack  on  this  place,  and  took  it.  The  stores  of  war-material, 
workshops,  artisans,  ships,  oarsmen,  money,  and  hostages  for  the 
fidelity  of  Spanish  tribes,  all  fell  into  his  hands.  All  were  turned 
to  good  account.  Here  was  a  case  in  which  the  one  side  really 
gained  as  much  as  the  other  lost.  The  Carthaginian  generals  had 
henceforth  to  wage  war  at  a  great  disadvantage.  Their  base  was 
now  as  in  former  times  the  city  of  Gades,  far  away  in  the  South- West. 

1 53'  Eight  years  of  war  had  strained  to  the  utmost  the 
resources  of  Rome.  To  keep  effective  fleets  at  sea  was  wisely 
recognized  as  necessary,  but  to  find  rowers  was  a  difficult  matter. 
We  hear  that  the  wealthier  classes  made  great  sacrifices  to  meet 
the  need,  but  the  financial  distress  was  extreme.  The  one  naval 
defeat  sufi'ered  by  the  Romans  in  this  war  was  in  an  attempt  to 
revictual  the  citadel  of  Tarentum.  The  victors  in  this  fight  were 
a  Tarentine  squadron.  Naval  apathy  or  mismanagement  seems 
to  have  marked  the  policy  of  Carthage  throughout.  We  read  of 
expeditions  of  Punic  fleets,  but  ever  misdirected  and  futile. 
Meanwhile  Hannibal  was  never  sufficiently  reinforced,  and  of  his 
original  army  a  large  part  must  by  this  have  perished.  Our 
accounts  of  the  fighting  in  Italy  in  210  are  obscure^  but  Hannibal 
at  least  gained  no  important  success.  His  Italian  allies  began  to 
make  their  peace  with  Rome,  and  he  could  only  operate  in  a 
restricted  area  of  the  South  and  South-East.  Rome  it  is  true  was 
in  great  straits.  Corn  was  scarce,  and  the  motive  of  an  embassy 
to  Egypt,  and  renewal  of  alliance  and  friendship  with  the  king 
(Ptolemy  IV),  was  probably  to  get  a  supply.  We  hear  of  religious 
observances,  expiation  of  prodigies,  and  so  forth.  But  the  chief 
cause  of  nervousness  was  the  fear  that  Hasdrubal  would  soon 
come  from  Spain.  The  last  reserves  of  the  treasury  were  taken 
to  equip  the  forces  for  a  supreme  effort  in  the  year  209. 

154.  At  this  point  our  very  dramatic  record  brings  in  a 
strange  story,  no  doubt  true  in  the  main,  but  imperfect  in  detail. 
There  were  at  this  time  thirty  Latin  colonies.  All  had  hitherto 
borne  their  share  in  the  burdens  of  the  war.  Twelve  of  them 
now  refused  to  furnish  their  yearly  contingents,  professing  that 
they  had  neither  the  men  nor  money  to  pay  them.  The  other 
eighteen  stood  by  Rome  as  before.  Somehow  (it  is  not  clear  how) 
the  Senate  managed  to  keep  the  armies  in  strength  at  the  front. 
Hannibal  was  kept  occupied,  and  bit  by  bit  the  revolted  Allies  in 


xiii]  Nero  and  Livius  139 

Samnium  and  Lucania  were  being  brought  back  into  obedience 
to  Rome.  The  great  event  of  the  year  was  the  recapture  of 
Tarentum.  Old  Fabius,  aided  by  treachery  within,  took  the  city. 
The  usual  scenes  of  slaughter,  slave-market,  and  plundering  were 
enacted  here.  No  more  Roman  Allies  would  now  risk  Roman 
vengeance.  The  only  remaining  hope  of  effecting  anything 
against  Rome  in  Italy  lay  in  the  coming  of  Hasdrubal  from  Spain. 

155.  Third  stage,  208 — 201  B.C.  The  last  years  of  the  war 
comprise  two  matters  of  great  interest,  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus 
and  the  final  defeat  of  Carthage  in  Africa.  But  there  is  no  doubt 
that  our  record  consists  of  stories  highly  coloured  by  family 
partiality.  The  general  outline  is  probably  true  :  the  exploits  of 
Nero  and  Scipio  are  mixed  with  legendary  detail. 

156.  It  is  an  indication  of  the  discontent  still  smouldering 
in  Italy  that  an  army  of  observation  had  to  be  kept  in  Etruria  to 
prevent  a  local  rising.  Even  now  no  Roman  commander  could 
cope  with  Hannibal  in  battle.  With  reduced  forces^  abandoned 
by  allies,  he  was  able  to  move  freely  from  Bruttium  to  Apulia  and 
back  again  as  suited  him.  In  208  he  faced  the  armies  of  the  two 
consuls,  of  whom  Marcellus  was  one.  Both  these  Roman  generals 
fell  into  a  trap.  Marcellus  died  on  the  field,  and  his  colleague 
soon  after.  But  here  Hannibal's  success  ended.  An  attempt  to 
use  the  signet  ring  of  Marcellus,  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  the 
surrender  of  a  town  in  obedience  to  a  forged  order,  only  ended 
in  the  loss  of  a  detachment  of  his  best  fighting  men,  entrapped 
and  killed  by  the  forewarned  garrison.  He  could  effect  nothing  of 
importance,  while  the  Romans  had  leisure  to  choose  with  care 
two  consuls  for  the  coming  year  (207).  Their  fleets  were  strong 
and  active.  The  war  in  Greece  was  serving  its  purpose  in  keeping 
Philip  busy,  but  the  fear  of  Hasdrubal  remained.  The  story  says 
that  the  choice  of  consuls  was  difficult,  but  C.  Claudius  Nero  and 
M.  Livius,  long  personal  enemies,  were  induced  to  waive  their 
hatred  and  serve  the  state  together. 

157.  Scipio  had  continued  his  successful  career  in  Spain. 
That  he  won  some  victories  and  gained  ground  for  Rome,  is 
probably  true.  But  he  seems  to  have  been  also  busied  in  forming 
connexions  in  Africa,  particularly  with  Masinissa  the  Numidian. 
At  all  events  he  failed  in  what  was  perhaps  his  first  duty.  Has- 
drubal gave  him  the  slip,  and  entered  Gaul,  where  he  wintered 
among  friendly  tribes  and  raised  more  troops  for  his  expedition. 


140  Metaurus  [ch. 

The  news  of  his  coming  caused  great  alarm  in  Rome.  Every 
nerve  was  strained  to  strengthen  the  two  main  armies.  The  lot 
assigned  to  Nero  the  charge  of  facing  Hannibal  in  the  South,  to 
Livius  the  duty  of  meeting  the  new  invader  in  the  North.  In  the 
spring  of  207,  so  soon  as  the  Alpine  passes  were  open,  Hasdrubal 
entered  Cisalpine  Gaul  unopposed.  His  army  is  said  to  have 
been  over  50,000  strong,  but  only  a  part  consisted  of  trained 
troops  from  Spain.  He  sent  a  letter  to  his  brother,  to  arrange  for 
their  junction.  The  bearers  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans, 
and  were  brought  to  Nero.  Nero  left  most  of  his  army  to  watch 
Hannibal,  and  set  out  by  night  with  a  picked  corps  for  the  North. 
The  eager  cooperation  of  the  country  people  on  the  line  of  march, 
the  agony  of  suspense  at  Rome,  the  crowding  of  Nero's  men  into 
the  camp  of  Livius  in  order  to  conceal  the  reinforcement,  the 
discovery  of  the  presence  of  both  consuls  through  the  double 
bugle-call  next  morning,  are  details  that  survive  in  the  dramatic 
tradition  of  this  supreme  moment.  Hasdrubal  fell  back  to  gain 
time,  but  his  army,  disordered  by  a  night  march,  was  brought 
to  battle  by  the  pursuing  Romans  at  the  river  Metaurus,  and 
annihilated.  The  failure  of  the  attempt  to  conquer  Rome  in  Italy 
had  been  certain  ever  since  the  experiences  of  Syracuse  Capua 
and  Tarentum.  It  was  now  plain  even  to  men  whose  nerves  had 
been  shaken  by  Cannae.  But  it  took  some  six  years  more  to 
gather  the  fruits  of  the  victory.  In  Rome  business  revived  with 
the  removal  of  a  great  fear,  and  money  circulated  freely.  Nero 
marched  back  to  his  own  district,  and  broke  the  news  to  Hanni- 
bal by  flinging  him  his  brother's  head.  On  their  own  shewing  the 
Romans  were  close-fisted  and  hard,  at  times  downright  brutal. 
Such  they  had  been,  and  such  they  were  yet  to  be. 

158.  The  years  207  and  206  passed  without  any  great  events 
in  the  West.  It  is  probably  true  that  Scipio  gained  some  victories 
over  the  Punic  generals,  and  that  very  little  of  Spain  remained 
subject  to  Carthage.  But  Spain  was  not  conquered  for  Rome. 
The  Spanish  tribes  wanted  to  be  independent.  Rebellions  took 
place,  probably  encouraged  by  Carthage.  Long  service  and  pay 
in  arrear  caused  a  mutiny  among  the  Roman  troops.  And  Scipio 
was  now  chiefly  interested  in  preparing  the  way  for  war  in  Africa. 
He  became  close  friends  with  Masinissa,  and  negotiated  with 
Syphax  the  king  of  western  Numidia.  Meanwhile  the  Punic 
government,  at  last  understanding  that  the  war  in  Italy  was  the 


xni]  Peace  in  Greece  141 

main  thing,  changed  its  policy.  Mago,  Hannibal's  youngest  brother, 
was  ordered  to  leave  Gades,  to  proceed  by  sea  to  the  Ligurian 
coast,  to  raise  a  force  of  Gauls  and  Ligurians,  and  renew  the  Italian 
war.  By  the  end  of  206  Gades  had  surrendered,  Carthage  had 
lost  her  footing  in  Spain^  and  Scipio  had  returned  to  Rome. 

159.  In  the  years  208  to  206  the  eastern  war  went  on, 
wasting  the  resources  of  the  Greek  states,  whether  they  fought  for 
or  against  the  king  of  Macedon.  The  efforts  of  RhodesJ"  Egypt, 
and  other  powers  interested  in  peace,  to  put  an  end  to  the  war, 
were  unsuccessful.  Philip,  beset  on  all  sides,  made  a  good  fight 
of  it  on  land,  while  the  Romans,  no  longer  fearing  him  in  Italy, 
were  less  active  at  sea.  Attains  of  Pergamum  was  drawn  off  to 
defend  his  own  kingdom,  invaded  by  Philip's  ally  Prusias  of 
Bithynia.  The  year  205  brought  peace,  for  all  were  weary  of  the 
war.  But  the  Aetolians  led  the  way  by  coming  to  terms  with 
Philip  on  their  own  account,  without  reference  to  their  allies,  and 
this  conduct  gave  offence  at  Rome.  When  shortly  after  Rome 
and  Philip  concluded  a  treaty  of  peace  for  themselves  and  their 
allies  on  both  sides,  no  mention  was  made  of  the  Aetolian  League. 
In  general  we  may  note  that  Rome  was  now  connected  with  a 
number  of  states  in  Greece  and  the  Aegean.  Her  foreign  policy 
had  undergone  a  marked  extension.  To  any  intervention  of  the 
Romans  in  Greece  Philip  was  firmly  opposed,  as  being  an  en- 
croachment on  the  sphere  of  Macedonian  influence.  But 
Macedon  needed  rest,  and  Rome  had  not  yet  done  with  Carth- 
age, so  a  peace  suited  both  parties  for  the  time. 

160.  After  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus  it  was  natural  that 
attention  should  be  turned  to  measures  for  restoring  order  in  Italy 
and  strengthening  the  position  of  Rome.  We  hear  that  Etruria 
still  needed  watching,  and  that  efforts  were  made  to  revive  the 
prosperity  of  the  colonies  of  Placentia  and  Cremona.  They  had 
been  held  as  fortresses  during  the  war,  and  supplies  had  no 
doubt  reached  them  by  river  through  help  of  the  friendly  Veneti. 
Now  pressure  was  put  upon  colonists  who  had  left  their  homes 
to  return,  under  protection  of  a  Roman  force  stationed  in 
the  North.  It  is  also  said  that  an  attempt  was  made  to  induce 
the  refugee  farmers,  who  had  fled  from  the  country  to  Rome  when 
Hannibal  was  ravaging  Italy,  to  go  back  to  their  farms.  This,  it 
is  added,  was  not  easy.  It  seems  that  the  corn  procured  from 
various  quarters  had  in  part  served  to  feed  these  people  in  idleness. 


142  Roman  revival  [ch. 

and  that  many  preferred  this  life  to  resuming  hard  work  on  derelict 
lands.  Here  we  may  see  the  beginnings  of  that  Roman  populace 
which  we  find  later  as  a  monstrous  urban  mob,  the  plague  of 
Roman  public  life.  But  the  record  of  all  these  things  is  slight 
and  doubtful.  It  is  more  certain  that  activity  in  matters  of 
religion,  referred  to  above,  continued  to  the  end  of  the  war.  In 
208  the  games  of  Apollo,  hitherto  held  irregularly  on  occasions, 
were  made  a  fixed  yearly  festival.  In  205  the  worship  of  the 
'  Great  Mother,'  with  its  exciting  orgies,  was  introduced  from  the 
East,  and  gave  rise  to  the  Megalensia,  another  regular  festival. 
Both  these  innovations  seem  to  have  been  connected  with  out- 
breaks of  epidemic  sickness.  The  longing  for  superhuman  aid,  and 
the  readiness  to  receive  religious  novelties,  are  not  to  be  overlooked. 
They  are  signs  of  Roman  feelings  at  the  time  of  the  great  war. 

161.  It  is  said,  perhaps  truly,  that  Scipio  on  his  return  from 
Spain  was  warmly  welcomed  by  the  people  in  general,  but  viewed 
with  jealousy  by  the  Senate.  He  was  elected  consul  for  205. 
His  intention  of  carrying  the  war  into  Africa  was  no  secret.  The 
Senate  yielded  so  far  as  to  assign  him  the  war-province  of  Sicily. 
He  might  if  necessary  cross  over  to  Africa,  but  this  forward  policy 
was  hindered  by  giving  him  insufficient  forces.  It  took  him  some 
time  to  raise  additional  volunteers  and  complete  his  preparations. 
We  hear  that  a  number  of  Italian  Allies  sent  contingents  and 
war-material.  Delay  was  caused  by  the  barbarous  misconduct  of 
one  of  his  subordinates  at  Locri  in  southern  Italy.  Scipio  had 
recovered  this  city  from  Hannibal,  and  the  man  left  in  charge 
by  him  had  made  it  a  scene  of  horrors.  A  senatorial  commission 
was  sent  to  inquire  and  make  redress,  at  the  same  time  to  keep 
an  eye  on  Scipio.  What  was  done  to  the  culprit  from  Locri  is 
uncertain  :  Scipio  proved  that  he  at  least  was  not  neglecting  his 
business.  With  great  skill  he  had  organized  his  naval  and  military 
forces,  and  no  further  attempt  was  made  to  molest  him.  In  204 
he  was  able  to  start,  and  he  landed  unopposed  on  the  Hermaean 
promontory  to  the  East  of  Carthage. 

162.  We  have  no  Carthaginian  version  of  these  events,  but 
the  Roman  tradition  is  probable,  and  of  a  piece  with  the  general 
policy  of  Carthage.  The  government  had  all  along  missed  its 
chances.  Its  fleets  were  generally  ineffective ;  even  the  squadron 
sent  to  help  Philip  in  the  Greek  war  had  been  useless.  Alarmed 
by  a  descent  already  made  by  Scipio's  friend  Laelius,  they  were 


xiii]  Carthage  failing  143 

hurriedly  trying  to  save  themselves  at  home  by  vigorous  action 
abroad.  Hannibal  had  done  wonders,  but  was  now  much  too 
weak  to  do  as  they  wished  and  keep  back  Scipio  by  ofifensive 
operations  in  Italy.  Nor  could  Mago  in  the  North,  though  rein- 
forced, do  more  than  just  hold  his  ground.  Philip  had  now  made 
peace  with  Rome,  and  in  any  case  he  could  not  have  invaded 
Italy.  The  simple  truth  was  that  Carthage  had  no  national  army 
or  navy.  She  depended  on  her  wealth,  and  to  turn  money  into 
the  means  of  war  needed  time.  It  was  now  too  late.  True,  the 
wavering  Syphax  was  at  last  won  over  to  the  cause  of  Carthage. 
But  against  him  there  was  to  be  set  Masinissa,  claimant  of  the 
kingdom  of  eastern  Numidia ;  a  prince  at  present  driven  from  his 
country  by  Syphax,  but  who  in  the  sequel  proved  to  be  a  valuable 
ally  of  Rome.  Scipio  seems  to  have  plundered  Punic  territory  as 
he  chose,  but  no  notable  success  was  achieved  in  the  season  of 
204,  owing  to  the  numbers  brought  into  the  field  by  Syphax.  In 
203  he  surprised  and  burnt  the  enemies'  camp,  and  killed  many, 
but  the  war  went  on.  In  a  great  battle  he  defeated  them  with 
great  loss.  Now  at  last  the  Punic  government  sent  to  recall 
Hannibal  and  Mago. 

163.  The  war  was  dying  down  in  Italy,  and  Rome  could 
act  more  freely.  In  204  the  twelve  Latin  colonies,  disobedient 
five  years  before,  were  taken  in  hand.  They  were  made  to  furnish 
contingents  of  double  strength,  a  tax  (perhaps  only  till  the  end  of 
the  war)  was  imposed  on  them,  and  their  census,  the  schedule  of 
their  citizens  and  properties,  was  in  future  to  be  conducted  on  the 
Roman  model  and  delivered  to  the  Roman  censors.  This  was  a 
beginning  of  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  members  of  the 
Italian  confederacy,  a  first  sign  of  the  inferior  position  of  the  Allies 
in  relation  to  Rome,  which  was  a  result  of  the  Hannibalic  war. 
A  beginning  was  also  made  of  repaying  some  of  the  debts  of  the 
state.  A  census  was  held.  The  censors  were  Livius  and  Nero, 
the  consuls  of  207,  who  are  said  to  have  indulged  in  unseemly 
squabbling,  their  old  animosities  having  revived  since  the  triumph 
for  the  victory  of  Metaurus.  But  the  general  trend  of  Roman 
policy  was  judicious.  Commanders  as  a  rule  were  continued  in 
office,  and  the  fleets  kept  in  good  fighting  trim.  Care  was  taken 
to  supply  the  forces  in  Africa  with  all  things  needed  for  the 
campaign  of  the  year  203.  Meanwhile  a  consul  took  severe 
measures  in   Etruria,  and   quelled   the  disaffection   renewed  by 


144  Zama  [ch. 

hopes  from  the  expedition  of  Mago.  In  203  Mago's  turn  came. 
His  army,  a  motley  force  raised  with  difficulty,  was  met  and 
defeated  by  the  Roman  army  of  the  North.  On  his  retreat  he 
received  the  order  of  recall,  and  sailed  with  the  remnant  of  his 
troops  for  Carthage,  but  died  at  sea  of  a  wound.  Hannibal  had 
been  standing  at  bay  in  the  South,  holding  a  district  near  Croton, 
from  which  the  Romans  were  unable  to  dislodge  him.  He  too 
obeyed  the  call  of  Carthage,  and  went.  He  left  behind  in  the 
temple  of  Hera  Lacinia  a  Punic  inscription  to  record  his  doings, 
a  monument  afterwards  consulted  by  the  Greek  historian  Polybius. 
Italy  was  now  clear,  and  Africa  the  seat  of  war. 

164.  It  was  no  light  task  for  Hannibal  to  form  an  army  in 
haste  out  of  miscellaneous  mercenaries  and  African  troops.  His 
remaining  veterans  from  Italy  were  a  sound  nucleus.  But  they 
were  few,  and  much  of  the  material  at  hand  was  unmilitary  or 
untrustworthy.  Roman  tradition  alleged  that  Philip  sent  a  Mace- 
donian corps.  Scipio  on  the  other  hand  was  much  strengthened 
by  the  result  of  his  recent  victory,  which  had  been  followed  by 
the  overthrow  and  capture  of  Syphax.  Masinissa  recovered  his 
father's  kingdom,  and  was  now  in  a  position  to  be  of  great  service 
to  Rome.  In  Carthage  itself  there  was  a  peace-party,  and  a  truce 
had  been  arranged  to  allow  an  embassy  to  visit  Rome.  This 
truce  was  said  to  have  been  broken  by  an  attack  upon  some 
Roman  corn-ships,  and  war  was  renewed.  When  the  two  armies 
met  in  202,  Scipio  gained  a  decisive^  victory.  Carthage  had  now 
to  submit,  and  Hannibal,  ever  a  true  patriot,  undertook  the 
unpopular  duty  of  persuading  his  fellow-citizens  to  bow  to  this 
necessity.  Scipio,  still  in  command,  but  fearing  to  be  superseded 
through  the  intrigues  of  ambitious  nobles  at  home,  was  glad  to 
expedite  matters,  and  dictated  terms. 

165.  Peace  of  201  B.C.  Carthage  was  left  in  possession  of 
the  African  territory  that  had  belonged  to  her  before  the  war. 
She  retained  her  self-government,  and  was  not  to  receive  a  Roman 
garrison.  But  she  was  forbidden  to  go  to  war  with  any  power 
outside  Africa.  In  Africa  she  was  not  to  engage  in  war  without 
the  leave  of  Rome.  She  was  to  surrender  all  her  elephants,  and 
all  her  ships  of  war  save  ten  triremes,  that  is,  all  her  larger  war- 
ships. All  territory  that  had  ever  belonged  to  the  ancestors  of 
Masinissa  was  to  be  restored  to  him :  the  settlement  of  boundaries 

1  Battle  of  Zama,  fought  near  a  place  called  Naraggara. 


xiii]  The  peace  of  201  b.c.  145 

was  deferred.  Carthage  was  to  pay  a  war-indemnity  of  10,000 
talents  (about  ;^2, 350,000)  in  instalments  spread  over  50  years. 
She  was  to  give  up  all  prisoners,  deserters,  runaway  slaves,  and 
captured  goods  of  every  kind ;  to  feed  and  pay  the  Roman  forces 
till  ratification  of  peace,  and  to  hand  over  picked  hostages.  Thus 
Carthage  became  a  purely  African  power,  depending  on  Rome  in 
all  matters  of  foreign  policy.  The  war-indemnity  was  a  light 
burden.  But  the  '  open  question '  of  boundaries  was  a  menace 
to  her  prosperity.  Any  quarrel  with  Masinissa  would  have  to  be 
referred  to  Rome,  and  the  interest  of  the  umpire  was  not  likely  to 
be  in  favour  of  Carthage.  But  at  the  time  it  was  hardly  possible  to 
stand  out  for  better  conditions.  And  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  clique  of  rich  merchant  princes,  who  had  always  been 
opposed  to  the  war  and  who  had  often  hampered  the  activity 
of  the  popular  war-party,  were  quite  willing  to  court  the  favour  of 
Rome  by  subserving  Roman  interests.  They  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  able  even  now  to  control  the  Carthaginian  government,  but 
they  remained  a  pro-Roman  influence,  blighting  the  hopes  of 
patriots  for  another  fifty  years. 

166.  In  spite  of  opposition  at  Rome,  the  peace  was  ratified 
and  Scipio  left  in  command  with  full  powers  to  make  the 
necessary  arrangements.  The  surrendered  fleet  was  burnt,  the 
deserters  put  to  death.  Scipio  on  his  return  was  the  first  man  in 
Rome  beyond  comparison.  But  the  credit  of  having  seen  the 
state  safely  through  the  dark  days  of  the  war,  and  thereby  made 
the  success  of  Scipio  possible,  belonged  to  the  Senate  rather  than 
to  any  one  man.  And  that  aristocratic  council  was  not  inclined 
to  let  any  one  man,  however  successful  and  popular,  engross  such 
power  as  to  weaken  the  collective  authority  of  their  body.  It  has 
been  already  pointed  out  that,  though  the  yearly  magistrates 
shared  the  sovran  imperium^  and  though  sovran  power  ultimately 
rested  with  the  popular  Assemblies,  the  real  working  of  the  govern- 
ment was  controlled  by  the  Senate.  And  the  republican  principle 
as  represented  in  the  Senate  was  this,  that  the  noble  families 
should  so  far  as  possible  share  office  and  power  among  themselves, 
and  not  be  thrust  into  the  background  by  the  preeminence  of 
an  individual.  Scipio  received  by  general  consent  the  title 
Afrtcanus,  an  unofficial  nickname  of  honour.  But  the  old  system 
of  changing  the  commanders  of  armies  year  by  year  was  at  once 
revived  now  that  the  danger  from  Carthage  had  passed  away. 

H.  10 


CHAPTER   XIV 

'rtlE   SITUATION    CREATED   BY   THE  WAR 

167.  From  a  time  when  Rome  had  to  fight  for  her  existence 
as  the  Head  of  Italy  we  shall  pass  to  a  period  of  great  conquests, 
only  delayed  by  the  clumsiness  of  Rome  herself  in  bringing  her 
superior  strength  to  bear.  It  is  well  to  pause  and  take  stock  of 
the  condition  of  the  Roman  state  as  shewn  in  the  traditions  of  the 
second  Punic  war.  Most  of  the  matters  to  be  considered  have 
been  already  referred  to  in  passing,  but  in  order  to  make  clear 
the  connexion  of  the  story  of  the  Republic  before  and  after  the 
great  struggle  with  Carthage  it  is  desirable  to  sum  them  up  briefly 
and  to  look  at  them  from  a  special  point  of  view. 

168.  We  have  seen  that  circumstances  had  tended  to  increase 
the  power  of  the  Senate.  But  we  must  remember  that  the  consti- 
tution remained  in  form  unchanged,  and  that  the  power  of  the 
Senate,  resting  on  no  law,  was  always  liable  to  be  overridden  by 
the  act  of  the  Assembly.  Now  the  Assembly  could  only  vote  on 
what  was  laid  before  it.  Thus  it  depended  for  the  means  of  exer- 
cising its  sovran  power  on  the  will  of  magistrates  who  convened  it. 
Therefore  it  was  quite  possible  to  gain  a  practical  control  over 
its  action,  by  gaining  control  of  the  magistracy.  This  was  what 
the  Senate  had  long  been  doing,  and  after  the  war  did  more  than 
ever.  We  have  noted  that  the  practice  of  changing  the  com- 
manders of  armies  year  by  year  was  at  once  resumed.  But  this 
only  concerned  magistrates  with  imperium^  capable  of  holding 
military  command.  The  tribunes,  who  presided  in  purely 
Plebeian  AssembUes,  had  no  imperium.  It  was  necessary  to 
control  these  also,  and  the  Senate  saw  to  it.  As  the  war  dragged 
on,  the  popular  movements,  begun  by  Flaminius  in  232  and  con- 
tinued by  Varro  in  217,  died  away,  and  the  tribunate  ceased  to  be 


CH.  xiv]  Rome  after  the  war  147 

troublesome.     After  the  war  it  became  the  regular  tool  of  the 
Senate.     It  was  also  desirable  in  the  interest  of  the  great  families 
to  control  the  composition  of  the  Senate  itself.     The  time  of  the 
great  war  was  unfavourable  to  the  free  action  of  the  censors,  who 
revised  the  roll  of  members.     After  the  war  we  find  the  appoint- 
ment of  censors  at  intervals  of  five  years  regularly  observed  for  a 
long  time,  and  pains  taken  to  make  the  House  a  close  body  of 
nobles.     But  the  most  significant  change  in  political  practice  is 
seen  in  the  fate  of  the  dictatorship.     It  had  been  found  necessary 
to  resort  to  it  after  Trasimene,  but  when  Minucius  was  raised  to 
an  equality  with  Fabius  the  whole  meaning  of  the  office  ceased. 
We  find  dictators  in  later  stages  of  the  war,  but  none  filling  the 
important  position  implied  by  the  greatness  of  the  office.     Most 
of  them  were  appointed  to  perform  some  special  duty  not  of  a 
military  kind,  which  no  consul  was  at  hand  to  undertake.     In 
this  we  may  trace  the  dislike  of  the  Senate  for  an  office  carrying 
such  unlimited  powers.     In  order  not  to  raise  individuals  to  so 
great  a  height  above  their  fellow  nobles,  the  Senate  contrived 
first  to  limit  the  sphere  of  its  functions  and  after  the  great  war  to 
do  without  it  altogether.     The  revived  dictatorship  of  120  years 
later  was  a  tyranny  created  by  victory  in  civil  war,  only  bearing 
an  old  name.     As  for  the  popular  Assemblies,  they  must  surely 
have  been  much  disorganized  in  consequence  of  the  war,  by  the 
absence  of  so  many  men  in  the  armies,  by  the  presence  of  refugees 
from  the  ravaged  country,  and  the  general  disturbance  of  life. 
Indeed  we  have  several  strange  scenes  in  the  record  transmitted 
by  Livy,  at  elections  and  state-trials,  which  are  indications  of  the 
helplessness  that  was  coming  over  these  Assemblies.     They  had 
to  be  carefully  managed  to  prevent  their  acting  foolishly.     This 
is  probably  not  very  greatly  exaggerated  by  the  noble  writers  of 
Roman  annals.     In  the  next  period  the  Senate  brought  the  art 
of  management  to  great  perfection. 

169.  While  aristocratic  jealousy  insisted  that  the  choice  of 
commanders  on  the  ground  of  efficiency  should  cease  with  the 
great  war,  something  had  certainly  been  learnt  as  to  the  defects 
of  Roman  armies.  It  seems  that  Scipio  had  in  the  last  stage  of 
the  war  improved  the  Roman  cavalry.  Through  Masinissa  he 
had  also  secured  the  help  of  Numidian  horse,  once  the  favourite 
fighting  arm  of  Hannibal.  In  his  two  victories  in  Africa,  well- 
handled  cavalry  had  played  a  leading  part.     But  there  can  be  no 

10 — 2 


148  Army  and  Navy  [ch. 

doubt  that  an  improvement,  of  which  we  have  no  record,  had  also 
taken  place  in  the  fighting  skill  of  the  infantry.  There  was  how- 
ever no  standing  army  in  the  system  of  the  Roman  Republic.  So 
long  as  the  war  lasted,  and  it  was  necessary  to  keep  men  under 
arms  for  a  considerable  time,  the  improvement  in  skill  continued. 
With  the  return  of  peace  armies  were  disbanded ;  only  a  few  garri- 
sons and  the  force  in  Spain  were  needed.  If  then  a  long  period 
of  peace  had  followed,  what  had  been  learnt  under  the  sharp  tuition 
of  Hannibal  would  speedily  have  been  forgotten.  But  wars  followed 
fast.  The  military  tradition  was  kept  up,  for  in  every  new  army 
there  was  a  nucleus  of  old  soldiers.  Many  men  had  become  used 
to  the  excitement  of  campaigns,  and  were  not  disposed  to  return 
to  the  monotony  of  rural  life.  Hence  we  begin  to  hear  of  volun- 
teers. These  would  be  trained  soldiers,  excellent  from  a  purely 
military  point  of  view.  In  the  wars  that  followed,  such  men  served 
to  leaven  the  mass  of  raw  lads  in  the  ranks,  and  to  supply  cen- 
turions, on  whom  the  efficiency  of  the  legions  mainly  depended. 
Only  bad  generalship  was  responsible  for  the  checks  suffered  by 
Roman  armies  in  the  later  wars.  The  lack  of  a  standing  army 
explains  the  increased  tendency  to  depend  on  allies  and  auxiliaries 
for  mounted  troops.  A  cavalry  soldier  is  not  made  in  a  day,  but 
troopers  could  be  found  more  or  less  ready-made  in  countries 
where  the  horse  was  more  an  animal  of  common  use  than  was 
the  case  in  Italy. 

170.  A  navy,  even  more  than  an  army,  cannot  be  produced 
in  a  hurry.  Ship-building  did  not  take  long.  The  training  of 
oarsmen  was  a  slow  process,  the  learning  to  manoeuvre  clumsy 
ships  no  easy  matter.  Greek  skippers  could  be  had  to  navigate 
the  vessels.  But  the  sea-fights  of  the  age  were  conducted  mainly 
by  the  fighting-crews,  who  overawed  their  own  slave-rowers  and 
engaged  the  enemy.  We  have  seen^  that  the  difficulty  of  finding 
suitable  fighting-crews  was  probably  a  cause  of  the  naval  weakness 
of  Carthage.  Rome  was  evidently  better  off  in  this  respect.  And 
the  Roman  government  shewed  wisdom  in  maintaining  efficient 
fleets  all  through  the  war  and  using  them  boldly.  But  the  navy, 
like  the  army,  was  not  a  standing  force.  When  a  fleet  was  needed 
for  a  new  war,  it  had  to  be  got  together  in  small  detachments  from 
the  allies  (chiefly  Greek)  who  were  bound  to  provide  naval  con- 
tingents.    Rome  herself  did  little  in  this  department,  and  Roman 

'  §§  94,  95. 


xit]  Rome  and   Italy  149 

citizens  were  not  willing  to  serve  on  shipboard.  The  duty  was 
generally  performed  by  freedmen,  and  the  naval  service  was  never 
a  strong  point  in  the  Roman  system.  In  the  second  Punic  war 
the  work  of  the  fleets  was  chiefly  in  guarding  the  great  convoys  of 
transports  bearing  troops  or  supplies.  Of  actual  fighting  there  was 
little. 

171.  Hannibal's  failure  left  those  Italians  who  had  joined 
him  to  submit  to  Rome.  We  have  no  detailed  account,  but  it 
seems  to  have  been  only  at  the  very  last  that  the  rebels  were 
harshly  treated.  Thus  the  Bruttians,  subdued  after  Hannibal's 
departure,  were  made  a  people  of  public  serfs,  employed  in  de- 
grading duties  such  as  executions  :  for  some  time  Bruttianus 
meant  'common  hangman.'  Most  of  Bruttium  became  Roman 
state-land.  There  were  some  confiscations  of  land  in  other  parts 
also.  The  '  Latins,'  that  is  the  30  Latin  Colonies  and  about  six 
old  Latin  or  Hernican  towns,  had  on  the  whole  shewn  a  splendid 
loyalty  to  Rome.  They  had  been  the  saving  of  Italy.  We  hear 
of  no  reward  for  the  faithful,  and  even  the  twelve  recusant  colonies 
of  the  year  209  seem  to  have  been  punished  lightly.  The  truth  is 
that  the  result  of  the  struggle  with  Carthage  had  been  to  differen- 
tiate Rome  from  her  Italian  Allies  much  more  than  had  been  the 
case.  Sicily  was  now  wholly  a  Roman  '  province,'  the  department 
of  a  Roman  governor.  Sardinia  and  Corsica  were  Roman  posses- 
sions, only  needing  complete  conquest.  Spain  was  not  conquered, 
but  Rome  claimed  a  great  part  of  it  as  overlord,  and  certainly 
meant  to  admit  no  other.  But  all  these  provincial  territories  were 
attached,  not  to  the  Italian  confederacy,  but  to  Rome.  Foreign 
relations  were  wholly  in  Roman  hands.  Rome  made  peace  with 
Philip  and  with  Carthage.  Rome  was  on  terms  of  friendship  or 
alliance  with  the  kings  of  Egypt  and  Pergamum,  with  Rhodes  and 
Massalia  and  other  republics,  and  she  was  the  protector  to  whom 
Masinissa  owed  his  throne.  Thus  she  was  above  all  things  an 
imperial  state.  Her  ItaHan  Allies  had  no  share  in  her  empire. 
They  were  an  aggregate  of  local  communities,  their  citizens  were 
not  citizens  of  Rome.  In  the  view  of  the  outside  world  they  were 
of  no  account.  For  international  purposes  Rome  was  Italy.  Afid 
we  can  see  that  further  extensions  of  Roman  dominion  would  tend 
to  increase  the  difference  between  Rome  and  her  Italian  Allies. 
The  more  the  Head  of  the  confederacy  became  imperial,  the  more 
its  inferior  members  became  virtually  subjects. 


150  Agriculture  [ch. 

172.  The  devastation  of  Italian  land  in  the  second  Punic 
war  has  perhaps  been  exaggerated  by  tradition.  Yet  it  was  no 
doubt  considerable,  and  the  diversion  of  so  many  men  from 
agriculture  to  war  would  surely  lead  to  some  neglect  of  tillage 
even  in  undisturbed  districts.  But  the  indirect  effects  of  the 
war  were  more  serious  still.  It  had  been  necessary  to  import 
corn  on  a  large  scale,  to  feed  both  the  armies  and  the  refugees 
in  the  city.  To  the  latter  it  had  to  be  sold  cheap,  and  the 
practice  once  begun  was  not  easily  discontinued.  The  state 
therefore  needed  to  get  it  cheap,  and  it  soon  appeared  that  it 
could  be  got  from  abroad  more  cheaply  than  in  Italy.  Foreign 
countries  such  as  Egypt  were  able  to  export  great  quantities  at 
low  rates  :  transport  by  sea  was  cheaper  than  by  road.  Moreover 
there  were  now  great  sources  of  supply  under  Roman  control. 
Not  to  mention  Sardinia,  Sicily  was  beginning  to  send  provincial 
tribute  in  the  form  of  corn.  A  momentous  lesson  was  also  learnt 
from  Carthaginian  agriculture.  It  was  practised  on  a  large  scale 
by  slave  labour,  and  the  profits  made  by  great  land-owners  soon 
whetted  the  appetite  of  the  capitalists  of  Rome.  Thus,  while 
cheap  corn  was  an  object  to  Roman  statesmen,  the  greed  of  gain 
suggested  to  rich  men  the  wholesale  introduction  of  slave-tillage 
into  Italy.  Three  circumstances  favoured  this  movement  at  the 
time.  The  gradual  repayment  of  debts  by  the  state  left  more 
capital  seeking  investments.  Many  small  freeholders,  unwilling 
to  return  to  their  lands,  were  willing  to  sell  them.  And  the  supply 
of  slaves  was  larger  than  usual,  owing  to  the  war.  Nor  must  we 
forget  that  a  law  {lex  Claudia)  of  218  B.C.  had  forbidden  senators 
to  own  ships  and  engage  in  commerce.  On  the  whole  senators 
were  the  wealthiest  class  of  Romans,  and  they  were  under  strong 
pressure  to  invest  in  land.  The  convenience  and  dignity  of  being 
great  Italian  landlords  was  attractive.  Already  they  held  as  *  pos- 
sessors '  a  large  part  of  the  Roman  domain-land  {ager  puhlicus\ 
subject  to  a  small  quit-rent  collected  irregularly  or  not  at  all. 
They  had  only  to  buy  out  the  small  owners  of  neighbouring  farms, 
and  they  would  become  the  territorial  lords  of  a  large  part  of  Italy. 
Furthermore,  they  had  only  to  obliterate  the  boundaries  between 
their  own  freeholds  and  the  land  held  in  '  possession,'  and  the 
rights  of  the  state  would  be  so  obscured  that  to  distinguish 
and  resume  public  property  would  be  impossible  without  a 
revolution. 


xiv]  Capitalism  151 

173.  Thus  the  effect  of  the  struggle  with  Carthage  was  to 
make  it  likely  that  the  numbers  of  small  farmers,  hitherto  the 
real  backbone  of  the  Roman  state,  would  be  reduced.  And  all 
through  the  following  period  this  process  was  in  fact  going  on, 
at  least  in  such  districts  as  Etruria  Apulia  Lucania  and  wherever 
land  suited  for  agriculture  on  a  large  scale  was  to  be  found.  We 
meet  with  three  main  kinds  of  farming.  First,  tillage  by  slave- 
gangs,  producing  cereal  crops  on  great  estates  of  arable  land. 
Second,  stock-farming  over  large  areas  of  highland  and  lowland 
pasture  according  to  the  season  of  the  year.  Third,  the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  vine  and  olive  on  estates  of  moderate  size,  All  required 
plenty  of  capital,  all  employed  slaves.  The  wine  and  oil  of  Italy 
were  not  yet  famous,  and  commanded  only  a  local  market.  But 
the  returns  from  such  crops  were  slow,  and  fell  to  the  man  who 
could  afford  to  wait. 

174.  We  have  seen  that  the  system  of  state-contracts  had 
been  greatly  developed  by  the  necessities  of  the  war.  The  close- 
fisted  Roman  took  readily  to  this  form  of  enterprise.  Joint-stock 
companies  or  syndicates  {societates  publicanorum)  became  common. 
By  allowing  the  state  to  defer  payment  for  services  they  had 
established  a  sort  of  claim  to  favour.  They  had,  in  short,  specu-- 
lated  in  patriotism  and  won.  Henceforth  their  wealth  and  power 
steadily  grew,  until  they  became  able  to  influence  public  policy  in 
their  own  interest.  And  their  interests  were  purely  financial.  The 
general  good  of  Rome  was  not  their  business ;  still  less  the  good 
of  Rome's  subjects  abroad,  as  we  shall  see.  It  was  largely  owing 
to  them  that  patriotism  remained  narrowly  Roman,  and  did  not 
become  imperial  with  the  extension  of  empire.  The  true  in- 
terest of  the  imperial  Republic  was  to  make  its  subjects  happy 
and  prosperous.  But  the  race  for  wealth  that  set  in  after  the 
second  Punic  war  corrupted  the  spirit  of  Roman  administration 
till  it  became  a  machine  for  extorting  money  to  fill  private 
purses. 

175.  The  currency.     At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  cur- 
rent coin  of  Rome  was  on  a  double  standard. 

bronze,  the  as  of  2  ounces  {unciae).  It  is  said  to  have  been 
originally  1 2  ounces  =  a  Roman  pound  {libra).  In 
268  it  seems  to  have  been  already^  lowered. 

^  To  2  ounces,  according  to  Mr  G.  F.  Hill  (see  above  §  104),  who  points  out 
{p.  48)  that  in  217  the  weight  of  the  denarius  was  reduced  by  about  one  sixth. 


152  Currency.     Religion  [ch. 

silver.      the  denarius  or  'tenner,'  first  coined  in  268  as  an 
equivalent  for  the  Greek  Drachma.     It  was  worth 
10  asses  of  2  unciae  each.     The  half,  quinarius  or 
*  fiver,'  was  worth  5  asses ^  the  quarter,  sestertius  or 
^  two-and-a-half er,'  was  worth  2  J. 
In  217  we  hear  of  a  further  lowering  of  the  bronze  standard,  said 
to  have  been  meant  for  the  relief  of  poor  debtors.     The  as^  then 
of  2  ounces,  was  evidently  the  trouble.    It  was  reduced  to  a  single 
ounce,  and  made  ^5-  of  the  Denarius.    The  weight  of  the  Denarius 
was  somewhat  reduced.     The  quarter  coin  or  Sesterce  was  now 
worth  four  of  the   new  asses.      It  became  the  regular  unit  of 
reckoning  in  business,  but  the  old  reckoning  by  the  as  of  4  ounces 
long  remained  in  use  for  soldiers'  pay.     The  currency  was  hence- 
forth on  a  single  standard  of  silver.     Bronze  was  a  token-coinage. 
The  financial  straits  of  Rome  in  the  war  were  shewn  not  only  in 
the  state's  deferring  its  payments  but  in  the  issue  of  base  coin, 
copper  denarii  plated  with  silver. 

176.  We  may  well  believe  that  people  in  Rome  lived  for 
several  years  under  a  distressing  strain  of  hope  suspense  or 
despair,  and  that  superstitious  fears  added  to  their  nervousness. 
We  have  noted  two  occasions  on  which  there  was  a  demand  for 
foreign  rites,  partly  met  by  the  introduction  of  a  new  worship 
from  the  East.  But  the  old  religion  had  not  lost  its  hold  on  the 
people.  Pontiffs  and  augurs  were  busy,  and  no  pains  were  spared 
to  propitiate  the  traditional  jealousy  of  the  gods.  It  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  every  public  act  had  its  religious  side.  An 
evil  sign  could  break  up  an  Assembly  or  vitiate  an  election.  Even 
the  Senate,  engaged  in  endless  details  of  business,  met  in  a  con- 
secrated place.  And  the  members  of  the  religious  colleges,  who 
judged  questions  of  religious  scruple,  held  their  places  for  life. 
They  were  men  of  high  standing,  most  if  not  all  senators,  and 
assuredly  inclined  to  lend  their  support  to  the  policy  of  the  Senate. 
The  general  success  of  the  Senate  in  overcoming  outbreaks  of 
popular  discontent  was  doubtless  in  great  part  due  to  their  in- 
fluence. In  the  next  period,  as  the  upper  classes  gradually  lost 
their  faith  in  the  ancient  religion,  while  the  masses  remained 
superstitious,  the  use  of  religious  scruples  became  more  and  more 
a  piece  of  purely  political  machinery,  in  the  interest  of  the  nobles 
who  led  the  Senate.  For  the  present  Greek  scepticism  had  not 
as  yet  taken  root  in  Rome.     But  the  great  war  had  prepared  the 


xit]  Plautus.     Ennius  153 

way  for  it  by  bringing  Roman  officers  into  close  contact  with 
Greeks.  Roman  deputations  still  sought  responses  from  the 
Delphic  Apollo.  Apollo  was  now  honoured  by  a  yearly  festival 
in  Rome.  Greek  works  of  art  forwarded  the  tendency  to  clothe 
divinities  with  a  human  form.  Above  all,  there  were  not  a  few 
Romans  who  understood  spoken  Greek.  We  have  seen  that  the 
first  Roman  historians  wrote  in  Greek.  And  the  Latin  poets  who 
appeared  at  the  end  of  the  war  gave  to  Roman  literature  its  final 
bent  of  dependence  on  Greek  models. 

177.  T.  Maccius  Plautus,  from  Umbria,  was  a  translator  or 
adapter  of  Greek  comedies.  He  used  a  number  of  Greek  metres, 
but  his  language  was  pure  Latin,  and  his  verses  depended  largely 
on  accent,  for  the  quantity  of  syllables  was  often  very  doubtful  in 
early  Latin.  He  produced  a  great  many  plays,  the  popularity  of 
which  was  long-lived.  Twenty  are  still  extant.  Plautus  skilfully 
adapted  them  to  a  Roman  audience  by  Roman  allusions  and  broad 
humour  of  his  own.  As  a  writer  of  Latin  he  quickly  became  a 
classic.  Tradition  places  his  birth  in  254  B.C.,  his  death  in  184. 
He  began  to  write  during  the  great  war. 

Q.  Ennius,  born  at  Rudiae  in  Calabria,  spoke  Greek,  and 
taught  it  at  Rome.  He  is  said  to  have  lived  from  239  to  169. 
He  too  influenced  the  Latin  language  greatly,  and  became  a 
classic.  In  particular,  he  made  a  start  in  fixing  the  quantity  of 
syllables,  and  the  prosody  of  Latin  verse  is  thus  mainly  due  to 
him.  He  also  brought  in  the  Greek  hexameter  metre,  which 
became  the  favourite  measure  of  Latin  poetry.  In  it  he  wrote 
his  great  poem  on  Roman  history,  called  annales.  But  he  adapted 
Greek  tragedies  with  success,  and  wrote  a  number  of  miscellaneous 
works  based  on  Greek  originals.  He  is  an  important  figure  in  the 
history  of  Rome,  for  through  him  Greek  views  on  many  subjects 
reached  men  unable  to  read  Greek.  He  belongs  chiefly  to  the 
period  after  the  great  war,  but  he  was  a  contemporary,  and  served 
in  the  army.  Later  generations  regarded  him  with  a  peculiar  re- 
verence. He  was  to  them  the  patriotic  voice  of  a  great  past,  the 
strong  unpolished  singer  of  Roman  endurance  and  Roman  triumph. 
But  it  was  only  in  the  latter  part  of  his  life  that  he  became  a  citizen 
of  Rome. 

178.  Imperial  Rome,  201  B.C.  Thus  we  find  the  Roman 
state  advanced  a  long  step  further  on  the  road  of  its  destinies. 
Danger  at  home  no  longer  threatened  Rome.     Her  mighty  rival 


154  The  imperial  Republic  [ch.  xiv 

was  overthrown.  The  long  war  had  put  to  the  proof  the  solid 
qualities  of  her  citizens  and  the  merits  of  her  Italian  policy,  and 
they  had  stood  the  test.  A  larger  policy  was  henceforth  inevitable. 
But  Roman  statesmen  still  acted,  and  long  continued  to  act,  as  if 
Rome  were  simply  and  necessarily  an  Italian  power.  Conquests 
abroad  were  *  departments '  {provinciae)  under  governors  invested 
with  both  civil  and  military  authority.  The  whole  of  her  present 
Provinces  had  fallen  to  her  by  the  accident  of  her  struggle  with 
Carthage.  That  Carthage  might  not  reoccupy  Spain  and  the 
islands,  Rome  must  keep  them.  So,  in  spite  of  imperfect  con- 
quest, she  was  the  paramount  power  in  the  western  Mediterranean, 
where  no  local  powers  existed  able  to  defy  her.  But  the  rise  of 
Rome  was  not  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  eastern  powers,  and 
the  condition  of  the  East  was  wholly  unlike  that  of  the  West. 
We  shall  see  that  in  her  eastern  conquests  Rome  had  to  deal 
with  peoples  more  advanced  in  civilization,  and  accustomed  to 
forms  of  government  which  Roman  statesmen  did  not  understand. 
Rome  in  short  was  not  trained  for  the  new  imperial  duties  that 
came  upon  her  as  the  sequel  of  the  second  Punic  war.  We  now 
enter  upon  a  story  of  blundering,  most  of  it  due  to  sheer  ignor- 
ance and  the  defects  of  her  own  republican  constitution,  destined 
to  inflict  needless  misery  for  many  years  upon  millions  of  the 
human  race. 


CHAPTER    XV 

WARS   AND   POLICY  IN   THE  EAST   200—168  B.C. 
AND    IN    THE   WEST   200—194  B.C. 

179.  The  union  of  Italy  under  Roman  headship  had  made 
Rome  by  265  B.C.  the  first  of  Mediterranean  powers.  But  her 
superiority  to  possible  rivals  in  the  vital  elements  of  strength  was 
as  yet  not  understood.  The  end  of  the  long  duel  with  Carthage 
left  her  clearly  the  head  of  the  West.  But  it  was  not  yet  plain  to 
eastern  powers  that  Rome  could  if  she  chose  overthrow  them  and 
take  her  place  as  mistress  of  the  East.  Only  a  loyal  combination 
of  the  eastern  powers  offered  any  chance  of  opposing  permanently 
her  eastward  progress  once  begun.  But  the  East  was  the  East. 
The  great  monarchies,  mutually  jealous,  could  not  combine,  and 
the  independent  Greek  states  viewed  the  kings  with  suspicion. 
Therefore  the  wars  from  200  to  168  B.C.  ended  by  establishing 
Rome  as  paramount  in  the  whole  Mediterranean.  And  her 
control  in  the  East  became  effective  more  quickly  than  in  the 
West.  The  West  had  to  be  conquered  piecemeal  by  long 
wasteful  wars.  The  East  was  the  scene  of  a  few  great  decisive 
battles,  but  the  extension  of  Roman  dominion  was  achieved  quite 
as  much  by  diplomacy  as  by  the  sword. 

180.  The  wars  of  the  period  200 — 168  may  be  arranged  thus 

East  West 

Second  Macedonian  war  200 — 197.  Wars  with  Cisalpine  Gauls  200 — 191. 

War  with  Antiochus  192 — 190.  Wars  in  Spain  197 — 195,  185 — 179. 

Aetolian  war  189.  Ligurian  wars  187 — 163. 
Galatian  war  189. 
Third  Macedonian  war  171 — 168. 
lUyrian  war  169,  168. 

181.  The  situation  in  the  East.  To  begin  with  Greece. 
Few  single  city-states  now  remained.     Athens  was  living  on  her 


156  Greece.     Aetolian  League  [cm. 

past;  the  philosophic  schools  presided  over  by  more  or  less 
eminent  professors  were  the  chief  feature  of  the  life  in  the  once 
imperial  city;  as  a  military  unit  Athens  did  not  count.  Sparta 
still  retained  military  traditions,  but  her  once  famous  constitution 
had  disappeared.  Military  tyranny  was  now  the  government, 
upheld  by  mercenaries.  The  present  ruler,  one  Nabis,  was  a 
faithless  and  brutal  ruffian.  The  normal  form  of  government  in 
Greece  seems  to  have  been  that  of  cities  in  groups,  confederations 
more  or  less  loose.  Boeotia  is  a  case  in  which  the  several  com- 
munities, though  recognizing  a  common  interest,  evidently  retained 
so  much  independence  that  they  did  not  always  pursue  a  common 
policy.  The  disunion  of  the  cities  of  Thessaly  was  more  marked. 
But  none  of  these  small  groups  was  strong  enough  to  pursue  a 
really  independent  policy.  Ever  since  221,  when  Antigonus 
Doson  of  Macedon  had  relieved  the  Achaean  League  by  crushing 
Cleomenes  of  Sparta,  the  Macedonian  kingdom  had  overshadowed 
Greece,  and  the  question  for  each  of  the  minor  powers  was  how 
it  could  best  keep  such  freedom  as  it  yet  enjoyed.  The  choice 
lay  between  subservience  to  the  king  and  taking  part  with  his 
enemies  in  hope  of  bettering  their  own  condition  thereby. 

182.  The  Leagues,  What  remained  of  Greek  freedom  was 
most  effectively  represented  by  the  Aetolians.  This  people  had 
come  to  the  front  when  the  great  ages  of  Greece  were  over,  and 
the  citizens  of  the  more  civilized  states  took  to  employing  mer- 
cenary troops  in  their  wars.  The  hardy  Aetolians  were  among 
the  best  of  hired  soldiers.  From  early  times  they  seem  to  have 
had  some  confederate  union,  and  they  had  no  great  cities  to 
hinder  combination  by  local  jealousies.  Increase  of  wealth  and 
power  only  strengthened  their  union.  It  became  a  true  Federal 
Government,  the  authority  of  the  central  power  overriding  that 
of  its  constituent  parts.  But  there  seems  to  have  been  no  means 
of  preventing  individuals  from  enlisting  for  service  under  foreign 
governments,  tempted  by  prospects  of  high  pay  and  plunder. 
Thus  the  military  force  at  disposal  in  Aetolia  varied  greatly  from 
time  to  time.  The  Federation  however  grew,  and  now  included 
some  states  in  Peloponnesus,  others  far  away,  islands,  or  coast- 
cities  in  the  Propontis.  Naupactus  was  the  station  of  an  Aetolian 
fleet.  The  cities  of  southern  Thessaly  had  been  forcibly  attached 
to  the  League,  but  in  the  peace  of  205  Philip  had  brought  them 
again  under  Macedonian  influence.    The  prestige  of  the  Aetolians 


xv]  Achaean  League  157 

in  Greece  rested  on  the  leading  part  taken  by  them  in  resisting 
the  inroad  of  the  Gauls  in  280 — 279,  and  on  their  opposition  to 
the  encroachments  of  the  royal  house  of  Macedon.  Polybius 
gives  the  Achaean  view  of  them  as  a  band  of  robbers.  And  it 
is  probably  true  that  they  were  somewhat  informal  and  rough. 
But  they  had  a  policy  of  their  own. 

183.     The  Achaean  League  was  a  revival  and  extension  of 

an  ancient  local  union  of  the  small  cities  of  Achaia  in  the  north 

of  Peloponnesus.    Its  great  statesman,  Aratus  of  Sicyon,  to  whom 

its  extension  was  mainly  due,  was  a  typical  subtle  Greek.     Old 

city-states^  Sicyon  Argos  Corinth  and  others,  were  brought  into 

the  League,  until  it  included  a  large  part  of  the  Peloponnese. 

But  Aratus  was  a  poor  soldier,  and  the  revival  of  Sparta  in  the 

middle  of  the  third  century  B.C.  was  a  blow  to  the  Achaeans. 

Aratus  was  no  match  for  the  warrior-king  Cleomenes  III,  and 

only  saved  the  League  by  calling  in  Macedonian  aid.     The  price 

of  this  was  the  surrender  of  the  Corinthian  citadel  (Acrocorinthus) 

to  Antigonus.     Henceforth  the  king  of  Macedon  held  the  key  of 

Peloponnesus,    and   the   Achaean    League,   though  free,   was  in 

foreign  policy  obliged   to  consult   his  wishes.     The   war   begun 

in  214,  owing  to  the  alliance  of  Philip  with  Hannibal,  dragged  on 

till  general  exhaustion  led  to  a  general  peace  in  205.    Aratus  died 

in  213.     The  army  of  the  League  was  inefficient,  but  a  few  years 

later  it  was  reformed  by  a  good  soldier,  Philopoemen,  who  became 

President  or  General  (a  yearly  office)  for  the  first  time  in  208. 

Under  him  the  League  prospered.     But  the  outbreak  of  war  in 

200   between   Rome  and  Macedon  placed   the   Achaeans  in  a 

difficult  position,  as  we  shall  see. 

184.  The  Achaean  League  was  a  more  highly-organized 
union  than  the  Aetolian,  partly  because  it  was  made  up  of  cities 
(each  with  its  territory)  rather  than  rural  cantons.  The  central 
power  was  effective.  Its  assemblies,  held  at  the  small  city  of 
Aegium,  were  in  general  orderly  and  cautious,  led  by  the  federal 
magistrates.  The  vote  of  each  city  counted  as  one.  The  franchise 
was  democratic,  but  the  wealthier  citizens  could  more  easily  attend 
meetings  away  from  home,  and  thus  their  assemblies,  held  at  rare 
intervals,  usually  consisted  of  men  who  had  something  to  lose. 
The  relations  of  the  Leagues  to  Rome  in  the  period  before  us 
(and  later)  are  painfully  interesting.  Roman  statesmen  could  not 
or  would  not  understand  a  Federation.      The  Greek  Leagues, 


158  Antigonids  [ch. 

more  especially  the  Achaean,  were  more  thorough  unions  than 
any  in  Italy.  The  persistent  attempts  of  Rome  to  ignore  the 
central  government  and  deal  with  the  members  singly,  at  first 
perhaps  in  good  faith,  were  the  cause  of  much  of  the  miseries 
of  Greece. 

185.  Beside  the  states  of  old  Greece,  and  the  Hellenistic 
or  half-Greek  cities  belonging  to  the  great  kingdoms,  there  were 
still  a  few  independent  republics.  Such  were  Rhodes,  long  on 
terms  of  friendship  with  Rome,  and  in  the  north  the  ancient 
colonies  of  Byzantium  and  the  Pontic  Heraclea.  Some  of  the 
Aegean  islands,  for  instance  Chios,  were  also  free  states;  and 
a  number  of  them  belonged  to  a  confederacy,  headed  by  Rhodes, 
for  the  protection  of  sea-borne  trade  against  piracy.  The  coast- 
cities  were  some  of  them  dependencies  of  the  Egyptian  kingdom. 
Crete  was  a  peculiar  island.  It  contained  a  number  of  cities, 
each  ruled  by  a  warrior-caste,  often  at  war  with  one  another,  but 
ready  to  combine  against  a  common  enemy.  The  Cretan  bowmen 
and  light  troops  served  abroad  for  hire  in  foreign  armies.  Cretans 
were  a  byword  for  treachery  and  guile,  a  contrast  to  the  Rhodians, 
whose  government,  famed  for  its  good  faith  and  honesty,  was 
everywhere  respected.  Rhodes  was  the  banker,  and  sometimes 
the  umpire  of  disputes,  in  a  large  part  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean. 

186.  The  Successor-Kingdoms.  Of  the  kingdoms  formed  out 
of  the  empire  of  the  great  Alexander  three,  to  all  appearance  great 
powers,  still  remained.  In  each  the  royal  house  was  descended 
from  one  of  Alexander's  marshals,  Antigonus  Seleucus  or  Ptolemy 
son  of  Lagus.  Thus  the  Antigonid  Seleucid  and  Lagid  dynasties 
were  all  Macedonian.  The  three  monarchies  differed  much,  but 
in  most  important  respects  were  alike.  The  reigning  king  was 
practically  absolute,  and  surrounded  by  a  court.  Greek  was  the 
common  language.  Their  diplomacy  was  formal  but  unscrupulous, 
for  mutual  jealousy  was  extreme. 

187.  Antigonids.  The  present  king  of  Macedon,  Philip, 
reigned  from  220  to  179.  Though  nominally  bound  to  consult 
the  Macedonian  chiefs  and  notables,  he  was  really  supreme  in 
the  kingdom  welded  together  in  the  fourth  century  B.C.  by  Philip 
the  father  of  Alexander.  For  the  Macedonians  were  a  true  nation, 
strong  in  unity,  and  a  king  was  the  expression  of  that  unity,  a 
national  institution  supported  by  national  loyalty.  Cities  were 
few,  and  the  court  at  Pella  less  splendid  than  those  of  the  eastern 


xv] 


Seleucids 


159 


kings.  Beyond  the  limits  of  Macedonia  Philip  owned  a  few  islands 
and  cities,  in  particular  the  three  fortresses  known  as  the  '  fetters ' 
of  Greece,  Demetrias  Chalcis  and  Corinth.  He  was  overlord  of 
Thessaly,  and  allied  more  or  less  closely  with  several  Greek  states, 
such  as  the  Acarnanian  League.  In  the  recent  wars  he  had  shewn 
much  vigour  and  little  mercy.  Hence  the  more  independent  Greek 
powers  feared  him.  With  the  Achaeans  he  was  on  friendly  terms, 
but  they  had  had  enough  of  him :  the  Aetolians,  whom  he  had 
humbled,  were  waiting  for  a  chance  of  revenge. 


Cepfiallenia 
(Aetol) 

Zacynthus 


Sketch  map  of  Balkan  peninsula  200  B.  C.  Macedonian  kingdom  jlllllllll||||illi . 
WM^  Macedonian  dependencies.  \.W'/^/,^  States  inclined  to  Mace- 
don.  ^^^  Anti- Macedonian  or  allies  of  Rome.  ^^^$1^^^  Inclined 
to  Rome  or  joined  Rome  for  various  reasons.    H  The  three  *  Fetters.' 


188.  Seleucids.  Antiochus  IH  ruled  from  224  to  187.  The 
vast  empire  of  Seleucus  had  once  included  a  part  of  Thrace  in 
the  West  and  most  of  Asia  Minor.  Its  eastern  provinces  reached 
far  into  central  Asia,  including  Bactria  to  the  N.E.  and  to  the  S.E, 
the  Punjab.  Thus  it  comprised  the  parts  of  Alexander's  empire 
in  which  that  conqueror  had  taken  the  place  of  the  Great  Kings 


i6o  Lagids  [Ptolemies]  [ch. 

of  Persia.  But  invasions  and  rebellions  had  shorn  away  many  of 
the  eastern  possessions,  and  it  was  only  in  Syria  and  the  neigh- 
bouring countries  that  the  young  Antiochus  was  effectively  obeyed. 
He  reconquered  some  of  the  lost  provinces  in  the  East.  His 
ambition  now  was  to  reestablish  Seleucid  dominion  to  the  westward, 
in  Asia  Minor  and  even  beyond.  The  city  of  Antioch,  famed  for 
beauty  splendour  and  luxury,  was  the  capital  of  his  kingdom.  The 
peoples  over  whom  he  reigned  were  united  only  by  subjection  to 
a  common  master.  Thus  there  was  no  nation,  but  an  empire  of 
Oriental  type.  It  contained  many  flourishing  Greek  cities,  enjoy- 
ing special  privileges  ;  but  the  '  Greeks  '  of  the  East  were  a  mongrel 
race,  largely  of  Oriental  blood.  In  these  cities  Greek  was  spoken, 
and  Greek  notions  and  Greek  ways  formed,  imperfectly  no  doubt, 
the  standard  of  civilization.  The  court  of  Antioch  was,  in  spite 
of  some  Greek  details,  really  the  court  of  a  Macedonian  Sultan, 
the  absolute  lord  of  as  much  territory  as  he  could  win  and  keep. 

189.  Lagids.  The  Egyptian  kingdom  had  the  advantage  of 
exceptional  security.  To  invade  it  was  most  difficult,  for  the 
desert  borderlands  were  a  natural  protection.  A  submissive 
people  furnished  an  immense  revenue  to  the  Lagid  kings,  whose 
capital  was  Alexandria,  named  after  its  great  founder.  This  city 
had  succeeded  to  a  large  share  of  the  commerce  lost  by  Tyre  and 
Sidon  in  their  decay.  It  was  now  the  most  famous  city  of  the 
Greek-speaking  world.  For  relations  with  the  outside  world 
Alexandria  was  Egypt.  It  was  the  most  cosmopolitan  of  all  the 
great  capitals.  Beside  the  privileged  Greek  and  Macedonian 
population  there  were  many  foreigners,  among  them  a  colony 
of  Jews,  and  the  growing  mass  of  native  Egyptians.  A  strong 
force  of  mercenaries,  largely  Greek,  were  kept  to  support  the 
royal  power.  There  was  money  to  pay  them  well,  but  under 
a  weak  king  they  were  apt  to  give  trouble.  As  a  centre  of  learning 
Alexandria  was  unrivalled.  Special  studies,  needing  the  best 
known  appliances,  were  the  peculiar  glory  of  the  great  school 
of  research  known  as  the  Museum.  Under  the  earlier  Ptolemies 
the  power  of  Egypt  had  been  great.  A  strong  fleet  had  enabled 
them  to  extend  their  influence  abroad.  Cyprus  and  the  district 
of  Gyrene  were  provinces  of  the  kingdom.  A  number  of  Aegean 
islands  and  coast-towns  of  Asia  Minor  were  dependencies  of  Egypt, 
also  a  large  part  of  Cilicia.  But  the  policy  of  the  Lagids  was  not 
really  warlike.    Commerce  and  security  were  its  chief  aims.    They 


xv]  Attalids.     Roman  policy  i6i 

were  old  friends  of  Rhodes,  and  we  have  seen  that  they  had  long 
ago  entered  into  relations  with  Rome.  But  after  the  death  of 
Ptolemy  III  (222)  the  Lagid  house  degenerated.  Under  weak 
kings  the  native  race  began  to  come  to  the  front,  and  the  power 
of  Egypt  was  declining.  The  fifth  Ptolemy  (205 — 181)  succeeded 
to  the  throne  as  a  boy,  and  the  intrigues  of  courtiers  and  the 
outbreaks  of  the  turbulent  mob  of  Alexandria  form  henceforth 
a  great  part  of  Egyptian  history. 

190.  Fergamum  mid  the  Attalids.  If  we  roughly  label 
Macedon  as  a  national  kingdom,  Syria  as  a  semi-oriental  empire, 
and  Egypt  as  a  snug  property  of  a  foreign  crown,  we  may  call 
the  Pergamene  kingdom  a  successful  enterprise.  Attalus  I  (241 
to  197)  succeeded  to  the  fortress  treasure  and  territory  which  his 
uncle  had  seized  during  the  wars  of  Alexander's  Successors.  He 
defeated  the  restless  Galatians  and  took  the  title  of  King.  The 
country  over  which  he  ruled  in  western  Asia  Minor  was  not  large 
but  rich,  and  the  wealth  of  Attalus  was  his  strength.  He  could 
keep  up  considerable  armies  and  fleets.  His  capital  Pergamum 
was  a  famous  art-centre,  and  he  was  much  concerned  to  maintain 
friendly  relations  abroad,  particularly  with  the  Greek  states.  But 
the  three  great  Successor-Kings  looked  on  him  as  an  upstart,  and 
his  fear  of  Philip  and  Antiochus  drove  him  into  alliance  with 
Rome.  For  his  kingdom  was  artificial,  not  national,  and  his 
frontiers  insecure. 

191.  The  Roman  position.  Thus  the  Roman  Senate  had  to 
face  the  prospect  of  disturbance  in  the  East  through  the  action 
of  two  aggressive  kings,  Philip  and  Antiochus.  The  fatal  results 
of  letting  things  drift  had  been  seen  in  the  case  of  Spain,  where 
the  neglect  to  resist  Carthage  in  time  had  made  possible  the 
Hannibalic  war.  Of  the  ambitions  of  the  two  kings  there  was 
no  doubt,  for  they  had  in  203  made  a  compact  to  divide  between 
them  most  of  the  outlying  dependencies  of  Egypt.  The  resistance 
offered  by  Rhodes  and  Pergamum  had  for  the  moment  checked 
this  attempted  robbery.  There  was  therefore  still  time  for  Rome 
to  intervene  with  effect  and  save  her  friends.  The  Senate  could 
see  that  duty  and  interest  alike  required  her  to  do  so.  But  the 
people  were  weary  of  war,  and  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  induce 
the  Assembly  to  accept  the  challenge  of  Philip,  particularly  as 
there  were  armies  needed  elsewhere.  Spain  had  to  be  held  by 
a  force  on  the  spot,  and  it  was  plainly  necessary  to  pacify  northern 

H.  II 


1 62  Second  Macedonian  War  [ch. 

Italy  by  conquering  the  Gauls  who  had  given  so  much  trouble. 
But  the  Senate  found  a  way  out  of  their  difficulties.  The  troops 
for  service  in  Spain  were  raised  among  the  Italian  Allies.  For 
war  in  Greece  pains  were  taken  to  secure  as  many  Greek  allies  as 
possible  and  keep  down  the  numbers  of  Roman  troops.  Thus 
the  burden  was  made  lighter  for  Roman  citizens,  and  the  Assembly 
was  at  last  persuaded  to  declare  war. 

192.  Second  Macedonian  war  200 — 197  B.C.  Rome  could 
not  look  on  while  Philip  made  himself  master  in  the  Aegean  and 
Antiochus  overpowered  Egypt.  Interest  and  duty  urged  her  to 
support  her  friends,  Egypt  Pergamum  and  Rhodes,  powers  whose 
policy  was  one  of  peace  and  trade.  But  the  Senate  wisely  took 
in  hand  only  the  case  of  Philip  for  the  present.  Their  plan  was 
to  fight  him  in  Greece,  with  the  help  of  Greek  allies,  and  to  drive 
him  out  of  the  Aegean  with  a  strong  fleet.  On  the  water  the 
allied  fleet  was  completely  successful.  On  land  progress  was 
slow.  The  Greek  states  generally  waited  to  see  what  would 
happen.  The  campaign  of  the  consul  Galba  in  200  was  in- 
decisive, and  also  that  of  P.  Villius  in  199.  But  Rome  seemed 
to  be  in  earnest  and  there  was  a  chance  of  putting  an  end  to 
Macedonian  domination  in  Greece.  Roman  diplomacy  began 
to  work  on  the  hopes  of  freedom.  In  199  the  Aetolian  League 
declared  war  against  Philip,  but  many  of  their  men  were  serving 
for  hire  in  Egypt.  Philip  defeated  their  forces  in  Thessaly,  and 
also  beat  back  an  invasion  of  barbarians  from  the  North.  Mean- 
while Antiochus  was  victorious  in  the  Syrian  war :  he  patched  up 
a  peace  with  Egypt  and  turned  to  Asia  Minor,  hoping  to  make 
great  conquests  there  while  Philip  and  the  Romans  were  busy. 

193.  So  far  the  Roman  government  had  not  effected  much. 
The  old  soldiers  serving  in  the  army  as  volunteers  were  discon- 
tented, and  the  system  of  placing  the  yearly  consuls,  average  men, 
in  command  had  not  been  a  success.  Greater  eff'orts  and  an  able 
general  were  clearly  needed.  The  Senate  changed  its  policy. 
Scruples  were  overruled,  and  a  young  noble,  Titus  Quinctius 
Flamininus,  was  elected  consul  for  198,  though  not  yet  30  years 
of  age.  He  had  served  in  the  Hannibalic  war,  and  his  knowledge 
of  Greek  and  sympathy  with  Greeks  made  him  peculiarly  qualified 
for  conducting  a  war  in  Greece,  where  diplomacy  was  not  less 
important  than  the  force  of  arms.  While  Flamininus  was  raising 
an  army,  among  them  many  volunteers,  there  was  danger  that 


xv]  The  coalition  against  Philip  163 

Rome  might  lose  the  help  of  Attalus.  Pergamum  was  menaced 
by  the  movements  of  Antiochus,  and  Attalus  needed  all  his  forces 
to  defend  his  kingdom.  But  the  Senate  sent  a  humble  embassy 
and  persuaded  the  Syrian  king  not  to  molest  their  ally.  Antiochus 
cared  nothing  for  his  ally  Philip,  and  the  mutual  suspicions  of 
eastern  kings  were  thus  turned  to  account  in  the  interest  of  Rome. 

194.  Flamininus  drove  Philip  out  of  a  strong  position  in 
Epirus  and  forced  him  to  retreat  into  Thessaly.  The  Roman 
army  wintered  in  Phocis,  drawing  supplies  by  sea.  Meanwhile 
the  Roman  commander  was  winning  favour  in  Greece  by  his 
considerate  treatment  of  the  people.  At  the  autumn  meeting 
of  the  Achaean  League  a  great  debate  took  place.  Against  the 
old  connexion  of  the  Achaeans  with  Macedon  was  set  the  prospect 
of  recovering  Corinth,  the  key  of  Peloponnesus,  which  was  still  in 
Macedonian  hands.  After  hearing  the  speeches  of  envoys  from 
both  sides,  the  Federal  Assembly  voted  to  join  Rome.  Omitting 
minor  details,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the  chief  Greek  powers 
were  now  arrayed  against  Philip.  The  aUied  fleet  commanded 
the  sea,  and  the  armies  of  the  coalition,  Roman  Aetolian  Per- 
gamene  and  Achaean,  were  free  to  operate  by  land.  The  extent 
of  Roman  authority  was  shewn  in  the  supplies  forwarded  from 
Sicily  and  Sardinia,  and  in  the  coming  of  an  auxiliary  force  from 
Numidia,  sent  by  king  Masinissa  to  fight  for  Rome.  Flamininus 
was  kept  on  in  command  as  proconsul  in  197.  Negotiations  for 
peace  failed,  Philip  not  being  as  yet  prepared  to  give  up  the  three 
great  fortresses,  the  *  fetters '  of  Greece.  So  a  victory  in  the  field 
was  necessary  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 

195.  The  armies  that  faced  each  other  in  Thessaly  differed 
widely  in  the  organization  of  their  main  bodies,  the  infantry.  The 
system  of  massing  men  in  bodies  of  great  depth,  a  Greek  invention, 
had  been  developed  in  the  fourth  century  B.C.  by  the  Macedonian 
kings  Philip  II  and  his  son  Alexander  the  Great.  This  famous 
formation,  known  as  the  Phalanx,  was  very  effective  in  a  direct 
charge.  It  broke  through  the  shallower  formation  of  an  enemies' 
line,  and  the  disorder  thus  produced  was  generally  fatal,  being 
followed  up  by  cavalry.  The  weapon  of  the  phalanx  infantry  was 
the  saristty  a  long  pike  of  considerable  weight.  But  when  the 
men  were  formed  in  the  usual  depth  of  16  files,  there  was  a  great 
waste  of  offensive  power.  Only  five  pike-heads  could  project 
before  the  front  rank :  the  eleven  ranks  in  the  rear  held  their 

II — 2 


1 64  Cy  noscephalae  [ch. 

pikes  pointing  upwards,  their  weight  alone  adding  to  the  shock 
of  the  charge.  The  phalanx  was  a  close  and  clumsy  column,  very 
liable  to  be  itself  thrown  into  disorder  on  broken  ground,  and  so 
to  become  helpless.  But  it  was  irresistible  when  circumstances 
favoured  it.  Some  70  years  before  this  Pyrrhus  had  employed 
it  in  Italy  with  skill  and  success.  But  in  course  of  time  military 
pedantry  had  intensified  its  defects,  and  it  was  now  more  than 
ever  unfitted  for  the  changing  conditions  of  the  battlefield.  The 
Roman  Legion  was  an  elastic  formation.  The  maniples  of  which 
it  was  made  up  had  each  its  own  organization,  and  the  rout  of 
one  did  not  disorder  the  rest.  The  pilum  and  sword  were  a  far 
handier  equipment  than  the  sarisa.  The  legionary  had  great 
freedom  of  movement,  and  could  at  need  change  his  front  quickly, 
while  the  phalangite,  wedged  fast  by  pressure,  was  in  no  position 
to  withstand  a  sudden  flank  attack.  Moreover  Roman  military 
skill  had  doubtless  improved  owing  to  the  recent  lessons  of  the 
second  Punic  war. 

196.  So  it  was  that  when  the  armies  met  in  misty  weather 
on  the  hills  known  as  the  *  Dog's  Heads '  the  rigid  phalanx  was 
a  failure.  Flamininus  won  a  complete  victory.  But  the  Aetolian 
horse  had  done  good  service  in  the  battle,  and  claimed  the  chief 
credit  of  the  day.  The  Roman  general  could  not  put  up  with  the 
boasting  and  pretensions  of  the  Aetolian  leaders,  and  was  driven 
to  ignore  their  claims  in  dealing  with  the  affairs  of  Greece.  He 
refused  to  prolong  the  war  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  Philip, 
or  to  allow  the  League  to  reannex  Thessalian  cities  of  which 
Philip  had  deprived  them.  Peace,  and  freedom  for  Greek  cities, 
were  the  aim  of  his  policy.  Philip  made  submission,  agreeing  to 
give  up  his  possessions  in  Greece,  such  as  Thessaly  and  Euboea, 
to  evacuate  the  three  fetter-fortresses,  and  to  pay  a  war  indemnity. 
The  peace  was  ratified  at  Rome,  and  in  the  next  year  (196) 
Flamininus,  still  proconsul,  was  joined  by  the  usual  ten  com- 
missioners, who  under  his  presidency  were  to  see  to  the  details, 
and  to  settle  Greek  affairs  generally.  Several  minor  operations 
of  war  occurred  in  the  meantime  in  various  parts,  but  we  need 
not  dwell  on  them.  The  victory  of  Cynoscephalae  had  decided 
that  Greek  questions  should  for  the  present  be  submitted  to 
Roman  arbitration :  and  so  they  were,  to  the  disgust  of  the 
enraged  Aetolians.  But  it  was  the  policy  of  Rome  to  restore 
order  and  contentment  in  Greece  so  far  as  possible.     The  move- 


xv]  Roman  policy  in  Greece  165 

ments  of  Antiochus  were  causing  anxiety,  and  there  had  been 
grave  disasters  in  Spain. 

197.  ^Freedom''  of  the  Greeks.  The  peace  in  its  final  form, 
dictated  by  the  Senate,  included  the  evacuation  by  Philip  of 
towns  held  by  him  in  Asia  Minor,  the  surrender  of  his  fleet,  and 
clauses  restricting  his  freedom  of  warlike  action.  If  he  was  for- 
bidden to  keep  an  army  of  more  than  5000  men,  the  clause  was 
not  strictly  enforced.  In  short,  he  was  confined  to  his  ancestral 
kingdom,  but  not  destroyed  :  his  power  would  suffice  to  make 
him  a  bulwark  against  the  restless  barbarians  of  the  North.  That 
his  presence  would  serve  to  keep  the  Greeks  quiet,  and  conscious 
of  depending  on  Rome,  was  a  point  probably  not  overlooked. 
The  decisions  of  the  Roman  commission  in  the  affairs  of  Greece 
were  announced  at  the  Isthmian  festival  to  the  eager  assembled 
multitude.  When  it  was  understood  that  those  Greeks  who  had 
been  subject  to  Philip  were  declared  free,  while  nothing  was  said 
about  the  rest  (their  freedom  being  assumed),  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  meeting  was  unbounded.  But  wild  demonstrations  of  joy 
were  not  enough  to  give  peace  and  unity  to  the  jealous  states  of 
Greece.  Moreover  '  freedom'  in  the  Roman  sense  did  not  include 
the  freedom  to  take  any  step  displeasing  to  Rome.  Henceforth 
there  was  a  distinction,  very  galling  to  Greeks,  between  what  they 
had  technically  a  full  right  to  do  and  what  they  could  in  practice 
venture  to  do  without  offending  Rome.  The  misunderstandings 
arising  from  the  difference  in  their  respective  views  of  '  freedom ' 
were  a  large  part  of  Greek  history  in  the  next  50  years. 

198.  The  war  was  over,  but  the  awards  of  the  commissioners 
did  not  give  universal  satisfaction.  Some  allies,  such  as  the  Achaean 
League,  received  extensions  of  territory,  but  it  seems  clear  that 
Rome  did  not  mean  to  allow  another  great  warlike  power  to  be 
built  up  in  Greece,  perhaps  to  be  as  troublesome  as  Macedon 
had  lately  been.  The  Aetolians  seemed  to  have  some  such  am- 
bition, and  it  was  therefore  thought  wise  to  refuse  their  extreme 
claims.  They  were  sulky  and  did  not  conceal  their  indignation. 
They  had  never  intended  to  submit  to  Roman  dictation,  nor  was 
it  as  yet  clear  that  this  was  the  inevitable  result  of  Roman  inter- 
vention. Philip's  position  was  different.  After  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  acting  on  Roman  advice,  he  applied  to  be  made  an  *  ally 
and  friend '  of  Rome.  The  request  was  granted,  and  he  thereby 
became  bound  not  to  fight  against  Rome,  remaining  free  to  help 


1 66  Antiochus  [ch. 

Rome  in  her  wars  or  to  stand  neutral  if  he  preferred  to  do  so. 
Thus  Rome  bound  him  over  not  to  help  Antiochus.  Antiochus 
had  left  him  to  be  humbled  by  Rome,  and  was  even  turning  his 
misfortunes  to  account  by  annexing  Greek  cities  in  Asia  to  which 
Philip  laid  claim.  The  Roman  commissioners  were  now  free  to 
deal  boldly  with  Antiochus.  Antiochus,  ignoring  their  previous 
warnings,  crossed  the  Hellespont  in  196  and  began  to  carry  out 
his  project  of  reconquering  the  parts  of  Thrace  which  he  claimed 
as  having  once  belonged  to  the  empire  of  Seleucus.  The  Roman 
envoys  found  him  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  busy  in  restoring 
the  fortress  of  Lysimacheia.  This  commanded  the  isthmus,  and 
it  meant  that  he  was  come  to  stay.  The  parties  could  not  agree. 
The  king  would  not  withdraw  from  Europe  at  the  order  of  Rome. 
He  asserted  his  right  to  recover  his  ancestral  dominions.  The 
Romans  could  not  consent  to  let  him  establish  himself  in  Europe. 
When  they  ordered  him  to  give  up  the  Greek  cities  he  had  seized, 
formerly  subject  to  the  kings  of  Egypt  or  Macedon,  he  replied 
that  Rome  had  no  concern  in  the  affairs  of  Asia.  A  false  report 
of  the  death  of  Ptolemy  V  caused  both  sides  to  end  the  conference 
and  find  a  pretext  for  hurrying  off  to  Alexandria  to  watch  over 
their  several  interests.  By  this  futile  diversion  the  development 
of  the  main  quarrel  was  suspended  for  a  time. 

199.  In  considering  the  relations  of  Rome  with  Antiochus 
we  must  bear  in  mind  that  neither  side  knew  what  we  know  now. 
The  Romans  feared  Antiochus  as  a  dangerous  enemy  who  must 
at  all  costs  be  prevented  from  coming  within  reach  of  Italy.  The 
king  had  no  fear  of  the  Romans  assailing  him  in  Asia,  and  little 
doubt  that  he  could,  if  he  chose,  face  them  successfully  in  Europe. 
So  great  was  their  misjudgment  of  each  other's  strength.  And 
the  king's  confidence  was  fatally  increased  by  the  flattery  of 
courtiers  who  did  not  venture  to  report  to  him  unwelcome  facts, 
necessary  for  judging  situations  rightly.  At  Rome  there  was  no 
lack  of  information,  derived  chiefly  from  Pergamum  and  Rhodes. 
These  powers  looked  to  Rome  for  protection  against  Antiochus, 
and  were  concerned  to  keep  alive  the  fear  of  the  king's  designs. 
They  made  much  of  the  king's  strength  in  order  to  alarm  their 
powerful  ally.  The  Senate  saw  that  it  was  not  Rome's  interest  to 
allow  her  eastern  allies  to  be  crushed,  for  Antiochus  would  th-en 
be  free  to  employ  all  his  forces  in  the  West.  Even  more  alarming 
was  the  news  that  the  king  had  been  joined  by  Hannibal.     For 


xv]  Hannibal.     Sparta  167 

this  Rome  had  to  thank  her  own  jealousy.  She  had  encouraged 
Masinissa  to  watch  Carthage,  and  she  had  on  occasion  dealt 
hardly  with  her  beaten  enemy.  But  still  Carthage  throve,  reviving 
under  the  reforms  and  good  administration  introduced  by  Hanni- 
bal as  leader  of  the  popular  party.  Roman  suspicion  was  aroused, 
and  fed  by  the  reports  received  from  the  wealthy  clique  whom 
Hannibal  had  driven  from  power.  These  men  were  base  enough 
to  play  upon  Roman  fears  in  order  to  get  rid  of  the  one  great 
Carthaginian.  A  Roman  embassy  came  to  impeach  Hannibal 
before  the  Punic  senate;  and  he,  to  avoid  being  sacrificed  to 
please  Rome,  fled  to  the  East. 

200.  Meanwhile  (195)  Flamininus,  still  in,  charge  of  Greek 
affairs,  had  to  deal  with  a  burning  question.  Argos,  once  a 
member  of  the  Achaean  League,  but  of  late  subject  to  Philip, 
had  been  transferred  by  Philip  to  Nabis  the  tyrant  of  Sparta. 
The  Achaeans  were  eager  to  recover  it,  all  the  more  as  Nabis, 
though  he  deserted  Philip,  had  acted  with  great  cruelty  at  Argos. 
A  congress  of  Greek  delegates  voted  for  war  with  Nabis,  in  spite 
of  the  furious  opposition  of  the  Aetolians.  Nabis  was  beaten, 
but  the  proconsul,  anxious  to  have  quiet  in  Greece,  and  more 
concerned  to  watch  Antiochus  than  to  destroy  Nabis,  did  his  best 
for  peace.  But  his  terms  were  severe,  and  the  tyrant  did  not 
accept  them  till  a  second  conflict  had  ended  in  the  assault  of 
Sparta,  in  which  the  city  was  only  saved  by  setting  it  on  fire. 
Nabis  had  now  to  give  up  Argos  and  some  other  towns,  to 
surrender  his  fleet,  to  pay  war-indemnities,  and  to  submit  to 
restriction  of  his  liberty  to  make  alliances  and  war.  But  the 
ruffian  was  still  left  in  being  as  ruler  of  Sparta,  and  the  Greeks 
guessed  rightly  that  the  Spartan  question  would  still  be  a  source 
of  trouble.  So  far  we  have  no  right  to  charge  the  Romans  with 
a  deliberate  aim  of  promoting  quarrels  and  dissensions  to  keep  the 
Greek  states  weak.  Greek  jealousy  was  of  home  growth.  The 
Aetolians  denounced  the  lenient  treatment  of  Nabis,  but  they 
were  far  more  angry  to  see  Argos  restored  to  their  Achaean 
rivals. 

201.  Greece  for  the  Greeks.  At  this  stage  orders  from 
Rome  intervened.  The  Senate  was  resolved  to  avoid  wars  so  far 
as  possible.  But  the  ambition  of  leading  men,  of  Scipio  in 
particular,  pointed  to  command  in  war.  In  order  to  thwart  it, 
the  Senate  appear  to  have  decided  to  patch  up  matters  East  and 


1 68  *  Freedom  '  in  Greece  [ch. 

West  and  to  withdraw  the  armies  from  Greece  and  Spain.  It  was 
premature  and  unwise,  but  Flamininus  had  to  go.  He  did  what 
he  could  to  strengthen  a  Roman  interest  in  Greece  by  placing 
Roman  partisans  (generally  the  wealthier  citizens)  in  power  in 
a  number  of  Greek  cities.  He  delighted  the  assembled  delegates 
by  announcing  the  immediate  evacuation  of  the  three  fetter- 
fortresses,  and  returned  to  Rome,  where  he  celebrated  a  splendid 
triumph.  Thus  in  194  Greece  was  left  nominally  free  and  at 
peace.  Such  was  the  Roman  policy.  The  Senate  wished  for  no 
wars,  above  all  for  no  annexations  likely  to  provoke  wars.  Flami- 
ninus and  the  rest  of  the  new  school  of  statesmen,  men  inspired  by 
admiration  of  Greek  literature  and  art,  fancied  that  in  removing 
the  Macedonian  yoke,  and  establishing  a  balance  of  power  among 
the  chief  Greek  states,  they  had  done  enough.  Freedom  would 
surely  be  turned  to  good  account  by  so  gifted  a  race,  and  Rome 
their  benefactress  would  have  no  further  trouble  from  the  quarrels 
of  the  Greeks.  The  sequel  proved  that  this  was  a  mistake.  Rome 
could  not  allow  the  Greeks  a  genuine  independence,  and  if  she 
meant  to  guide  them  peaceably  it  was  needful  that  she  should  rule 
them  effectively.  A  policy  of  leaving  them  to  their  own  devices, 
and  now  and  then  intervening  as  umpire,  could  only  succeed  if 
founded  on  a  thorough  understanding  of  Greek  ideas  and  Greek 
institutions.  And  this  understanding  the  Romans  lacked.  In 
particular,  they  never  understood  the  nature  of  Federal  govern- 
ments. In  Italy  it  had  been  the  Roman  policy  to  break  up 
Leagues,  and  to  attach  their  members  separately  to  Rome.  But 
she  did  rule  Italy,  and  at  present  she  did  not  and  would  not  rule 
Greece.  Yet  she  was  ever  seeking  to  deal  separately  with  the 
several  members  of  the  Leagues.  At  first  she  seems  to  have  acted 
in  ignorance :  the  time  came  when  she  acted  with  malignant 
purpose. 

202.  Roman  doings  in  the  West,  The  experience  of  the 
Hannibalic  war  had  taught  the  Roman  government  that  the 
power  paramount  in  Italy  must  for  its  own  security  advance  its 
frontier  to  the  Alps.  The  Cisalpine  Gauls  in  the  rich  lowlands 
of  the  Po  must  not  be  left  free  to  help  invaders.  The  Ligurians 
of  the  north-western  hills  were  a  troublesome  race.  Sometimes 
they  raided  Etruria ;  now  and  then  they  combined  with  the  Gauls 
to  resist  the  advance  of  Rome.  But  the  conquest  of  Liguria 
might  wait  for  a  time  ;  the  conquest  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  could  not. 


Plate    III 


6.     Coin  of  Philip  V  of  Macedon   (220—178  B.C.), 
obv.    Head  of  Philip. 

rev.    Athena  Alkis.     BASIAEfiS  ^lAinnOT. 
See  §§  140,  187. 


Coin  of  x\etolian  League  (?  192 — i  B.C.). 

obv.    ?  Head  of  Antiochus  HI,  elected  a-Tparaybs  avTOKparajp 

of  the  League. 
rev.    Meleager.     AITQAfiN. 

See  §§  204 — 207. 


Coin  of  Rhodes,  about  200  B.C. 
obv.    Head  of  Sun-god  (?  after  Colossus). 
rev.    Rose  (podop).      PO  below.     ?  Persephone.     Name  of 
magistrate  above. 

See  §§  185,  217,  222,  226. 


xv]  The  West.     Spain  169 

So  the  years  201 — 194  were  years  of  warfare  in  northern  Italy. 
We  have  no  trustworthy  record  of  these  wars,  but  we  know  that 
they  were  aggressive  wars,  probably  mismanaged.  No  sufficient 
effort  at  any  one  time  was  made.  When  the  Gauls  made  a  feigned 
submission,  there  was  a  temporary  lull  in  the  operations,  then 
a  fresh  outbreak  and  more  bloodshed.  Average  Roman  magis- 
trates held  command,  and  the  armies  were  such  as  could  be  spared 
while  other  forces  were  on  service  in  Greece  and  Spain.  No 
doubt  the  Gaulish  tribes  were  weakened,  but  at  the  cost  of  great 
Roman  losses.  The  colonies  on  the  Po  were  maintained,  but 
with  difficulty.  In  short,  a  beginning  had  been  made,  but  as  yet 
there  was  no  effective  conquest  of  Cisalpine  Gaul. 

203.  Spain.  In  the  far  West  also  Rome  meant  to  be 
mistress,  and  blundered  by  attempting  to  solve  the  Spanish 
problem  with  insufficient  means.  The  native  tribes  were  glad  to 
be  rid  of  Carthage,  but  unwilling  to  be  controlled  by  Rome. 
Rome  had  two  '  provinces '  there,  known  as  the  Nearer  and 
Further  Spain.  But  the  frontiers  were  disturbed  and  uncertain. 
The  governors  of  these  provinces  had  no  easy  task.  Each  had 
an  army,  inadequate  to  carry  on  a  serious  war,  and  composed 
of  contingents  of  Italian  Allies,  always  more  or  less  discontented. 
The  service  in  Spain  was  most  unpopular.  In  197  a  step  was 
taken  to  provide  a  regular  succession  of  governors.  The  number 
of  praetors  was  raised  from  four  to  six,  and  two  were  intended  for 
the  Spanish  posts.  A  delimitation  of  the  provincial  spheres  was 
carried  out,  and  some  concessions  made  to  the  great  trading  city 
of  Gades.  But  risings  of  the  native  tribes  and  disasters  to  the 
Roman  arms  soon  shewed  the  need  of  a  great  effort.  In  the 
year  195  we  find  the  consul  M.  Porcius  Cato  at  work  in  Spain 
with  a  strong  army,  including  Roman  legions.  He  was  a  man  of 
exceptional  energy,  and  he  not  only  gained  victories  and  pacified 
the  country  for  the  time,  but  took  steps  to  increase  its  prosperity 
and  contentment.  In  particular,  he  promoted  mining,  as  Hanni- 
bal had  done  before  him.  But  political  movements  at  Rome  led, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  his  premature  recall ;  and  Spain,  quiet  for  the 
moment,  was  left  under  two  praetors  as  before.  The  peninsula 
had  to  suffer  dreadful  things  under  Roman  mismanagement  in 
the  course  of  the  next  60  years.  The  policy  of  Rome  may  be 
now  stated  in  few  words.  In  the  East  she  made  final  conquests, 
but  shrank  from  the  needful  annexations  :  in  the  West  (for  Sardi- 


170  The  Aetolians  and  Antiochus  [ch. 

nia  and  Corsica  are  further  instances)  she  was  ready  to  annex, 
but  cruelly  slow  to  carry  out  the  needful  conquests. 

204.  The  war  with  Antiochus  192 — 190  B.C.  We  have 
seen  that  by  the  year  195  it  was  clear  that  a  war  was  inevitable. 
But  it  did  not  break  out  at  once.  Antiochus,  having  gained 
a  footing  in  Europe,  was  for  a  time  busy  asserting  his  power  in 
southern  Asia  Minor.  The  Romans  were  in  no  hurry.  They 
took  matters  very  seriously.  In  194  they  founded  a  number  of 
colonies  in  southern  Italy,  fortresses  to  protect  the  coast,  and 
prepared  to  guard  Sicily  also,  fearing  an  invasion  by  sea.  The 
year  193  was  a  time  of  negotiations,  each  side  trying  to  put  the 
other  in  the  wrong,  but  nothing  came  of  the  embassies.  It  was 
the  situation  in  Greece  that  brought  on  actual  hostilities.  The 
Aetolians  stirred  up  Nabis  to  try  and  recover  by  war  the  towns  of 
which  he  had  been  deprived  in  Laconia.  Of  the  minor  Greek 
states  several  were  ready  to  follow  the  lead  of  the  Aetolians.  But 
Philip  of  Macedon  and  the  Achaean  League  were  loyal  to  Rome. 
Nothing  could  be  done  against  Rome  in  Greece  without  the  aid 
of  a  great  military  power.  It  is  said  that  the  Aetolians  tried  to 
win  the  support  of  Philip,  who  detested  them  and  refused.  But 
they  seem  to  have  thought  that  he  was  only  waiting  to  see  whether 
a  strong  coalition  could  be  formed  against  Rome.  They  turned 
to  Antiochus,  holding  out  prospects  of  a  great  rising  in  Greece  if 
the  king  would  but  come  to  head  it.  This  he  undertook  to  do, 
relying  on  the  boasted  forces  of  the  League  and  its  sympathizers. 
They  were  in  fact  trusting  to  the  vast  resources  of  Antiochus.  It 
was  a  partnership  in  which  each  partner  relied  on  the  other,  and 
mutual  deception  led  naturally  to  common  ruin. 

205.  Antiochus  had  indeed  no  trusty  allies,  willing  to  make 
great  sacrifices  in  a  common  cause.  Even  in  and  beyond  the 
Aegean  Rome  was  sure  of  the  zealous  support  of  the  Rhodian 
republic  and  some  other  maritime  Greek  cities,  also  of  Eumenes  II 
king  of  Pergamum,  not  to  mention  Egypt.  All  these  powers 
looked  to  Rome  for  protection  against  the  ambition  of  Antiochus. 
The  effective  military  strength  of  the  Seleucid  empire  was  greatly 
overrated  by  its  opponents.  It  consisted  of  contingents  drawn 
from  eastern  peoples  owning  a  lukewarm  or  forced  allegiance  to 
the  ruler  of  Antioch,  and  of  mercenaries,  Galatian  or  Cretan, 
ready  to  serve  for  hire  in  any  cause.  If  the  weakness  of  a  power 
so  lacking  in  national  cohesion  was  at  all  clearly  understood,  it 


xv]  Antiochus  in  Greece  171 

was  assumed  that  the  presence  of  Hannibal  would  lead  to  the 
formation  of  efficient  armaments  and  supply  the  best  of  contem- 
porary generalship.  Hannibal  knew  the  mettle  of  the  Romans, 
and  we  hear  that  in  his  opinion  the  only  chance  of  success  lay  in 
a  vigorous  invasion  of  Italy,  which  he  offered  to  conduct.  An 
attempt  to  gain  the  support  of  Carthage  was  foiled  by  the  party 
in  power  there.  Meanwhile  Hannibal  lost  favour  at  court  through 
insisting  on  unwelcome  truths.  The  king  decided  on  a  campaign 
in  Greece.  This  plan  was  foredoomed  to  failure,  unless  he  at 
once  placed  in  the  field  a  large  and  well-trained  army,  and  sent 
large  sums  of  money  to  maintain  it  and  his  Greek  allies  as  well. 
But  he  did  not  do  so.  In  Peloponnesus  war  broke  out  in  192. 
The  Achaeans  defeated  Nabis,  who  was  soon  after  murdered  by 
an  Aetolian  force  nominally  sent  to  his  aid.  These  Aetolians 
were  massacred  by  the  Spartans,  and  Sparta  was  attached  to  the 
Achaean  League  by  its  general  Philopoemen.  The  Aetolians 
were  busy  occupying  positions  in  readiness  for  the  coming  of 
Antiochus,  and  Flamininus,  who  was  again  acting  for  Rome  in 
Greece,  could  get  no  satisfaction  from  them. 

206.  In  192  Antiochus  came  with  something  over  10,000 
men  and  insufficient  supplies.  The  Aetolians  voted  him  the 
chief  command  of  their  forces.  But  their  enthusiasm  was  much 
damped  by  the  weakness  of  the  king's  army.  A  far  stronger  force 
was  necessary  if  Greek  states  were  to  be  induced  to  declare  for 
him.  He  promised  to  furnish  immense  armaments  on  land  and 
sea,  and  supplies  to  match.  But  he  had  made  a  bad  beginning. 
A  section  of  the  Aetolians  mistrusted  him,  and  the  Achaean 
League,  after  hearing  the  envoys  of  Antiochus  and  the  Aetolians, 
and  Flamininus  in  reply,  decided  to  cooperate  with  Rome.  At 
this  stage  he  was  cheered  by  a  few  strokes  of  luck.  Chalcis  fell 
into  his  hands,  and  became  his  base  of  operations.  In  a  short 
time  he  was  master  of  Euboea  and  a  considerable  part  of  the 
adjoining  mainland.  The  Boeotians  joined  him,  and  he  won  a 
number  of  Thessalian  towns  in  a  short  campaign.  But  the 
adhesion  of  these  petty  states  was  worthless,  as  Hannibal  is  said 
to  have  pointed  out.  The  help  of  Macedon  would  be  worth 
securing.  But  Philip  held  aloof.  The  Epirotes  would  not 
commit  themselves  to  a  war  with  Rome.  Meanwhile  the  rein- 
forcements from  Asia  were  delayed,  and  when  they  arrived  they 
were  insufficient  for  the  work  in  hand.     At  this  time  the  Romans 


172  Thermopylae  [ch. 

had  already  sent  over  an  army  to  Epirus,  and  had  declared  war. 
Antiochus  passed  a  luxurious  winter  at  Chalcis,  apparently  uncon- 
scious of  his  danger. 

207.  The  Romans  were  usually  slow  to  take  the  field, 
and  on  this  occasion  their  preparations  were  more  than  usually 
deliberate  and  complete.  Home  defence,  the  fleet,  religious 
precautions,  supplies,  were  carefully  attended  to.  The  foreign 
allies,  Masinissa,  Carthage,  Ptolemy,  Philip,  all  zealously  sent 
contingents  or  money  and  corn.  Eumenes  and  the  Rhodians 
were  of  course  hard  at  work.  In  191  the  consul  Manius  Acilius 
Glabrio  crossed  the  Adriatic  with  a  strong  force.  The  army  sent 
to  Epirus  was  already  recovering  Thessalian  cities  with  the  help 
of  Philip.  The  Aetolians,  who  had  invited  Antiochus  to  Greece, 
now  failed  him,  sending  only  4000  men  to  his  aid.  The  king  fell 
back  upon  the  famous  pass  of  Thermopylae,  where  he  was  defeated 
by  Glabrio  with  the  loss  of  nearly  all  his  army.  The  pass  had 
been  turned  by  a  Roman  detachment  led  by  the  ever-active  Cato. 
After  his  recent  victories  in  Spain,  the  ex-consul  was  ready  to 
serve  as  a  subordinate  against  Rome's  enemy.  Such  was  the 
spirit  against  which  the  misguided  Antiochus  had  to  contend. 
The  king  fled  to  Chalcis,  and  so  to  Ephesus,  where  he  fondly 
imagined  himself  out  of  Roman  reach.  The  general  submission 
of  the  Greek  states  that  had  joined  him  was  made  without  delay. 
The  Aetolians  too  were  driven  to  negotiate,  and  persuaded  to 
'  entrust  themselves  to  the  faith  of  the  Roman  people,'  not  under- 
standing that  this  was  the  Roman  phrase  for  unconditional 
surrender.  A  quarrel  arose,  and  the  Assembly  of  their  League, 
encouraged  by  money  and  promises  from  Antiochus,  went  on 
with  the  war. 

208.  Roman  policy.  The  siege  of  Naupactus,  where  the 
AetoHans  were  making  a  stand,  was  a  difficult  undertaking, 
but  it  was  not  the  most  important  part  of  the  Roman  pro- 
ceedings in  Greece.  Rome's  allies,  Philip  and  the  Achaeans, 
were  acting  independently.  The  Achaeans  were  annexing  the 
Peloponnesian  states  that  had  belonged  to  the  Aetolian  League, 
and  were  buying  the  island  of  Zacynthus  from  the  present  oc- 
cupant. The  Messenians  objected  to  submit  to  the  Achaeans, 
and  put  themselves  in  the  hands  of  Flamininus.  The  Roman 
agent  insisted  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Achaean  force,  but 
ordered  the  Messenians  to  join  the  League  and  to  recall  their 


xv]  Selfish  policy  of  Rome  173 

own    exiles.      Thus    an   unwilling    member   was   added   to   the 
League,  while  Messene  itself  was  exposed  to  the  certainty  of 
sedition  within.     Flamininus  then  claimed  Zacynthus  for  Rome, 
warning   the  Achaeans   not  to   risk  their   compact  sovranty  in 
the   Peloponnese   by  seeking   extensions   abroad.     To   this   the 
League  was  forced  to   consent.     Philip  was  making  conquests 
in  the  North  with  leave  of  the  consul  Glabrio.     But  Flamininus 
pointed  out  that  it  was  not  Rome's  interest  to  let  him  win  and 
keep  these  territories,  or  to  weaken  the  Aetolians  further.     The 
siege  of  Naupactus  was  raised,  and  the  decision  of  policy  re- 
ferred to  Rome.     It  seems  clear  that  a  change  was  coming  over 
Roman  policy  in  Greece.     The  philhellene  party  in  the  Senate 
might  wish  to  treat  the  Greeks  kindly  and  interfere  with  them 
as  little  as  possible.     But  Antiochus  had  proved  that  Greece 
might  at  any  time  be  made  a  base  of  operations  against  Rome. 
By  keeping  all  the  Greek  states  weak  and  disunited  (and  Greek 
jealousy  made   this   easy)   the  danger  might  be   reduced  to   a 
minimum,  and  Rome  would  thus  be  spared  much  trouble  and 
expense.     As  time  went  on,  this  policy  became  cruel  and  ma- 
lignant.    For  the   present  it  was   simply  an   attempt  to   avoid 
future   embarrassments.     But  what  to   Rome  was   a   saving   of 
trouble  was  a  slow  torture  to  the  Greek  Leagues,  particularly 
to  a  highly-organized  federation  like  that  of  the  Achaeans.     The 
Roman  claim  to  deal  directly  with  separate  members  superseded 
the  central  authority  of  the  League.     Sparta  was  already  giving 
trouble   in  this  respect,  and  was  destined  to   give   more   later 
on,  under  Roman  encouragement.     So  the  Achaeans,  the  loyal 
friends   of  Rome,   had   to   learn  that   in   their   case  '  freedom ' 
meant  the  liability  to  have  their  internal  relations  subjected  to 
Roman  interference  and  revision.     Philip,  their  former  overlord, 
was  for  the  moment  treated  with  kindness  and  civility  by  the 
Romans,   who   were   about   to   require   his   further   help.     The 
Aetolians  were  let  off  easily.     In  short,   there  was   henceforth 
to  be  only  one  interest  dominating  the  whole  Balkan  peninsula, 
and  that  interest  the  selfish  policy  of  Rome. 

209.  The  Aetolians  were  not  willing  to  accept  the  terms 
offered  by  the  Senate,  so  war  began  again.  But  to  put  down 
Antiochus  was  the  chief  business  in  hand.  The  joint  fleets  of 
Rome  Rhodes  and  Pergamum  defeated  his  fleet,  but  it  was  seen 
that  only  a  crushing  defeat  on  land   could  force  the  king  to 


174  Magnesia  [ch. 

withdraw  from  Europe  and  western  Asia  Minor.  Nothing  less 
than  this  would  render  him  harmless.  So  all  preparations  were 
carefully  made  as  before,  and  the  consul  appointed  to  command, 
Lucius  Cornelius  Scipio,  had  with  him  his  brother,  the  great 
Africanus,  as  his  adviser.  The  Scipios,  eager  to  win  the  glory 
of  victory  within  the  year  (190),  gave  the  Aetolians  another  truce 
for  a  fresh  embassy,  and  set  out  to  deal  with  Antiochus.  They 
had  to  choose  between  two  risks.  If  they  took  their  army  across 
the  Aegean,  a  single  disaster  might  be  fatal.  If  they  took  the 
land-route,  it  was  necessary  to  rely  on  the  friendly  cooperation 
of  Philip.  Inquiry  shewed  that  Philip  was  both  loyal  and  ready, 
so  the  latter  course  was  chosen.  While  they  were  on  their  way, 
Pergamum  was  attacked  by  the  king's  forces,  but  without  success. 
The  fleets  too  were  at  work.  A  Rhodian  squadron  was  destroyed, 
but  the  Rhodians  equipped  another,  and  prevented  Hannibal, 
who  was  bringing  up  a  fleet  from  the  East,  from  joining  the  king's 
other  fleet  at  Ephesus.  Soon  after  this,  the  allied  fleet  gained 
a  great  victory  off  Myonnesus  in  Ionia  and  held  command  of 
the  sea.  The  Roman  army  was  approaching  the  Hellespont, 
and  Antiochus,  who  had  hoped  to  be  safe  in  Asia,  was  now 
thoroughly  frightened.  He  evacuated  Lysimacheia,  giving  up 
his  hold  on  Europe.  An  attempt  to  negotiate  had  failed,  and 
he  set  himself  to  increase  his  army  by  contingents  of  various 
peoples.  But  it  was  not  numbers  that  were  needed,  and  spirit 
and  discipline  were  lacking  in  his  splendid  and  motley  host. 
Again  he  tried  to  negotiate,  but  the  Roman  terms  were  too  hard. 
The  armies  met  near  Magnesia  by  mount  Sipylus.  Tactical  errors 
on  the  king's  part  seem  to  have  rendered  even  the  best  part  of 
his  army,  the  phalanx  drawn  up  in  sections  32  files  deep,  quite 
ineffective.  Rout  quickly  followed.  It  is  said  that  out  of  70,000 
men  50,000  were  killed  or  taken  prisoners.  Africanus  had  been 
sick,  and  bore  no  part  in  the  battle.  L.  Scipio  the  consul  had 
the  credit  of  the  victory,  but  the  effective  commander  was  his 
subordinate  Cn.  Domitius,  and  Eumenes  of  Pergamum  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  on  the  field. 

210.  So  far  as  Antiochus  was  concerned,  the  war  was  at  an 
end.  He  had  to  accept  the  Taurus  range  as  the  north-western 
boundary  of  his  kingdom,  to  pay  a  great  war-indemnity,  to  feed 
the  Roman  army  while  in  Asia,  and  to  deliver  up  certain  dan- 
gerous persons.     Among  the  last  was  Hannibal,  who  managed 


xv]  The  eastern  settlement  175 

to  escape.  All  now  knew  where  the  real  centre  of  power  lay, 
and  numerous  embassies  came  to  seek  favour  at  Rome.  A 
senatorial  commission  was  as  usual  sent  to  the  East  to  arrange 
the  details  of  the  territorial  settlement.  A  vast  area  in  Asia 
Minor  and  a  small  district  in  Europe,  ceded  by  Antiochus,  had 
to  be  disposed  of  The  Roman  Senate  had  no  desire  for  an- 
nexation with  all  its  responsibilities.  There  were  three  parties 
anxious  to  share  the  pickings  of  the  provinces  detached  from 
the  Seleucid  realm ;  PhiHp,  Eumenes,  and  the  Rhodian  republic. 
To  the  last,  already  possessed  of  a  province  on  the  Asiatic  main- 
land, were  assigned  Lycia  and  southern  Caria.  To  Eumenes 
were  granted  immense  territories,  many  times  larger  than  his 
present  kingdom.  His  frontier  was  to  touch  Bithynia  Galatia 
Cappadocia  Cilicia  and  Lycia,  and  to  include  northern  Caria. 
It  seems  certain  that  the  generosity  of  Rome  was  part  of  a 
far-sighted  policy.  If  Eumenes  could  establish  himself  firmly 
in  this  great  new  territory,  he  would  serve  to  watch  Antiochus 
and  Philip,  while  his  exertions  in  securing  his  sovranty  would 
keep  him  employed.  To  Philip,  beyond  a  few  compliments  and 
remission  of  the  outstanding  balance  of  his  war-indemnity,  no 
reward  was  given.  The  three  claimants  were  jealous  of  each 
other,  as  plainly  appeared  in  the  discussion  of  the  future  status 
of  the  Greek  cities  in  the  coast-lands  of  the  Aegean.  Eumenes 
wished  to  have  them  as  tributaries.  Philip .  coveted  those  in 
Thrace.  Rhodes  was  all  for  having  them  free.  This,  said 
Eumenes,  would  make  them  in  effect  dependencies  of  Rhodes. 
The  Senate  finally  decided  to  let  Eumenes  have  some  that  had 
formerly  been  tributary  to  Pergamum,  and  to  declare  the  rest 
free.  Thus  Rome  fostered  the  jealousy  of  her  'friends'  in  her 
own  interest,  as  she  had  done  in  Greece,  and  left  herself  free  to 
intervene  as  umpire  in  disputes  that  were  only  too  likely  to  arise. 
211.  But  there  were  still  two  quarters  in  which  there  was 
some  reason  for  the  forcible  assertion  of  Roman  power.  Of  the 
consuls  for  189,  M.  Fulvius  Nobilior  was  sent  to  humble  the 
Aetolians  and  teach  them  a  lesson,  for  they  were  still  giving 
trouble.  The  chief  operation  of  this  war  was  the  siege  of  the 
stubbornly  defended  city  of  Ambracia.  The  terms  of  peace 
finally  imposed  on  the  Aetolians  included,  beside  the  usual 
penalties  of  defeat,  two  special  provisions.  The  foreign  policy 
of  the  League  was  to  be  wholly  dependent  on  that  of  Rome, 


176  Galatian  war  [ch. 

and  it  was  to  cede  the  island  of  Cephallenia.  Thus  Rome  did 
not  destroy  the  League,  but  kept  it  as  a  vassal-state,  useful  for 
maintaining  a  balance  of  power  in  Greece.  She  annexed  another 
island,  according  to  her  usual  practice.  The  other  consul,  Cn. 
Manlius  Vulso,  took  over  the  command  in  Asia.  Whether  the 
Senate  meant  him  to  engage  in  war  or  not,  there  seems  to  have 
been  good  ground  for  a  demonstration  in  force,  that  the  peoples 
annexed  to  the  Pergamene  kingdom  might  understand  the  ne- 
cessity of  submission.  Eumenes,  in  short,  was  to  have  a  fair 
start;  and  Manlius  thirsted  for  military  glory.  In  the  uplands 
of  Asia  Minor  were  the  restless  Galatian  tribes.  What  with  their 
own  wars  and  their  mercenary  service  in  foreign  armies,  they 
had  been  disturbing  the  peace  and  accumulating  booty  for  about 
100  years.  With  the  help  of  Attalus,  the  brother  of  Eumenes, 
Manlius  carried  out  a  successful  expedition  into  the  interior,  and 
ended  by  two  great  victories  over  the  Galatians.  The  effect  of 
this  long  march  and  the  defeat  of  the  brave  barbarians  was  to 
prepare  the  ground  for  Eumenes,  while  making  it  clear  that  the 
real  overlord  of  these  parts  was  Rome. 

212.  Manlius  was  continued  in  command  as  proconsul,  and 
early  in  188  Eumenes  and  the  ten  commissioners  arrived  from 
Rome.  The  detailed  settlement  now  taken  in  hand  shewed 
clearly  the  intentions  of  the  Senate.  Peace  was  to  be  secured 
in  the  East :  nearer  home,  Philip  was  not  to  be  strengthened 
so  as  to  become  once  more  dangerous.  Antiochus  was  deprived 
of  his  fleet  and  elephants,  and  strictly  bound  by  treaty  excluding 
him  from  all  interference  in  the  western  countries  where  Roman 
influence  was  supreme.  The  Thracian  district  with  Lysimacheia 
and  other  cities  was  assigned  to  Eumenes,  not  to  Philip.  The 
king  of  Cappadocia,  on  whom  a  heavy  fine  had  been  laid  for 
his  support  of  Antiochus,  was  excused  half  the  penalty,  as  a 
further  favour  to  Eumenes,  who  thus  gained  a  friend  on  his 
new  eastern  frontier.  In  fact  Rome  acted  on  a  principle  of 
lowering  the  high  and  raising  the  low.  The  latter  would  be 
dependent  on  her  protection,  and  thereby  bound  to  loyalty. 
And  the  arbitration  on  which  she  insisted  in  treaties  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  wars  meant  simply  that  no  movements  were  to  be 
allowed  without  Roman  leave.  But,  if  Rome  gained  vast  prestige 
by  her  rapid  advance  to  the  first  place  in  the  East,  the  reaction 
of   the  East  on  Rome  was,  if  we  may  trust  Roman  tradition,  not 


xv]  Rome  and  the  Greek  States  177 

less  momentous.  It  had  been  shewn  that  oriental  armies  were 
no  match  in  battle  for  the  armies  of  Italy.  The  enormous  booty, 
in  particular  the  hoarded  Galatian  gold,  looted  by  the  troops  of 
Manlius,  opened  the  eyes  of  Roman  soldiers.  The  easy  gains 
and  glory  of  eastern  wars  made  a  deep  impression,  and  hence- 
forth we  find  men  regarding  military  service  as  a  source  of  profit, 
and  more  than  ever  loth  to  serve  in  the  hard  and  unremunerative 
warfare  of  the  West. 

213.  Manlius  took  back  his  army  by  land,  perhaps  to 
overawe  Philip.  Waggons  laden  with  spoil  made  their  progress 
slow,  but  they  got  through  somehow,  losing  some  men  and 
booty  by  the  attacks  of  Thracian  tribesmen.  They  crossed  the 
Adriatic  early  in  187.  While  he  had  been  in  Asia,  Fulvius  had 
been  busy  in  Greece.  Here  also  the  change  in  Roman  policy 
was  manifest.  In  188  Sparta  was  giving  trouble  to  the  Achaean 
League.  The  League,  lately  strengthened  by  the  wise  reforms  of 
Philopoemen,  was  well  able  to  coerce  Sparta.  Sparta  appealed 
to  Fulvius,  who  at  once  forbade  the  League  to  coerce  its  unruly 
member  till  the  Senate  gave  its  decision.  The  decision  was 
ambiguous.  Sparta  was  subdued  and  restored  to  the  League. 
But  the  Achaeans  were  of  course  greatly  annoyed  at  this  inter- 
ference in  their  federal  affairs,  while  the  Romans  were  more  than 
ever  jealous  of  a  power  possessed  of  so  much  vital  energy  and 
even  capable  of  growth  under  the  eyes  of  Rome.  Rome  had 
now  risen  to  a  marked  predominance  in  the  Mediterranean  world, 
and  her  aim  was  peace,  in  other  words  the  retention  of  this 
predominance  without  effort.  From  this  point  of  view  there  was 
no  room  for  gratitude  or  grudge.  Friend  and  foe  stood  on  the 
same  footing,  and  to  be  strong  and  independent  without  Roman 
leave  was  to  be  suspected.  There  was  also  a  change  coming 
over  Roman  public  life.  Contact  with  the  East  had  brought 
wealth  and  with  it  luxury.  Roman  nobles  were  losing  the  simple 
patriotism  of  their  fathers.  Old-fashioned  politicians  were  alarmed 
at  the  signs  of  the  times.  We  find  an  Old-Roman  party  beginning 
to  form,  in  opposition  to  the  new  school,  stubbornly  endeavouring 
to  withstand  the  growth  of  greed  and  ambition,  and  to  uphold  the 
honesty  frugality  and  scrupulousness  to  which  they  attributed  the 
success  of  Rome  in  the  past.  The  struggle  went  on  for  many 
years,  and  the  chief  figure  among  these  narrow-minded  but  well- 
meaning  reactionaries  was  Cato. 

H.  12 


178  Attacks  on  public  men  [ch. 

214.  For  the  present  this  movement  resulted  in  three  open 
attacks  on  men  distinguished  by  recent  victories.  The  details, 
in  part  obscure,  may  be  omitted.  The  general  line  taken  was 
to  impute  to  a  commander  improper  ambition,  shewn  in  rash  or 
brutal  conduct  to  foreign  peoples,  contrary  to  the  true  interest 
of  Rome.  Thus  great  efforts  were  made  to  rob  Fulvius  and 
Manlius  of  the  coveted  honour  of  a  triumph.  In  both  cases 
the  assailants  had  the  advantage  at  first,  but  time  and  private 
influence  were  too  strong  for  them,  and  both  the  triumphs  were 
granted.  Suggestions  of  a  corrupt  appropriation  of  state-moneys 
and  booty  were  another  form  of  imputation.  In  the  famous  but 
obscure  case  of  the  Scipios  they  seem  to  have  been  the  staple 
of  a  formal  charge  tried  before  a  specially  appointed  court.  It 
was  urged  that  the  circumstances  of  the  peace  granted  to  An- 
tiochus  were  highly  suspicious,  and  pointed  to  bribery.  Africanus 
had  made  many  enemies  by  his  haughty  bearing,  particularly 
among  the  jealous  nobles,  and  he  is  said  to  have  acted  in  a 
bold  defiant  manner  now.  His  brother  Lucius  was  condemned 
to  a  heavy  fine.  The  intervention  of  a  tribune  prevented  the 
completion  of  the  proceedings,  and  the  great  Africanus,  disgusted 
with  public  life,  passed  the  rest  of  his  days  in  retirement.  These 
affairs  shew  us  that  the  control  of  commanders  abroad  was  be- 
coming more  difficult  as  Rome  advanced.  They  remind  us  that 
the  responsibility  of  Roman  officials  was  always  difficult  to  en- 
force, depending  as  it  did  on  the  action  of  party-spirit,  capricious 
and  devoid  of  legal  principle.  To  rise  above  the  ordinary  level 
of  Roman  nobles  was  a  fault  less  easily  condoned  than  gross 
misconduct. 

215.  We  shall  see  below  that  the  years  186 — 173  were  not 
barren  of  important  events  either  in  the  internal  politics  of  Rome 
or  in  her  dealings  with  Italy  and  the  West.  For  the  present  let 
us  trace  the  course  of  affairs  in  Greece  down  to  the  war  of  171 — 
168,  in  which  the  Macedonian  kingdom  perished. 

Philip,  enraged  at  his  treatment  by  Rome,  set  himself  to 
repair  the  exhausted  resources  of  Macedon,  and  to  build  up  a 
fresh  army.  Roman  suspicions  were  soon  roused.  A  Roman 
commission  forbade  him  to  retain  his  conquests  in  northern 
Greece.  When  even  the  Thracian  coast-cities  were  denied  him, 
his  fury  vented  itself  in  a  massacre  of  the  people  of  Maronea. 
Unable  to  conceal  this  deed,  he  sent  his  son  Demetrius  to  Rome 


xv]  Philopoemen.     Hannibal  179 

to  pacify  the  Senate.  But  he  went  on  with  his  schemes,  and 
bided  his  time.  He  was  still  Rome's  '  Friend  and  ally,'  and  as 
such  was  closely  watched.  He  was  visited  by  Roman  com- 
missioners, and  it  was  well  known  that  hostile  reports  from 
other  witnesses  would  find  a  hearing  at  Rome.  The  same 
jealousy  appeared  in  Roman  dealings  with  the  Achaeans.  That 
the  League  was  eminently  loyal  and  pacific  made  no  difference. 
In  185  they  received  embassies  from  the  kings  of  Pergamum 
Syria  and  Egypt.  Great  care  was  taken  to  accept  no  offers  of 
which  Rome  might  fairly  complain.  But  the  mere  fact  of  friendly 
diplomatic  intercourse  between  powers  connected  with  Rome  was 
displeasing  to  the  Senate.  The  Senate  wished  to  keep  Rome's 
'Friends  and  allies'  apart  from  each  other,  while  bound  to 
dependence  on  the  paramount  power.  It  was  her  old  policy, 
but  it  was  henceforth  carried  out  with  less  and  less  scruple  as 
to  the  means.  Chronic  interference  in  Achaean  affairs  kept  the 
League  in  a  constant  state  of  unrest,  and  the  rules  of  the  federal 
constitution  were  disregarded  to  suit  the  convenience  of  Roman 
commissioners.  As  in  other  parts  of  Greece,  men  of  the  baser 
sort  were  beginning  to  form  a  party  abjectly  subservient  to  Rome. 
The  chief  source  of  trouble  arose  from  the  inclusion  of  unwilling 
members  in  the  League.  The  friction  with  Sparta  continued, 
and  Roman  commissions  only  fomented  the  evil.  Messene  se- 
ceded in  183,  and  in  the  war  that  followed  old  Philopoemen 
was  taken  prisoner  and  put  to  death.  It  was  a  bad  time  for 
Achaean  patriots.  In  Crete  too  Rome  intervened  as  umpire, 
with  the  same  result  of  leaving  that  distracted  island  more  dis- 
united than  ever.  In  this  same  year  Hannibal  was  at  last  hunted 
down.  He  had  taken  refuge  with  the  meanest  of  kings,  Prusias 
of  Bithynia.  A  Roman  embassy  with  a  military  escort  came  to 
demand  his  extradition,  and  he  took  poison  to  avoid  capture. 
All  these  proceedings  must  have  served  to  enlighten  the  Greek 
and  half-Greek  world  as  to  the  meaning  of  Friendship  and  Free- 
dom when  enjoyed  under  the  overlordship  of  Rome. 

216.  Phihp  had  sought  to  stave  off  Roman  hostility  by 
sending  his  favourite  son  Demetrius  to  plead  his  cause  at  Rome. 
We  hear  that  the  Senate  deferred  a  final  decision,  and  that 
leading  nobles  tried,  by  paying  great  attention  to  the  young 
prince,  to  estrange  him  from  his  father.  Meanwhile  another 
son,  Perseus,  was  busy  at  Pella,  undermining  the  influence  of 

12 — 2 


i8o  Perseus  L^h. 

his  brother.  Perseus  hoped  to  succeed  to  the  throne,  posing 
as  champion  of  a  national  interest  against  Demetrius  favoured 
by  Rome.  We  have  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  was  an  un- 
scrupulous villain,  ambitious,  but  weak  and  nerveless  in  character. 
Philip  in  his  latter  days  was  arbitrary  and  cruel.  Perseus  found 
agents  at  court,  and  his  spies  watched  Demetrius.  The  old  king 
was  led  to  suspect  his  favourite  son  of  designs  upon  his  father's 
life.  A  forged  letter  from  Rome  was  taken  as  proof  of  guilt,  and 
Demetrius  was  put  to  death  in  i8i.  In  179  Philip  learnt  that 
he  had  been  foully  tricked,  but  before  he  could  exclude  Perseus 
from  the  succession  he  died.  Perseus  now  hoped  to  revive  and 
extend  the  power  of  Macedon.  The  first  step  necessary  was  to 
get  rid  of  Roman  control.  With  this  view  he  took  great  pains 
to  improve  the  Macedonian  army  and  to  heap  up  vast  stores  of 
money.  While  he  sought  and  procured  recognition  as  king  and 
Friend  of  Rome,  it  seems  that  he  tried  to  induce  some  northern 
barbarians  to  invade  Italy.  Nothing  came  of  this,  but  the  Senate 
heard  of  the  design.  He  surrounded  himself  at  home  with  a 
gang  of  men  wholly  dependent  on  his  favour,  and  looked  abroad 
for  allies.  By  dynastic  marriages  he  connected  himself  with 
Prusias  of  Bithynia  and  Seleucus  IV  now  king  of  Syria.  He 
exchanged  civilities  with  the  Rhodian  republic.  All  these  moves 
were  viewed  uneasily  by  the  Senate,  particularly  the  last. 

217.  The  cities  of  Lycia,  handed  over  to  Rhodes  in  189, 
were  united  in  a  federal  League.  They  rose  against  the  Rhodians, 
who  for  the  time  put  down  the  rebellion.  They  appealed  to 
Rome,  and  the  Senate  now  held  that  according  to  the  terms 
of  the  award  the  Lycians  were  friends  and  allies  of  Rhodes, 
not  subjects.  This  seems  to  have  been  in  177.  The  Rhodian 
government  was  too  cautious  to  resent  this  malign  treatment 
openly,  but  henceforth  their  relations  with  Rome  were  less  warm 
and  certain ;  there  was  now  a  party  in  Rhodes  inclined  to  look 
more  kindly  on  the  approaches  of  Perseus.  Perseus  went  on 
with  his  intrigues,  and  grew  bolder.  In  174  he  visited  northern 
Greece,  winning  favour  in  various  quarters.  He  knew  that 
Roman  interventions  had  brought  little  happiness  to  the  Greek 
states.  In  particular,  he  tried  to  renew  friendly  relations,  long 
broken  off,  with  the  Achaean  League.  The  partisans  of  Rome 
with  difficulty  prevented  this,  and  the  plausible  king  had  sown 
the  seeds  of  dissension  in  the  League.     It  was  a  time  of  un- 


xv]  The  coming  struggle  i8i 

easiness.  There  was  trouble  in  Aetolia,  in  Crete,  in  Lycia ;  and 
Rome,  engaged  in  wearisome  western  wars  and  afflicted  with 
plague  in  the  city,  was  in  no  mood  for  another  Macedonian 
war.  The  Senate  sent  commissioners  to  keep  things  quiet,  but 
the  Greeks  remained  restless.  In  173  the  report  of  envoys  was 
alarming.  Disorders  were  spreading,  Perseus  meant  war,  and 
was  fast  gaining  popularity  in  Greece.  Temporary  quiet  was 
restored,  but  the  situation  was  now  serious,  and  Roman  em- 
bassies were  sent  to  watch  Roman  interests  at  Pella  Alexandria 
and  Antioch.  In  Egypt  the  old  friendship  was  to  be  renewed 
with  the  young  Ptolemy  (VI  or  VII)  Philometor,  who  had  come 
to  the  throne  in  181.  In  Syria  Antiochus  IV  Epiphanes  had 
succeeded  his  brother  Seleucus  in  175.  He  had  in  his  youth 
lived  at  Rome  for  some  time  as  a  hostage  for  his  father  An- 
tiochus III,  and  had  become  an  admirer  of  Roman  institutions. 
He  was  now  a  crazy  autocrat,  with  a  mania  for  reproducing  in 
Antioch  the  elections,  law-courts,  even  gladiatorial  shows,  that 
he  had  seen  in  Rome.  Of  course  the  result  was  a  silly 
travesty.  But  this  madman  was  destined  to  make  trouble  in 
the  East. 

218.  The  Greek  East  saw  that  a  conflict  was  inevitable. 
The  growing  influence  of  Perseus,  and  the  dallying  policy  of 
Rome,  alarmed  Roman  partisans.  If  things  followed  their  present 
course,  and  Perseus  superseded  Rome  as  master  of  Greece,  with 
backers  in  Asia  also,  what  was  the  prospect  of  Rome's  allies? 
Embassies  flocked  to  Rome  to  get  light  on  the  situation.  Eumenes 
came  in  person.  But  the  Senate,  aware  that  it  would  take  some 
time  to  place  an  army  in  the  field,  still  refrained  from  shewing 
its  warlike  intentions.  It  was  Perseus  who  made  the  first  move, 
by  sending  men  to  assassinate  Eumenes  on  his  way  home. 
Eumenes  was  stunned  and  left  for  dead,  but  recovered.  The 
report  of  this  outrage  was  followed  by  further  evidence  of  the 
murderous  plots  of  Perseus.  It  appeared  that  he  had  tried  to 
arrange  a  regular  scheme  for  poisoning  Roman  representatives 
on  their  way  to  and  from  Greece.  Thus  in  1 7  2  the  Senate  could 
delay  no  longer.  They  declared  the  king  of  Macedon  a  public 
enemy  and  began  openly  to  prepare  for  war.  A  commission  was 
sent  to  ascertain  the  temper  of  some  of  Rome's  eastern  friends. 
On  their  return  they  reported  that  there  was  general  loyalty,  in 
spite  of  the  wide-spread  intrigues  of  Perseus :   of  Rhodes  they 


1 82  Preparations  [ch. 

spoke  with  less  confidence.  But,  as  the  Romans  had  feared 
Antiochus  overmuch,  so  now  they  underrated  the  power  of 
Perseus.  That  one  of  the  consuls  for  171  would  be  equal  to 
the  task  in  hand  seems  to  have  been  assumed.  Military  and 
naval  preparations  were  made,  and  religious  observances  ordered. 
A  force  was  sent  over  the  Adriatic  in  advance,  and  corn  bought 
abroad.  But  the  most  important  measures  were  those  directed 
to  lessen  the  strain  on  Roman  resources  in  the  West  until  Rome 
had  settled  accounts  with  Macedon.  Spain  was  just  now  fairly 
quiet,  but  Sardinia  Corsica  and  Sicily  had  to  be  firmly  held. 
Complaints  from  Carthage  as  to  the  aggressions  of  Masinissa 
had  to  be  shelved,  for  the  help  of  that  king  was  badly  needed. 
The  chief  saving  was  effected  in  the  North,  where  Ligurian  wars 
were  now  chronic.  Rome  refrained  from  conquest  for  a  while, 
and  the  hillmen  enjoyed  a  rest. 

219.     The  total  of  Roman  and  Italian   troops   sent  to  the 
front  is  not  certain.     Great  attention  was  paid  to  quality.     Two 
choice  legions  were  the  backbone  of  the  army.    Seasoned  soldiers, 
Romans  and  AlHes,  were  drawn  from  the  army  in  Liguria.    Veteran 
centurions  were  procured,  and  the  military  tribunes  were  to  be 
nominated  by  the  consul  in  command,  not  elected  by  the  As- 
sembly.    The  fleet  had  fighting  crews  of  citizens  (freedmen)  and 
Allies.     Of  foreign  kings,  Rome   could   rely  on  Eumenes  and 
Masinissa.     Antiochus  and  Ptolemy  were  preparing  to  fight  for 
possession  of  the   district   known   as  Hollow  Syria,  and  could 
send  only  their  promises.    Perseus  seems  to  have  had  in  all  about 
43,000  men,  of  whom  some  21,000  were  Macedonian  phalangites. 
The  rest  were  mercenaries,  Gauls,  Thracians,  with  Cretans  and 
other  Greeks,  and  the  whole  formed  a  well-equipped  and  efficient 
army.    Cotys,  a  Thracian  chief,  was  on  his  side,  but  some  Thracian 
tribes  favoured  Rome.    Prusias  of  Bithynia  and  Gentius  of  Illyria 
were  at  present  neutral,  but  Perseus  had  hopes  of  the  latter.     Of 
the  Greek  states  in  general  we  hear  that  the  poorer  citizens  mostly 
favoured  Perseus,  for  Roman  policy  always  was  to  give  power  to 
the  rich.     But  the  wealthier  citizens  were  not  all  of  one  mind. 
Some  leant  to  Rome,  some  to  Macedon,  as  their  private  interests 
led  them.     Some  patriotic  statesmen  hoped  that  neither  power 
would  crush  the  other,  and  so  room  be  left  for  more  free  action 
than  the  Greek  states  now  enjoyed.     This  is  the  analysis  of  the 
Achaean  Polybius.     We  may  add  that  all  these  smaller  powers 


xv]  Mismanaged  War  183 

were  agreed  in  wishing  to  be  on  the  winning  side,  for  fear  of  losing 
what  freedom  they  still  had. 

220.  War  was  formally  declared,  and  an  embassy  from  the 
nervous  Perseus  ordered  out  of  Italy.  A  Roman  commission 
visited  the  Greek  states,  calling  on  them  as  Friends  to  get  ready 
contingents  and  declare  for  Rome.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
Achaeans,  though  offended  at  recent  treatment,  were  consistently 
and  actively  loyal  to  Rome  all  through  the  war.  Meanwhile 
Perseus  was  quite  ready,  the  Romans  at  first  not.  The  king  made 
yet  another  attempt  to  negotiate  through  Q.  Marcius  Philippus, 
the  chief  Roman  commissioner.  He  met  his  match.  Marcius 
allowed  him  to  send  another  embassy  to  Rome,  thus  gaining  time, 
which  the  Romans  wanted.  The  Rhodians,  called  upon  to  sup- 
port Rome,  provided  a  fine  naval  contingent,  and  for  the  present, 
though  desiring  peace,  refused  to  stand  neutral  as  Perseus  asked 
them  to  do.  The  war  opened  feebly  on  the  part  of  Rome.  The 
consul  in  command,  P.  Licinius  Crassus,  was  no  skilled  soldier, 
and  competent  advisers  were  sent  to  guide  him.  Perseus  ad- 
vanced and  easily  occupied  most  of  northern  Thessaly,  but,  instead 
of  pressing  on,  he  then  formed  a  camp  and  waited  to  be  attacked. 
Crassus  did  much  the  same,  and  his  inactivity  revived  the  king's 
courage.  In  some  minor  engagements  the  Romans  had  the  worst 
of  it,  and  the  men  were  losing  heart.  Things  looked  badly :  the 
Greek  contingents  were  below  their  expected  strength,  and,  though 
a  few  Boeotian  towns  declared  for  Perseus  and  were  cruelly 
punished,  this  was  not  enough  to  restore  confidence.  The  suc- 
cess of  the  king  was  popular  in  Greece,  but  for  the  present  the 
fear  of  the  Romans  prevented  any  open  rising  in  his  favour.  On 
the  one  hand  the  arrival  of  the  Numidian  contingent  shewed  the 
wide  extent  of  Roman  power.  On  the  other  hand  a  revolution  in 
Epirus,  provoked  by  Roman  partisans,  added  the  Epirotes  to  the 
forces  of  Perseus.  It  was  the  king  himself  who  best  helped  the 
cause  of  Rome.  Evidently  he  did  not  understand  that  the  Senate 
were  in  earnest,  and  that  he  had  no  choice  but  either  to  lose  his 
kingdom  or  to  fight  and  win  without  delay.  He  made  offer  of  peace 
on  the  terms  granted  to  his  father  in  196.  The  Roman  answer  was 
a  demand  for  an  unconditional  surrender.  Even  so  he  went  on 
bargaining  to  no  purpose,  till  the  moral  effect  of  his  successes  was 
fooled  away.  After  one  or  two  indecisive  combats  the  war  ended 
for  the  season,  leaving  the  Romans  worse  off  than  when  it  began. 


184  Inefificiency  [ch. 

221.'.  Matters  were  not  mended  in  the  campaign  of  170.  The 
consul  A.  Hostilius  Mancinus  seems  to  have  done  something  to 
improve  the  tone  of  the  demoralized  army.  But  he  gained  no 
ground,  and  Perseus  was  able  to  chastise  the  Dardani  and  to 
invade  Illyria  and  Epirus,  while  the  Romans  could  not  enter 
Macedonia.  And  the  impotence  of  the  Roman  government  was 
to  blame  for  most  of  these  failures.  The  Senate,  loth  to  employ 
none  but  competent  commanders,  for  fear  of  raising  up  a  new 
AfricanuS;  was  not  able  to  control  bad  ones.  Barbarity  accom- 
panied inefficiency  as  before.  The  fleet,  engaged  in  no  serious 
naval  war,  was  even  a  greater  terror  than  the  army  to  loyal  or 
peaceful  people.  The  cruel  treatment  of  Coronea  in  171  was 
followed  by  the  destruction  of  Abdera  and  outrages  at  Chalcis. 
Redress  of  these  misdeeds  was  a  farce,  and  the  punishment  of 
guilty  officers  generally  eluded.  For  the  moment  the  fear  of 
Roman  severities  kept  the  Greeks  quiet,  and  drew  humble  em- 
bassies to  Rome.  Failures  had  not  made  the  Senate  less  domi- 
neering in  foreign  policy :  the  Cretans  were  warned  that  their 
friendly  relations  with  Rome  were  in  danger.  To  send  a  corps 
of  bowmen  to  the  Roman  army  was  not  enough  :  they  must  recall 
those  sent  to  Perseus,  or  take  the  consequences.  This  was  not 
a  Greek  (least  of  all  a  Cretan)  view.  It  was  an  object  with  both 
sides  to  gain  the  support  of  Gentius  the  Illyrian  chief.  His 
warlike  people  would  be  a  great  help  to  whoever  could  win  their 
support  and  find  money  to  keep  them  in  the  field.  He  defeated 
a  Roman  expeditionary  force.  In  the  winter  of  170 — 169  Perseus 
approached  Gentius,  but  would  not  give  him  a  subsidy,  so  for  the 
present  no  bargain  was  struck.  The  operations  of  170  were  un- 
important, but  the  Senate  had  cause  for  uneasiness  both  at  home 
and  in  Greece.  A  commission  sent  to  report  on  the  state  of  things 
at  the  front  brought  back  alarming  news  of  the  army.  Its  weak- 
ness was  lamentable,  the  allies  of  Rome  were  losing  heart,  and 
Perseus  gaining  ground.  To  raise  troops  for  the  next  campaign 
was  not  easy.  Only  after  some  pressure  on  feeble  magistrates 
was  compulsion  firmly  applied  and  the  levy  completed.  The 
censors  for  169,  both  strong  men,  had  to  begin  work  by  using 
their  authority  to  enforce  enrolment  and  even  to  send  absentees 
on  furlough  back  to  Greece.  The  Senate  strove  to  check  the 
harm  done  to  the  Roman  cause  by  the  exactions  of  Roman  officers. 
They  instructed  the  Greek  allies  to  supply  nothing  without  an 


Plate   IV 


Coin  of  Perseus  of  Maceclon  (179 — 168  B.C.). 
obv.    Head  of  Perseus.     Below,  name  of  mint-officer. 
rev.    Eagle  on  thunderbolt.     BASIAEfiS  HEPSEfiS. 
See  §§  216 — 226. 


^^^^^^^^^^^^    "^      w^^^^ 

^^^m 

^^^^^^^^^^   \  t  ^    .^ 

^r       -"^^B 

r    1 

^H 

^B 

^^^^H 

1       .i,.-.:.~  •,  ■ 

■tgj%^ 

1    -^v-  ...^-..^  -M 

^^HS^tesMl^^^  \ 

^-----  -.M 

^^^^H^c"^^  .7S>»-  ~^ 

^^^^^^^^^^H^^M^  '-<'      ,  -  ^ 

^MM 

10.    Coin  of  the  second  of  the  4  Macedonian  republics  167 — 146. 
Struck  after  the  grant  of  the  right  to  coin  in  silver,  158  B.C. 
obv.    Head  of  Artemis  in  a  Macedonian  shield. 
rev.    Club  in  oak-wreath.     MAKEAONfiN  AETTEPAS. 
See  §§  228,  243. 


II.     Coin  struck  by  Faustus  Sulla  about  62  B.C. 
obv.    Head  of  Diana,  lihcus.     FAVSTVS. 
rev.    Sulla   (L.,  the  Dictator)  seated,  receiving  Jugurtlia  from 
Bocchus,  who  holds  olive-branch.     FELIX. 
See  §  366. 


xv]  Q.    Marcius   Philippus  185 

order  of  the  House.  This  step  was  well  received,  but  the  state 
of  quarrelling  and  disorder  in  many  parts  of  Greece  shewed  that 
there  was  good  ground  for  anxiety. 

222.  The  consul  commanding  in  169  was  the  same  Marcius 
who  had  been  too  wily  for  Perseus  two  years  before.  He  was  a 
crafty  diplomatist :  in  a  former  military  command  he  had  failed. 
But  he  boldly  advanced  into  Macedonia.  It  is  true  he  found 
himself  in  an  awkward  fix,  unable  to  move  without  exposing  his 
army  to  attack  in  both  front  and  rear.  But  the  nerve  of  Perseus 
again  gave  way.  He  withdrew  the  detachments  that  commanded 
the  consul's  line  of  retreat,  and  fell  back,  thus  relieving  the  distress 
of  the  Romans.  In  his  panic  he  sent  orders  to  have  his  treasure 
sunk  in  the  sea.  When  Marcius  retired  after  a  futile  advance,  the 
king  recovered  his  treasure  and  tried  to  hide  the  fact  of  his  fright. 
He  once  more  fortified  a  strong  position  and  waited  to  be  attacked. 
While  this  season  was  passing,  still  without  any  decisive  result, 
many  things  were  happening,  of  which  we  have  no  satisfactory 
accounts.  Antiochus  (IV)  of  Syria  had  defeated  Ptolemy's  army. 
He  invaded  Egypt,  and  the  disorder  of  Egypt  interrupted  trade. 
The  Rhodians,  who  were  the  chief  sufferers,  sent  to  Rome  for 
leave  to  buy  corn  in  Sicily,  which  was  granted.  They  protested 
that  doubts  lately  thrown  on  their  loyalty  were  groundless,  and 
this  protest  was  conveyed  by  other  envoys  to  the  consul  Marcius 
also.  Now  Marcius  (if  Polybius  is  to  be  trusted)  had  lately  been 
dealing  with  the  Achaean s  in  a  very  strange  manner,  discouraging 
them  from  giving  much-needed  aid  to  the  Roman  force  in  Epirus. 
Perhaps  he  mistrusted  them ;  at  any  rate  Eumenes  was  trying  to 
improve  his  own  connexion  with  the  League,  and  Eumenes  was 
already  under  some  suspicion.  It  may  be  that  there  was  reason 
for  Roman  uneasiness  just  now;  for  the  mismanagement  of  the 
war  might  well  shake  the  faith  of  allies  whose  first  interest  was 
their  own  safety.  Marcius  now  suggested  to  the  Rhodian  envoys 
that  Rhodes,  a  power  ever  desirous  of  peace,  might  come  forward 
with  proposals  for  ending  the  war.  Whether  this  suggestion  was  a 
base  trick  to  lure  the  Rhodians  into  a  false  move,  or  was  prompted 
by  genuine  alarm  at  the  growing  complications  in  Egypt,  we  cannot 
tell.     What  came  of  it  we  shall  see  below. 

223.  It  was  manifestly  high  time  for  a  complete  change,  if 
the  position  of  Rome  beyond  the  Adriatic  was  to  be  retained.  In 
the  Rome  of  this  period  it  was  an  unusual  step  to  put  a  man  for- 


1 86  Paullus.     Gentius.     Eumenes  [ch. 

ward  for  the  consulship  merely  on  the  ground  of  his  fitness  for  the 
work  in  hand.  But  it  had  to  be  done.  A  good  soldier  was  now 
needed,  one  who  would  be  master  in  his  own  camp,  who  would 
be  incorruptible  himself  and  put  an  end  to  corruption  and  out- 
rages. The  choice  fell  on  L.  Aemilius  Paullus,  a  noble  of  old 
Patrician  family,  son  of  the  consul  killed  at  Cannae,  a  man  of 
60  years.  He  was  noted  for  his  scrupulous  attention  to  matters 
of  religion  and  civic  duty.  He  may  be  called  the  representative 
man  of  this  age,  in  which  Old  and  New  were  meeting  and  often 
conflicting.  In  him  old  Roman  traditions  and  temper  were 
smoothed  and  mollified  by  Greek  influences,  which  do  not  seem 
to  have  weakened  his  character  as  they  did  in  the  case  of  some 
others.  By  his  first  wife  he  had  two  sons,  to  whom  he  gave  the 
best  education  to  be  had,  partly  through  Greek  teachers.  One 
of  them  was  adopted  by  a  Fabius,  the  other  by  a  Scipio,  sons  of 
the  two  heroes  of  the  HannibaHc  war :  the  latter  became  famous 
afterwards  as  Scipio  AemiHanus.  Paullus  had  been  consul  in  182 
and  had  seen  a  good  deal  of  service.  But  he  had  no  record  of 
great  victories.  It  seems  certain  that  a  general  trust  in  his  moral 
qualities  was  the  reason  why  men  pressed  him  to  undertake  a  task 
in  which  three  ordinary  nobles  had  failed. 

224.  The  winter  of  169 — 168  was  eventful.  While  Paullus 
was  busy  raising  troops,  he  ascertained  by  inquiry  the  miserable 
state  of  things  at  the  front.  A  complete  reorganization  was  neces- 
sary, both  in  Macedonia  and  Illyria.  But  it  was  carried  out,  and 
a  praetor,  L.  Anicius,  selected  for  Illyria.  Perseus  had  at  last 
drawn  Gentius  into  the  war,  at  the  same  time  cheating  him  out 
of  nearly  all  the  promised  money.  But  Gentius  had  now  to  be 
conquered  without  delay.  Still  more  alarming  was  the  report 
(recorded  and  believed  by  Polybius)  that  Eumenes  also  was 
negotiating  with  Perseus,  and  willing  to  abandon  the  Romans 
for  a  price.  It  was  said  that  the  transaction  only  miscarried 
because  Eumenes  insisted  on  ready  money,  while  Perseus  wanted 
to  swindle  him  as  he  had  swindled  Gentius.  Moreover  the  Mace- 
donian fleet,  handled  no  doubt  by  Greeks,  profited  by  the  break- 
down of  the  Roman  naval  service.  It  commanded  the  Aegean, 
and  spared  only  the  merchantmen  of  Rhodes.  The  Roman 
partisans  in  that  republic  could  no  longer  control  the  popular 
movement  called  forth  by  an  embassy  from  Perseus  and  Gentius. 
Rhodian  envoys  were  sent  to  Rome  and  to  the  consul  in  com- 


xv]  Pydna.      Popillus  187 

mand,  charged  to  insist  on  the  ending  of  the  war,  and  miUtary 
preparations  were  begun  in  order  to  give  effect  to  intervention. 
When  we  add  that  Antiochus  was  now  besieging  Alexandria,  and 
that  a  Roman  embassy,  sent  to  warn  him  off  and  save  the  king- 
dom of  the  Ptolemies,  was  at  present  unable  to  get  further  than 
Delos,  where  the  sanctity  of  the  island  protected  them ;  and 
further,  that  Perseus  had  been  in  communication  with  Antiochus ; 
it  is  clear  that  Rome  had  now  to  face  a  situation  more  compli- 
cated and  perilous  than  ever. 

225.  But  Rome  was  now  in  earnest,  and  had  taken  the 
proper  means  to  achieve  her  end.  In  a  month's  time  Gentius 
was  a  captive,  and  firmness  combined  with  lenity  put  an  end  to 
the  war  in  Illyria.  In  Macedonia  PauUus  speedily  brought  his 
army  to  full  efficiency,  aided  by  his  well-selected  staff.  He  turned 
the  king's  position  and  drove  him  back  on  Pydna,  where  he 
defeated  him  with  great  slaughter.  After  all  the  heaping-up  of 
resources,  the  formation  of  armies,  the  subtle  diplomacy,  the 
doubts  and  dreams  of  wavering  powers,  one  hearty  stroke  brought 
down  the  whole  fabric.  The  sudden  end  of  a  weary  drama  left 
Rome  beyond  all  doubt  supreme,  and  the  revelation  of  what 
had  all  along  been  the  truth  caused  the  changed  situation  to  be 
accepted  at  once. 

226.  We  need  not  dwell  on  the  prompt  submission  of 
Macedonia,  or  on  the  flight  of  Perseus,  losing  his  cherished 
money  as  he  went  by  the  pilfering  or  swindling  of  his  associates. 
In  the  island  of  Samothrace  he  was  blockaded  by  the  Roman 
fleet  and  forced  to  surrender.  At  Rome  the  Rhodian  envoys 
offered  congratulations  and  suppressed  their  original  message. 
But  their  errand  was  known,  and  they  were  sent  back  without 
an  answer.  Rhodes  was  in  terror.  The  Roman  ambassadors, 
now  released  from  Delos,  were  entreated  to  hear  their  defence. 
C.  Popilius,  head  of  the  embassy,  bullied  them  into  a  frenzy  of 
fear  and  went  on  to  Egypt,  while  the  unhappy  Rhodians  sentenced 
Macedonian  partisans  to  death.  The  story  of  Popilius  in  Egypt 
is  famous.  The  Roman  handed  the  king  the  written  order  of 
the  Senate.  Antiochus  asked  for  time  to  consider  it.  Popilius 
with  his  stick  drew  a  circle  on  the  ground  and  required  the  king 
to  answer  Yes  or  No  before  he  left  the  circle.  Antiochus  sub- 
mitted, and  was  then  recognized  as  being  still  a  Friend  of  Rome. 
The  envoys  next  ordered  a  Syrian  force  out  of  Cyprus  and  re- 


i88 


The  great  Settlement 


[CH. 


united  the  island  to  Egypt.  Antiochus  on  his  way  home  vented 
his  rage  on  the  Jews,  and  provoked  the  famous  revolt  headed  by 
the  Maccabees. 

227.  The  Senate  had  now  to  dictate  terms  to  a  large  part 
of  the  civilized  world,  and  to  appoint  commissioners  for  settlement 
of  details.  It  is  well  to  consider  some  of  the  motives  that  guided 
their  policy.    First,  they  wished  to  secure  a  lasting  peace,  that  the 


Dyrrachiumj 

BrOfin'lusiuTn 
olLonia' 


f 


Corcj^ra 


CephalleniaM^ 
Zacynthus  ™^ 


Sketch  map  of  Balkan  peninsula  about  170  B.C.     Roman  dominions  in  black. 
Aetolia  a  dependent  ally  of  Rome  since  189.     Greece  in  'free'  Leagues, 
the  Achaean  now  including  the  whole  Peloponnesus.    The  'free  Laconian ' 
district  dotted.     The  divisions  of  Macedonia  167 — 148  B.C.   roughly  in- 
dicated by  dotted  lines. 

armies  abroad  and  the  reserve  forces  at  home  might  be  disbanded 
without  delay.  The  conquest  of  Liguria  was  enough  to  have  on 
hand.  Secondly,  they  meant  to  teach  the  Greek  East  such  a  lesson 
that  it  should  give  no  trouble  in  future.  There  was  to  be  no  more 
trusting  to  the  loyalty  of  Friends  and  allies.  Doubtful  friends  or 
conquered  foes,  all  must  be  paralysed.  The  guilty  would  of  course 
be  punished ;  the  suspected  must  not  go  scot-free  for  mere  defect 
of  convincing  proof.  On  the  other  hand  the  Senate  was  still 
resolved  to  annex  no  provinces.     The  ruling  nobles,  jealous  of 


XV]  of    167  B.C.  189 

equality  among  themselves,  knew  that  the  governors  of  civilized 
lands,  many  of  them  rich  fields  for  plunder,  would  be  beyond 
control.  At  home  they  would  rise  above  their  peers,  abroad  they 
were  only  too  likely  to  provoke  fresh  wars.  The  old-Roman  party 
dreaded  the  influence  of  the  East  on  Roman  character.  And  the 
abuses  that  might  arise  out  of  the  exploitation  of  mines  and  other 
resources  by  companies  of  Roman  capitalists  were,  it  is  said,  already 
foreseen.  Let  us  now  review  briefly  the  chief  points  of  the  great 
settlement  of  167. 

228.  '■Freedom?  The  conquered  peoples  were  to  be  'free.' 
That  is,  they  were  to  have  no  kings,  no  central  authorities  to 
which  they  might  rally  and  become  powerful.  In  Macedon  this 
meant  that  the  one  bond  of  union  known  to  the  people,  the 
monarchy  under  which  they  had  become  a  nation,  was  taken 
away.  The  country  was  to  be  cut  up  into  districts  (three  in 
Illyria,  four  in  Macedonia),  each  with  a  centre  and  constitution 
of  its  own.  Each  was  a  self-governing  unit,  isolated  on  an  old 
Roman  plan.  Its  members  could  contract  legal  marriages  and 
hold  property  only  within  their  own  district.  These  new  republics 
were  an  utterly  strange  system  to  the  peoples  of  that  part  of  the 
world.  And  all  the  men  who  had  any  experience  of  administra- 
tion were  ordered  to  depart  for  Italy  and  await  the  pleasure  of 
the  Roman  government.  Thus  the  inexperienced  mass  were  left 
helpless,  deprived  of  their  natural  leaders.  They  were  to  pay  to 
Rome  a  tribute,  half  the  amount  hitherto  paid  to  their  kings. 
This  reduced  taxation  seems  meant  to  reconcile  the  conquered 
to  the  new  system.  But  the  commercial  restrictions,  such  as 
prohibition  of  the  export  of  Macedonian  timber  and  the  import 
of  salt,  tended  to  check  the  growth  of  trade,  and  the  closing  of 
gold  and  silver  mines  stopped  another  industry  for  the  present. 
The  people  in  general  were  disarmed,  but  the  dwellers  in  border 
districts  were  allowed  the  means  of  defence  against  barbarian 
neighbours.  It  may  be  that  the  parcelling-out  of  a  large  country 
mattered  little  in  rude  Illyria :  in  Macedonia  it  was  the  cutting-up 
of  a  nation.  We  must  note  that  Rome,  implicitly  if  not  expressly, 
reserved  to  herself  the  sovran  power  over  the  whole  area.  She 
was  the  only  possible  umpire  in  any  dispute  :  her  leave  was  needed 
for  everything.  She  decHned  to  be  responsible  for  the  admini- 
stration, but  the  appointment  of  Roman  governors  would  at  any 
time  convert  the  conquered  countries  into  provinces. 


190  Pergamum  and  Rhodes  [ch. 

229.  ''Friendship'  Whatever  were  the  truth  as  to  the  sus- 
pected intrigues  of  Eumenes,  the  Senate  meant  to  teach  him  that 
he  ruled  by  Roman  leave  and  must  obey  orders.  An  invasion  of 
Galatians  was  probably  not  undertaken  without  Roman  connivance. 
When  he  sent  Attalus  to  complain  of  it,  Attalus  was  privately 
prompted  to  ask  for  a  part  of  his  brother's  kingdom.  A  message 
from  Eumenes  caused  him  to  decline  this  insidious  proposal.  So 
the  Attalid  house  was  not  weakened  by  a  dynastic  quarrel.  It  is 
said  that  leading  senators,  who  had  looked  for  bribes  to  favour 
his  claim,  were  disgusted  at  the  failure  of  this  dirty  intrigue,  and 
sent  a  hint  to  the  Galatians  that  they  might  worry  Pergamum. 

230.  The  harsh  treatment  of  Rhodes  is  remarkable,  when 
contrasted  with  the  comparative  leniency  shewn  to  Eumenes. 
Perhaps  the  republic,  unable  to  act  with  regal  secrecy,  was  thought 
to  have  offered  a  more  flagrant  insult  to  the  majesty  of  Rome. 
But  the  fact  of  Rhodes  being  primarily  a  naval  power  was  surely 
one  reason  for  Roman  severity.  Rome  kept  no  regular  fleet  in 
commission.  Her  policy  was  to  annex  islands  in  the  seas  round 
Italy,  and  to  trust  to  maritime  Greeks  for  the  speedy  provision 
of  a  fleet  when  needed.  Above  all  she  relied  on  Rhodes  to 
hold  in  check  all  attempts  to  create  a  hostile  sea-power  in  eastern 
waters.  Roman  confidence  was  now  shaken ;  it  was  even  pro- 
posed to  declare  war  against  the  Rhodians.  Cato  and  others 
managed  to  prevent  this,  but  the  Rhodians  were  terribly  frightened. 
In  the  settlement,  they  were  deprived  of  the  Lycian  and  Carian 
territories  granted  them  in  189,  thereby  losing  a  considerable 
revenue.  Their  commerce  was  injured  by  the  establishment  of 
Delos  as  a  free  port,  to  which  most  of  the  Aegean  trade  was 
soon  attracted.  Even  in  their  old  province  on  the  mainland 
there  was  a  rebellion^  the  suppression  of  which  was  a  further 
drain  on  their  resources.  They  learnt  that  the  days  of  simple 
Friendship  with  Rome  were  over,  and  applied  for  a  treaty.  Thus 
they  became  allies  of  Rome.  They  lost  all  power  of  independent 
action.  This  could  not  be  helped ;  at  least  they  had  a  clearly 
defined  position  stated  in  official  terms. 

231.  In  Greece  the  malignant  policy  of  promoting  disunion 
and  impotence  was  pursued  more  thoroughly  than  ever.  In  most 
of  the  states  vile  men  came  to  the  front  as  Roman  partisans,  and 
murders  of  anti-Roman  or  patriotic  leaders  were  the  order  of  the 
day.     Aetolia  in  particular  was  a  scene  of  massacres  and  banish- 


xv]  Greece.     Rome  Supreme  191 

ments.  A  black-list  of  the  chief  men  in  the  northern  Greek  states 
was  published  by  the  Roman  commission :  they  were  to  go  and 
stand  their  trial  in  Rome.  The  steady  loyalty  of  the  Achaean 
League  did  not  protect  it.  Infamous  traitors  accused  the  best 
patriots  of  disloyalty,  and  1000  men,  the  very  pick  of  their  citi- 
zens, were  deported  to  Italy.  Thus  Greek  public  life  was  robbed 
of  all  its  soundest  and  most  competent  elements.  Epirus  was 
for  the  moment  the  scene  of  the  worst  atrocities.  Its  chief  men 
had  been  removed  or  murdered.  Finally,  by  an  act  of  cruel 
treachery,  the  defenceless  country  was  swept  by  the  Roman  army. 
It  is  said  that  150,000  people  were  carried  oif  into  slavery.  The 
kindly  Paullus,  deservedly  popular  in  Greece,  had  to  preside  over 
the  commission  and  to  carry  out  these  abominations  ;  but  he  was 
not  the  man  to  question  the  orders  of  the  Senate. 

232.  The  old-fashioned  scruples  of  Paullus  caused  him  to 
keep  for  the  Roman  treasury  the  rich  war-booty  that  properly 
belonged  to  it.  For  himself  he  took  only  the  royal  library  of 
Macedon,  as  a  prize  for  his  grown-up  sons.  In  his  army  he 
had  maintained  discipline,  and  the  largess  given  to  the  soldiers 
at  his  triumph  was  on  a  moderate  scale.  We  hear  that  the  men 
were  sulky  at  the  poor  returns  from  the  sale  of  captives,  and 
grumbled  at  the  stingy  dole.  The  triumph  itself  was  splendid 
beyond  precedent.  But  it  was  the  state-finances  that  profited. 
The  old  war-tax  or  forced  loan  {tributu7n\  formerly  one  of  the 
regular  burdens  of  citizenship,  ceased  to  be  levied.  It  was  indeed 
a  turning-point  in  Roman  history.  The  Roman  soldier-citizen 
was  developing  into  a  greedy  mercenary,  and  an  honest  com- 
mander like  Paullus,  thinking  only  of  his  duty,  was  already 
exceptional.  And  the  position  of  Rome  was  now  one  of  un- 
challenged supremacy.  The  virtues  of  her  people  and  govern- 
ment had  been  a  wondrous  growth,  stimulated  by  the  actual  or 
probable  competition  of  rivals.  Now  there  was  no  rival  power, 
nor  the  smallest  likelihood  of  one  to  come.  The  hand  of  Rome 
was  everywhere,  and  no  fugitive  enemy  could  find  a  safe  refuge 
from  her  vengeance.  Nor  could  her  prisoners  in  Italy  escape. 
The  custody  of  Perseus  and  Gentius,  and  also  of  the  suspected 
Greeks,  was  provided  for  by  placing  them  out  in  towns  of  the 
Italian  Allies.  No  doubt  this  was  a  great  nuisance  and  respon- 
sibility laid  on  the  local  authorities,  but  it  was  a  saving  of  trouble 
to  the  Roman  government.    We  may  see  in  it  an  additional  proof 


192  The  deported  Greeks  [ch.  xv 

of  the  tendency  to  treat  the  AUies  as  subjects,  ever  since  the 
second  Punic  war.  And  the  unhappy  Greeks  were  left  to  pine 
away  in  confinement.  The  Senate  would  not  bring  them  to  trial. 
One  by  one  they  died  off:  what  became  of  the  survivors  we  shall 
see  below.  Very  few  had  the  good  luck  of  the  Achaean  Polybius, 
who  found  favour  with  some  cultivated  Romans  and  lived  in  some 
of  the  best  society  in  Rome. 

These  struggles  in  which  Rome  became  the  paramount  power 
in  the  East  were  affairs  of  little  fighting  and  much  diplomacy. 
Let  us  turn  to  the  striking  contrast  presented  by  her  doings  in 
the  West. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

WARS   AND    POLICY   IN   THE  WEST,    193—167  B.C. 

233.  Spain'^.  Our  knowledge  of  Spanish  affairs  in  this 
period  is  very  fragmentary.  We  read  of  obscure  wars  to  put 
down  native  risings,  generally  provoked  by  Roman  misdeeds,  of 
insincere  submissions  and  renewed  rebellions.  The  Roman  forces 
in  Spain,  mostly  Allies,  were  in  a  chronic  state  of  discontent.  It 
was  not  only  the  soldiers  that  disliked  the  Spanish  service,  with 
its  hardships  and  dangers,  and  small  prospect  of  rich  booty  to 
compensate  them  (in  case  they  survived  it)  for  their  long  exile 
from  Italy.  Praetors  also  shirked  the  Spanish  provinces.  In  176 
both  the  praetors  to  whom  the  lot  assigned  these  departments 
contrived  to  evade  the  duty.  Yet  the  occasional  employment 
of  native  levies  to  cooperate  with  Roman  armies  suggests  that 
better  management  might  have  made  things  work  more  smoothly. 
In  the  years  171 — 168,  when  Rome  was  busy  with  Perseus,  a  single 
praetor  was  left  in  charge  of  both  provinces.  The  previous  wars 
had  been  due  to  the  irritating  policy  of  the  Roman  governors, 
and  this  had  to  cease  for  a  time.  The  chief  war  of  this  period 
was  that  of  181 — 180,  when  a  great  rising  of  the  Celtiberians  in 
central  Spain  was  suppressed.  Roman  policy  appeared  at  its  best 
in  Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus,  who  ruled  the  Hither  Spain  in 
180  and  179.  By  kindly  and  fair  treatment  he  gained  the  con- 
fidence of  the  natives  and  led  them  to  more  settled  and  peaceful 
ways  of  life.  After  his  return  to  Rome  he  watched  over  their 
interests,  and  the  land  had  rest  for  some  25  years.  Oppression 
did  not  wholly  cease.  In  171  a  deputation  came  from  the  Spanish 
provinces  to  complain  of  recent  extortions.  Two  or  three  ex- 
governors  were  brought  to  trial  in  the  form  of  civil  actions  for 

^  This  chapter  resumes  the  narrative  from  §§  203,  218. 
H.  13 


194  Spain.     Sardinia  [ch. 

recovery  of  sums  wrung  by  them  from  the  provincials.  Senators 
of  the  old-Roman  party,  among  them  Cato  and  Paullus,  conducted 
the  several  cases  on  behalf  of  the  Spaniards.  Two  of  the  culprits 
went  into  exile  to  avoid  judgment  j  but  this  merely  meant  a  change 
of  residence  (probably  not  permanent)  to  Latin  towns  hard  by. 
No  effective  redress  was  gained.  But  the  Macedonian  war  was 
on  foot,  and  the  Senate  did  what  it  could  to  gratify  the  Spaniards 
by  passing  strict  orders  forbidding  certain  practices  of  governors. 
These  abuses  were  connected  with  the  collection  of  tribute,  par- 
ticularly with  the  valuation  of  corn.  But  to  get  good  regulations 
carried  out  was  the  really  difficult  matter,  and  so  it  remained. 
And  yet  it  had  been  wise  to  resent  oppression.  The  worst  abuses 
of  provincial  government  were  never  established  in  Spain.  Another 
Spanish  question  was  that  of  the  half-breeds,  children  of  Italians 
and  Spanish  mothers.  A  number  of  these  were  granted  a  town^ 
on  the  southern  coast,  where  they  formed  with  the  present  in- 
habitants a  peculiar  colony,  linked  to  Rome  on  special  terms. 
It  seems  that  the  amalgamation  of  races  and  Romanizing  of  the 
peninsula,  which  took  place  much  later,  might  have  made  great 
strides  now.  But  Roman  misgovernment  was  destined  to  do 
much  more  mischief  yet  in  Spain,  as  we  shall  see. 

234.  Sardinia  and  Corsica.  These  islands,  necessary  to 
Rome  as  lying  near  Italy  on  the  way  to  Spain,  had  been  annexed 
when  Carthage  was  helpless  after  the  first  Punic  war.  But  after 
half  a  century  they  had  still  never  been  really  conquered.  The 
combined  province  was  ruled  by  a  succession  of  yearly  praetors, 
who  often  had  to  fight  the  natives  of  the  interior.  Of  the  final 
result  there  could  be  no  doubt,  but  the  reluctance  to  act  boldly 
and  firmly  led  the  Romans  here  as  elsewhere  into  wasteful  wars, 
in  which  much  blood  was  shed  needlessly.  In  177  Sardinia  was 
taken  in  hand.  Gracchus  was  sent  there  as  consul,  and  kept  on 
as  proconsul  in  176.  He  quelled  all  resistance.  The  slave-market 
was  glutted  with  his  captives,  so  that  '  Sards  for  sale '  became  a 
phrase  for  anything  dirt-cheap.  But  there  was  an  end  of  general 
risings,  and  the  conquest  of  Corsica  in  173  left  the  province 
normally  a  quiet  one;  that  is,  unable  to  give  Rome  serious  trouble 
or  escape  the  extortions  of  bad  governors.  When  a  spare  praetor 
was  wanted  for  some  special  purpose  it  was  usual  to  employ  the 
man  to  whom  the  Sardinian  province  had  fallen. 

1  Carteia. 


xvi]  Liguria  195 

235'  Liguria.  The  broken  hill-country,  cut  up  by  ravines, 
formed  by  the  northwestern  Apennine  and  the  southwestern  Alps, 
was  inhabited  by  the  people  known  as  Ligures.  In  early  times 
they  had  probably  covered  a  much  wider  area,  and  had  been 
driven  back  into  the  hills  by  other  races.  Even  now  they  still  held 
the  highlands  that  looked  down  upon  the  Arno  and  the  Rhone. 
The  Romans  in  Etruria  and  the  Massaliots  in  their  seaboard 
territories  found  the  Ligurian  highlanders  troublesome  neighbours. 
It  was  the  occupation  of  the  rich  lowlands  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  that 
shewed  the  Romans  the  necessity  of  conquering  Liguria.  Until 
this  was  done  there  could  be  no  security  in  the  region  of  the  Po. 
It  was  a  case  of  deliberate  conquest,  carried  on  intermittently  and 
piecemeal.  There  was  no  central  power  in  Liguria,  and  the  sub- 
mission of  one  tribe  did  little  or  nothing  to  effect  the  subjugation 
of  the  rest.  So  the  warfare  begun  in  193  dragged  on  for  about 
forty  years  with  varying  fortune  and  vast  expenditure  of  human 
lives.  The  Ligurians  were  attacked  from  several  quarters,  mainly 
from  the  North,  for  most  of  the  country  slopes  that  way,  and  the 
streams  are  affluents  of  the  Po.  From  193  to  173  the  war  was 
practically  continuous.  It  was  the  '  province '  of  a  consul,  often 
of  both  consuls,  ordinary  Roman  yearly  magistrates.  Some  won, 
or  claimed  to  have  won,  victories,  and  had  triumphs,  so  cheaply 
earned  that  Ligurian  triumphs  became  a  byword.  The  defeats 
of  others  were  not  disasters  of  supreme  importance  :  the  assertion 
of  Roman  power  was  delayed,  but  Roman  dominion  in  Italy  was 
unshaken.  And  consuls  were  kept  employed  in  an  undertaking 
where  there  was  no  prospect  of  great  glory,  nothing  likely  to  raise 
a  man  far  above  his  fellow  nobles. 

236.  The  systematic  nature  of  the  Roman  advance  is  shewn 
in  the  foundation  of  fortress-colonies.  Of  those  in  Cisalpine  Gaul 
we  will  speak  below.  In  northern  Etruria  we  find  a  Latin  colony, 
Luca  (Lucca),  planted  inland  in  180,  and  in  177  a  citizen  colony, 
Luna,  near  the  partus  Veneris  (Bay  of  Spezia).  On  the  Ligurian 
coast  the  Romans  held  the  port  of  Genua  (Genoa),  and  the 
operations  on  this  side  included  the  suppression  of  the  local 
piracy,  at  times  troublesome  even  after  the  Roman  annexation 
of  Sardinia  and  Corsica.  But  descents  on  that  coast  were  not 
easy,  nor  always  successful.  The  stubborn  resistance  of  the 
Ligurians  at  last  caused  the  Romans  to  try  a  new  policy.  This 
was  the  transplantation  of  large  bodies  of  natives  to  places  far 

13—2 


196  Cisalpine  Gaul  [ch. 

from  their  home.  After  a  period  of  great  efforts,  40,000  of  them 
were  taken  away  (180)  and  settled  in  Samnium,  where  there  were 
some  vacant  state-lands,  and  7000  more  soon  after.  Other  bodies 
were  removed  to  lands  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  about  this  time.  Thus 
the  highland  population  was  somewhat  thinned  out,  while  the 
settlers  in  new  homes  were  not  likely  to  be  too  friendly  with  their 
neighbours  to  the  embarrassment  of  Rome.  But  the  Ligurians 
were  not  subdued  yet.  The  warfare  became  more  ferocious,  and 
in  177  a  Roman  fortress  was  taken.  In  173,  just  when  the  Senate 
wanted  to  have  quiet  for  a  time  until  they  had  dealt  with  Perseus, 
a  consul  provoked  the  Ligurians  by  selling  into  slavery  men  who 
had  surrendered.  The  Senate  tried  hard  to  cancel  the  transaction 
and  make  the  fullest  redress  for  this  barbarous  act  and  others  of 
the  same  kind.  But  in  spite  of  all  their  efforts  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  Ligurians  were  effectively  compensated  or  the  offender 
punished.  Mutual  exasperation  was  the  characteristic  feature  of 
these  wretched  wars,  and  it  was  only  because  it  suited  Roman 
convenience  that  the  years  171 — 168  were  an  interval  of  com- 
parative peace. 

237.  Cisalpine  Gaul.  Of  the  forward  movements  of  Rome 
in  this  period  the  most  judicious  and  well-managed  was  that  by 
which  she  secured  the  region  of  the  Po  and  advanced  her  northern 
frontier  to  the  Alps.  We  must  bear  in  mind  from  the  first  that 
the  country  known  as  Cisalpine  Gaul  did  not  become  a  Province, 
with  a  charter  and  a  governor,  for  about  a  century  more.  It  did 
not  become  technically  a  part  of  Italy  till  after  the  fall  of  the 
Roman  Republic.  But  it  was  virtually  attached  to  Italy,  and 
great  pains  were  taken  to  Romanize  the  inhabitants.  Colonies 
and  roads  helped  to  introduce  Roman  civilization  as  well  as  to 
facilitate  the  movement  of  Roman  armies.  In  short,  we  are 
entering  on  a  time  in  which  careful  policy,  rather  than  great 
battles,  is  the  chief  feature.  The  Gauls  had  learnt  the  power  of 
Rome :  Rome  had  learnt  the  value  of  the  Gauls,  and  meant  to 
control  them. 

238.  The  grouping  of  population  between  Alps  and  Apennine 
was  roughly  as  follows.  North-West,  in  the  district  about  Medio- 
lanum  (Milan)  dwelt  the  Insubres,  the  most  independent  of  the 
GauUsh  tribes.  Under  the  middle  Alps,  about  Verona  and  Brixia 
(Brescia)  were  the  Cenomani,  who  had  long  been  on  friendly 
terms  with  Rome.    South  of  the  Po,  in  the  district  about  Bononia 


xvi]  The  North-East  frontier  197 

(Bologna)  were  the  Boii.  These  were  in  the  direct  line  of  the 
Roman  advance,  lying  between  the  frontier-post  at  Ariminum 
(Rimini)  and  the  colonies  of  Placentia  and  Cremona,  founded 
in  218.  The  Boii  had  already  suffered  much  in  wars.  In  192 
we  hear  that  they  submitted  to  Rome,  on  terms  which  suggest 
that  the  wealthier  tribesmen  were  as  usual  favoured  and  thus 
a  Roman  party  formed  among  them.  The  confiscation  of  half 
their  territory  provided  room  for  Roman  colonies.  The  Veneti 
in  the  Po-delta  and  northeastern  lowlands  were  old  friends  or 
allies  of  Rome.  They  had  been  very  useful  in  former  times, 
and  seem  to  have  been  ready  to  fall  into  the  Roman  system. 

239.  It  was  clear  that  the  success  of  a  forward  movement 
would  add  a  vast  area  of  rich  country  to  the  dominions  of  Rome. 
The  undertaking  made  it  necessary  to  provide  for  the  security 
of  the  country  on  two  sides  where  it  lay  open  to  attack.  The 
Ligurians  were  troublesome  as  raiders ;  when  they  sent  aid  to 
rebellious  Gauls,  they  were  a  danger.  Hence  the  Ligurian  wars 
referred  to  above.  On  the  North-East  there  was  manifest  need 
of  a  more  defensible  frontier,  if  Rome  intended  to  protect  the 
low  country  of  the  Veneti.  Already  the  northern  barbarians 
(Gauls,  it  is  said,)  were  finding  their  way  over  the  passes  of  the 
Carnic  Alps.  We  hear  of  two  parties  who  came,  in  186  and  179, 
professing  a  desire  to  settle  peaceably  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic. 
This  might  be  the  beginning  of  a  great  migration,  and  could  not 
be  allowed.  The  intruders  were  sent  back  with  no  more  show  of 
force  than  was  necessary.  Rome  had  had  quite  enough  of  Trans- 
alpine Gauls  in  Italy,  and  it  had  been  rumoured  that  Philip  of 
Macedon  designed  to  promote  a  barbarian  invasion  by  this  route. 
It  was  therefore  a  precautionary  measure  when  the  peninsula  of 
Istria  (or  Histria)  was  conquered  in  183 — 181.  Roman  supremacy 
was  established  there,  and  the  control  of  the  harbours  was  con- 
venient for  checking  the  pirates  of  Illyria. 

240.  We  must  now  sketch  the  course  of  occupation  by  which 
the  Romans  took  possession  of  Cisalpine  Gaul.  In  190  fresh 
colonists  were  sent  to  reinforce  Placentia  and  Cremona.  In  189 
a  Latin  colony  was  founded  at  Bononia.  In  187  two  important 
roads  were  undertaken.  One  was  carried  over  the  Apennine  from 
Arretium  in  Etruria  to  Bononia.  The  other,  the  famous  via 
Aemilia,  ran  parallel  with  the  range,  along  the  low  ground,  from 
Ariminum  to  Placentia,  taking  Bononia  on  the  way.     There  were 


198  Extension  of  roads  [ch. 

thus  two  alternative  routes  from  Rome  to  Bononia,  and  a  good 
military  road  beyond,  connecting  Bononia  with  the  fortress  com- 
manding the  passage  of  the  great  river.     In  183  the  stretch  of 
road  from  Bononia  to  Placentia  was  guarded  by  the  foundation 
of  two  colonies,  Mutina  (Modena)  and  Parma.     These  mark  a 
change    in    Roman   policy.      They   were    citizen   colonies,    but 
organized  on  the  scale  of  Latin  colonies  and  designed  to  fulfil 
the  same  purpose.     Each  had  2000  colonists ;  each  was  a  new 
fortress,  holding  an  important  line   of  inland   communications. 
In  181   an  outlying  fortress  was  established  at  the  head  of  the 
Adriatic,  to  give  Rome  a  firm  foothold  in  the  North-East.     This 
was  a  step  connected  with  the  frontier-policy  of  the  Istrian  war. 
It  was  Aquileia,  a  Latin  colony  of  3000  men,  the  last  of  its  kind. 
Since  the  second  Punic  war,  the  increased  predominance  of  Rome 
in   Italy  had  caused  Roman   citizenship   to  be  valued  for   the 
privileges  that  went  with  it,  such  as  the  more  favourable  conditions 
of  military  service.     This  feeling  was  destined  to  grow  stronger, 
and  to  have  a  great  influence  on  the  course  of  Roman  history. 
It  seems  to  have  been  already  strong  enough  to   create  some 
difficulty  in  finding  colonists  willing  to  settle  in  new  homes  on 
no  better  terms  than  the  '  Latin  right.'     But  the  system  of  roads 
and  colonies  was  not  the  only  means  employed  to  consolidate 
Roman  dominion  in  the  Cisalpine.     It  seems  that  a  real  effort 
was  made  to  conciliate  the  Gauls  by  friendly  treatment.     When 
a  praetor  in  187  disarmed  the  Cenomani,  the  Senate  took  vigorous 
measures  to  enforce  full  redress  for  the  wrong,  and  for  once  the 
good  intention  seems  to  have  been  carried  out.     In  171  a  self- 
willed  consul  set  out  on  an  unauthorized  expedition  into  Illyria, 
hoping  to  win  glory  in  the  Macedonian  war.     Recalled  by  strict 
orders,  he  turned  upon  some  Alpine  tribes,  wantonly  ravaging  the 
lands  of  peaceful  neighbours  whom  it  was  folly  to  provoke.    Their 
appeal  to  the  Senate  was  met  with  civility  and  presents,  but  the 
author  of  the  outrage  eluded  punishment.     In  these  episodes  we 
may  find  traces  of  Roman  policy  in  the  North  during  the  war  of 
conquest  in  Liguria. 

241 .  In  speaking  of  the  war  with  Antiochus,  reference  was  made 
to  foundation  of  colonies  as  one  of  the  means  employed  to  protect 
southern  Italy  against  invasion  by  sea.  It  was  in  the  South  that 
Hannibal  had  found  support  among  the  ItaHan  Allies,  and  the 
experience  must  not  be  repeated.     So  in  194  no  less  than  eight 


xvi]  and  Colonies  199 

points  on  the  southern  coasts  were  occupied  by  citizen  colonies 
of  the  old  sort,  in  which  a  garrison  of  Roman  citizens  became 
a  kind  of  local  aristocracy  in  an  existing  town.  Of  these  eight, 
Puteoli  alone  was  a  place  of  commercial  importance.  In  193 — 192 
two  Latin  colonies  were  added,  one  of  them  also  on  the  coast. 
We  have  seen  that  the  invasion  feared  did  not  take  place.  What 
with  colonies  of  earlier  date  and  the  Greek  Allies,  such  as  Neapolis 
and  Rhegium,  the  southern  seaboard  was  safe  enough.  If  Samnites 
or  other  Allies  inland  were  still  discontented,  they  could  at  least 
receive  no  new  deliverer  by  sea.  Rome  was  determined  that 
neither  should  a  new  Hannibal  come  from  the  North.  It 
is  to  be  noted  that  the  defeat  of  Antiochus  (190)  was  at  once 
followed  by  the  foundation  of  Bononia  (189).  To  keep  out  all 
foreign  intruders,  and  to  have  the  undisputed  control  of  the 
resources  of  the  Italian  Confederacy,  were  the  first  objects  of 
the  Senate,  and  each  helped  to  secure  the  other.  As  in  playing 
off  Masinissa  against  Carthage,  as  in  the  policy  of  balancing  and 
weakening  followed  in  Greece  and  the  East,  the  ultimate  aim  was 
to  maintain  peace  with  the  least  possible  trouble  and  exertion. 
Therefore,  within  the  ever-widening  sphere  of  Roman  influence, 
no  movement  could  be  permitted  unless  authorized  by  Rome. 
Such  was  the  circular  argument  of  imperial  policy.  Conquest 
for  conquest's  sake  was  not  the  Roman  way.  But  pax  Romana 
was  not  less  costly:  it  led  inevitably  to  hypocrisies,  jealousy,  mis- 
understandings, frictions^  wars ;  and  it  came  to  much  the  same 
thing  in  the  end. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

EXTERNAL  AFFAIRS    167—133  B.C. 

242.  We  are  now  come  to  the  period  immediately  preceding 
that  revolutionary  century  (133 — 31)  which  ended  by  establishing 
a  disguised  but  effective  monarchy.  In  that  age  of  seditions  and 
civil  wars  the  prominent  fact  is  that  the  Roman  Republic,  unable 
to  cure  its  internal  maladies,  rent  itself,  while  the  subject  world 
passively  looked  on.  It  is  the  present  period,  in  which  all  the 
remaining  powers  that  might  cause  any  uneasiness  to  the  governing 
class  at  Rome  were  suppressed,  that  explains  the  strange  sequel. 
The  weakness  of  distracted  Rome  was  not  the  opportunity  of  the 
subject  peoples,  because  each  unit  was  too  weak  to  stand  alone, 
while  combined  action  was  impossible.  Nor  was  there  any  im- 
perial power  other  than  Rome  by  submitting  to  which  they  might 
in  despair  of  liberty  at  least  better  their  condition.  So  they 
waited,  not  in  vain.  The  same  internal  corruption  that  cankered 
and  destroyed  the  Roman  Republic  was  also  at  the  bottom  of 
provincial  extortion  and  misgovernment ;  and  when  Augustus 
made  an  end  of  corrupt  public  life  in  Rome,  he  at  once  relieved 
the  suffering  of  the  provinces.  We  have  now  to  give  a  short 
account  of  the  last  steps  by  which  the  pax  Romana  was  imposed 
on  the  Mediterranean  world,  and  Romans  set  free  to  work  their 
will  on  the  subject  peoples. 

243.  Macedon  and  Greece.  The  suppression  of  the  Mace- 
donian monarchy  was  a  great  blow  to  a  population  mainly  rustic, 
whose  national  unity  had  been  the  work  of  kings  and  who  were 
quite  unaccustomed  to  self-government.  The  four  republics  did 
not  work  well.  After  some  years  of  discomfort  and  discontent, 
in  149  a  pretender  appeared,  one  Andriscus,  who  professed  to 
be  a  natural  son  of  Perseus.     He  soon  drew  after  him  a  large 


CH.  xvii]  Macedonia  and  Greece  201 

following  of  men  who  hoped  to  restore  the  kingdom  and  be  a 
nation  once  more.  After  some  success  at  first,  he  was  defeated 
and  captured  by  the  praetor  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus.  In  146 
the  unsatisfactory  arrangements  were  ended  by  the  annexation 
of  Macedonia  as  a  Roman  Province.  Henceforth  it  was  the 
department  of  a  Roman  governor,  but  no  unnecessary  changes 
were  made  in  the  regulations  drawn  up  by  Paullus  and  the 
commission  of  167. 

244.  In  Greece  the  Achaean  League  was  by  far  the  most 
powerful  state  remaining.  As  such,  it  incurred  Roman  jealousy. 
We  have  seen  how  the  chief  Achaean  patriots  were  deported  to 
Italy,  and  the  Roman  partisans  w^ere  left  in  power.  But  patriotism 
was  not  extinct,  and  Achaean  embassies  pleaded  for  the  restora- 
tion, or  at  least  the  trial,  of  the  lost  leaders.  The  Senate  refused 
this,  and  addressed  its  answers  not  to  the  League  but  to  the 
several  members,  thus  ignoring  the  federal  union  and  seeking  to 
sow  discord  in  its  ranks.  And,  when  Sparta  once  more  began 
to  give  trouble,  an  appeal  to  Roman  arbitration  was  used  as  an 
opportunity  of  making  further  mischief.  But  the  League  still 
held  together.  In  150  the  survivors  of  the  exiled  1000,  about 
300  in  all,  were  allowed  to  return,  mostly  embittered  by  their 
dreary  captivity.  Among  them  was  Polybius,  who  soon  felt 
out  of  place  and  returned  to  Rome.  Roman  malignity  at  last 
produced  a  violent  reaction  in  the  League.  The  anti-Roman 
party  came  into  power,  and  a  conflict  became  inevitable.  An 
obscure  quarrel  in  which  Athens  was  concerned  set  going  other 
causes  of  friction  in  Greece.  In  149  an  ambiguous  decision  from 
Rome  left  Sparta  and  the  League  at  war.  Rome  had  just  then 
enough  to  do  in  Macedonia  Africa  and  Spain.  So  the  party 
ruling  the  League  went  on  their  way,  heedless  of  warnings. 

245.  The  defeat  of  the  Spartans  did  not  restore  harmony 
in  the  League.  By  147  the  Macedonian  rising  was  put  down, 
and  Rome  could  act  freely.  A  Roman  commission  arrived,  and 
announced  the  Senate's  orders.  The  rules  and  constitution  of 
the  League  were  disregarded,  and  certain  cities,  among  them 
Corinth,  were  no  longer  to  be  members  of  it.  At  this  there 
was  a  riot,  and  the  Romans  withdrew.  A  second  commission 
came  with  a  milder  message,  which  was  taken  to  shew  that 
Rome  had  her  hands  full  in  Africa  and  Spain,  and  might  safely 
be  defied.     Meanwhile  Metellus  drew  near  with  his  army  from 


202  End  of  Greek  freedom  [ch. 

the  North.  He  tried  hard  to  preserve  peace,  and  continued  to 
do  so,  even  when  his  envoys  were  insulted  and  war  declared, 
nominally  against  Sparta.  The  frantic  leaders  of  the  League 
set  to  work  releasing  debtors,  liberating  slaves,  and  giving  over 
the  cities  to  mob-rule.  Their  army  entered  central  Greece  and 
was  joined  by  some  local  alHes.  Metellus  now  had  to  act,  and 
routed  them  at  Scarphea  in  Locris.  While  they  were  raising 
more  troops  and  reforming  their  army,  Metellus  was  superseded 
by  L.  Mummius,  under  instructions  to  make  an  end  of  the  busi- 
ness. This  he  speedily  did.  He  utterly  defeated  the  Achaean 
force  at  Leucopetra  on  the  Isthmus.  Corinth  at  once  fell.  The 
inhabitants  were  slain  or  sold  for  slaves ;  the  city,  plundered  of 
its  artistic  and  other  treasures,  was  burnt ;  the  site,  long  famed 
as  a  centre  of  commerce,  was  laid  under  a  solemn  curse  and  left 
desolate. 

246.  So  at  last  in  146  B.C.  the  vain  pretence  of  Greek 
freedom  came  to  an  end.  It  was  well  it  did  so,  for  Greek  and 
Roman  notions  of  freedom  could  never  have  been  reconciled, 
and  one  or  other  had  to  go.  Ever  since  Rome  became  mixed  up 
with  the  affairs  of  Greece  things  had  been  going  from  bad  to 
worse.  A  true  Greek  nation  had  never  existed,  and  the  growth 
of  great  powers  had  made  it  impossible  for  the  small  to  enjoy 
a  real  independence.  Little  republics  were  unable  to  stand  alone, 
and  the  Greek  federations  were  on  too  small  a  scale  to  solve  the 
problem.  Roman  interference  was  perhaps  well-meaning  at  first. 
But  it  was  unintelligent.  Selfish  motives  soon  guided  it :  for 
many  years  it  had  been  hypocritical  and  malignant :  to  a  gifted 
and  sensitive  race  like  the  Greeks  it  was  a  slow  and  cruel  torture. 
Compared  with  this  abominable  system,  the  work  of  Mummius 
was  mercy. 

247.  The  settlement  proceeded  under  a  commission  in 
the  usual  way  and  on  the  usual  principles.  All  Leagues  were 
dissolved,  and  the  several  communities  effectually  isolated  by 
allowing  no  reciprocity  of  property-rights  (commercium)  between 
them.  The  growth  of  common  interests  was  further  checked  by 
differential  treatment.  While  the  territory  of  Corinth  Chalcis  and 
Thebes  became  domain-land  of  Rome,  Athens  and  Sparta  were 
declared  Free  States.  Athens  kept  her  old  island-dependencies 
of  Lemnos  Imbros  and  Scyros,  and  received  also  Delos.  Treated 
with  indulgence  and  respect,  the  famous  city  was  no  more  in- 


xvii]  The  settlement  203 

dependent  than  others ;  hence  she  was  made  in  form  mistress 
of  the  Delian  free  port,  Rome  wishing  to  be  spared  the  trouble  of 
administering  what  in  effect  was  a  Roman  possession.  The  mass 
of  the  Greek  cities  were  on  various  footings  between  these  ex- 
tremes, and  the  work  of  the  commission  was  largely  concerned 
with  details.  Roman  precedent  was  followed  in  regulating  the 
constitutions  under  which  the  cities  were  still  to  carry  on  their 
local  government.  Rome  would  not  tolerate  democracies  swayed 
by  men  with  nothing  to  lose,  so  all  franchises  were  confined  to 
owners  of  property.  We  are  told  that  the  Greek  communities 
were  made  subject  to  a  tribute  of  some  sort,  but  the  particulars 
are  not  given.  It  seems  certain  however  that  the  country  was 
not  made  into  a  Province  with  a  Roman  governor.  It  remained 
a  bunch  of  separate  states  free  or  '  autonomous '  in  the  sense  that 
they  had  local  governments  and  might  not  meddle  with  each 
other.  Any  questions  arising  between  them  were  referred  in  the 
first  instance  to  the  governor  of  Macedonia,  who  was  thus  a  kind 
of  standing  commissioner  for  Greek  affairs.  Rome  was  the  sovran 
power,  and  we  may  describe  Greece  as  a  Roman  protectorate. 

248.  The  settlement  was  not  in  itself  harsh.  The  oppressions 
of  which  we  sometimes  hear  later  on  were  the  doing  of  Roman 
officials  insufficiently  controlled  by  the  home  government.  In- 
deed we  learn  that  after  a  time  the  revival  of  federal  Leagues 
was  allowed  (of  course  as  mere  shadows),  and  the  restrictions  on 
reciprocal  property-rights  withdrawn.  Nevertheless  the  Greeks 
of  old  Hellas  were  neither  prosperous  nor  happy.  Freedom  of 
action,  wise  or  unwise,  was  to  their  little  states  the  very  breath 
of  life.  Decay  had  already  gone  far  before  federation  took  a 
practical  form :  federation  was  only  partial,  and  it  came  too  late. 
Rome  freed  them  from  Macedonian  control,  but  was  driven  to 
substitute  her  own.  And  under  control  of  any  kind  they  could 
not  thrive.  Trade  had  long  been  declining,  and  its  revival  was 
now  more  impossible  than  ever.  Economic  and  political  dead- 
ness  only  hastened  the  decay  of  literature  and  art.  The  Greeks 
of  whose  influence  Roman  life  was  destined  to  feel  the  power 
were  the  Greeks  or  half-Greeks  chiefly  drawn  from  the  cities 
of  the  East.  The  transition  to  the  new  system  was  somewhat 
smoothed  by  the  services  of  Polybius  the  Achaean.  He  did  his 
best  to  explain  things  to  his  countrymen  and  reconcile  them  to 
the  inevitable.     Perhaps  no  man  ever  understood  the  necessities 


204  Delos.     Pergamum  [ch. 

of  his  own  time  better  than  this  worthy  and  experienced  man. 
But  he  could  do  nothing  to  arrest  the  withering  effects  of  poverty 
helplessness  and  dulness.  Athens  herself,  still  the  seat  of  philo- 
sophic schools  claiming  descent  from  the  great  leaders  of  thought, 
more  and  more  was  driven  to  draw  her  professors  from  abroad. 
As  the  resort  of  Roman  tourists  and  students  she  was  able  to 
profit  by  a  steady  patronage,  the  fruit  of  a  glorious  past. 

249.  Among  the  islands,  the  great  fact  is  the  rise  of  Delos 
since  it  had  been  made  a  free  port.  Merchants  flocked  there,  and 
the  dealings,  particularly  in  the  slave-market,  became  immense. 
The  little  island  was  a  centre  of  Roman  financial  and  trading 
companies,  and  the  influence  of  capitalists  in  Rome,  interested 
in  these  operations,  probably  had  something  to  do  with  the 
destruction  of  Corinth.  But,  while  Delos  was  the  scene  of  an 
unwholesome  'boom,'  the  commerce  of  Rhodes  declined.  The 
time  was  now  near  at  hand  when  Rhodes  would  be  more  famous 
as  a  centre  of  culture  and  rhetoric  than  as  a  naval  power.  This 
had  one  very  serious  consequence.  The  Rhodian  fleets  had  been 
the  most  efl'ective  protectors  of  sea-borne  trade,  and  Rome  made 
no  provision  for  the  performance  of  this  duty.  Hence  came  the 
monstrous  growth  of  piracy,  of  which  we  shall  speak  below. 

250.  Of  the  kingdoms,  Pergamum  was  ruled  by  Eumenes 
till  his  death  in  159.  His  brother  Attalus  II,  who  succeeded 
him,  was  more  in  favour  with  the  Senate,  and  ruled  prosperously 
till  138.  He  sent  a  contingent  to  the  Achaean  war,  and  was 
rewarded  with  a  dole  of  the  spoils  of  Corinth.  After  him  his 
nephew  Attalus  III,  a  poor  creature,  reigned  till  133.  We  may 
look  forward  so  far  as  to  note  that,  having  no  successor,  he 
bequeathed  his  kingdom  to  the  Roman  people.  Whether  his 
will  was  made  under  Roman  influences  is  not  certain.  But  the 
Province  (called  Asia)  made  out  of  the  Attalid  kingdom  at  once 
became  the  sphere  of  extortions  and  iniquities  even  beyond  the 
ordinary  standard  of  Roman  misrule.  For  the  present  Perga- 
mum was  a  centre  where  art,  and  in  some  degree  literature  also, 
flourished  under  royal  patronage. 

251.  The  Bithynian  kings,  a  dynasty  of  doubtful  inclinations, 
were  watched  by  Rome.  They  were  a  factor  in  the  balance  of 
power.  To  the  East  of  Bithynia  was  the  growing  kingdom  of 
Pontus.  The  reigning  king  Mithradates  III  (169 — 121  b.c.)  was 
on  friendly  terms  with  Rome,  and  he  too  had  a  place  in  the 


xvii]  Eastern  Greeks.     Syria  205 

balance-scheme.  The  king  of  Cappadocia,  Ariarathes  V  (163 — 
130),  was  also  a  'friend.'  It  was  his  misfortune  to  become  in- 
volved in  the  wars  of  succession  now  chronic  in  the  neighbour- 
kingdom  of  Syria,  and  to  suffer  losses  thereby.  Of  the  Galatian 
tribes  we  hear  little  in  this  period.  It  was  in  wars  that  they 
chiefly  made  their  mark  as  mercenaries,  and  wars  in  Asia  Minor 
were  less  frequent,  owing  to  the  policy  of  Rome.  It  should  be 
observed  that  in  the  kingdoms  of  this  part  of  the  world  Hellenism 
was  gaining  ground.  Both  on  the  coast  and  inland,  cities  with 
Greek  institutions  and  populations  partly  Greek  were  prospering 
greatly  under  the  favour  of  the  kings.  Greeks  were  in  demand, 
for  it  was  seen  that  no  other  race  could  match  them  in  the 
intellectual  gifts  necessary  for  success  in  peace  or  war.  These . 
cities,  whether  old  colonies  from  the  free-states  of  Hellas  or  royal 
foundations  of  Alexander's  Successors,  were  nearly  all  merged  in 
this  or  that  kingdom.  But  they  generally  enjoyed  a  good  deal  of 
freedom  in  local  government,  seldom  interfered  with  so  long  as 
their  allegiance  was  secure. 

252.  The  importance  of  the  Greek  cities  in  Syria  (including 
eastern  or  *  level '  Cilicia)  has  been  referred  to  above.  Their 
loyalty  was  now  the  mainstay  of  the  failing  Seleucid  dynasty. 
We  need  not  follow  out  the  wearisome  tale  of  disorders  and  the 
succession  of  kings  unfortunate  illegitimate  or  incapable.  Suffice 
it  to  note  that  the  average  length  of  reigns,  which  between  312 
and  187  B.C.  had  been  nearly  21  years,  between  187  and  129  was 
just  over  7  years.  The  Senate  watched  this  kingdom  carefully, 
and  for  a  good  many  years  required  a  prince  of  the  royal  house 
to  reside  in  Rome  as  a  hostage  for  the  good  behaviour  of  the 
ruler  of  Antioch.  On  the  death  of  Antiochus  IV  (Epiphanes) 
in  165  a  significant  incident  occurred.  The  Senate  would  not 
let  the  hostage-prince  Demetrius  go  to  claim  the  throne,  but 
recognized  a  child,  son  of  Epiphanes,  as  Antiochus  V.  Thus 
they  claimed  to  determine  the  succession,  meaning  no  doubt 
to  weaken  the  Seleucid  kingdom.  But  this  made  the  Syrian 
minister  Lysias  the  real  ruler,  and  he  began  to  raise  forces 
beyond  the  scale  fixed  in  the  treaty  of  189.  Commissioners 
were  then  sent  to  upset  these  arrangements  in  the  interests  of 
Rome.  They  went  without  an  armed  escort,  and  the  majesty 
of  Rome  proved  to  be  no  sufficient  protection.  One  of  them 
was  killed  in  a  riot.     An  embassy  of  apology  was  disregarded. 


2o6  Parthia.     Judaea.     Egypt  [ch. 

To  avenge  the  outrage  by  war  was  out  of  the  question,  owing 
to  the  distance,  so  the  Senate  waited.  But  in  162  Demetrius 
escaped  from  Rome  and  seized  the  crown,  which  he  held  till 
ejected  in  150  by  a  pretender  encouraged  by  Rome.  The  story 
is  a  good  illustration  of  the  Senate's  policy.  Whoso  dared  to 
defy  the  sovran  power  must  be  punished,  but  patience  and 
diplomacy  were  less  costly  and  embarrassing,  while  generally 
not  less  effective,  than  a  resort  to  arms. 

253.  It  may  be  well  to  refer  here  to  the  growth  of  another 
power  in  the  further  East,  destined  to  give  Rome  much  trouble 
in  later  times.  This  was  the  Parthian  kingdom.  In  the  middle 
of  the  third  century  B.C.,  when  the  empire  of  Seleucus  was  losing 
provinces  in  central  Asia,  this  monarchy  was  founded  in  the 
rebellion  of  Arsaces.  Under  Mithradates  I,  the  present  Arsacid, 
the  Parthians  had  been  working  westwards,  occupying  the  pro- 
vinces temporarily^  reannexed  by  Antiochus  III.  The  Seleucid 
kingdom  in  this  period  was  thus  a  mere  remnant.  In  Judaea 
its  authority  was  being  extinguished  by  degrees.  The  High 
Priests  of  Jerusalem  took  advantage  of  the  disputed  successions 
at  Antioch,  and  of  the  wars  between  Syria  and  Egypt  for  the 
possession  of  the  'hollow'  Syria.  At  last  the  Jewish  tribute 
was  redeemed  by  payment  of  a  capital  sum  to  a  needy  king, 
and  in  141  the  expulsion  of  the  Syrian  garrison  from  the 
citadel  left  Jerusalem  free.  Antiochus  VII  reconquered  it  for 
a  moment,  but  the  Jews  remained  practically  independent  after 
129,  on  friendly  terms  with  Rome,  for  more  than  50  years.  So 
this  small  people,  nerved  by  their  religion,  made  a  stout  resistance 
to  the  hellenizing  influences  promoted  by  Seleucid  kings. 

254.  In  Egypt  under  the  degenerate  Lagids  Greek  influence 
was  declining.  The  contests  of  two  brothers,  Ptolemy  VII  Philo- 
metor  and  Ptolemy  VIII  (or  IX)  Euergetes  II  compose  the  story 
of  the  royal  house.  The  latter,  best  known  by  his  nickname 
Physcon  (fat-belly),  was  an  unscrupulous  and  cruel  monster.  The 
kingdom  was  virtually  protected  by  Rome,  as  we  saw  above.  To 
Rome  the  brothers  in  turn  appealed,  and  the  Senate  decided  in 
accordance  with  what  were  held  to  be  Roman  interests.  The 
old  game  was  played  again.  A  partition  was  made  by  restoring 
Philometor  to  Alexandria,  and  giving  the  outlying  provinces  of 
Cyrene  and  Cyprus  to  Physcon.     In  146  Philometor  perished  in 

1  See  §  188. 


xvii]  Africa  207 

a  Syrian  war,  and  Physcon  reigned  over  the  whole  kingdom  till 
117,  countenanced  by  Rome.  He  knew  how  to  keep  the  favour 
of  greedy  Roman  nobles,  and  quenched  in  blood  the  hatred  of 
the  Alexandrines.  To  support  his  tyranny  he  relied  mainly  on  the 
native  Egyptians,  whose  priests  he  conciliated,  and  on  mixed 
foreign  mercenaries.  Such,  under  Roman  protection,  was  the 
kingdom  of  the  Lagids. 

255.  Africa,  Let  us  now  turn  to  Africa,  that  is  the  middle 
part  of  the  northern  coast-lands  of  the  great  southern  continent, 
the  part  once  dominated  by  Carthage.  The  present  Punic  territory 
was  now  only  the  block  of  land  about  300  x  200  miles  in  extent, 
the  old  Home-province  of  Carthage,  and  a  long  strip  of  seaboard 
to  the  East.  But  the  loss  of  empire  had  not  ruined  Punic  com- 
merce, and  rumours  of  Carthaginian  wealth  kept  alive  the  jealousy 
of  Rome.  The  Senate  might  dally  with  other  dangers ;  the  vitality 
of  Rome's  old  rival  was  sleeplessly  watched.  The  merchant  princes 
had  sacrificed  Hannibal,  and  their  subservience  to  Roman  dicta- 
tion would  go  almost  any  lengths,  if  they  could  but  be  suffered 
to  enjoy  their  wealth  in  peace.  But  we  have  seen  how  Rome 
connived  at  the  constant  encroachments  of  Masinissa.  Com- 
missions came  in  answer  to  Carthaginian  appeals,  but  the  word 
that  would  have  restrained  the  Numidian  was  never  spoken,  and 
so  the  persecution  was  not  abated.  The  commission  of  157 
included  the  vigorous  and  prejudiced  Cato.  Himself  a  close- 
fisted  man  of  business,  he  came  home  deeply  impressed  with 
the  evidence  of  the  vast  resources  of  Carthage,  and  convinced 
that  the  safety  of  Rome  was  thereby  directly  menaced.  So  he 
ceased  not  to  clamour  for  the  destruction  of  Carthage.  Less 
narrow-minded  opponents  delayed  open  action  for  a  time.  The 
old  methods  were  still  employed.  The  pressure  of  Masinissa  grew 
worse  and  worse.  In  152  the  Punic  government  began  arming  to 
resist  him.  The  report  of  this  soon  reached  Rome,  and  Cato, 
backed  no  doubt  by  greedy  capitalists,  eager  to  exploit  a  rich 
country  and  to  rid  themselves  of  commercial  rivals,  insisted  on 
war.  On  the  return  of  a  commission  sent  to  verify  the  report, 
orders  were  sent  to  Carthage  that  they  must  disband  their  army 
and  burn  their  fleet.     Meanwhile  Rome  still  waited. 

256.  In  151  the  Carthaginians,  perhaps  emboldened  by 
Roman  dallying,  began  war  with  Masinissa.  In  150  Rome  de- 
clared war.     Utica,  the  oldest  of  the  Phoenigian  cities  in  Africa, 


2o8  Third  Punic  war  [ch. 

now  went  over  to  Rome.  It  was  hopeless  to  fight  against  both 
Masinissa  and  Rome,  so  Carthage  sued  for  peace  on  any  terms. 
In  149  all  the  Punic  war-material,  arms  etc.,  a  vast  store,  was 
handed  over  to  the  consuls  of  the  year  when  they  reached  Utica. 
By  thus  complying  with  orders  Carthage  was  left  helpless,  for  to 
raise  great  mercenary  forces  was  no  longer  possible  as  of  old. 
Then  came  the  final  order :  the  city  must  be  destroyed,  and  the 
population  removed  not  less  than  ten  miles  inland.  It  is  said 
that  they  numbered  700,000.  Only  the  trade  of  Carthage  could 
support  such  a  number,  and  the  trade  depended  on  the  advantages 
of  the  present  site.  The  cruel  order  was  a  mere  pretext  for  the 
destruction  of  Carthage.  Our  information  as  to  the  so-called 
third  Punic  war  all  comes  from  the  Roman  side,  and  it  seems 
certain  that  the  Roman  government  had  from  the  first  resolved 
to  shew  neither  scruple  nor  mercy. 

257.  Semitic  peoples  driven  to  bay  have  more  than  once 
made  a  surprising  stand  against  fearful  odds.  About  200  years 
earlier  Alexander  tasted  their  mettle  at  the  siege  of  Tyre,  as 
Titus  was  to  do  about  200  years  later  at  Jerusalem.  We  need 
not  follow  in  detail  the  story  of  over-confident  and^^ungling 
consuls.  The  Carthaginians  by  supreme  efforts  made  shift  to 
forge  new  weapons  and  build  new  engines  and  a  new  fleet.  They 
even  raised  a  new  field  army  in  place  of  that  lately  defeated  by 
Masinissa.  Their  cavalry  scoured  the  country  and  kept  open  a 
route  for  the  entrance  of  supplies  by  land.  No  impression  could 
be  made  on  the  great  city  walls,  and  the  Roman  operations  con- 
sisted chiefly  in  blunders  retrieved  by  a  military  tribune,  in  whom 
alone  the  army  found  a  competent  leader.  This  was  P.  Cornelius 
Scipio  Aemilianus,  son  of  Aemilius  PauUus,  adopted  by  the  son  of 
Scipio  Africanus.  It  was  not  only  as  a  soldier  that  his  presence 
was  important ;  from  Africanus  he  inherited  the  connexion  of  the 
Scipios  with  the  royal  house  of  Numidia.  His  young  brother-in- 
law  Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus  distinguished  himself  greatly 
in  the  later  course  of  the  siege. 

258.  Old  Cato  did  not  live  to  hear  of  the  fall  of  Carthage. 
In  149  he  died;  also  Masinissa,  in  extreme  old  age.  The  king 
left  to  Scipio  the  charge  of  apportioning  his  kingdom  among  his 
three  sons.  This  Scipio  did,  not  by  dividing  the  territory,  but 
by  a  separation  of  functions.  One  was  to  have  Cirta  the  capital 
and  the  dignity  of  a  general  presidency,  another  the  administra- 


XVIl] 


Scipio  Aemilianus 


209 


tion  of  justice.  But  the  command  of  the  army  was  assigned  to 
Gulussa,  the  prince  who  had  already  shewn  marked  attachment 
to  the  cause  of  Rome.  Thus  the  award  of  Scipio  was  guided 
by  Roman  interests.  In  the  conduct  of  the  war  too  he  performed 
many  services.  The  new  consul  commanding  in  148  was  as  in- 
effective as  his  predecessors.  Hope  revived  in  Carthage,  while 
Rome  was  now  preoccupied  with  the  troubles  in  Macedonia  and 
Greece,  and  with  the  rising  in  Spain.  Punic  envoys  were  sent 
to  stir  up  disaffection  in  Numidia  and  elsewhere.  The  situation 
was  getting  worse,  and  some  practical  step  was  clearly  needed. 
So  when  Scipio  returned  to  Rome  men  looked  to  him  as  the 
natural  commander  against  Carthage.  He  stood  for  the  aedile- 
ship,  being  under  the  existing  rules  not  of  age  for  the  consulship. 
But  in  this  emergency  means  were  found  to  suspend  the  rules,  to 
elect  him  consul  for  147^  and  to  entrust  him  with  the  charge  of  the 
Punic  war. 


Outline  of  Carthage. 

259.  Under  Scipio  the  siege  of  Carthage  began  in  earnest. 
The  first  thing  was  to  clear  the  Roman  camp  of  non-combatants 
and  restore  the  discipline  of  the  army.  After  this,  the  quarters 
of  the  city  were  to  be  attacked  and  captured  one  by  one.  The 
taking  of  Megara,  the  great  garden-suburb,  drove  the  defenders 
back  into  the  old  city,  but  they  still  had  plenty  of  room.  Has- 
drubal  the  Punic  general,  by  torturing  his  Roman  prisoners  to 
death  in  view  of  both  armies,  confessed  that  nothing  remained 
to  them  but  a  resistance  of  despair.     Scipio  cut  oif  the  supply 

H.  14 


2IO  The  end  of  Carthage  [ch. 

of  food  by  land,  and  by  sea  blockade-running  was  difficult  and 
uncertain.  So  the  besieged  began  to  suffer  famine.  The  next 
move  was  to  close  the  harbour  mouth  by  an  artificial  dam. 
This  was  met  by  cutting  a  new  entrance,  opening  into  the  sea 
at  a  different  point.  But  when  the  Punic  fleet  came  out  (no 
doubt  at  a  great  disadvantage  from  want  of  training)  it  suffered 
defeat.  Meanwhile  Scipio  won  and  kept  a  footing  on  the  sea 
front,  commanding  the  harbour.  In  the  winter  147 — 146  he 
destroyed  the  remains  of  the  Carthaginian  field  army.  The 
starving  multitude  in  the  city  was  all  that  was  left  of  the  once 
imperial  Carthage. 

260.  In  146  Scipio  was  kept  on  as  proconsul  to  finish  his 
task.  After  the  old  commercial  quarter  of  the  city  was  seized, 
the  Romans  fought  their  way  up  to  the  Byrsa  or  citadel,  taking 
houses  one  by  one  in  a  slow  progress  of  looting  burning  and 
awful^  carnage.  A  remnant  (50,000,  it  is  said)  now  surrendered, 
and  the  Byrsa  was  occupied.  In  the  temple  of  the  healing  god 
Eshmun,  on  the  summit  of  the  hill,  a  body  of  Roman  deserters 
(probably  not  Roman  citizens),  aware  that  they  could  expect  no 
mercy,  made  a  last  stand.  Hasdrubal  left  them  and  went  to  beg 
his  own  life.  So  they  set  the  temple  afire  and  perished.  Scipio 
had  done  what  he  was  sent  to  do.  As  he  looked  out  on  the  ruins 
of  the  famous  city,  Polybius  heard  him  quote  some  lines  of  the 
Iliad,  foretelling  the  fall  of  Troy.  This  was  not  the  expression 
of  triumph  or  remorse :  it  was  that  his  mind  misgave  him  as  to 
the  future  of  Rome. 

261.  In  dealing  with  the  booty,  the  sale  of  captives  was 
held  as  usual,  and  the  proper  share  of  spoils  reserved  for  the 
Roman  state.  But  there  were  found  in  Carthage  a  number  of 
marble  statues,  carried  away  from  Sicily  in  old  wars.  These 
Scipio  restored  to  the  cities  that  had  formerly  owned  them,  thus 
winning  the  hearts  of  the  island  Greeks,  and  proving  that  the 
Greek  culture  of  his  youth  had  not  been  in  vain.  And  now  the 
usual  commissioners  arrived  from  Rome,  and  the  settlement  of 
the  conquered  territory  began.  It  became  a  Province,  under  the 
name  of  Africa.  The  various  towns  were  rewarded  or  punished 
by  gain  or  loss  of  lands,  according  to  the  parts  they  had  taken  in 
the  war,  Utica  received  special  privileges,  and  became  the  chief 
city  of  the  province,  a  centre  frequented  by  Roman  financiers  and 
merchants.     The  site  of  Carthage  was  cleared  and  left  desolate 


xvii]  The  Romans  in  Spain  211 

under  a  solemn  curse.  The  restrictions  on  reciprocal  property- 
rights  were  probably  of  the  same  character  as  in  Sicily,  favouring 
the  gradual  transfer  of  landed  property  to  Romans.  The  great 
estates  of  Roman  landowners  were  a  marked  feature  of  this  pro- 
vince in  later  times.  Tillage  by  slave-gangs  on  the  Carthaginian 
model  was  the  normal  form  of  agriculture.  The  governorship  of 
Africa  was  one  of  the  prizes  of  Roman  public  life.  The  provin- 
cial tribute  took  the  form  of  a  fixed  impost  {stipendium)^  which  at 
all  events  relieved  the  subjects  of  the  irregular  extortion  practised 
under  a  system  of  tithes. 

262.  Spain.  As  in  the  last  period,  the  Spanish  difficulties 
of  Rome  illustrate  most  forcibly  the  differences  of  East  and  West. 
In  Spain  the  tribal  units  were  warlike,  but  numerous  and  small. 
Each  one  could  only  answer  for  itself,  and  Roman  supremacy, 
implied  in  the  creation  of  Provinces,  rested  on  the  power  of  the 
sword.  Romanization  had  as  yet  not  gone  far,  and  the  difficulty 
of  providing  armies  for  a  hated  service  stood  in  the  way  of  a  bold 
and  thorough  conquest.  So  Roman  policy,  temporizing  and  hesi- 
tating elsewhere,  was  naturally  not  less  so  in  Spain.  In  the  present 
period  the  results  were  disastrous.  The  great  Celtiberian  and 
Lusitanian  wars  were  sheer  waste  of  energy,  provoked  and  pro- 
tracted by  the  misdeeds  and  incapacity  of  Roman  officers,  con- 
ducted with  shameless  treachery  and  barbarity,  and  ended  without 
glory.  The  occasional  successes  of  better  commanders  were  again 
and  again  cancelled  by  the  utter  failures  of  commonplace  nobles 
to  whom  the  cause  of  Rome  was  entrusted.  Exhaustion  and 
tardy  alarm  at  last  compelled  resort  to  the  services  of  a  picked 
man.  After  his  horrible  victory  the  bulk  of  the  peninsula  recog- 
nized that  the  disunited  tribes  were  no  match  for  the  power  of 
Rome  firmly  appHed.  Rome  too  had  learnt  a  lesson,  and  the 
abuses  of  provincial  administration  were  nowhere  more  effectively 
checked  than  in  pacified  Spain. 

263.  The  wise  and  conciliatory  policy  of  Gracchus  in  179 
kept  the  country  generally  quiet  for  some  24  years.  But  then 
fighting,  and  Roman  defeats,  began  on  the  Lusitanian  border. 
In  153  the  great  Celtiberian  rebellion  broke  out  in  central  Spain. 
Thus  both  the  Further  and  the  Hither  province  were  involved. 
In  the  latter  case  the  right  to  fortify  towns  was  in  question.  The 
views  of  natives  and  Romans  as  to  the  treaty  of  Gracchus  differed, 
and  war  followed.     That  the  matter  was  taken  seriously  at  Rome 

14—2 


212  Viriathus  [ch. 

appears  from  the  appointment  of  a  consul  to  command,  of  course 
with  a  full  consular  army,  and  from  the  recorded  fact  that  the 
change,  by  which  the  consular  year  was  made  to  begin  on  the  first 
of  January,  belongs  to  this  date  and  was  connected  with  the  Spanish 
rising.  The  consul  of  153  failed;  his  successor  did  better,  but  the 
Senate  rejected  Spanish  overtures  for  peace.  In  151  the  consul 
L.  Licinius  Lucullus  was  sent  with  more  troops.  But  these  had 
been  raised  with  great  difficulty,  and  there  were  grave  collisions 
between  consuls  and  tribunes  over  the  levy  in  Rome.  We  are  told 
that  the  patriotic  offer  of  Scipio  Aemilianus  to  serve  as  military 
tribune  overcame  the  reluctance  of  men  of  position  to  volunteer 
as  officers,  and  so  the  trouble  ended :  but  this  story  is  doubtful. 
In  the  field  Lucullus  was  no  bad  specimen  of  a  consul  of  the 
period,  wantonly  attacking  natives,  granting  them  terms,  and 
butchering  them  in  defiance  of  his  pledge.  After  a  fruitless 
campaign  he  had  to  withdraw  his  suff'ering  army  to  winter 
quarters  further  south.  Galba  the  praetor  in  Further  Spain  had 
also  fared  badly.  In  150  the  two,  now  proconsul  and  propraetor, 
joined  in  attacking  the  Lusitanians,  on  whom  they  avenged  their 
previous  failures.  Both  acted  with  brutal  cruelty.  Galba  made 
a  treaty  with  the  barbarians  under  promise  of  finding  lands  for 
them,  divided  them  into  three  bodies,  disarmed  them,  and  cut 
them  to  pieces.  Such  was  Roman  faith  in  these  days;  as  in 
Liguria,  so  in  Spain.  And  these  two  ruffians  escaped  punish- 
ment. Lucullus  was  not  even  impeached.  Galba  was  brought 
to  trial,  but  by  bribery  and  appealing  to  the  pity  of  the  court  he 
escaped,  and  was  consul  five  years  later. 

264.  Viriathus,  a  Lusitanian  shepherd,  had  escaped  the 
massacre,  and  in  149  we  find  him  heading  the  great  rising  of 
his  people  which  taxed  the  utmost  energies  of  Rome  for  nearly 
ten  years.  For  some  four  years  his  success  was  unbroken.  He 
kept  to  guerrilla  warfare,  avoiding  sieges  and  pitched  battles,  and 
ranging  with  his  mobile  forces  over  a  great  part  of  Spain.  But 
to  effect  a  concerted  war  of  liberation  was  beyond  his  power. 
The  Spanish  tribes  were  too  divided,  and  some  even  furnished 
contingents  to  Roman  armies.  After  146  the  Senate,  having 
settled  matters  in  Greece  and  Africa,  resolved  to  deal  more 
thoroughly  with  the  problem  of  Spain.  Henceforth  we  find 
consuls  or  proconsuls  employed  with  full  consular  armies,  and 
Viriathus  was  somewhat  checked.     Yet  he  was  able  to  raise  a 


xvii]  Numantia  213 

rebellion  among  some  Celtiberian  tribes.  Thus  began  the  ten- 
years  Celtiberian  war  (143 — 133),  to  which  we  will  return  in 
speaking  of  Numantia.  Still  the  noble  generals  could  not  beat 
the  shepherd-chief.  Failure  barbarity  and  breaches  of  faith  con- 
tinued to  be  the  Roman  record.  But  to  keep  his  guerrilla  bands 
together  was  not  easy  for  Viriathus,  and  the  consul  Q.  Servilius 
Caepio  was  more  successful.  But  treachery  was  more  effective 
than  arms.  Under  cover  of  sham  negotiations,  he  found  a  traitor 
in  the  patriot  camp,  and  procured  the  murder  of  Viriathus.  This 
exploit  soon  led  to  the  submission  of  the  Lusitanians.  And  now 
the  plan  tried  in  the  later  stages  of  the  Ligurian  wars  was  tried  in 
Spain :  a  number  of  the  surrendered  enemy  were  transplanted  to  a 
district  on  the  east  coast.  This  more  humane  policy  was  carried 
out  and  continued  by  the  consul  D.  Junius  Brutus,  who  came  in 
138  and  ruled  the  Further  province  for  several  years.  By  putting 
down  resistance  in  Lusitania,  and  by  defeating  the  Callaici  of  the 
far  North- West,  he  taught  the  natives  that  they  must  bow  to  the 
yoke  of  Rome.  By  treating  them  with  mercy  and  good  faith  he 
laid  the  foundations  of  a  better  state  of  things,  so  that  Roman 
civilization  could  spread  in  peace. 

265.  Meanwhile  the  Celtiberian  war  dragged  on.  Some 
years  were  more  disastrous  than  others.  If  the  Roman  com- 
manders were  maligned,  the  slanders  come  to  us  on  Roman 
authority.  At  all  events  from  143  to  135  we  have  a  story  of 
utter  failure.  As  early  as  140  the  war,  fruitless  elsewhere,  had 
centred  on  the  siege  of  Numantia,  a  fortified  stronghold  the 
capture  of  which  was  expected  to  break  down  the  resistance  of 
the  rebel  tribes.  Not  only  was  the  siege  raised  in  consequence 
of  Roman  losses :  a  treaty  was  made  with  the  Numantines  (and 
carried  out  by  them),  only  to  be  repudiated  by  the  proconsul  who 
made  it,  and  ignored  at  Rome.  A  hypocritical  proposal  to  hand 
him  over  to  the  enemy  was  foiled.  Again  in  138  we  hear  of  the 
difficulty  of  raising  troops  for  this  miserable  war,  and  a  renewal 
of  quarrels  between  consuls  and  tribunes.  In  137  the  consul 
C.  Hostilius  Mancinus  did  even  worse  than  his  predecessors, 
being  routed  by  a  Numantine  force  less  than  y  of  his  own.  He 
only  escaped  utter  destruction  by  a  treaty  guaranteeing  the  inde- 
pendence of  Numantia.  Even  this  was  only  granted  on  the  faith 
of  his  quaestor,  young  Tiberius  Gracchus,  son  of  the  good  governor 
of  179,  for  the  consul  was  not  trusted.     The  treaty  was  of  course 


214        Scipio  and  the  settlement  of  Spain         [ch. 

repudiated,  and  this  time  Mancinus  was  actually  exposed  half- 
stripped  between  the  opposing  lines,  and  left  for  the  enemy  to 
take.  But  they  would  not  have  him,  and  after  a  day  of  suspense 
he  was  fetched  back.  It  was  a  shameful  business,  but  strictly  in 
order  from  the  legal  point  of  view.  What  interested  later  genera- 
tions of  Romans  was  the  question  whether  he  had  or  had  not  lost 
his  rights  as  a  Roman  citizen.  For  the  present  a  law  passed  in  his 
favour  served  to  cut  the  knot. 

266.  In  136  and  135  no  progress  was  made:  indeed  the 
state  of  the  army  made  progress  impossible.  The  camp  was  full 
of  disorderly  non-combatants,  and  a  strong  hand  was  needed  to 
restore  discipline.  Yet  the  country  in  general  was  quieting  down, 
thanks  to  the  work  of  Brutus  in  the  West.  In  Rome  there  was 
indignation  at  the  gross  mismanagement  of  the  war,  so  the  Senate 
had  to  give  way  and  employ  a  man  chosen  for  his  efficiency. 
Once  more  Scipio  was  called  upon  to  retrieve  the  failures  of 
others.  Once  more  a  constitutional  rule  (against  reelections)  was 
suspended,  and  he  was  elected  consul  a  second  time  for  134.  His 
charge  was  to  destroy  Numantia,  and  by  this  object-lesson  to  clear 
the  ground  for  a  permanent  settlement  of  Spain.  The  first  busi- 
ness was  to  purge  and  reform  the  army.  This  he  did  thoroughly. 
In  his  unpopular  duty  he  found  it  well  to  have  a  bodyguard,  which 
was  furnished  by  a  corps  of  volunteer  friends  and  dependants, 
about  500  men,  personally  attached  to  him.  He  had  also  some 
contingents  sent  by  allied  states  and  kings.  Some  Spanish  levies 
were  employed  later,  when  discipline  had  been  restored.  After 
training  his  soldiers  in  a  short  campaign,  he  sat  down  to  reduce 
Numantia  by  famine.  A  complete  circuit  of  works  blockaded 
the  town,  and  its  fall  was  only  a  question  of  time.  His  forces 
seem  to  have  outnumbered  the  enemy  by  about  eight  to  one. 
As  Rome  was  resolved  to  be  mistress  in  Spain,  this  great  clumsy 
effort  was  in  truth  less  cruel  than  the  vacillations  of  the  past, 
certainly  not  unwise. 

267.  Scipio  had  with  him  several  remarkable  men.  Two 
of  his  military  tribunes,  R  Sempronius  Asellio  and  P.  Rutilius 
Rufus,  afterwards  wrote  histories  of  the  war.  Of  the  latter  we 
shall  hear  again.  In  the  cavalry  was  C.  Marius  of  Arpinum, 
famous  as  a  soldier  in  later  days.  C  Gracchus,  younger  brother 
of  Tiberius,  served  with  credit ;  Tiberius  was  in  Rome.  Polybius 
too  may  have  visited  his  patron's  headquarters.     In  command  of 


xvii]  Northern  Italy  215 

the  Numidian  contingent  was  the  vigorous  young  prince  Jugurtha, 
who  distinguished  himself  greatly.  In  the  company  of  young 
Roman  nobles  this  ambitious  man  listened  to  the  scandalous 
gossip  of  Roman  corruption,  and  learnt  to  fancy  that  it  was 
possible,  purse  in  hand,  to  defy  the  whole  power  of  Rome. 
This  was  so  nearly  true  that  it  was  a  dangerous  delusion.  For 
fifteen  months  the  weary  siege  dragged  on  :  inside  the  town  it 
was  a  time  of  horrors,  ending  in  cannibalism.  But  the  thing 
was  done  at  last.  The  Spanish  tribes  bowed  to  their  fate,  and 
there  were  no  more  great  rebellions  in  Spain.  A  regular  settle- 
ment followed  in  the  usual  form.  The  tribute  was  a  fixed  impost. 
Roads  opened  up  the  country^  Roman  civilization  effected  the  real 
conquest  so  long  and  wastefuUy  delayed.  Roman  capital  developed 
mines  and  other  resources.  Spanish  soldiers  served  in  Roman 
armies.  In  short,  from  the  time  of  Brutus  and  Scipio  Spain  was 
on  its  way  to  become  one  of  the  most  Romanized  and  prosperous 
parts  of  the  Roman  empire. 

268.  In  northern  Italy  things  were  a  stage  further  advanced 
than  in  Spain.  Only  small  local  outbreaks  interrupted  the  pro- 
gress of  Romanization  now  and  then.  Roman  supremacy  was  no 
longer  in  question,  though  the  Ligurians  had  still  to  be  watched. 
In  the  years  156 — 154  we  find  Roman  forces  engaged  beyond  the 
frontiers  both  East  and  West.  The  necessity  of  controlling  the 
Adriatic  led  to  a  Dalmatian  expedition,  and  the  chastisement  of 
these  barbarians  checked  their  raids  for  a  time.  On  the  other 
side,  Rome's  old  ally  Massalia  was  troubled  by  Ligurians,  who 
descended  on  the  Massaliot  territory  along  the  coast  and  did 
much  damage.  A  campaign  conducted  by  Q.  Opimius,  consul 
154,  put  an  end  to  this  annoyance.  This  little  war  is  worth  notice 
as  the  first  step  in  the  Roman  advance  towards  Transalpine  Gaul. 
But  Rome  annexed  no  territory.  In  148  a  practical  measure  was 
undertaken  by  the  consul  Sp.  Postumius  Albinus.  This  was  the 
via  Postumia^  a  road  connecting  Genua  on  the  coast  with  Placentia 
on  the  Po,  by  way  of  an  Apennine  pass.  For  facilitating  military 
movements  this  connexion  was  most  important.  The  real  trouble 
remaining  in  these  parts  arose  from  the  presence  of  consuls  with 
armies  in  the  Cisalpine.  They  had  no  regular  war  to  occupy  them, 
and  were  tempted  to  seek  cheap  glory  and  triumphs  by  getting  up 
quarrels  with  Alpine  tribes.  The  case  of  a  Claudius,  consul  143, 
who  attacked  the  Salassi  in  the  North-West  on  a  pretext  connected 


2 1 6  pax  Romana  [ch.  xvii 

with  a  watercourse  and  some  gold-washings,  was  thought  a  scandal. 
But,  so  long  as  the  Senate  could  not  effectively  control  com- 
manders of  armies,  such  misconduct  was  liable  to  happen.  And 
northern  Italy  was  not  under  an  ordinary  provincial  governor. 
It  was  an  appendage  to  Italy  proper,  and  as  such  it  naturally 
came  under  a  consul.  With  the  consulship  a  man  reached  the 
goal  of  his  ambition,  and  it  became  no  easy  matter  to  control  him. 
So  ineffective,  under  the  Roman  constitution,  were  the  means  at 
the  disposal  of  the  government. 

269.  We  have  now  reviewed  the  last  steps  by  which  the 
Roman  nobility  and  capitaHsts  cleared  the  ground  for  a  career 
of  monstrous  tyranny  and  extortion.  That  Roman  society  and 
Roman  government  were  inwardly  rotten,  we  shall  presently  see. 
But  conquest  went  on  nevertheless.  We  have  seen,  and  shall 
see,  the  peoples  used  to  effect  each  other's  subjection,  or  even 
their  own.  As  in  Italy,  so  on  a  larger  scale  abroad,  to  isolate 
and  so  to  rule  was  ever  the  guiding  principle  of  the  policy  of 
Rome. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 

INTERNAL    HISTORY   201  —  133  B.C. 

270.     In  the  foregoing  chapters  we  have  often  met  with  signs 
of  a  change  for  the  worse  in  the  Roman  commonwealth,  and  it 
has  now  and  then  been   necessary  to   call  particular  attention 
thereto.     In  the  story  of  the  next  period  we  shall  find  Roman 
public  life  carried  on  under  conditions  widely  differing  from  those 
under  which  Rome  bore  the  strain  of  the   second  Punic  war. 
From   the  peace   with   Carthage   in   201    to   the  destruction  of 
Numantia  in   133  we  have  traced  the  development  of  Roman 
policy  abroad.     Looking  back  over  this  period,  we  have  seen 
the  Roman  system  prove  itself  superior  to  opposing  systems  of 
two   clearly-marked  types.     Where   local   independence  was  the 
rule,  neither  barbarian  tribes  nor  small  Greek  unions  could  stand 
against  the  force  of  the  centralized  Italian  confederacy.     That 
force  was  too  great,  if  used  in  earnest  by  the  great  Head  of  Italy. 
In  the  case  of  great  kingdoms,  Rome's  easy  victories  were  largely 
due  to  the  exercise  of  intelligence  and  sound  appreciation  of  facts. 
The  truth  of  things  seldom  reached  the  ears  of  autocrats,  unpalat- 
able advice  was  scorned,  and  the  personal  bias  of  a  king  generally 
corrupted  his  own  judgment.     In  the  Roman  Senate  there  was 
a  store  of  experience,  such  as  no  king  could  acquire  on  any  terms. 
There  was  a  continuity  of  policy,  such  as  no  dynasty  of  hereditary 
rulers  could  long  maintain.     Lastly,  in  an  age  when  it  was  hardly 
possible  for  states  to  live  side  by  side  on  an  equal  footing,  when 
*  eat  or  be  eaten '  was  the  unconfessed  rule  of  international  practice, 
the  fears  of  the  weaker  powers  exercised  a  marked  influence.    The 
warnings  and  information  that  poured  into  Rome  kept  the  Senate 
well  supplied  with  the  materials  for  forming  a  judgment,  and 
enabled  it  to  employ  the  resources  of  diplomacy  with  effect.    Yet 


2i8  The  wealthy  classes  [ch. 

with  all  these  advantages  the  imperial  progress  of  Rome  was  far 
slower  than  it  might  conceivably  have  been.  Truth  is,  the  obstacles 
abroad  were  trifling  compared  with  those  at  home.  The  Roman 
government,  though  better  adapted  than  others  to  face  the  struggles 
of  an  age  of  conflict,  was  already  suffering  from  diseases  both 
political  and  social.  Let  us  review  briefly  the  inner  history  of 
Rome  from  200  to  133  B.C.  We  shall  see  enough  to  explain  how 
it  was  that  the  great  republic  could  neither  conquer  with  a  wise 
economy  of  eflbrt  nor  rule  her  subjects  with  justice  and  decency. 

271.  The  working  of  the  constitution.  Rome  had  no  system 
of  written  constitutional  laws.  Certain  changes  had  in  the  past 
been  made  by  statute,  chiefly  under  popular  pressure  acting  in 
Assemblies  led  by  tribunes.  But  for  more  than  a  century  this 
pressure  had  been  becoming  weaker  and  more  fitful,  and  had 
now  practically  ceased.  The  tribunate  survived  mainly  as  an 
organ  of  the  Senate.  The  Senate,  once  a  council  of  picked  men 
chosen  by  the  censors  on  the  ground  of  official  position  or  merit 
otherwise  attested,  was  fast  becoming  a  close  body  of  nobles ;  for 
those  members  who  were  not  magistrates  past  or  present  nearly 
all  belonged  to  noble  families.  And  the  Senate  was  now  virtually 
the  Government.  Aristocratic  bodies  always  tend  to  close  their 
ranks  against  intruders  and  to  aim  (more  or  less  imperfectly)  at 
equality  within  their  own  circle.  The  distinction  of  Patrician  and 
Plebeian  had  now  no  political  importance.  In  172  both  consuls 
were  Plebeians,  and  the  same' was  often  the  case  later  on.  The 
line  of  division  in  the  community  was  more  nearly  that  between 
Rich  and  Poor.  But  the  Rich  were  now  forming  two  distinct 
classes.  Senators,  debarred  from  openly  taking  a  part  in  com- 
merce, were  in  the  main  a  landholding  aristocracy.  Beside  them 
were  a  number  of  non-noble  capitalists.  This  class,  long  existing 
in  Rome,  carried  on  banking,  money-lending,  and  speculation  in 
various  enterprises  of  a  financial  kind,  particularly  in  state-contracts. 
In  this  period  these  men  became  more  numerous.  The  growth  of 
empire  added  to  their  opportunities.  Wars  found  employment 
for  army-contractors  and  slave-dealers,  and  in  newly-annexed 
countries  land-speculators  and  moneylenders  reaped  a  golden 
harvest.  In  Rome  their  influence  was  on  the  rise,  largely  owing 
to  the  increase  of  the  companies  or  syndicates  {societates)  referred 
to  above.  Through  these  a  host  of  smaller  capitalists  were  able 
to  share  in  the  profits  of  exploiting  enterprises  that  would  other- 


xviii]  Capitalism  and  Slavery  219 

wise  have  been  beyond  their  reach,  without  being  obliged  to  travel 
in  search  of  investments.     And  these  men  had  votes. 

272.  In  speaking  of  the  rapid  growth  and  organization  of 
a  capitalist  class,  who  in  the  next  period  became  a  recognized 
Order,  we  are  touching  on  a  great  economic  and  social  change 
that  passed  over  Rome  and  a  large  part  of  Italy.  Whence  came 
the  funds  that  enabled  men  to  start  as  investors  in  a  small  way  of 
business?  Once  started,  most  Romans,  keen  in  money-matters, 
were  well  able  to  make  their  capital  grow.  Two  sources  may  be 
suggested,  from  which  original  small  nest-eggs  were  probably 
derived.  First,  the  profits  of  military  service.  There  is  good 
reason  to  think  that  even  in  the  field  the  soldiers  of  this  period 
often  amassed  considerable  sums,  and  there  were  generally  some 
pickings  on  the  occasion  of  a  triumph.  We  even  hear  of  money 
carried  on  foreign  service  to  be  used  in  loans  at  interest.  Second, 
the  sale  of  small  holdings  of  land.  We  know  that  the  formation 
of  large  landed  estates  was  going  on  in  several  parts  of  Italy,  and 
that  this  process  consisted  partly  in  the  big  landlords  buying  out 
the  small.  The  wide  estates  ijatifundia)  of  the  new  style  were 
tilled  by  gangs  of  slaves ;  the  grazing  business  employed  slave- 
herdsmen.  The  free  small  farmer  was  in  large  districts  (such  as 
most  of  Etruria  Lucania  and  Apulia)  unable  to  compete  with 
large-scale  husbandry.  But  there  was  a  growing  market  for  slaves, 
and  the  soldier  who  received  a  slave  or  two  as  a  reward  after 
victory  could  always  get  cash  from  the  dealers  who  followed  the 
army.  The  dealers  in  slaves  would  themselves  usually  be  old 
soldiers,  or  ex-farmers,  or  both,  and  would  be  either  speculating 
on  their  own  account  or  agents  for  a  syndicate  in  Rome.  In  any 
case  the  dealers'  profit  was  doubtless  great.  To  many  men  these 
openings  for  acquiring  a  competence  would  be  irresistible,  com- 
pared with  a  farmer's  life,  always  hard  and  now  unremunerative. 
So  the  old  principle,  that  the  citizen  was  a  soldier  who  served  for 
duty's  sake  and  then  returned  to  rural  life,  was  now  an  obsolete 
theory.  We  have  seen  that  the  attempt  to  enforce  an  old-fashioned 
military  levy  was  at  times  attended  with  serious  difficulties.  Italian 
Allies  could  be  employed  in  the  less  attractive  campaigns.  When 
a  better  prospect  offered  itself,  the  Roman  citizen  was  ready  to 
come  forward  as  a  mercenary  volunteer. 

273.  Another  great  change,  silent  and  continuous,  not 
effected  by  any  one  deliberate  act,  was  upsetting  the  balance  of 


2  20  Beginnings  of  a  city  mob  [ch. 

the  constitution.  The  Assemblies  were  becoming  less  and  less 
the  genuine  mouthpiece  of  the  Roman  people.  Roman  citizens 
were  in  this  period  more  scattered  than  of  old.  Numbers  went 
off  to  the  new  citizen  colonies  founded  in  northern  and  southern 
Italy  at  great  distances  from  Rome.  These  would  probably  be 
men  rather  above  the  average  in  energy.  But  they  could  seldom 
attend  an  Assembly  in  Rome.  Nor  should  we  forget  that  a  large 
number  of  citizens  were  at  any  time  absent  on  service  or  on  their 
own  occasions  abroad.  Meanwhile  the  mass  of  those  at  any  time 
within  reach  was  becoming  less  and  less  fit  to  represent  the  views 
of  the  whole  citizen  body.  The  lazy  and  thriftless  tended  to  drift 
into  Rome  and  stay  there,  enjoying  privileges  and  perquisites 
denied  to  the  rustic  folk.  The  more  their  numbers  grew,  the 
more  it  was  the  interest  of  the  ruling  class  to  keep  them  in  good 
humour,  for  they  at  least  were  always  able  to  use  their  votes  at 
elections.  After  the  second  Punic  war  it  had  not  been  easy  to 
induce  refugees  to  return  to  rural  life,  and  the  effect  of  changes 
in  agriculture  was  to  send  a  steady  stream  of  rustics  into  the  city, 
the  less  capable  of  whom  remained.  As  these  immigrants  were 
still  registered  in  their  original  Tribes,  it  was  not  merely  the  four 
city  Tribes  in  which  these  city  residents  voted.  Thus  the  formation 
of  an  urban  mob,  ignorant  and  fickle,  went  on  apace,  and  this  mob 
tended  to  become  more  and  more  corrupt.  But  the  mob  was 
further  recruited  from  sources  not  Roman.  The  great  rise  of 
Rome  had  made  the  full  Roman  franchise  an  object  of  desire  to 
the  Latin  communities,  hitherto  content  with  their  local  freedom. 
They  now  saw  Romans  gradually  monopolizing  imperial  privileges, 
and  leaving  to  them  the  greater  share  of  the  burdens.  Hence 
enterprising  Latins  often  migrated^  to  Rome,  and  sometimes 
succeeded  in  passing  themselves  off  for  Roman  citizens.  More- 
over there  were  a  number  of  freedmen,  and  they  were  increasing 
with  the  increase  of  slaves. 

274.  Neither  the  Latin  immigrants  nor  the  citizens  of  servile 
extraction  were  necessarily  paupers.  It  seems  probable  that  the 
pauper  element  was  in  this  period  mainly  Roman  by  birth.  But 
the  two  non-Roman  elements  were  themselves  very  different  in 
their  political  character.  The  Latins  represented  the  claim  of 
the  Italian  Allies  (the  mainstay  of  Roman  power)  to  be  placed 
on  an  equality  with  Romans.     The  freedmen  were  aliens.     They 

1  See  §§  82,  283. 


xviii]  Importance  of  the  censorship  221 

had  no  Italian  traditions,  and  their  connexion  with  Rome  was 
a  purely  personal  one.  Their  former  owners,  to  whom  they 
owed  their  emancipation,  would  all  be  men  of  property,  and  to 
them  they  owed  allegiance  according  to  all-powerful  custom,  to 
some  extent  even  by  law.  Now  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the 
rule  of  the  Senate  was  a  fact,  not  a  right.  It  was  the  effect  of 
causes  that  we  have  considered  above,  not  of  a  statute.  The 
Assembly  alone  could  legislate;  indeed  to  its  power  there  was 
no  limit,  for  there  was  no  means  of  challenging  its  decisions  other 
than  the  discovery  of  some  religious  flaw  in  the  proceedings. 
Therefore  the  nobles  who  controlled  the  Senate  had  to  manage 
the  Assembly,  or  lose  the  direction  of  affairs.  In  general,  their 
control  of  the  tribunate  was  enough  for  the  purpose,  but  this  could 
not  always  be  relied  on.  From  their  point  of  view  it  was  most 
important  to  see  that  the  Assembly  was  amenable  to  their  influence. 
This  could  only  be  done  by  watching  the  composition  and  organi- 
zation of  that  body.  There  were  two  questions,  (a)  to  whom 
should  the  Roman  franchise  be  granted  (d)  in  what  Tribes  should 
new  citizens  be  enrolled. 

275.  Now  the  attempts  made  to  answer  these  questions  were 
the  chief  constitutional  movements  of  this  period.  It  is  charac- 
teristic of  the  Roman  system  that  these  attempts  were  not  made 
in  a  series  of  laws  but  in  the  action  of  various  censors.  Very  little 
legislation  took  place  on  such  matters.  Every  five  years  the 
censors  had  to  decide  whom  they  would  recognize  as  citizens 
and  in  what  voting  groups  they  would  place  them.  This  then 
was  the  period  in  which  the  censorship  reached  the  height  of  its 
importance.  It  was  the  organ  of  the  senatorial  nobles,  by  which 
they  (or  the  party  at  any  time  dominant  among  them)  strove  to 
model  the  citizen  body  in  accordance  with  their  own  interest. 
Therefore  we  find  none  of  the  old  irregularity  in  the  periodical 
revision.  From  199  to  154  the  succession  of  censors  is  perfectly 
regular  at  intervals  of  five  years,  and  even  then  it  was  only  inter 
rupted  for  a  moment.  The  policy  of  various  censors  differed 
widely,  but  the  general  tendency  continued,  corresponding  to 
the  general  course  of  the  influences  prevailing  at  different  times 
in  public  life.  There  was  ebbing  and  flowing,  but  the  ebbing 
of  old-Roman  principles  was  on  the  whole  stronger  than  the  flow. 
In  the  long  run  the  practice  of  the  new  school  prevailed.  Perhaps 
nothing  could  have  prevented  the  formation  of  a  Roman  mob, 


222  The  old  and  new  schools  [ch. 

such  as  we  find  it  in  the  next  period.  At  all  events  the  censors 
did  not  prevent  it,  nor  was  their  policy,  so  far  as  we  can  trace  it, 
likely  to  do  so.  In  dealing  with  the  freedmen,  the  new  school 
were  lax.  Their  bent  was  to  put  these  easily-influenced  voters 
into  any  of  the  35  Tribes,  that  the  Assembly  might  be  more  easy 
to  control.  The  reformers,  starting  from  old  Roman  ^  principles, 
strove  to  confine  citizens  of  servile  extraction  to  the  four  city 
Tribes,  that  their  votes  might  have  less  weight.  But  on  the 
question  of  the  Latins  both  schools  agreed.  To  the  new  school 
the  intruders  were  unwelcome,  as  being  men  on  the  average  more 
independent  than  suited  the  nobles  bent  on  monopolizing  power. 
The  reformers,  led  by  Cato,  took  a  narrowly  legal  view.  The 
relations  between  Rome  and  the  various  Italian  Allies  were 
defined  by  treaties.  A  bargain  was  a  bargain,  and  to  make  any 
allowance  for  change  of  circumstances  was  no  doubt  too  statesman- 
like a  policy  for  these  well-meaning  men.  So  both  parties  watched 
the  Latin  intruders  and  did  their  best  to  exclude  them. 

276.     It  is  not  possible  in  the  space  at  disposal  to  discuss 
the  proceedings  of  the  several  pairs  of  censors,  so  far  as  we  know 
them  from  our  fragmentary  record.      But  we  can  hardly  omit 
altogether  the  two  notable  censorships  of  leading  reformers.     The 
failure  of  the  attacks  on  Vulso  and  Nobilior  in  187,  and  the  dis- 
grace of  L.  Scipio,  shew^  the  discontent  then  prevailing  and  how 
it  was  thwarted.     The  old-Roman  party  gained  strength  for  the 
moment,  and  in  185  they  were  able  to  get  Cato  and  his  friend 
L.  Valerius  Flaccus  elected  censors  for  the  next  year.     The  result 
was  a  census  carried  out  with  a  severity  long  unknown.     The 
Senate  was  purged  of  its  unworthy  members.     The  interests  of 
the  state  were  firmly  guarded  in  the  letting  of  contracts.     In 
valuing  citizens'  property,  liable  to  taxation  in  the  event  of  war, 
luxuries  were  assessed  at  ten  times  their  market  price.     It  is  most 
probable  that  they  admitted  freedmen  to  the  four  city  Tribes  only, 
and  excluded  Latins — of  course  when  detected.     It  is  clear  that 
a  reform-movement  undertaken  in  so  unbending  a  spirit  was  likely 
to  provoke  a  reaction.     And  the  work  of  one  census  was  only  in 
force  till  the  next.      So  the  censorship  of  Cato,  a  byword  for 
priggish  self-righteousness,  was  productive  of  no  permanent  effect. 
Things  slipped  back  into  their  former  groove,  and  a  spell  of  slack- 
ness at  home  was  accompanied  by  grave  scandals  in  the  wars 
1  See  §  III.  *  See  §  214. 


xviii]  The  Freedmen  and  the  Latins  223 

abroad.  It  was  during  the  war  with  Perseus  that  the  old- Roman 
reformers  once  more  came  to  the  front.  In  169  C.  Claudius 
Pulcher  and  Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus  were  censors.  The 
latter  was  the  man  who  had  done  good  service  in  Spain  and  else- 
where. Both  were  strong  men  :  we  have  seen'  how  they  used 
their  censorial  powers  to  overcome  the  difficulties  connected  with 
the  military  levy.  In  the  work  of  revision  they  were  severe.  But 
an  attempt  to  get  rid  of  jobbery  in  letting  the  state  contracts  soon 
brought  them  into  violent  collision  with  the  now  powerful  class 
of  capitalists,  backed  by  a  tribune.  After  a  bitter  quarrel,  the 
censors  were  accused  of  high  treason  i^perduellid)  before  the 
Assembly  of  Centuries,  and  only  the  exertions  of  leading  nobles 
and  the  personal  popularity  of  Gracchus  procured  their  acquittal. 

277.  Here  we  get  a  glimpse  of  the  political  situation  in 
Rome  at  this  time.  Senate  and  censors  defeated  capitalists  and 
tribune,  but  with  great  difficulty.  The  mass  of  poor  citizens  had 
to  decide  the  issue,  though  the  voting  was  by  Centuries,  not  by 
Tribes.  For  the  moment  they  decided  in  favour  of  the  nobles. 
But  it  was  clear  that  their  support  could  not  be  relied  on,  and  the 
need  of  care  in  controlling  the  composition  and  organization  of 
the  citizen  body  was  unmistakeable.  Accordingly  the  censors 
made  a  distinction  between  the  wealthier  and  poorer  freedmen. 
The  former  they  admitted  to  any  of  the  35  Tribes,  the  latter  to 
only  one  of  the  four  city  Tribes.  Detected  Latin  claimants  they 
excluded  altogether.  But  their  work  was  short-lived.  After  the 
victory  of  Pydna  Rome  seemed  so  secure  that  reformers  could 
not  get  a  sympathetic  hearing.  In  the  race  for  wealth  and  luxury 
men  disregarded  the  principles  and  practice  of  old  Rome,  and 
censorial  vigour  died  away.  There  were  those  who  saw  and 
lamented  the  demoralization  of  the  age,  and  confessed  that 
corrupt  and  unpatriotic  Assemblies  were  a  grave  danger.  Such 
was  Scipio  Aemilianus,  censor  in  142.  It  is  said  that  in  closing 
the  purification  {lustrum)  he  prayed  the  gods  to  keep  Rome  safe, 
not  (as  in  the  usual  form)  to  make  her  greater.  Nor  was  this 
a  groundless  pessimism.  The  Roman  constitution  had  hitherto 
only  been  made  to  work  through  the  high  moral  qualities  of  the 
people.  Wise  concessions  made  in  time  had  brought  good  new 
blood  into  the  citizen  body  and  bound  all  together  in  a  common 
patriotism.     Now,  in  the  full  flush  of  Roman  greatness,  a  jealous 

^  See  §  221. 


2  24  ^^^   Villia  annalis  [ch. 

exclusiveness  prevailed.  The  ruling  nobles  wanted  to  share  public 
offices  among  themselves,  and  to  shut  out  the  lower  orders.  The 
mass  of  citizens,  loth  to  share  their  advantages  with  others,  were 
less  and  less  willing  to  see  the  franchise  granted  to  the  Italian 
Allies. 

278.  To  begin  with  the  nobles.  It  was  their  aim  to  prevent 
young  men  of  their  own  order  from  rising  too  fast  and  so  over- 
topping their  peers,  and  to  shut  out  '  new  men '  from  office  (at 
least  from  the  consulship)  altogether.  The  latter  object  had  to 
be  achieved  mainly  by  the  steady  pressure  of  influence,  but  it 
would  no  doubt  be  helped  on  by  attaining  the  former.  Existing 
custom  enjoined  the  leaving  of  an  interval  between  the  tenure  of 
one  office  and  the  next.  The  ordinary  course  of  honours  {honores 
=  offices)  was  quaestor  aedile  praetor  consul.  But  there  had  been 
cases,  such  as  those  of  Scipio  Africanus  and  Flamininus,  in  which 
the  steps  of  office  had  been  partly  skipped  by  men  of  mark  in 
special  circumstances.  To  stop  this  it  was  at  length  found 
necessary  to  resort  to  legislation.  In  180  the  'law  of  years' 
{lex  annalis)  was  carried  by  the  tribune  L.  Villius.  It  enacted 
a  regular  statutory  scale  of  eligibility.  After  ten  years  of  liability 
to  military  service  (17 — 27),  a  man  could  hold  the  quaestorship 
at  28,  the  praetorship  at  31,  and  the  consulship  at  34.  If  after 
the  quaestorship  he  became  aedile,  he  might  hold  it  at  31.  Then 
he  might  be  praetor  at  34,  and  consul  at  37.  Thus  between  any 
two  offices  there  was  to  be  a  minimum  interval  of  two  years.  The 
aedileship  was  an  optional  step  in  the  course,  for  there  were  only 
four  aediles,  not  enough  to  supply  candidates  for  the  six  praetor- 
ships.  But  the  office  of  aedile  was  becoming  more  and  more 
identified  with  the  duty  of  providing  for  the  games  or  shows  ijudi) 
in  which  the  idle  populace  delighted.  The  state  allotted  funds  for 
the  purpose,  but  more  and  more  was  expected,  and  ambitious  men 
found  it  worth  their  while  to  win  popular  favour  by  lavish  outlay 
from  their  own  purses.  Thus  the  road  to  the  consulship  was 
generally  a  costly  one,  and  the  extravagance  of  those  who  meant 
to  compete  later  for  the  highest  honour  was  a  chief  cause  of 
Roman  iniquities  abroad.  For  empty  purses  were  to  be  refilled 
at  the  expense  of  the  subject  world. 

279.  The  lex  Villia  long  remained  in  force,  suiting  as  it  did 
the  convenience  of  the  great  majority  of  the  class  interested.  To 
hold  each  office  in  a  man's  '  own  year '  {anno  suo\  that  is  at  the 


xviii]  The  Senate  225 

earliest  lawful  date,  became  an  object  of  ambition.  But  there 
was  the  further  question  of  reelections.  An  old  law  required  an 
interval  of  ten  years  between  two  consulships.  In  order  to  prevent 
reelections  from  lessening  average  men's  chances  of  holding  the 
chief  office,  it  was  thought  desirable  to  forbid  reelection  altogether. 
This  seems  to  have  been  done  by  a  law  passed  in  151.  Scipio 
Aemilianus  had  to  receive  a  special  exemption  from  it,  that  he 
might  be  consul  a  second  time  in  134.  But  under  the  strain  of 
events  this  rule  was  broken  to  pieces  in  the  following  period. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  strictly  Plebeian  office  of  tribune  was 
not  touched  by  these  laws,  which  only  applied  to  the  regular 
magistracies.  At  some  date  '  continuation  '  (immediate  reelection) 
seems  to  have  been  forbidden ;  when,  is  uncertain.  And  the 
tribunate  was  not  greatly  sought  after  in  an  age  of  great  wars,  for 
it  did  not  lead  to  military  command.  We  find  tribunes  taking 
part  in  public  affairs,  generally  as  tools  of  the  Senate,  but  now 
and  then  apparently  acting  on  behalf  of  some  personal  interest 
in  opposition  to  consuls.  In  151  C.  Laelius,  friend  of  Aemilianus, 
is  said  to  have  made  agrarian  proposals,  meant  to  get  the  people 
back  to  the  land.  But  he  could  effect  nothing,  and  dropped  his 
scheme.     The  revival  of  the  active  tribunate  had  to  wait. 

280.  We  have  seen  that  the  degradation  of  the  Assembly 
was  in  full  progress,  and  that  more  and  more  care  was  taken  to 
govern  the  official  career  by  rigid  rules,  under  which  a  regular 
succession  of  commonplace  magistrates  was  secured,  and  only 
departed  from  under  pressure  of  some  great  emergency.  Yet  a 
Republic  can  hardly  thrive  under  a  system  of  suppressing  ambi- 
tions, a  truth  which  appears  most  clearly  in  connexion  with  the 
Senate.  That  body  had  now  to  guide  the  policy  of  Rome,  but 
in  the  last  resort  it  was  the  Assembly  with  which  the  sovran  power 
rested.  It  was  therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  in- 
ternal relations  of  the  Senate  should  be  harmonious.  There  is 
reason  to  think  that  they  were  not  so.  Jealousies  prevailed,  and 
found  open  expression  on  such  occasions  as  the  discussion  of 
claims  to  triumphs,  approval  of  acts  of  provincial  governors,  and 
so  forth.  The  efforts  of  the  old-Roman  party  were  reinforced  by 
personal  animosities.  Proconsuls  returned  with  all  the  glories  of 
victory  followed  by  a  great  settlement  fresh  upon  them,  and  after 
a  triumph  had  to  become  once  more  the  peers  of  a  number.  For 
men  who  had  been  in  an  almost  regal  position  this  was  hard  at 

H.  15 


2  26  Rome  and  the  Allies  [ch. 

first.  Nor  did  time  make  it  easier,  for  there  was  a  succession  of 
men  returning  with  more  or  less  claims  to  distinction,  and  former 
achievements  were  passing  out  of  notice.  There  would  also  be 
men  rightly  or  wrongly  regarded  as  failures,  and  some  who  had 
attempted  nothing  remarkable,  from  lack  of  enterprise  or  oppor- 
tunity. The  younger  members,  bent  on  climbing  the  ladder  of 
office,  would  look  at  things  chiefly  from  the  point  of  view  of  their 
own  interests.  Enough  has  been  said  to  shew  that  the  elements 
of  discomfort  were  already  rife.  No  wonder  there  were  cliques 
and  factions  in  the  Senate,  and  that  the  House  was  often  too 
divided  to  enforce  its  will. 

281.     The  Allies.      On  one   all-important   matter  of  policy 
there  was  unhappily  no  real  difference  between  Senate  Magis- 
trates and  Assembly.     The  old  system  of  half-citizenship,  a  stage 
through  which  a  number  of  Italians  had  passed  to  the  full  Roman 
franchise,  was  no  longer  in  use.     In  188  the  citizens  of  Fundi 
Formiae  and  Arpinum  were  thus  promoted.      Even  the  Cam- 
panians  punished  for  the  misdeeds  of  Capua  in  the  Hannibalic 
war  received  an  instalment  of  forgiveness.    They  were  on  the  way 
to  the  full  citizenship.     It  seems  certain  that  they  and  any  other 
half-citizens  now  remaining  received  the  full  civitas  in  this  period 
or  very  soon  after.     Thus  there  were  in  Italy  only  the  two  classes 
of  cives  and  socii^  and  the  new  growth  of  Rome  as  an  imperial 
power  had  completely  changed  the  relations  between  them.     In 
the  distant  wars  of  the  age,  ever  extending  Roman  power,  the 
Allies   as   such   had  no  concern.      Provinces  were  annexed  to 
Rome  :  to  Rome,  not  to  united  Italy,  tributes  were  paid  :  Roman, 
not  Italian,  officers  were  at  the  head  of  provinces  and  armies,  and 
Roman  purses  were  filled  by  exploiting  the  results  of  war.     Yet  it 
was  on  the  Allies  that  the  most  irksome  burdens  of  warfare  fell. 
Thousands  and  thousands  of  their  youth  perished  in  Spain  alone. 
Still,  when  Romans  and  Allies  had  fought  side  by  side,  it  was 
the  old  custom  to  give  them  equal  largess  at  the  triumph.     At 
a  triumph  in  177  and  on  several  later  occasions  the  Allies  received 
only  half    It  had  formerly  been  a  privilege  to  be  made  a  member 
of  a  Latin  colony  founded  by  Rome,  where  the  colonist  was  given 
an  allotment  of  land.     But  in  this  period  Latin  colonies  were 
giving  place  to  citizen  colonies,  to  which  very  few  Allies  could 
gain  admission.     As  early  as  194,  some  'Latins'  had  tried  to 
gain  the  Roman  franchise  in  this  way,  but  the  Senate  decided 


xviii]  Overbearing  Nobles  227 

that  their  admission  would  not  make  them  Romans.  A  very 
few  Allies,  such  as  Ennius,  were  granted  the  franchise  by  this 
means  as  a  favour.  And  all  the  while  the  value  of  the  franchise 
went  on  rising. 

282.  For  not  only  did  the  privileges  of  Romans  automatic- 
ally grow  by  the  growth  of  the  opportunities  offered  by  empire. 
Legislation  directly  conferred  privileges  denied  to  the  Ally.  The 
three  leges  Porciae  belong  to  this  period.  Their  exact  dates  and 
scope  are  uncertain,  but  we  know  that  in  some  form  or  other  they 
protected  the  citizen's  back.  That  is,  the  Roman  was  no  longer 
exposed  to  be  cruelly  scourged  at  the  will  of  a  magistrate  holding 
the  military  imperium.  He  could  claim  the  right  of  appeal,  at  all 
events  in  some  circumstances.  The  Ally,  even  the  favoured  Latin, 
could  not.  Here  was  a  galling  distinction,  felt  whenever  an  army 
was  raised.  If  we  may  believe  a  passage  from  a  speech  of  Cato, 
even  the  chief  men  of  an  allied  town  were  not  safe  from  the 
brutality  of  a  Roman  magistrate  who  took  offence  at  some  act 
on  their  part.  The  overbearing  pride  of  some  Roman  nobles 
found  various  ways  of  displaying  itself.  In  174  a  censor,  wishing 
to  adorn  a  new  temple  that  he  was  building  in  Rome,  stripped 
the  famous  Greek  temple  of  Hera  Lacinia  (near  Croton)  of  its 
marble  tiles.  It  was  an  outrage  on  Greek  feeling,  and  the  Senate 
ordered  him  to  restore  the  tiles.  But  they  were  only  shot  down 
in  the  temple  court,  not  restored  to  their  proper  place.  In  173 
a  consul  was  instructed  to  see  to  some  boundary-questions  in 
Campania.  He  had  a  grudge  against  the  people  of  Praeneste, 
an  old  Latin  city,  a  Roman  Ally  of  the  first  rank,  long  faithful 
and  useful  to  Rome.  He  chose  to  travel  by  way  of  Praeneste, 
and  wrote  requiring  a  public  reception  and  entertainment,  and 
conveyance  on  the  next  stage  of  his  journey  at  the  cost  of  the 
town.  He  had  no  right  to  do  this.  But  the  Praenestine  autho- 
rities thought  it  better  to  submit  to  an  illegal  exaction  than  to  risk 
the  ill  turns  that  the  consul  and  his  friends  might  do  them.  They 
did  as  he  ordered,  and  an  evil  precedent  was  made.  There  was 
in  fact  no  protection  for  the  Allies  against  the  insolence  of  a 
Roman  noble. 

283.  It  is  not  wonderful  that  'Latins'  often  migrated  to 
Rome  and  tried  to  register  themselves  as  Roman  citizens.  The 
old  rules  relative  to  migration  from  Latin  communities  no  doubt 
offered  facilities  for  removal,  and  it  was  not  easy  to  detect  evasion 

IS— 2 


228  The  Allies  and  the  franchise  [ch. 

of  the  conditions.  But  there  were  also  some  new  devices.  A 
Latin  sold  his  son  to  a  Roman,  who  agreed  to  emancipate  the 
young  man,  and  so  make  him  a  citizen.  It  seems  to  have  been 
understood  that  a  freedman  of  this  sort  was  on  a  different  social 
footing  from  the  ordinary  manumitted  slave.  The  process  was 
very  like  adoption,  and  Romans  were  found  to  carry  it  out, 
probably  for  a  consideration.  But  the  movement  of  Latins  to 
Rome  set  going  a  movement  of  ordinary  Allies  to  Latin  towns. 
This  attempt  of  Allies  to  better  themselves  might  suit  the  indi- 
vidual migrants.  But  it  bore  hardly  on  those  left  behind  in  their 
proper  homes,  for  the  depleted  communities  had  still  to  furnish 
their  military  contingents.  We  are  told  that  both  Latins  and 
other  Allies  complained  of  these  migrations,  and  the  Senate  had 
to  deal  with  the  matter.  In  187  we  hear  of  a  commission  of 
inquiry,  followed  by  the  expulsion  from  Rome  of  12,000  Latins.  In 
177  the  lex  Claudia  de  sociis  was  passed  to  check  migrations, 
ordering  the  Latins  back  to  their  homes,  and  providing  against 
certain  evasions.  It  had  now  come  to  actual  legislation,  and  the 
Assembly  endorsed  the  policy  of  the  Senate.  In  174  a  consul 
issued  a  stringent  edict,  to  put  the  law  in  force.  But  there  was 
no  regular  machinery  in  the  Roman  system  for  continuous  en- 
forcement of  such  regulations.  The  attractions  remained,  and  it 
seems  certain  that  no  prohibition  of  migrations  was  permanently 
successful  in  stopping  them. 

284.  It  is  quite  clear  that  the  Allies  were  in  a  far  worse 
position  than  before  the  Second  Punic  war.  Their  various  grades 
of  privilege  and  divergent  interests  hindered  combination  for 
common  ends.  Meanwhile  the  Romans  scattered  over  Italy 
were  more  united  and  more  exclusive,  and  the  military  services 
of  the  Allies  only  extended  the  empire  of  Rome.  Yet  they  had 
not  lost  all  hope  of  bettering  their  condition,  and  the  insults 
referred  to  above  were  no  doubt  exceptional.  The  situation  was 
perhaps  not  easily  understood  at  the  time.  By  incorporating  her 
early  conquests  in  the  Roman  state,  Rome  had  built  up  a  power 
stronger  than  any  Italian  rival,  had  overcome  the  disunited  Italian 
powers  in  detail,  and  had  organized  the  whole  in  a  confederacy 
of  which  she  was  the  Head.  She  was  now  dealing  with  powers 
abroad,  and  overcoming  them  in  detail  by  Italian  strength.  But 
her  success  only  made  the  Allies  wish  for  incorporation  and  a 
share  of  imperial  privileges.     This  Rome  refused.     But  they  still 


xviii]  Provincial  government  229 

had  their  local  self-government.    They  were  not  under  the  rule  of 
a  Roman  governor,  and  they  paid  no  tribute. 

285.  The  Provinces.  It  was  in  her  transmarine  possessions 
that  the  sovranty  of  Rome  appeared  at  its  worst.  We  have  already 
spoken  of  the  way  in  which  the  provincial  system  grew  up,  of  the 
charter  {lex^  organic  statute)  regulating  each  province,  of  the  suc- 
cession of  governors  holding  civil  and  military  power,  and  of  the 
graduated  variety  of  privileges  by  which  the  interests  of  the  several 
communities  within  the  province  were  kept  apart.  In  the  hands 
of  virtuous  governors,  with  honest  and  competent  subordinates, 
the  system  might  have  worked  well.  The  Senate  did  not  inten- 
tionally encourage  ill  treatment  of  Rome's  tributary  subjects,  but 
there  was  no  effective  machinery  for  training  or  controlling  either 
the  governors  or  their  staff.  They  were  amateurs,  whom  yearly 
change  prevented  from  learning  their  duties  and  becoming  experts., 
They  were  ordinary  Roman  nobles,  generally  in  want  of  money, 
and  exposed  to  temptations  which  they  were  quite  unable  to  resist. 
The  best  of  them  were  liable  to  err  from  ignorance;  the  worse 
were  certain  to  oppress  the  provincials  from  greed. 

286.  The  staff  of  a  provincial  governor  was  arranged  on  a 
military  model.  First  came  the  quaestor,  in  charge  of  the  finances, 
Dut  often  employed  as  deputy  in  other  work.  Next  the  legati  or 
attaches  appointed  by  the  Senate  to  act  as  subordinates,  and  a 
number  of  clerks  orderlies  and  men  skilled  in  some  special 
function  or  other.  There  were  also  a  number  of  unofficial 
companions  {comites)  whom  a  governor  was  allowed  to  take  out 
with  him.  One  characteristic  was  common  to  all :  they  went 
abroad  with  an  eye  to  their  own  advancement.  Some  meant  to 
rise  in  public  life,  others  were  seeking  a  competence  to  live  in 
comfort.  All  looked  to  Rome,  and  all  wanted  money.  The 
governor,  usually  a  praetor  or  propraetor,  wanted  to  be  consul. 
He  therefore  wanted  the  support  of  his  staff  later  on,  and  money 
too.  He  could  not  afford  to  offend  these  people.  But  there 
were  others  whom  it  was  necessary  to  please.  There  were  Roman 
traders  (mercatores),  always  pushing  to  the  front,  even  beyond  the 
frontier  of  the  province.  These  had  to  be  protected  when  (as 
happened)  they  got  into  trouble.  Then  there  were  the  financiers 
{negotiatores),  principals  or  agents  of  syndicates,  who  did  the 
banking  and  money-lending.  These  men  swarmed  in  the  Pro- 
vinces, where  they  operated  at  a  great  advantage ;  for  by  putting 


230  publicani  [ch. 

pressure  on  governors  they  were  able  to  influence  the  courts  of 
law,  composed  of  Roman  residents,  with  the  governor  as  supreme 
judge.  Thus  backed  by  official  favour,  they  got  all  financial 
business  into  their  hands,  and  made  immense  profits  by  usury. 
Lastly  there  were  the  publicani^  the  farmers  of  tolls  and  dues  of 
various  kinds,  not  officials,  but  persons  acting  under  licence  from 
the  Roman  state  in  virtue  of  a  definite  contract  for  a  certain  pur- 
pose, valid  for  a  certain  term. 

287.     We  have  already  seen  that  the  system  of  farming  out 
the  collection  of  revenues  was  of  old  standing,  and  had  been  first 
applied  in  Italy  and  then  extended  to  the  provinces.     The  syndi- 
cates each  paid  a  lump  sum  to  the  state  for  the  right  to  collect  a 
particular  set  of  dues.     Of  course  the  shareholders  expected  to 
make  a  good  profit :   the  state,  having  no  regular  civil  service, 
was  glad  to  be  relieved  of  the  task  of  collection :  the  governor, 
representing  the  state,  was   bound  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the 
actual  collectors.     It  was  in  this  connexion  that  the  evils  of  the 
system  most  readily  developed.     For  the  agents  of  the  publicani 
had  only  to  report  that  a  too  scrupulous  governor  was  hindering 
collection ;  investors,  furious  at  the  prospect  of  a  poor  dividend, 
would  make  themselves  felt  in  Rome.     The  provincials  had  no 
voice  in  the  matter,  and,  as  the  growth  of  luxury  and  corruption 
in  Rome  created  a  growing  demand  for  money,  the  pressure  on 
governors  grew  also.     The  causes  of  provincial  extortion  were  in 
Rome,  and  the  working  of  Roman  politics  in  this  period  offered 
no  prospect  of  their  abatement  or  removal.     While  the  farming 
of  customs  rents  royalties  and  other  dues  of  a  simple  kind  was 
probably  a  source  of  some  grumbUng,  the  chief  trouble  arose  in 
connexion  with  the  provincial  tributes.     Where  the  tribute  took 
the  form  of  a  fixed  impost  {stipe7tdium)  there  was  little  difficulty. 
This  was  the  system  to  which  the  Romans  inclined.     In  Spain 
the  subjects  even  won  the  right  to  collect  it  themselves.     The 
amount  was  not  excessive,  and  this  tribute-system  was  applied 
later  to  Africa  and  Macedonia.     When  part  of  the  tribute  was 
levied  in  corn,  abuses  might  occur,  as  we  saw^  above.     But  on 
the  whole  this  system  worked  well. 

288.  Things  were  very  different  in  provinces  where  Roman 
statesmen,  ever  loth  to  change  existing  institutions,  had  adopted 
a  system  of  exacting  yearly  percentages  of  crops.     These  varied 

*  §  233. 


xviii]  Extortion  231 

with  the  crop  from  year  to  year,  and  to  farm  the  collection  of 
such  dues  was  in  any  case  a  venture  of  the  most  speculative  kind. 
The  work  came  with  a  rush  at  the  time  of  harvest.  To  prevent 
fraud,  the  growers  of  corn  or  other  crops  had  to  be  watched.  To 
avoid  loss,  it  was  almost  necessary  to  have  a  small  margin  beyond 
the  strict  amount.  Here  was  a  rich  field  for  progressive  extortion. 
There  were  also  further  opportunities.  The  most  notorious  was 
this.  A  grower  was  required  to  deliver  the  corn  due,  not  at  the 
place  of  growth,  but  at  some  distant  centre.  The  cost  of  transport 
was  used  to  force  him  to  commute  his  liability  for  a  cash  payment 
far  greater  than  the  market  value  of  the  corn.  By  ringing  changes 
on  this  iniquity  a  vast  scheme  of  extortion  was  built  up.  Such  was 
the  working  of  the  system  of  tithes  {decumaeY,  prevailing  in  Sicily, 
applied  together  with  the  other  system  in  Sardinia,  and  carried  to 
infamous  perfection  in  Asia,  after  that  province  was  formed  out  of 
the  kingdom  of  Pergamum.  Against  the  tithe-farmers  {decumani) 
the  best  of  governors  was  powerless :  too  many  people's  incomes 
in  Rome  depended  on  their  squeezing  of  the  provincials,  and  no 
laws  availed  to  stop  the  abuses.  Ordinary  governors  were  con- 
cerned to  enrich  themselves.  They  had  no  official  salaries,  and 
the  absolute  nature  of  their  power  made  their  favours  a  market- 
able commodity.  Presents  were  offered  and  received,  for  hastening 
or  delaying  judicial  proceedings,  to  avert  burdens  such  as  an  official 
visit  or  the  quartering  of  soldiers  in  a  town,  the  last  a  contingency 
peculiarly  dreaded.  And  when  precedents  were  created,  these  and 
other  voluntary  gifts  quickly  became  normal  exactions.  Moreover 
the  governor's  staff  looked  for  some  pickings  on  their  own  account, 
and  for  his  own  sake  he  had  to  connive  at  their  doings. 

289.  These  horrible  abuses  were  in  full  play  during  the  next 
period,  but  they  began  in  the  present.  How  inevitable  they  were, 
and  how  unable  the  Roman  government  was  to  check  them,  appears 
from  the  vain  attempts  made  to  punish  governors.  Any  court  be- 
fore which  an  ex-governor  could  be  brought  must  sit  in  Rome,  and 
the  cause  of  provincials  could  only  be  pleaded  by  Romans.  Com- 
petent and  willing  advocates  were  hardly  ever  to  be  had,  unless 
they  had  some  personal  or  party  grudge  against  the  culprit,  or 
were  seeking  notoriety  to  forward  their  own  ambition.  There 
were  men  who  pitied  the  provincials,  or  at  least  thought  that  it 
was  Rome's  interest  to  keep  them  prosperous.     Such  was  Cato. 

1  See  §  103. 


232  lex  Calpurnia  de  repetundis  [ch. 

But  Cato  died  in  149.  It  was  in  this  very  year  that  a  notable 
law  was  carried,  honestly  meant  to  reform  the  iniquities  of  pro- 
vincial administration.  Its  author  was  a  highly  respected  tribune, 
L.  Calpurnius  Piso.  Public  trials  before  the  Assembly  were  known 
to  be  in  these  days  a  mischievous  farce.  Special  judicial  commis- 
sions to  try  particular  cases  were  generally  ineffective,  probably 
owing  to  the  selection  of  the  court  being  made  a  party  affair. 
The  attempt  to  enforce  restitution  of  extorted  moneys  by  means 
of  a  civil  action  in  a  Recovery  court  had,  as  we  saw^  above,  been 
made  and  failed.  The  lex  Calpurnia  took  a  new  line,  a  develop- 
ment of  previous  methods.  It  created  a  standing  court  for  the 
recovery  of  '  reclaimable  moneys '  {pecuniae  repetundae).  A  list 
of  senators  was  to  be  prepared  each  year,  out  of  whom  a  court 
was  to  be  formed  for  the  trial  of  particular  cases  as  they  arose. 
The  parties  each  staked  a  deposit  {sacramentum),  which  the  loser 
forfeited.  Beside  this,  the  accused,  if  he  lost  his  cause,  had  to 
restore  the  sum  wrongfully  exacted.  And  it  seems  that  this 
was  all. 

290.  Apart  from  its  actual  enactments,  this  law  had  an  ex- 
ceptional importance  from  the  precedent  created  by  it.  The  new 
courts  were  real  juries,  deciding  issues  by  a  majority  of  votes, 
under  the  chairmanship  of  a  praetor.  The  decision  was  theirs, 
not  the  praetor's  on  their  advice,  and  it  was  final.  For  the  passing 
of  the  law  by  the  Tribe-Assembly  made  these  juries  the  delegates 
of  the  Assembly  for  a  special  purpose,  and  therefore  there  could 
be  no  appeal  from  them  to  the  Assembly  itself.  The  Assembly 
had  abdicated  a  function.  That  the  Tribes,  having  no  power  to 
impose  the  capital  penalty,  could  not  give  that  power  to  the  juries, 
was  a  minor  point.  Even  in  the  treason-jurisdiction  of  the  Cen- 
turies, the  capital  penalty  had  practically  ceased  to  mean  death, 
and  treason  trials  were  very  rare.  On  the  other  hand,  the  new 
courts,  being  for  the  present  merely  a  development  of  old  civil 
procedure,  were  not  subject  to  the  'intercession'  of  a  tribune. 
The  iudex  in  civil  suits  was  not  a  magistrate.  His  verdict  was 
on  the  point  of  fact,  and  final.  The  new  jurors  were  iudices^  and 
were  so  called.  Thus  the  effect  of  the  Calpurnian  law  was  to  set 
up  a  permanent  commission  for  providing  civil  courts  as  required, 
competent  to  deal  with  imperial  questions  in  virtue  of  statutory 
powers. 

'  §  233- 


xviii]  The  new  courts.     Corruption  233 

291.  That  such  a  law  could  be  passed  is  a  notable  fact. 
It  only  applied  to  senators,  that  is  to  ex-governors  of  provinces. 
But  the  juries  were  to  be  composed  of  senators.  This  probably 
was  the  reason  why  we  hear  of  no  great  conflict  over  the  passing 
of  the  measure.  Distance  and  delays  made  it  very  hard  to  get 
up  a  case  and  produce  the  provincial  evidence  of  extortion. 
Good  Roman  pleaders  were .  seldom  to  be  had  for  the  purpose, 
and  senators  would  not  be  too  eager  to  condemn  a  man  of  their 
own  Order.  So  the  law,  while  it  affirmed  a  principle,  could  not 
create  a  practice.  We  shall  see  that  the  '  public  courts '  {iudicia 
publico)  became  in  course  of  time  one  of  the  most  corrupt  insti- 
tutions of  the  Republic.  To  capture  the  privilege  of  supplying 
jurors  became  a  prize  competed  for  by  the  partisans  of  the 
governing  and  capitalist  classes  in  the  next  age,  and  these  courts 
(for  the  system  was  soon  extended  to  other  offences)  were  the 
centre  of  some  of  the  gravest  scandals  of  Rome.  The  court  of 
repetundae  established  in  149  was  the  most  important  and  the 
most  scandalous.  Justice  was  generally  foiled,  and  its  miscar- 
riage was  one  of  the  many  ways  in  which  the  government  of  the 
provinces  reacted  as  a  corrupting  influence  on  Roman  public  life. 
Personal  and  party  feuds  might  now  and  then  lead  to  the  success- 
ful accusation  of  some  evildoer.  As  a  rule  it  was  the  shameful 
truth  that  to  submit  in  silence  to  wrong  was  both  cheaper  and 
safer  than  to  seek  redress  at  Rome. 

292.  Roman  life.  The  inner  corruption  of  Rome  was  both 
an  effect  and  a  cause  of  the  race  for  wealth.  Many  were  enriched 
by  the  great  wars  between  200  and  168  B.C.  The  standard  of 
living  became  higher,  and  contact  with  the  East  brought  in  new 
tastes,  sometimes  more  refined,  always  more  expensive.  As  the 
great  wars  ceased,  the  plunder  of  armed  enemies  gave  place  to 
the  fleecing  of  peaceful  subjects.  As  affecting  Roman  character, 
it  was  not  a  change  for  the  better.  This  robbery  did  not  end, 
like  wars,  but  tended  to  perpetuate  itself.  The  increase  of  extra- 
vagance at  home  increased  the  drain  on  the  sources  of  supply 
abroad.  The  vast  expenses  of  the  Roman  nobles  in  this  period 
(in  the  next  even  greater)  were  chiefly  incurred  in  luxury  and  the 
support  of  pride,  and  in  political  corruption.  Luxury  took  many 
forms.  Houses  were  becoming  grand  mansions.  Great  house- 
holds of  slaves,  mainly  oriental,  were  kept  up  for  ostentation. 
The  service  of  the  toilet  employed  some,  the  kitchen  others. 


234  Slavery.      Legislative  reforms  [ch. 

Gluttony  and  other  vices  were  spreading;  gout,  common  later, 
began  to  appear.  The  only  hope  of  the  slave  lay  in  currying 
favour  with  his  (or  her)  owner,  and  the  means  employed  were 
generally  degrading.  Children  were  spoilt  by  the  indulgence  and 
connivance  of  the  slave-tutor  or  nurse.  A  few  sturdy  fellows 
were  kept  to  act  as  porters  or  escort  their  master  in  the  jostling 
streets.  As  a  rule  the  domestic  slaves  were  pampered  menials, 
the  young  and  handsome  bought  as  pets  at  scandalous  prices. 
There  were  some  few  of  a  better  kind,  valued  for  their  special 
attainments,  Hterary  medical  and  so  forth.  Artisans  of  all  kinds 
were  numerous,  but  they  were  not  a  part  of  the  household. 

293.  Of  the  great  landed  estates  and  country  mansions,  in 
which  the  senatorial  landlords  took  pride,  we  shall  speak  below. 
Of  the  extravagant  outlay  on  public  shows  to  please  the  city 
populace  we  have  spoken  above.  Vast  sums  were  already  being 
wasted  thus,  and  even  direct  bribery  was  beginning.  All  men 
knew  that  corruption,  political  and  social,  was  undermining  the 
health  of  the  state,  and  the  old- Roman  reformers  tried  hard  to 
cure  the  disease  by  legislative  remedies.  In  181  2.  lex  Baebia 
punished  corrupt  practices  {ambitus)  at  elections  by  excluding 
the  offender  from  office  for  ten  years.  In  159  another  law  raised 
the  penalty  to  death,  that  is  exile.  To  check  bribery,  voting  by 
ballot  was  introduced,  in  139  for  elections,  in  137  for  popular 
trials  before  the  Tribes.  Looking  forward,  we  find  that  in  131 
it  was  extended  to  legislative  Assemblies;  and  in  107  even  to 
treason-trials  before  the  Centuries.  But  these  long-continued 
efforts  were  vain.  Bribery  increased,  and  votes  were  sold  so 
long  as  they  were  worth  buying.  Sumptuary  laws  in  181,  161, 
143,  passed  to  check  extravagant  entertainments  and  gluttony, 
were  ineffective.  In  the  matter  of  inheritances  also  new  and  lax 
practices  were  coming  in,  subversive  of  old-Roman  notions.  The 
permanence  of  families  was  threatened  by  large  bequests  to  persons 
other  than  the  heir,  who  then  took  over  the  burdens  of  the  family 
succession  with  reduced  means.  That  testators  under  undue 
influence  should  thus  break  up  estates  and  weaken  families,  dis- 
regarding family  religion  and  the  custom  of  their  ancestors,  was  a 
serious  matter.  With  it  was  connected  another  symptom  of  the 
new  notions  now  prevailing,  in  the  growing  emancipation  of  women. 

294.  Of  the  traditional  position  of  women  under  Roman 
law  we   have    spoken   above.     The  wife  in  the  '  hand '  of  her 


xviii]  Successions  and  bequests  235 

husband,  the  widow  or  maid  controlled  by  her  guardian  {tutor), 
are  the  female  figures  of  the  upper  classes,  to  which  Roman 
tradition  refers.     But  new  and  less  complete  forms  of  marriage, 
of  Plebeian  origin,  had  long  been  superseding  the  old  Patrician 
one.     Wives  were  now  seldom  their  husbands'  property  in  the 
old  sense.     And  other  women,  aided  by  ingenious  lawyers,  were 
making  the  restraints   of  wardship  a  dead   letter.     They  were 
gaining  the   power   of  appointing  their   own   guardians.     They 
influenced  testators,  and  took  large  bequests.     But  they  could 
not  be  heads  of  families.     To  make  a  woman  heir  was  therefore 
to  break  the  family  succession  :    to  impoverish  a  male  heir,  by 
leaving  large  bequests  to  women,  came  to  much  the  same  in 
the  end.     And  Roman  ladies  of  the  new  school  gave  occasion 
to  several  scandals  in  this  period,   so  that  things  were  unsatis- 
factory from  that  point  of  view  also.     Attempts  to  revive  the  old 
customs  of  inheritance  and  the  old  order  of  family  government 
were   made   by  a   law   of  wills    {testamentaria)    passed   in   183, 
restricting  the  freedom  of  bequest.     In  169  it  was  followed  by 
the  famous  law  {lex   Voconia)   forbidding  a  testator  to  make  a 
woman  his  heir  or  to  bequeath  to  any  legatee  more  than  was 
left  to  the  heir.     Even  so  the  male  succession  could  be  made 
not  worth  accepting,  if  many  legacies  were  bequeathed.     Some- 
thing was  effected  by  these  statutes,  but  evasions  took  place,  and 
there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  wealthy  classes  were  led  to 
reform  their  ways. 

295.  It  has  been  remarked  that  the  only  check  upon  the 
sovran  power  of  Assemblies  lay  in  the  necessity  of  avoiding  all 
flaws  in  the  religious  part  of  the  proceedings.  Here  was  an 
opening  for  the  governing  nobles  to  exert  some  control  over 
the  popular  body.  Nothing  could  be  done  without  favour  of 
the  gods,  and  the  interpretation  of  signs  was  in  the  hands 
of  noble  augurs.  The  lore  of  the  augural  college  had  long 
been  used  on  these  occasions  in  good  faith.  If  a  strange  in- 
genuity had  at  times  been  shewn  in  evading  a  difficulty,  this 
was  but  a  phase  of  the  same  temperament  that  clung  to  the 
formalities  and  quibbles  of  the  law.  But  now,  when  religious 
beliefs  were  losing  their  hold  upon  educated  men,  while  the 
masses  were  intensely  superstitious,  political  convenience  gave 
a  new  importance  to  religious  rules.  Accordingly  we  find  that 
in  this  period  the  management  of  signs  from  heaven  was  regu- 


236  Religion.     Rationalism  [ch. 

lated  by  statute.  The  Aelian  and  Fufian  laws,  in  some  way  or 
other  not  clearly  recorded,  dealt  with  the  matter,  probably  by 
giving  legal  force  to  existing  custom.  The  magistrate  saw  a  sign, 
or  had  it  reported  to  him ;  the  augur  pronounced  on  its  meaning, 
good  or  bad.  The  magistrate  had  also  the  right  to  watch  for 
signs,  and  nothing  could  be  done  while  he  was  so  engaged.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  the  governing  class,  these  powers  furnished 
a  twofold  remedy  against  the  mischievous  action  of  Assemblies 
which  were  becoming  more  and  more  unfit  to  exercise  popular 
sovranty,  yet  could  not  be  deprived  of  it.  They  were  meant  to 
be  obstructive,  and  in  course  of  time  they  came  to  be  so  employed 
as  a  party  weapon.  Not  only  could  action  be  impeded  thereby : 
if  a  popular  leader  disregarded  these  hindrances,  he  would  now 
be  breaking  laws  of  the  state.  His  laws,  carried  in  defiance  of 
religion,  would  not  be  binding  on  the  people.  We  shall  see  that 
the  Senate,  whenever  it  felt  strong  enough,  assumed  the  right 
of  annulling  unwelcome  laws  on  this  very  ground. 

296.  The  state  religion,  with  all  its  punctilious  formality 
and  scruples,  was  indeed  still  a  potent  force  in  Roman  public 
life.  The  great  conquests  of  the  period  might  well  seem  a 
sufficient  proof  of  the  power  and  goodwill  of  the  Roman  gods, 
and  of  the  skill  of  religious  experts  in  bargaining  for  divine  aid. 
Some  of  the  nobles  still  had  a  genuine  belief  in  the  traditional 
religion  :  such  were  PauUus  and  Cato.  In  a  system  the  spirit 
of  which  was  little  more  than  legality,  it  was  enough  to  conform. 
Anything  hke  enthusiasm  was  only  possible  in  moments  of  sus- 
pense and  fear.  Such  moments  were  becoming  rare.  Conformity 
was  tending  to  become  indifference.  Meanwhile  Roman  gods 
were  being  more  and  more  identified  with  foreign  gods,  chiefly 
Greek,  and  Greek  works  of  art  helped  on  the  change.  But 
contact  with  Greeks  brought  in  Greek  rationalism,  and  was  fast 
sapping  the  beliefs  of  educated  men.  The  superstitious  fears 
of  the  ignorant  remained,  and  could  be  turned  to  account  in 
politics.  And  they  were  thus  utilized  by  the  governing  class, 
whether  they  themselves  shared  them  or  not.  So  the  observances 
of  the  state  religion  were  in  no  danger  of  disuse :  destructive 
criticism  of  this  useful  political  engine  was  a  private  matter. 

297.  Greek  thinkers  had  long  questioned  the  truth  of  the 
popular  mythology,  and  the  educated  Greeks  of  this  age  had  as 
a  rule  no  belief  in  it.     Many  no  doubt,  such  as  Polybius,  had  a 


xviii]  The  Bacchanalia  237 

general  faith  in  the  moral  government  of  the  world,  without 
a  definite  theological  system.  For  the  plainer  and  more  prac- 
tical Romans  such  a  position  was  too  intellectual  and  refined. 
At  least  their  society  was  not  yet  educated  up  to  this  point,  and 
the  removal  of  superstitious  fear  tended  to  destroy  in  them  all 
self-restraint.  A  notable  event  in  the  first  half  of  this  period  was 
the  appearance  of  Euhemerism  in  a  Latin  dress.  About  315  B.C. 
Euhemerus  wrote  a  book  in  which  he  accepted  the  view  that 
the  gods  were  only  great  men  of  the  past,  deified  by  human 
admiration.  Ennius  now  translated  this  into  Latin,  and  apphed 
its  principles  in  passages  of  his  own  works.  The  simplicity  of 
the  theory  fitted  it  for  reception  in  Roman  minds  :  that  Ennius 
dared  to  propound  it  in  Rome  shews  that  some  were  prepared 
to  receive  it.  But  these  would  be  more  or  less  thoughtful  people ; 
not  the  choicest  natures,  who  were  attracted  by  Stoicism,  nor  the 
emotional  and  weak,  whose  dissatisfaction  with  the  old  religion 
expressed  itself  differently.  The  craving  for  excitement  is  best 
illustrated  by  the  affair  of  the  Bacchanalia  in  186.  The  old 
worship  of  the  wine-god  had  been  developed  into  a  system  of 
mysteries  on  a  Graeco-oriental  model.  Nightly  orgies,  immo- 
ralities, murders,  were  imputed  to  its  votaries.  The  movement, 
in  which  women  took  the  chief  part,  was  especially  strong  in 
the  Greek  districts  of  the  South  and  in  Etruria,  but  it  was 
widespread  in  Italy,  and  found  its  way  into  Rome.  On  receipt 
of  sure  information  the  Senate,  alive  to  the  danger  of  secret 
societies,  commissioned  the  consuls  to  hold  an  inquiry  in  Rome 
and  through  Italy,  and  to  stamp  out  the  evil.  But  in  spite  of 
great  severities  (for  numbers  were  executed)  it  took  some  five 
years  to  put  it  down.  Soon  after,  the  detected  forgery  of  the 
so-called  'Books  of  Numa,'  probably  an  attempt  to  smuggle 
foreign  notions  into  Rome,  caused  further  uneasiness. 

298.  But  it  was  impossible  to  shut  out  Greek  influences. 
The  Senate  instinctively  felt  that  the  upsetting  of  reverence  for 
old  Roman  tradition  and  custom  was  dangerous,  in  fact  a 
cutting-adrift  from  principles  that  had  made  Rome  what  she 
was.  In  173  two  Epicurean  philosophers  were  ordered  to  leave 
Rome.  In  155  came  the  famous  embassy  of  the  three  philo- 
sophers from  Athens.  In  intervals  of  their  business  they  gave 
lectures,  which  were  well  attended  by  a  number  of  young  Romans 
who  understood  Greek.     In  these  discourses,  those  of  Carneades 


23S  Education.     Hellenism  [ch. 

in  particular,  there  was  much  to  unsettle  young  minds,  for  the 
clever  statement  of  arguments  for  and  against  current  principles 
undermined  respect  for  authority,  and  left  the  hearers  in  doubt 
whether  there  were  such  a  thing  as  truth  at  all.  The  Senate, 
urged  by  Cato,  settled  their  business  quickly  and  got  rid  of  them. 
But  religion  and  speculative  thought  were  not  the  only  spheres  in 
which  Greek  influence  was  felt.  Works  of  Greek  art  came  and 
began  to  arouse  interest.  In  literature  the  irresistible  Greek  was 
dominant.  The  plays  of  the  freedman  Terence,  translated  or 
adapted  from  the  New  Comedy  of  Athens,  belong  to  the  middle 
of  this  period,  and  conveyed  in  pure  Latin  the  naughty  morals 
of  their  originals.  In  the  best  society  Greek  education  was  the 
mode.  A  few  parents,  such  as  Paullus,  Cato,  and  Cornelia 
mother  of  the  Gracchi,  took  pains  to  see  that  their  children 
imbibed  culture  without  corruption.  But  they  were  no  doubt 
exceptions.  Generally  speaking,  all  special  studies,  such  as 
astronomy,  were  Greek.  Cato  warned  his  son  against  Greek 
physicians  and  Greek  literature,  but  he  had  to  learn  Greek 
himself. 

299.  Nothing  however  was  so  effective  in  propagating 
Hellenism  as  the  conversation  in  private  houses.  For  nearly 
200  years  Greek  freedom  had  been  precarious  or  unreal. 
Talented  Greeks  still  abounded,  but  the  public  men  among 
them  were  very  different  from  the  bold  and  intense  men  of 
thought  and  action  produced  in  their  golden  age.  The  philo- 
sophers were  occupied  with  questions  bearing  on  practical  conduct 
of  life,  the  statesmen  with  diplomatic  expedients  and  with  the 
study  of  the  changes  in  policy  at  home  and  abroad  since  the  days 
of  Alexander.  The  fierce  energy  and  stimulating  life  of  little 
republics  was  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  the  typical  Greeks  of  the 
present  age  were  supple  and  cosmopolitan.  To  cultivated  Romans 
the  company  of  such  men,  with  their  store  of  new  ideas  and  their 
rich  fund  of  observation  and  experience,  was  an  intellectual  treat. 
Of  the  social  coteries  in  which  able  Greeks  were  welcomed,  the 
most  famous  was  the  so-called  'Scipionic  circle,'  the  centre  of 
which  was  the  genial  and  accomplished  Aemilianus.  It  included 
orators  lawyers  poets  historians  soldiers  and  men  noted  for  high 
principles  and  practice.  As  the  elder  Africanus  had  an  inse- 
parable friend  in  the  elder  C.  Laelius,  so  the  younger  Laelius 
represented  personal  attachment  in  this  brilliant  company.     Two 


xviii]  Rural  Slavery  239 

distinguished  Greeks  enjoyed  a  favoured  position  among  these 
eminent  Romans.  Panaetius  of  Rhodes  was  a  Stoic  philosopher, 
who  had  the  skill  to  adapt  the  stiff  principles  of  his  school  to  the 
practical  needs  of  Roman  life.  Polybius  the  Achaean  statesman 
was  a  man  of  unrivalled  experience,  to  whom  the  study  of  politics, 
and  not  least  of  Roman  politics,  was  the  most  absorbing  interest 
of  his  life.  Conversation  often  turned  on  ethical  and  political 
subjects.  Greek  inquirers,  these  two  in  particular,  had  many 
thoughts  to  offer  and  problems  to  suggest.  New  ideas  were 
developed  in  friendly  discussion,  and  spread  beyond  the  im- 
mediate circle.  The  effect  could  not  be  confined  to  Scipio 
and  his  intimates.  And  there  was  always  the  danger  that  new 
ideas,  working  in  eager  minds,  might  lead  hasty  men  into 
political  ventures  without  sufficient  allowance  for  the  practical 
difficulties  created  by  the  Roman  constitution  and  past  history. 
The  reality  of  this  danger  was  soon  to  be  proved  by  the  careers 
of  Scipio's  near  connexions,  the  two  Gracchi. 

300.  Rural  economy.  There  was  no  lack  of  great  and 
growing  evils  to  tempt  a  patriot  into  projects  of  reform.  Of 
domestic  slavery  as  tainting  the  home  life  of  the  rich  we  have 
spoken.  That  the  use  of  slaves  as  gladiators  was  a  horrible  evil, 
can  hardly  be  denied.  It  is  on  the  social  and  economic  evils 
of  industrial  slavery  that  it  is  most  necessary  to  dwell.  The 
employment  of  slave-gangs  by  contractors  for  works  in  Rome 
or  elsewhere  tended  to  degrade  labour  and  to  drive  free  labour 
out  of  the  market.  Even  in  skilled  work,  it  was  not  easy  for 
the  poor  Roman  freeman  to  compete  with  slaves  imported  from 
countries  of  old  civilization,  trained  in  arts  and  trades  which 
they  practised  for  the  profit  of  their  owners.  Such  was  the 
deadly  fruit  of  empire  won  in  successful  wars,  and  of  ancient 
views  on  the  subject  of  human  bondage.  But  it  was  on  the 
latifundia,  the  great  landed  estates  in  the  country,  that  slavery 
appeared  in  its  worst  form.  The  plantation-system  of  agriculture 
was  spreading  fast  in  Italy,  particularly  in  Etruria  and  parts  of 
the  South.  It  made  possible  the  cultivation  of  great  blocks 
of  land  by  slave-gangs  working  under  slave-overseers.  The 
rustic  slaves  were  treated  as  brute  beasts.  Some  worked  in 
chains  during  the  day :  all  were  locked  up  in  foul  pens  or 
barracoons  {ergastula)  at  night.  An  overseer  was  forced  to 
exact  from  them  the  utmost  labour,  for  to  save  his  own  skin 


240  The  new  agriculture  [ch. 

he  dared  not  be  merciful.  The  owner  wanted  money  to  spend 
in  Rome.  Orders  must  be  obeyed,  for  there  was  no  limit  to  the 
power  of  the  lord  over  his  human  chattels. 

301.  The  system  was  not  Italian  in  origin.  In  Africa  it 
had  been  long  normal  under  Punic  rule.  The  Roman  conquest 
made  no  difference  there,  unless  perhaps  by  extending  it.  Its 
prevalence  in  Sicily  we  shall  see  fully  proved  below.  But  in 
subject  lands  its  evils  did  not,  at  least  directly,  injure  the 
Roman  state.  In  Italy  they  did,  by  reducing  the  number  of 
freeholders  in  large  districts.  The  citizen-soldier  who  went  back 
to  his  little  farm  after  service  in  the  field  of  war  was  becoming 
a  rare  type.  Yet  such  men  had  formerly  been  the  mainstay  of 
Rome.  Nor  was  it  tillage  alone  that  was  passing  into  servile 
hands  and  being  organized  on  a  large  scale.  There  was  a  ten- 
dency to  give  up  tillage  for  grazing,  and  the  employment  of 
slaves  in  charge  of  flocks  and  herds  had  a  disastrous  effect  on 
the  country  side.  It  was  not  merely  that  slaves  displaced  free- 
men, in  winter  on  the  lowland  meadows  or  in  summer  on  the 
hills ;  nor  that  the  great  herds  of  the  rich  monopolized  the  public 
pastures,  driving  out  the  few  cattle  of  the  poor.  The  slave 
herdsman  had  to  carry  weapons  in  order  to  guard  his  lord's 
property  from  wolves  and  robbers.  He  became  familiar  with 
vast  stretches  of  country.  Peaceful  travellers  at  times  went  by, 
and  the  armed  slave  was  tempted  to  rob  them.  Thus  the  new 
system  was  a  school  of  brigandage,  the  curse  of  rural  Italy  for 
centuries.  Rural  police  there  was  none,  and  neither  the  owner 
of  the  slave-brigand  nor  his  bailiff  were  concerned  to  protect 
travellers.  There  were  districts  not  affected  by  these  changes 
in  rural  economy.  The  upland  peoples  of  central  Italy  for  the 
most  part  remained  farmer-dalesmen,  and  in  the  North,  beyond 
the  official  border,  a  great  and  prosperous  population,  favoured  by 
peace,  was  now  growing  up  in  Cisalpine  Gaul. 

302.  But  it  seems  certain  that  another  change  was  in 
progress.  The  growth  of  corn  for  market,  if  ever  remunerative 
in  Italy,  could  now,  in  the  face  of  provincial  competition,  only 
be  made  to  pay  in  a  few  favourably-situated  districts.  It  was  a 
better  speculation  to  cultivate  the  olive  and  vine.  This  required 
much  skill  and  patience,  and  the  grower  had  to  be  a  man  of 
capital,  able  to  wait  for  slow  but  good  returns.  Agriculture 
of  this  sort  called  for  close  personal  attention,  and  was   best 


xviii]  Cato.     latifundia  241 

suited  to  an  estate  of  moderate  size.  That  no  small  interest 
was  being  taken  in  this  form  of  enterprise  is  clear  from  Cato's 
treatise  on  Agriculture,  which  has  come  down  to  us  more  or 
less  complete.  This  remarkable  work  tells  us  many  things.  In 
particular  it  leaves  no  doubt  that  such  estates  as  Cato  had  in 
view  were  worked  by  slave  labour,  and  that  the  aim  of  cultivation 
was  simply  profit.  It  would  seem  that  already  some  landlords 
were  building  country  houses  too  fine  and  large  for  the  scale 
of  their  estates.  Cato  insists  on  the  wisdom  of  keeping  the 
estate  {fundus)  [and  the  country  house  {villa)  in  due  proportion. 
The  owner  must  visit  the  farm  often,  for  only  the  master's  eye 
can  check  mismanagement  and  waste.  The  responsibility  of  the 
bailiff  is  very  great,  and  he  must  be  kept  up  to  the  mark.  The 
live  and  dead  stock  under  his  charge  makes  a  long  list.  What- 
ever is  worn  out  is  to  be  sold  off.  Cleanliness  and  forethought 
are  most  necessary.  Household  medicine  (including  incantations), 
instructions  for  making  oil  and  wine,  kitchen  receipts,  and  rules 
for  certain  religious  formalities,  find  a  place  in  the  book. 

303.  We  do  not  know  whether  there  were  many  estates  of 
this  kind,  but  we  may  be  pretty  sure  that  few  landlords  came  up 
to  Cato's  standard  in  respect  of  knowledge  and  energy.  Another 
proof  of  the  consciousness  that  there  was  something  lacking  in 
the  agriculture  of  the  day  is  seen  in  the  action  of  the  Senate  after 
Cato's  death.  The  Punic  libraries  found  in  Africa  were  given  to 
the  Numidian  princes,  but  one  book,  the  treatise  of  Mago  on 
agriculture,  was  kept  and  translated  into  Latin.  Its  technical 
value  was  recognized  later  by  Greeks.  But  the  Punic  system  was 
based  on  slave  labour,  and  Mago's  precepts  could  do  nothing  to 
arrest  the  disease  that  was  weakening  Italy.  The  farmer-class  of 
the  older  type  continued  to  decay,  and  the  slave-worked  estates 
to  grow.  That  the  latifundia  were  the  ruin  of  Italy,  was  remarked 
afterwards  by  Roman  writers.  The  phrase  was  perhaps  too 
sweeping,  but  in  the  main  true.  Rome  had  now  an  empire  to 
rule,  won  by  the  sword.  In  the  past  the  backbone  of  her  strength 
had  been  the  small  farmers,  serving  in  wars  at  the  call  of  duty, 
men  with  something  to  lose,  not  paupers  or  mercenaries.  This 
period  saw  a  grievous  change.  The  soldier-yeomen  were  disap- 
pearing, the  city-rabble  was  increasing,  and  the  growing  slave- 
population,  so  far  from  adding  recruits  to  the  armies,  was  fast 
becoming  in  itself  a  source  of  the  gravest  danger. 

H.  16 


242  The  city  mob  and  its  food  L^h. 

304.  Turning  to  the  city  of  Rome,  we  have  first  of  all  to 
lament  our  want  of  statistics.  We  have  no  record  of  births  and 
deaths,  of  the  number  of  manumissions  of  slaves,  or  details  of  the 
numbers  of  claimants  admitted  to  the  Tribes  or  excluded  by  the 
various  censors.  If  the  figures  of  the  census  are  to  be  trusted, 
there  was  a  fall  in  the  number  of  citizens  registered  on  several 
occasions  in  this  period.  This  decrease  is  probably  a  fact.  Of 
course  this  gives  us  no  clue  to  the  total  (free  or  slave) 
population  resident  in  Rome.  It  is  clear  that  the  free  element 
was  not  all  Roman,  and  that  the  Roman  element  consisted  largely 
of  persons  drawn  to  the  city  by  the  great  facilities  for  idleness 
offered  by  urban  life.  A  chief  attraction  was  the  regular  supply 
of  cheap  corn.  We  have  seen  that  the  government  was  forced 
to  take  this  matter  in  hand  after  the  second  Punic  war.  The 
aediles  had  to  provide  the  people  with  corn  at  half  the  market 
price  or  less.  The  system  became  normal,  and  the  state  was 
burdened  with  an  ever-increasing  charge.  The  mob  of  state- 
paupers  grew,  and  demagogues  could  always  win  cheap  popularity 
by  proposing  to  reduce  the  price  further.  Whatever  industrial 
life  there  was  among  the  poorer  citizens  was  fatally  discouraged, 
and  later,  when  the  distribution  of  corn  became  gratuitous,  rich 
men  were  not  loth  to  manumit  slaves  whose  maintenance  as 
freedmen  was  borne  by  the  state.  In  this  period  it  is  a  fair 
guess  that  the  citizens  (if  any)  who  left  Rome  to  join  the  citizen 
colonies  were  the  pick  of  the  poor,  and  that  the  worthless  in 
general  remained. 

305.  For  keeping  these  idle  and  indigent  voters  in  a  good 
humour,  amusements  on  a  grand  scale  had  to  be  found.  The 
established  shows  or  games  of  Rome  were  some  of  them  very 
ancient.  All  were  connected  with  religious  festivals.  The  new 
tendency  was  to  increase  their  duration  and  splendour.  The 
cost  was  becoming  enormous,  and  we  have  seen  how  they  were 
being  used  by  ambitious  men  for  political  purposes,  and  the 
provincial  extortions  to  which  they  indirectly  led.  But  there 
were  exactions  of  a  direct  kind.  Provincials,  dependent  kings, 
even  Italian  Allies,  were  pressed  to  contribute  to  the  cost  of 
shows  provided  by  influential  men,  and  no  orders  of  the  Senate 
availed  to  stop  the  practice.  The  victims  were  'free'  to  refuse — 
and  to  take  the  consequences  of  a  noble  Roman's  enmity.  The 
splendid  triumphal  processions  after  the  wars  of  this  period,  and 


xviii]  Shows.     Buildings  243 

the  special  games  held  by  generals  in  fulfilment  of  vows  made  in 
the  field,  all  contributed  to  raise  the  standard  of  popular  expec- 
tations, and  so  to  promote  extravagance  in  the  regular  official 
festivals  also.  Horse  and  chariot  races  were  old  traditional  events. 
Dramatic  shows  followed,  and  were  regular  since  240,  when  Livius 
Andronicus  began  to  exhibit.  The  novelties  added  later  were 
mostly  importations  from  eastern  lands,  such  as  performances  of 
Greek  athletes,  singers,  dancers,  and  so  forth :  also  the  wild  beast 
fight  {venatio)^  the  animals  for  which  were  procured  from  abroad. 
The  military  show  {decursio)  of  special  evolutions  by  picked  men 
was  another  of  these  varieties.  Some  of  the  shows  were  demoral- 
izing, but  the  actresses  were  slaves,  indecent  to  order.  Worst  of 
all  were  the  gladiatorial  shows  in  which  trained  slaves  killed  each 
other.  These  were  private  affairs,  part  of  funeral  ceremonies,  held 
according  to  very  ancient  notions  in  honour  of  the  dead.  But  the 
public  were  freely  admitted,  and  these  entertainments  became  the 
most  popular  of  all.  In  this  period  they  became  common  and 
lavish.  In  174  we  hear  of  one  lasting  three  days,  in  which 
37  pairs  of  swordsmen  fought.  There  were  no  permanent  theatres 
or  amphitheatres;  seats  or  stands  were  temporary  structures  of 
wood.  The  regular  place  for  shows  was  the  Circus,  but  gladiators 
fought  in  the  Forum.  The  only  serious  objection  to  any  of  these 
exhibitions  was  that  felt  by  the  Senate  on  the  score  of  expense, 
and  this  referred  only  to  the  public  shows,  the  cost  of  which  was 
partly  borne  by  the  state. 

306.  The  outward  aspect  of  the  city  in  this  period  was 
probably  still  very  homely,  though  a  good  deal  had  been  done 
since  the  great  Punic  wars.  The  chief  streets  were  paved  with 
blocks  of  lava  {silex).  The  piers  of  a  new  bridge  over  the  Tiber 
were  built  in  179,  and  the  arches  added  in  142.  A  quay  at  which 
vessels  could  discharge  cargoes  was  built  in  193,  and  paved  in  174. 
In  179  an  attempt  to  construct  a  third  aqueduct  failed  through  the 
opposition  of  a  landlord  whose  estate  was  in  the  way,  but  in  144 
the  aqua  Marcia  was  built.  Public  Halls  {basilicae)  were  a  public 
convenience,  serving  as  Exchanges  and  as  places  for  the  courts 
of  law.  We  find  three  erected  (184,  179,  169)  in  this  period. 
The  number  of  temples  was  increasing,  and  we  begin  to  hear  of 
arches  and  a  public  colonnade.  But  splendour  was  not  the  mark 
of  the  buildings  of  the  age,  nor  were  Roman  works  up  to  Greek 
artistic  standards.   The  Greek  statues,  spoils  of  war,  were  probably 

16 — 2 


244  Habits.     Literature  [ch. 

a  great  contrast  to  their  surroundings.  Private  dwellings  of  course 
made  up  the  bulk  of  the  city,  and  these  must  have  increased  con- 
siderably with  the  increase  of  the  city  population.  But,  so  far  as 
we  know,  the  domestic  architecture  did  not  add  to  the  dignity  or 
brightness  of  the  streets.  Even  the  houses  of  the  rich  presented 
a  dull  front.  Any  improvement  in  comfort  or  elegance  within 
was  hidden  by  the  plain  and  solid  wall  facing  the  street,  pierced 
by  a  single  door.  The  dwellings  of  the  poor,  mostly  on  the  low 
ground,  were  surely  mean  enough.  The  age  of  high  buildings 
was  not  yet  come,  but  there  is  reason  to  think  that  upper  storeys 
of  wood  were  now  commonly  added  to  the  ground-floors  of 
unbaked  brick.  The  latter  gave  way  in  floods,  the  former 
suffered  from  fires.  We  have  recorded  instances  of  both  these 
dangers.  Fire-risks  indeed  tended  to  become  greater,  for  the 
quantity  of  wood  in  benches  and  stalls,  or  brought  into  the  city 
for  temporary  erections,  was  ever  on  the  increase. 

307.  We  have  a  few  details  to  indicate  the  change  in  the 
habits  of  the  people,  chiefly  among  the  upper  classes.  Scipio 
Aemilianus  set  the  fashion  of  a  daily  shave.  The  practice  of 
washing  the  whole  body  daily  was  coming  in.  It  may  be  that 
public  baths  were  started  in  this  period,  but  certainly  not  yet  as 
«.  free  luxury  for  the  masses,  and  in  any  case  they  were  very 
simple  affairs.  Baking,  formerly  a  household  duty  of  women, 
was  becoming  a  specialized  trade.  Only  the  rich  had  the  room 
and  the  domestic  staff  to  do  such  things  comfortably  at  home. 
A  doubtful  story  suggests  that  the  corrupting  example  of  rich 
men's  banquets  led  to  drunkenness  among  the  poor.  This  may 
be  only  an  exaggerated  account,  due  to  some  fervid  reformer. 
But  that  gluttony  and  wine-bibbing  were  now  established  in  Roman 
society  is  doubtless  true. 

308.  The  literary  movement  of  the  age  was  very  important 
in  many  ways.  It  was  still  inspired  by  Greek  models,  and  trans- 
lations and  adaptations  went  on.  Plautus  did  most  of  his  work 
in  this  period,  and  he  was  followed  by  others,  such  as  Terence. 
Pacuvius  and  Ennius  did  the  same  in  tragedies,  and  Accius 
somewhat  later.  There  was  however  a  beginning  made  of  an 
independent  kind.  Titinius  Pacuvius  and  Accius  produced  plays 
the  scene  of  which  was  laid  in  Italy,  or  the  plots  drawn  from 
Roman  history  or  legend.  But  these  eff'orts  did  not  result  in 
the  creation  of  a  true  Roman  drama.     Of  Ennius  and  his  great 


xviii]  Cato.     Lucillus  245 

historical  poem  I  have  spoken  above.  Latin  in  fact  was  becoming 
a  literary  language,  the  verse-writers  leading  the  way.  But  the 
great  step  in  advance  was  the  foundation  of  a  Latin  prose.  The 
use  of  Greek  for  historical  narratives  was  still  in  fashion,  but  Cato 
wrote  in  Latin.  His  work  Origines^  treating  of  the  early  history 
of  the  Romans  and  other  peoples  of  Italy,  set  an  example  soon 
followed  by  others,  among  therh  Piso  the  author  of  the  Calpurnian 
law.  A  number  of  great  lawyers  too  lived  in  this  period  and 
promoted  the  progress  of  jurisprudence,  beyond  all  others  a 
Roman  study.  But  nothing  was  more  flourishing,  or  more 
important  in  the  history  of  Roman  literature,  than  oratory. 
Only  a  very  few  fragments  remain,  quoted  by  later  writers,  but 
many  of  the  speeches  of  this  time  were  preserved,  and  we  have 
the  testimony  of  Cicero.  Public  men  in  Rome  had  to  deliver 
their  opinions  in  the  Senate,  to  address  mass  meetings  now  and 
then,  not  to  mention  pleading  for  clients  in  the  courts.  So  oratory 
began  to  be  cultivated.  The  next  period  was  its  golden  age,  from 
the  Gracchi  to  Cicero.  At  present  it  was  the  ornament  of  a  dis- 
tinguished man,  not  a  gift  by  which  a  man  could  rise  to  distinction. 
In  this  department  too  Cato  made  his  mark,  but  he  was  only  one 
of  a  considerable  number. 

309.  It  was  surely  a  great  stimulus  to  literature  when  it 
began  to  concern  itself  with  public  questions  and  public  characters. 
Intensity  of  feeling  gave  it  warmth  and  vigour.  And  this  not  only 
in  the  form  of  speeches  preserved  as  party  pamphlets.  We  know 
next  to  nothing  of  the  occasional  pieces  {saturae)  produced  by 
Ennius.  But  in  the  latter  part  of  this  period  there  flourished 
a  man  whom  Roman  tradition  regards  as  the  true  father  of  Satire, 
the  one  branch  of  literature  claimed  by  Romans  as  their  very  own. 
C.  Lucilius  was  a  native  of  Suessa  Aurunca,  a  Latin  colony,  but 
he  may  have  been  a  Roman  citizen.  He  was  a  friend  of  Scipio 
Aemilianus,  and  a  member  of  the  Scipionic  circle.  He  served 
in  Scipio' s  bodyguard  at  Numantia,  and  his  chief  had  no  more 
devoted  admirer.  Though  his  writings  belong  to  the  next  genera- 
tion, he  was  iri  spirit  a  contemporary  of  Aemilianus  (185 — 129) 
whom  he  outlived  by  some  27  years.  From  that  eminent  but 
politically  ineffective  man  he  perhaps  caught  the  combination  of 
hating  corruption  and  shrinking  from  reform.  In  his  satires 
(sermones,  talks)  he  dealt  out  praise  and  blame,  especially  blame, 
with  a  free  hand.    The  form  of  his  poems  varied  greatly ;  also  the 


246  The  new  Rome  [ch.  xvm 

metres,  but  he  ended  by  preferring  the  hexameter.  He  boldly 
lashed  the  vices  follies  and  affectations  of  private  life,  and  referred 
to  persons  by  name  with  a  freedom  envied  by  his  literary  successors. 
He  was  wealthy,  and  himself  apparently  a  very  free  liver.  While 
keenly  alive  to  the  defects  of  the  world  around  him,  he  seems  to 
have  distrusted  change.  At  least  in  public  affairs  he  wrote  as  a 
warm  partisan,  and  his  leader  Scipio  was  opposed  to  the  Gracchan 
movement.  It  is  a  pity  that  we  have  nothing  but  fragments  of 
his  satires,  for  it  is  certain  that  they  presented  a  lively  picture  of 
Roman  life  in  the  middle  of  the  second  century  B.C.,  drawn  from 
the  inside.  He  wrote  as  a  Roman  of  Romans,  and  it  is  interesting 
to  note  that  he,  like  some  others  of  the  day,  was  concerned  to 
maintain  the  purity  of  the  Latin  tongue. 

310.  We  have  now  passed  in  review  the  influences,  political 
social  intellectual  moral  and  economic,  that  were  working  in  the 
Roman  state  and  empire,  changing  the  character  of  the  govern- 
ment and  people.  Outwardly  and  nominally  all  things  remained 
the  same  as  before  200  B.C.  Inwardly  and  vitally  the  Rome  of 
133  B.C.  was  a  new  Rome,  and  the  relation  of  the  central  power 
to  Allies  and  subjects  was  so  changed  as  to  be  full  of  difficult 
problems.  Men  of  the  time,  in  Rome  as  in  other  states  and  other 
ages,  were  not  prophets.  Yet  there  were  some  who  saw  that  all 
was  not  well,  though  they  could  not  guess  what  a  long  and  terrible 
period  of  revolution  was  coming.  Thorough  reform  was  urgently 
needed,  but  to  succeed  in  reformation  a  power  was  needed,  not 
only  irresistible  but  continuous.  And  the  constitution  in  its 
present  working  was  in  this  respect  weaker  than  it  had  been  two 
centuries  before,  during  the  struggle  for  the  Licinian  laws.  The 
power  needed  could  not  be  got  peaceably.  So  we  must  not 
wonder  that  Laelius  in  151  dropped  his  project  of  land-reform, 
the  thorniest  question  of  all.  Men  feared  to  attempt  reforms, 
and  the  majority,  for  their  own  present  comfort,  were  only  too 
ready  to  let  things  drift  from  bad  to  worse.  How  strong  the 
constitution  of  the  Republic  still  was,  had  now  to  be  proved  by 
the  length  of  time  that  it  took  to  overthrow  it. 


CHAPTER    XIX 

THE   SICILIAN    SLAVE-WAR    134—132   B.C. 

311.  The  arbitrary  division  of  periods  at  the  years  134 — 3 
is  a  mere  matter  of  convenience.  In  134  a  war  broke  out  in  Sicily 
the  horrors  of  which  were  an  awful  illustration  of  the  evils  now  at 
work  in  the  Roman  world.  Local  slave-risings  had  occurred  in 
Italy  in  198  and  185.  They  had  been  suppressed,  and  the  danger 
was  well  known.  In  recent  years  there  had  been  trouble  in  Sicily 
also,  not  to  mention  small  outbreaks  or  conspiracies  elsewhere. 
But  the  Roman  government,  slack  and  dilatory  as  usual,  took  no 
proper  precautions.  In  the  end  they  had  to  employ  consuls  with 
consular  armies,  and  the  Sicilian  rebellion  was  only  put  down  in 
132,  after  vast  destruction  of  property  and  shedding  of  blood. 
But  the  causes  of  evil  were  not  removed;  this  event  registers 
the  effect  of  misgovernment  in  the  past,  and  prepares  us  for 
that  which  was  to  come. 

312.  The  war  brings  to  our  notice  several  classes  of  people 
in  Sicily.  Roman  capitalists,  favoured  by  their  right  {comniercium) 
of  acquiring  property  in  any  part  of  the  Roman  dominions,  now 
held  much  of  the  land.  Some  of  these  would  be  non-resident. 
Sicilians  of  a  few  privileged  communities  enjoyed  the  same  right 
within  the  province,  others  only  within  the  territories  of  their  own 
communities.  These  Sicilian  landlords  would  be  all  or  mostly 
Greeks  or  half-Greeks.  The  above  had  one  thing  in  common ; 
they  were  slave-owners,  and  needed  protection,  surrounded  as 
they  were  by  an  immense  population  of  hardy  and  discontented 
slaves.  There  seem  to  have  been  also  a  number  of  poorer 
Sicilians,  of  whom  some  still  farmed  small  holdings.  The  spread 
of  great  slave-worked  estates  would  surely  tell  against  these  men, 
as  the  same  system  had  been  ruining  small  farmers  in  Italy 


248  Sicily  and  the  slave-war  [ch.  xix 

They  had  no  reason  to  be  content  with  the  present  state  of 
things.  It  is  probable  that  there  were  also  a  good  many  landless 
poor,  though  the  numbers  of  the  free  population  can  hardly  have 
been  as  great  as  they  had  been  in  better  days.  For  the  Cartha- 
ginian plantation-system  of  agriculture  was  now  extended  all  over 
the  island.  Money  was  drained  away.  The  great  cities  had  never 
recovered  their  old  prosperity.  Some  had  been  destroyed  utterly; 
others  were  shrunken,  as  Syracuse  and  Agrigentum. 

313.  It  was  at  Enna,  a  strong  hill-town  in  the  middle  of 
Sicily,  that  the  first  outbreak  occurred.  Some  slaves  rose,  mas- 
sacred wealthy  masters,  and  seized  the  town.  They  were  mostly 
patient  orientals  from  Syria,  only  roused  to  vengeance  by  great 
brutality.  Eunus  their  ringleader  was  a  Syrian,  skilled  in  divina- 
tion and  jugglery.  Him  they  made  their  king,  and  he  set  up  a 
court  of  the  oriental  pattern.  The  rustic  slaves  rose  in  thousands. 
Small  Roman  forces  were  routed,  and  the  arms  captured  were 
added  to  those  seized  or  made  at  Enna.  A  second  rising  took 
place  in  the  West,  and  the  two  chiefs  did  not  fall  out,  but  com- 
bined. In  a  short  time  a  great  army  was  formed,  which  is  said 
to  have  reached  a  total  of  200,000  able-bodied  men.  The  leaders 
checked  devastation,  with  a  view  to  supplies.  In  134  the  consul 
C.  Fulvius  Flaccus  seems  to  have  been  unable  to  retrieve  the  pre- 
ceding defeats.  The  rebels  held  most  of  the  island.  In  133  Piso 
(the  author  of  the  Calpurnian  law)  made  some  progress,  and  left 
to  his  successor  an  army  in  better  heart.  In  132  P.  Rupilius  was 
able  to  capture  the  strongholds  of  the  slave-power.  Enna  fell, 
rebel  bands  were  hunted  down.  Those  taken  alive  were  tortured 
or  crucified.  A  commission  under  Rupilius  reorganized  the  pro- 
vince by  a  fresh  charter  {lex  Rupilid).  New  slaves  took  the  places 
of  the  old,  and  things  went  on  as  before. 


CHAPTER    XX 

TIBERIUS   GRACCHUS    133   B.C. 

314.  While  Scipio  was  engaged  in  destroying  Numantia,  and 
the  Sicilian  slave-war  was  causing  grave  uneasiness  nearer  home, 
the  city  itself  was  the  centre  of  a  disturbance  the  momentous 
consequences  of  which  none  could  then  foresee.  Among  the  ten 
tribunes  for  133,  who  entered  on  office  loth  December  134,  was 
Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus,  the  elder  son  of  the  consul  and 
censor  of  the  same  name  by  his  wife  Cornelia,  daughter  of  Scipio 
the  conqueror  of  Hannibal.  He  was  a  man  of  30,  and  had  served 
abroad  with  distinction.  He  belonged  to  the  best  society  in  Rome, 
and  was  closely  connected  with  Scipio  Aemilianus.  In  tempera- 
ment he  was  quite  unlike  that  eminent  man.  His  education, 
guided  by  his  noble  mother,  had  been  mainly  conducted  by  Greek 
tutors  from  whom  he  learnt  high  principles,  and  doubtless  imbibed 
an  admiration  for  the  Reformers  famous  in  the  history  of  ancient 
Greece.  But  the  circumstances  of  political  life  in  the  little  Greek 
republics  were  widely  different  from  those  with  which  a  Roman 
statesman  of  this  age  would  have  to  deal.  The  problems  to  be 
faced  were  now  far  more  complicated  and  vast.  Most  of  the 
leading  men  were  interested  in  the  continuance  of  present  abuses, 
or  timidly  averse  to  change.  Therefore  a  reformer  must  not 
reckon  on  the  support  of  the  Senate.  The  Assemblies  were 
already  so  far  degenerate  that  no  steady  and  loyal  backing  could 
be  relied  on  from  them.  The  whole  tendency  of  law  and  custom 
had  long  been  to  weaken  the  yearly  magistracy  and  make  it  more 
and  more  into  a  succession  of  average  men,  cramped  by  the  Senate 
at  home  and  insufficiently  controlled  abroad.  Thus  there  was  no 
means  of  dealing  with  problems  the  solution  of  which  would  in 
any  case  require  the  work  of  years.     Even  a  tribune  could  not 


250  Tiberius  Gracchus  [ch. 

hold  office  two  years  running,  and  of  a  succession  of  tribunes  to 
keep  up  a  continuous  movement  for  reform  there  was  no  prospect 
whatever. 

315.  Yet  Gracchus,  either  not  fully  conscious  of  dangers 
ahead,  or  too  hopeful  of  overcoming  them,  boldly  proceeded  to 
grapple  with  the  most  difficult  and  complex  problem  of  the  day, 
the  land-question.  To  get  any  notion  of  this  we  must  look  back 
into  the  past,  and  bear  in  mind  that  we  are  not  speaking  of  private 
property  but  of  land  owned  by  the  state.  The  ager  publicus  of  the 
Roman  people  had  been  won  in  the  conquest  of  Italy  or  forfeited 
to  Rome  in  the  Hannibalic  war.  Out  of  it  a  good  deal  had  in 
course  of  time  been  granted  to  colonists  on  the  foundation  of 
colonies,  or  to  individual  citizens  when  a  district  was  settled  with- 
out founding  a  colony.  These  allotments  were  private  property, 
which  the  state  could  not  resume.  But  to  the  rest,  probably  the 
larger  part,  the  state  had  never  resigned  its  claim  as  owner.  Some 
of  this  state  property  was  regularly  leased  out  by  the  censors,  and 
yielded  yearly  rents.  Some  arable  land,  and  a  great  deal  of  grazing 
runs  {saltus)  woodlands  etc,  were  dealt  with  thus,  and  to  disturb 
so  safe  a  financial  resource  was  out  of  the  question.  The  land  on 
which  Gracchus  had  his  eye  was  that  part  (probably  very  large)  of 
which  the  state  retained  the  property  (dominium)  while  individuals 
or  communes  held  it  in  effective  occupation  {possessio).  It  is  said 
that  such  lands  had  been  originally  granted  on  condition  of  pay- 
ment (according  to  the  kinds  of  land)  of  a  tithe  or  quit-rent.  But 
in  course  of  time  the  collection  of  these  dues  had  been  allowed  to 
fall  into  arrear,  and  they  had  by  this  ceased  or  become  nominal. 

316.  No  doubt  the  original  grants  had  been  matters  of  favour. 
In  some  cases  a  community  of  Allies  had  been  rewarded  by  as- 
signing to  them  a  block  of  land  in  '  possession,'  adjoining  their 
own  territory.  But  most  of  the  original  grantees  had  been  in- 
fluential Romans,  for  we  hear  of  this  sort  of  land-grabbing  very 
early  in  the  history  of  the  Republic.  Centuries  had  gone  by,  and 
the  neglect  of  the  state  to  assert  its  rights  had  caused  the  rights  to 
be  forgotten.  Rearrangements  of  estates  had  led  to  the  oblitera- 
tion of  boundaries,  and  it  was  often  impossible  to  tell  where  the 
private  freehold  ended  and  possession  began.  Money  had  been 
invested  in  land,  or  lent  on  mortgage,  without  inquiry  into  the 
varieties  of  tenure  under  which  the  various  parts  of  an  estate  were 
held.     Such  distinctions  had  come  to  be  ignored  as  obsolete,  and 


xx]  and  the  land-problem  251 

the  evidence  to  justify  them  had  mostly  disappeared.  Any  attempt 
to  disturb  the  present  state  of  things,  by  investigating  titles  and 
resuming  rights  that  had  been  allowed  to  lapse,  was  certain  to 
arouse  fierce  opposition,  not  only  from  the  present  possessors 
but  from  many  others  also,  whose  interests  would  be  indirectly 
touched.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  true  that  this  appropriation 
of  state  lands  had  been  carried  out  in  defiance  of  the  Licinian 
land-law  of  367  B.C.  By  that  law  the  amount  of  land  that  an 
individual  might  hold  in  possession  (500  iugera)  was  strictly 
limited,  and  the  maintenance  of  boundaries  was  necessary  to 
prevent  evasion.  The  existing  abuse  was  illegal,  but  it  was  in 
nearly  all  (perhaps  all)  cases  the  work  of  the  earUer  '  possessors,' 
to  whom  the  present  holders  had  succeeded  by  inheritance  or 
purchase.  Was  it  wise  in  the  interest  of  Rome  to  endeavour  to 
upset  a  system  the  growth  of  centuries?  The  advantages  of  a 
radical  reform  could  only  be  guessed:  the  dangers  were  sure. 

317.  But  Gracchus  feared  no  danger,  and  he  traced  the 
failure  of  the  Licinian  law  to  the  lack  of  machinery  for  enforcing 
it.  He  intended  not  only  to  reenact  it  but  to  provide  a  standing 
land-commission,  empowered  to  resume  for  the  state  all  lands 
illegally  held,  and  to  allot  the  same  in  parcels  to  poor  citizens. 
Thus  he  would  put  the  people  back  on  the  land,  to  the  lasting 
benefit  of  Rome.  By  the  time  of  his  entry  on  ofiice  he  had 
prepared  his  famous  land-bill,  with  the  help  of  some  of  the  first 
lawyers  of  the  day.  Indeed  he  did  not  lack  influential  support 
at  this  stage,  and  with  the  common  folk  he  was  popular  enough. 
The  question  now  was,  could  he  peaceably  and  constitutionally 
carry  the  law,  and  on  what  support  could  he  reckon  in  case  he 
were  driven  to  resort  to  unconstitutional  means  ?  Further,  if  he 
carried  it  by  whatever  means,  could  he  insure  the  continuance  of 
his  policy  after  he  himself  ceased  to  be  tribune  ? 

318.  Of  the  law  we  know  a  few  main  points.  It  reenacted 
the  limit  of  the  Licinian,  but  allowed  a  possessor  to  hold  also  half 
the  amount  (250  iugera)  for  each  of  two  sons.  It  seems  that  the 
smaller  possessors  (below  500  iugera)  were  not  touched,  but  this 
is  not  clear.  Some  compensation  to  present  possessors  for  unex- 
hausted improvements  is  mentioned.  But  whether  this  was  in  the 
form  of  a  cash  payment  is  very  doubtful.  The  land  still  left  to 
possessors,  after  the  resumption  of  excess-amounts,  was  to  be 
guaranteed  to  them  in  future  free  of  all  dues  and  claims  for 


252  Support  and  opposition  [ch. 

arrears.  The  law  also  set  up  a  standing  land-commission,  with 
power  to  inquire  into  cases  and  to  distribute  allotments  out  of 
land  resumed  on  behalf  of  the  state.  Power  of  jurisdiction  in 
disputed  cases  was  included  either  now  or  at  a  later  stage.  The 
publication  of  the  bill  at  once  raised  a  storm,  for  the  possessors 
were  not  to  be  soothed  by  the  concessions  offered.  Gracchus 
was  giving  them  what  in  their  view  was  already  their  own.  But 
the  tradition  of  the  discontent  expressed,  and  of  the  harangues 
in  which  the  tribune  stirred  up  the  multitude  to  insist  on  a  share 
of  the  state  land,  is  so  sensationally  dressed  up  that  it  can  hardly 
be  accepted  as  a  trustworthy  picture  of  what  actually  happened. 
We  do  not  know  how  many  of  the  poorer  citizens  addressed  by 
Gracchus  were  influenced  by  genuine  land-hunger  rather  than  by 
a  general  discontent  the  effect  of  indigence. 

319.  Our  authorities  speak  of  a  great  influx  of  country  folk 
into  Rome  to  support  Gracchus.  This  seems  to  imply  that  many 
at  least  of  those  who  desired  allotments  of  land  were  rustic  citizens 
who  hoped  to  better  their  present  position.  Nor  is  this  unlikely. 
Such  men  would  be  the  first  to  feel  and  resent  the  pressure  of  the 
great  landlords  who  were  squeezing  out  the  small  holders,  and 
most  of  them  would  have  sons.  Voters  of  this  class  would  be 
steady  supporters  of  the  new  policy,  and  they  might  well  deter- 
mine the  votes  of  a  majority  of  the  Tribes,  whenever  they  flocked 
to  Rome.  But  at  seasons  of  urgent  farm  work  they  could  not  well 
leave  their  farms.  It  is  not  clear  that  there  was  any  other  class  of 
citizens  on  whose  loyal  support  Gracchus  could  safely  rely;  for  the 
city  mob  was  easily  corrupted  by  various  influences,  and  a  leader 
who  trusted  them  was  likely  to  be  left  in  the  lurch.  In  the  absence 
of  statistics  we  are  driven  to  guess-work.  The  above  considera- 
tions are  at  least  consistent  with  the  sequel.  The  opponents  of 
the  bill  were  not  merely  the  great  landlords  and  those  under  their 
influence.  The  communities  of  Allies  to  whom  Roman  state-land 
had  been  granted  in  possession  raised  an  outcry  against  the  harsh- 
ness of  disturbing  their  tenure  after  all  their  long  and  faithful 
service.  This  was  not  without  effect  on  the  more  moderate  of 
the  nobles,  who  were  conscious  that  to  provoke  the  already  ill- 
treated  Allies  still  further  was  both  inexpedient  and  unjust.  But 
Gracchus  had  no  time  to  lose,  if  he  meant  to  get  anything  done, 
so  he  prepared  to  carry  the  bill.  The  opposition  now  induced 
another  tribune,  M.  Octavius,  to  block  it.    Gracchus  tried  in  vain 


xxj  Gracchus  in  difficulties  253 

to  buy  off  his  'intercession.'  Much  debate  followed.  Gracchus 
used  his  official  powers  to  stop  all  public  business,  and  even  sealed 
up  the  treasury.  But  rioting  prevented  the  voting  on  the  bill,  and 
the  Senate  would'  do  nothing  to  help  him.  At  last  he  was  driven 
to  take  an  unconstitutional  course.  He  declared  that  Octavius, 
by  thwarting  the  people's  will,  had  betrayed  his  trust.  He  called 
upon  the  Tribes  to  depose  their  unfaithful  servant.  The  Tribes 
voted  for  deposition.  The  first  step  in  the  Roman  revolution  was 
thus  taken ;  it  remained  to  abide  the  consequences. 

320.  The  bill  now  quickly  became  law.  A  new  tribune  was 
put  into  the  place  of  Octavius.  A  commission  of  three  was  ap- 
pointed. The  three  were  Gracchus  himself,  his  brother  Gaius, 
and  his  father-in-law  Appius  Claudius.  The  rural  voters  went 
home,  and  the  tribune  was  left  to  face  a  storm  of  calumny  and 
spite.  And  now  came  the  news  that  Attalus  IH  king  of  Per- 
gamum  was  dead,  and  had  left  his  kingdom  and  treasure  to  the 
Roman  people.  Gracchus  at  once  prepared  to  take  the  matter 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  Senate,  by  a  bill  for  appropriating  the 
treasure  to  meet  the  expenses  of  stocking  the  new  land-allotments. 
The  encroachments  of  the  popular  tribune  were  beginning  to 
alienate  many  supporters.  Romans  were  hardly  ripe  as  yet  for 
the  methods  of  Greek  demagogues.  His  enemies  worried  him 
fiercely,  most  of  all  on  the  matter  of  Octavius.  He  was  driven 
into  the  weak  position  of  justifying  his  action  in  a  public  speech. 
By  slanders  and  heckling  he  was  made  to  appear  as  aiming  at 
unconstitutional  power,  and  in  this  charge  there  was  only  too 
much  truth.  But  he  had  gone  too  far  to  stop.  Immediate  re- 
election was  his  only  chance  of  effecting  reform,  and  this  meant 
breaking  another  rule  of  the  constitution.  The  summer  elections 
were  coming  on,  and  the  rural  voters  were  busy.  Gracchus  was 
in  a  fix.  He  strove  to  win  the  support  of  the  resident  voters  by 
a  number  of  proposals  of  a  demagogic  kind.  He  seems  by  such 
despairing  efforts  to  have  regained  some  popularity,  but  not  to 
have  aroused  enough  enthusiasm  to  overawe  his  bitter  enemies. 

321.  At  the  election,  voting  for  Gracchus  was  stopped  by 
the  squabble  that  took  place  over  an  objection  to  his  eligibility. 
An  adjournment  followed.  The  tribunes  were  evidently  unwilling 
or  afraid  to  back  up  their  leader.  A  party-fight  was  now  in 
prospect.  The  next  morning  Gracchan  partisans  occupied  the 
Capitoline  temple.     The  Senate  met  conveniently  near,  and  the 


254  The  end  of  Gracchus  [ch.  xx 

great  majority  of  the  members,  headed  by  P.  Cornelius  Scipio 
Nasica  the  chief  pontiff,  only  waited  for  a  chance  of  intervening 
with  effect.  They  had  armed  their  slaves  and  dependants, 
meaning  to  use  force.  The  voting  was  again  stopped  by  a  riot; 
the  tribunes  fled.  Then  Nasica  and  his  band  of  furious  senators 
led  their  followers  into  the  Capitol  yard  and  fell  upon  the  ill-pre- 
pared Gracchans,  of  whom  with  clubs  and  stones  they  slew  300  or 
more,  among  them  Tiberius  Gracchus.  Nor  did  religious  senti- 
ment respect  the  corpses  of  the  dead.  They  were  cast  into  the 
river.  Roman  politics  had  come  to  this  pass,  that  a  precedent 
had  been  set  for  massacre  as  a  means  of  party-strife.  And  it  was 
the  rich  landlords  that  had  set  this  precedent,  in  defence  of  their 
privileges  against  a  movement  for  reform. 

322.  The  massacre  was  followed  up  by  the  appointment  of 
a  judicial  commission  to  inquire  into  the  complicity  of  survivors 
in  the  designs  of  Gracchus.  Some  are  said  to  have  been  outlawed 
by  this  court.  His  Greek  tutor  Blossius  had  friends  on  the  com- 
mission, and  escaped.  But  he  left  Rome  and  went  to  join  the 
rebellion  in  Asia.  It  is  clear  that  the  nobles  did  not  feel  strong 
enough  to  defy  public  feeling.  Men  mourned  for  Gracchus^  and 
shewed  such  hatred  for  Nasica,  that  a  pretext  was  found  for  send- 
ing him  on  a  mission  to  Asia,  where  he  soon  after  died.  Nor  were 
the  new  laws  directly  attacked.  The  vacant  place  on  the  land- 
commission  was  filled  by  the  election  of  a  friend  of  Gracchus, 
P.  Licinius  Crassus.  In  132  Scipio  Aemilianus  returned  from 
Spain.  An  opportunity  was  found  to  draw  from  him  an  opinion 
on  the  Gracchan  affair.  He  plainly  disapproved  his  brother-in- 
law's  projects  and  condoned  his  murder.  We  are  told  that  the 
common  people  were  disgusted  with  him.  This  seems  to  indicate 
that  the  Sempronian  land-law  was  really  a  popular  measure,  and 
the  Roman  mob  perhaps  still  capable  of  some  genuine  land-hunger. 
Anyhow  Scipio's  attitude  made  him  the  associate  of  the  violent 
and  selfish  nobles,  the  tool  of  a  clique  with  which  he  could  have 
little  or  no  sympathy. 

Such  in  brief  is  the  story  of  Tiberius  Gracchus  the  Reformer, 
the  record  of  which  leaves  only  too  many  points  open  to  serious 
doubt. 


CHAPTER    XXI 

THE   INTERVAL    132—123  B.C. 

323.  After  the  death  of  Tiberius  Gracchus  in  133,  more 
than  nine  years  passed  before  Gaius  Gracchus  could  take  up 
and  extend  his  brother's  projects.  In  this  interval  things  were 
moving  on  both  at  home  and  abroad,  not  for  the  better.  A 
short  narrative  will  shew  that  the  situation  in  123,  as  compared 
with  133,  was  less  favourable  to  any  peaceable  and  effective 
reform. 

324.  In  the  East,  the  bequest  of  the  Pergamene  kingdom 
seemed  to  promise  new  and  profitable  spheres  of  activity  both 
for  noble  governors  and  for  enterprising  capitalists.  A  Province 
called  Asia  was  to  be  formed  out  of  countries  notoriously  rich. 
No  resistance  was  expected.  The  people  were  to  be  'free'; 
that  is,  to  have  no  more  kings,  but  to  be  dominated  by  Roman 
interests.  But  a  certain  Aristonicus  appeared  as  pretender  to  the 
throne  of  Pergamum,  and  drew  away  many  after  him.  Repelled 
by  the  Greek  cities  of  the  coast,  he  raised  an  army  of  slaves  and 
barbarians  inland,  and  withstood  the  forces  of  Rome  for  about 
two  years.  A  large  part  of  these  forces  consisted  of  contingents 
furnished  by  the  kings  of  Bithynia  Paphlagonia  Pontus  and 
Cappadocia,  for  Rome  drew  upon  her  own  resources  as  little 
as  possible.  There  was  serious  fighting.  P.  Licinius  Crassus, 
consul  in  131,  was  defeated  and  fell  in  battle  :  Ariarathes  of 
Cappadocia  also  died  fighting  for  Rome.  In  130  Isl.  Perpema 
brought  the  war  to  an  end,  but  it  was  Manius  Aquilius  (consul 
129)  who  presided  over  the  following  settlement.  The  after- 
effects of  the  Gracchan  affair  are  visible  in  this  war.  The 
Greek  Blossius  killed  himself  in  despair  after  the  defeat  of 
Aristonicus.     Crassus,  though  chief  pontiff  after  Nasica's  death, 


256       Province  Asia.     Advance  Into  Gaul        [ch. 

was  appointed  to  command  in  Asia,  though  Scipio  wished  for 
the  post.  The  matter  was  decided  by  the  Assembly,  and  the 
influence  of  the  Gracchan  party  surely  contributed  to  the  result. 

325.  The  boundaries  of  the  new  province  Asia  had  no 
doubt  been  fixed  by  the  Senate  in  general  terms,  leaving  dis- 
cretion to  the  commissioners  in  dealing  with  the  further  districts. 
Not  to  annex  too  much,  but  to  reward  client-kings  with  territories 
of  doubtful  present  value,  was  a  practice  well  established.  So  a 
wide  region  was  added  to  Cappadocia.  The  district  known  as 
the  Greater  Phrygia  was  important  from  its  position  and  wealth. 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  and  Mithradates  IV  of  Pontus  both 
wanted  it.  The  latter  got  it,  having  it  was  said  bribed  Aquilius. 
But  he  did  not  keep  it  long.  The  award  was  challenged  in 
Rome  as  the  needless  sacrifice  of  a  valuable  property.  It  seems 
that  before  this  king's  death  in  120  the  concession  was  with- 
drawn, and  another  safe  outlet  found  for  Roman  capital.  For 
the  present  Asia  included  Mysia  Lydia  and  Caria,  with  most  of 
the  adjacent  islands. 

326.  In  the  North  and  West  there  were  a  few  movements 
worth  noting.  In  129  the  consul  C.  Sempronius  Tuditanus  made 
a  campaign  in  northern  Illyria,  probably  to  keep  the  peace  of  the 
Adriatic  and  secure  the  route  to  the  East.  In  Sardinia  a  rebellion 
in  126  was  not  put  down  till  124.  Gaius  Gracchus  served  there 
as  quaestor.  He  did  as  his  brother  had  done  in  Spain,  winning 
the  confidence  of  the  natives  and  being  otherwise  helpful.  So  the 
Senate,  in  order  to  keep  him  away  from  politics,  continued  the 
consul  L.  Aurelius  Orestes  in  command.  This  meant  by  custom 
the  detention  of  his  quaestor,  but  Gracchus  saw  through  the  trick 
and  returned  to  Rome  in  124.  In  the  South  of  Transalpine  Gaul 
the  Romans  again  intervened  to  protect  their  old  ally  Massalia. 
This  time  also  the  enemy  were  a  Ligurian  tribe,  the  Salluvii  or 
Salyes,  in  the  country  north  of  Massalia  and  east  of  the  Rhone. 
In  125  the  consul  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus  defeated  them,  and  by  123 
they  were  no  longer  a  menace  to  the  Massaliots.  The  land-route 
to  Spain  was  now  safer,  and  a  step  was  taken  which  indicates  that 
the  possibility  of  a  forward  policy  was  now  in  view.  In  122,  at  a 
spot  behind  the  Massaliot  territory,  where  there  were  some  hot 
springs,  the  proconsul  C.  Sextius  founded  a  military  station  called 
Aquae  Sextiae  (Aix  en  Provence).  In  123  the  consul  Q.  Caecilius 
Metellus  conquered  and  occupied  the  Balearic  isles.     Thus  the 


xxi]  The  land-commission  257 

sea-passage  to  Spain  was  better  secured,  and  Balearic  slingers 
were  some  of  the  most  useful  among  the  auxiliaries  now  com- 
monly employed  in  Roman  armies. 

327.  To  return  to  Italy.  The  land-commission  was  at  work 
settling  boundary  questions,  perhaps  granting  allotments.  After 
the  deaths  of  Crassus  and  Appius  Claudius  two  new  colleagues 
were  found  for  C.  Gracchus.  These  were  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus 
and  C.  Papirius  Carbo,  both  at  present  hot  reformers.  Of  course 
they,  like  the  Gracchi,  belonged  to  the  noble  class.  In  the  pre- 
ceding period  the  nobles  had  been  splitting  up  into  two  factions, 
which  now  became  regularly  labelled  with  party-names.  The 
genuine  aristocrats  or  'best  men'  {optimates)  had  a  majority  in 
the  Senate,  and  were  stubborn  upholders  of  senatorial  govern- 
ment. The  other  section,  the  'people's  men'  {populares),  included 
some  patriotic  reformers,  but  consisted  mainly  of  men  who  saw  a 
better  prospect  of  pushing  themselves  forward  by  courting  the 
multitude  than  by  trusting  to  a  share  of  the  patronage  of  their 
own  Order.  The  revived  activity  of  the  Assembly  encouraged 
these  men,  of  whom  Flaccus  and  Carbo  were  specimens.  Such 
politicians  could  not  be  relied  on  for  consistency,  for  their 
patriotism  rested  on  no  principle  strong  enough  to  overcome 
personal  interests.  We  shall  often  come  across  these  two 
factions,  and  find  them  equally  selfish  and  mischievous. 

328.  The  arbitrary  powers  of  the  commission  were  in 
practice  clogged  by  the  delay  of  possessors  to  make  returns  of 
their  holdings.  To  quicken  matters,  informations  were  invited. 
A  mass  of  litigation  was  the  result.  Many  awkward  questions 
arose,  for  in  the  lax  management  of  former  times  the  evidences 
of  previous  transactions  had  often  disappeared,  arid  the  proof  of 
titles  was  impossible.  So  the  outcry  against  the  commission  grew 
stronger,  and  the  Allies  who  feared  to  be  dispossessed  added 
their  protests  to  those  of  the  citizen  possessors.  Scipio,  who 
owed  much  to  the  Allies,  and  disliked  the  Gracchan  policy,  now 
interposed.  He  procured  the  transference  of  the  judicial  powers 
of  the  commission  to  a  consul.  This  was  in  129.  The  consul 
soon  wearied  of  the  tiresome  work ;  he  went  off  to  the  Illyrian 
campaign.  The  commission  were  now  powerless,  and  their  work 
came  to  a  standstill.  Scipio  was  in  fact  now  a  leader  of  obstruction 
in  the  interest  of  the  great  landlords.  In  131  a  bill  was  brought 
forward  to  revive  the  old  right  of  reelecting  tribunes  continuously 

H.  17 


258  Death  of  Aemllianus  [ch. 

Scipio  and  Laelius  got  it  rejected,  but  some  measure  of  the  kind 
seems  to  have  passed  a  few  years  later. 

329.  It  is  clear  that  in  these  years  there  was  much  friction 
and  unpleasantness  in  Roman  public  life.  The  *best  men/  or 
conservative  aristocrats,  were  glad  to  use  Scipio  against  the  still 
vigorous  Gracchan  party,  but  they  did  not  share  his  scruples.  It 
was  not  he,  but  Metellus^  Macedonicus,  that  had  the  ear  of  the 
Senate  or  the  senatorial  juries.  At  this  time  the  Metelli  were 
the  most  powerful  family  in  Rome.  But  the  Gracchan  revival 
of  the  tribunate  was  a  fact.  In  131,  when  Macedonicus  was 
censor,  he  came  into  collision  with  a  tribune,  and  a  scandalous 
squabble  followed.  The  position  of  Scipio  and  his  clique  as 
moderate  men  in  a  factious  society  was  a  difficult  one,  and  the 
great  man  was  now  both  unpopular  and  ineffective.  One  morning 
in  the  year  129  he  was  found  dead  in  his  bed.  There  were 
rumours  of  foul  play,  but  no  proof,  nor  even  an  inquiry.  His 
health  had  never  been  strong.  So  the  first  Roman  of  the  day 
passed  from  the  scene  under  mysterious  circumstances  at  a 
critical  moment.  Neither  the  selfish  rich  nor  the  fanatical  re- 
formers seem  to  have  mourned  one  who  was  too  scrupulous  to 
please  either.  Tradition  did  homage  to  his  nobility  of  character, 
but  as  a  statesman  he  was  out  of  place  in  a  turbulent  and  self- 
seeking  age. 

330.  The  death  of  Aemilianus  made  the  treatment  of  the 
Allies  a  practical  issue  in  Roman  politics.  True,  they  had  no 
votes,  but  their  importance  to  the  Roman  state  was  not  to  be 
ignored.  The  Gracchan  reformers,  checked  in  their  agrarian 
scheme,  began  to  try  and  quicken  matters  by  a  proposal  to 
make  the  Allies  Roman  citizens.  It  is  said  that  this  was  meant 
to  buy  off  their  opposition  to  the  resumption  of  state  domains 
by  the  state,  and  that  they  were  willing  to  accept  the  offer  on 
those  terms.  The  matter  is  most  obscure :  anyhow  the  Senate 
thwarted  the  design.  In  126  a  strong  measure  was  taken  to 
prevent  anything  of  the  kind.  The  tribune  M.  lunius  Pennus 
brought  forward  a  bill  for  the  expulsion  of  aliens  {peregrini)  from 
Rome.  Gaius  Gracchus  led  the  opposition,  but  it  passed  into 
law.  We  see  that  the  'popular'  party  could  not  rely  on  the 
Assembly,  at  least  in  such  a  question  as  this.  Too  many  citizens 
were  jealous  of  the  Allies,  and  the  '  best  men '  probably  appealed 

1  See  §  245. 


xxi]  The  Allies.     Fregellae  259 

to  this  feeling  with  success.  The  cause  of  the  Allies  was  being 
made  the  plaything  of  Roman  factions.  The  optimates  would 
not  grant  them  the  Roman  franchise;  Xhe  populares  would  not 
guarantee  them  perpetual  possession  of  Roman  domain-land. 
And  now  the  Allies  were  further  irritated  by  an  insulting  law. 
They  knew  that  the  strength  of  Rome  depended  on  their  support. 
To  some  of  them  the  land-question  was  the  most  important  point. 
All  no  doubt  wished  to  be  no  longer  exposed  to  the  tyrannical 
insolence  of  Roman  nobles.  In  using  their  claims  as  a  party 
weapon,  the  Roman  politicians  were  playing  with  fire. 

331.  Gracchus  went  off  to  duty  in  Sardinia.  Party-spirit 
was  very  bitter  in  Rome,  and  the  acquittal  of  M'.  Aquilius  by 
a  senatorial  jury  on  a  charge  of  extortion  in  Asia  was  scandal 
enough  to  make  things  worse.  Flaccus  and  Carbo  were  leading 
the  'popular'  reform-party,  and  the  former  was  elected  consul 
for  125.  He  began  office  by  a  bill  for  granting  the  Roman 
franchise  to  the  Allies,  apparently  reserving  to  those  who  might 
prefer  it  the  choice  of  receiving  the  right  of  appeal  {provocatid) 
instead.  This  would  give  them  a  certain  personal  protection, 
while  leaving  them  local  autonomy.  But  Flaccus  seems  to  have 
found  the  opposition  too  strong.  He  dropped  the  proposal,  and 
went  off  to  Gaul.  The  consequences  of  raising  and  dashing  hopes 
were  shewn  at  once.  The  Latin  colony  of  Fregellae,  founded 
328  B.C.,  had  served  the  cause  of  Rome  with  conspicuous  loyalty 
for  200  years.  The  people  were  '  Latins,'  Roman  Allies  of  the 
most  favoured  class.  They  rose  in  revolt,  declaring  their  secession 
from  the  Italian  confederacy.  If  they  hoped  for  support  from 
other  Allies,  they  were  mistaken.  The  rising  was  ill-timed,  for 
the  Allies  had  not  yet  fully  learnt  that  they  must  stand  or  fall 
together,  and  that  their  wrongs  could  only  be  righted  by  the 
sword.  The  praetor  L.  Opimius  was  promptly  sent  with  a  force 
to  quell  the  revolt,  and  he  soon  took  the  town  by  the  aid  of 
treachery  within.  Fregellae  was  dismantled.  A  citizen  colony, 
Fabrateria,  was  founded  near,  and  took  its  place  5,s  a  centre. 
But  the  shameful  story  did  not  end  there.  The  '  best  men '  in 
Rome  declared  that  the  secession  had  only  been  brought  about 
through  the  encouragement  of  Gracchan  sympathizers.  Thus 
they  hoped  to  discredit  their  opponents.  A  judicial  inquiry 
was  held,  and  no  effort  spared  to  attach  the  guilt  of  treason 
to  the  popular  leaders. 

17 — 2 


26o  C.  Gracchus  tribune  [ch.  xxi 

332.  Among  those  accused  of  complicity  in  the  revolt  of 
Fregellae  was  Gaius  Gracchus  himself,  on  his  return  from  Sardinia. 
He  defended  himself  with  success.  But  his  services  in  the  island, 
particularly  his  wide  influence,  shewn  in  procuring  a  gift  of  corn 
for  the  army  from  the  Numidian  king,  had  only  alarmed  the 
Senate.  The  censors  of  125 — 4,  before  quitting  office,  called 
him  to  account  for  coming  home  before  his  commander.  Again 
he  justified  himself,  by  shewing  that  his  conduct  had  been  above 
the  ordinary  standards  of  the  day.  In  the  summer  of  124  he 
stood  for  the  tribunate,  and  was  elected,  but  only  fourth  in 
order.  We  hear  of  great  enthusiasm  and  crowds  of  country 
voters,  perhaps  attracted  by  the  wish  to  set  the  land-reform 
going  again.  But  events  had  strengthened  the  influence  of  the 
*best  men,'  and  Gaius  was  not  able  to  secure  the  unanimous 
vote  of  the  Tribes. 


CHAPTER   XXII 

GAIUS   GRACCHUS   124— 121  B.C. 

333.  The  two  tribunates  of  Gaius  Gracchus  lasted  from 
10  December  124  to  9  December  122.  The  details  of  his  acts 
and  the  order  of  events  are  in  many  points  far  from  certain,  for 
our  record  is  incomplete  and  comes  almost  wholly  from  prejudiced 
sources,  hostile  to  the  hero  of  the  story.  It  is  most  important  to 
bear  in  mind  that  the  work  of  a  tribune's  official  year  was  almost 
unavoidably  done  in  the  first  half.  Contemplated  measures  could 
be  (and  were)  prepared  beforehand  in  the  form  of  bills,  which  he 
introduced  in  the  regular  way  as  soon  as  he  entered  on  office. 
In  the  course  of  the  summer  the  tribunes  for  the  next  year  were 
elected,  and  their  presence  could  not  but  weaken  the  hands  of 
men  whose  successors  were  already  known.  The  power  of  im- 
mediate reelection,  even  if  only  for  a  second  year,  greatly  extended 
the  range  of  a  tribune's  activity ;  for  the  second  half  of  his  first 
year,  and  the  first  half  of  his  second,  were  both  made  effective. 
Therefore  the  work  of  Gracchus  is  better  understood  if  we  treat 
it  as  carried  on  in  three  divisions. 

(a)  Summer  124  to  summer  123,  including  election,  pre- 
paration, popular  legislation,  and  reelection. 

(b)  Summer  123  to  summer  122,  including  legislation  of  a 
more  contentious  kind,  ending  in  defeat  at  the  election  for  121. 

(c)  Summer  122  to  winter  122,  when  the  end  of  his  office 
was  in  sight.  The  attack  on  his  measures,  and  his  death,  bring 
us  to  the  early  days  of  121. 

334.  Gaius  was  as  well-meaning  as  his  brother,  but  more 
eager  and  impatient,  and  embittered  by  the  murder  of  Tiberius. 
That  murder  had  shewn  that,  to  effect  anything,  he  must  put  an 
end  to  the  usurped  supremacy  of  the  Senate.     He  seems  to  have 


262  -    The  Sempronian  corn-law  [ch. 

believed  that  the  Assembly  could  be  trusted  to  give  a  hearty  and 
consistent  support  to  a  popular  leader  who  could  and  would  shew 
it  the  way  to  recover  and  assert  its  sovran  power.  The  sequel 
proved  his  error.  Selfishness  indifference  and  corruption  had 
already  destroyed  the  once  solid  patriotism  of  Roman  Assemblies : 
the  non-attendance  of  rural  voters  generally  made  them  unfit  to 
express  public  opinion :  even  those  present  did  not  decide  by  a 
total  majority,  but  by  the  majorities,  however  small,  in  not  less 
than  18  of  the  35  Tribes.  Thus  the  power  at  which  Gracchus, 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  aimed  was  that  of  a  popular  leader 
in  a  Greek  Demos ;  and  there  was  nothing  like  a  Greek  Demos 
in  Rome.  But  the  rule  of  the  Senate  was  to  him  unbearable, 
and  he  set  to  work  at  once.  The  judicial  commission  that  sat 
after  the  murder  of  Tiberius,  and  put  to  death  or  outlawed  his 
adherents,  was  appointed  by  the  Senate.  The  Senate  itself  could 
not  act  as  a  court  of  justice.  Therefore  this  act  was  one  more 
encroachment  on  the  Assembly's  sovran  power,  and  must  not  be 
passed  over.  The  act  of  the  court  was  strictly  the  act  of  its 
president.  Gracchus  then  carried  a  law  declaring  illegal  any 
sentence  affecting  the  bodily  or  civil  life  {caput)  of  any  citizen, 
passed  without  the  leave  of  the  Assembly,  and  he  made  it 
retrospective.  Under  this  law  P.  PopiHus  Laenas,  who  had 
presided  in  the  special  court,  was  clearly  guilty.  Gracchus  then 
denounced  Popilius  before  the  Assembly,  and  got  him  outlawed 
in  the  regular  form.  This  Sempronian  law  in  fact  revived  the 
old  popular  jurisdiction,  chiefly  in  order  to  ruin  an  obnoxious 
individual. 

335*  It  was  plain  that  the  leading  tribune  had  the  complete 
mastery  of  his  nine  colleagues,  and  that  he  was  for  the  present 
the  ruler  of  the  Assembly,  controlling  the  legislative  power.  The 
only  thing  to  be  done  was  to  let  him  alone  and  to  wait.  But  he, 
with  great  and  growing  designs,  could  not  have  too  much  popular 
support,  and  therefore  it  was  probably  now  that  he  produced  and 
carried  his  famous  corn-law.  The  state  was  to  buy  corn,  and  to 
retail  it  to  citizens  in  Rome  at  half  the  cost-price.  That  is,  an 
expedient  hitherto  used  for  temporary  relief  in  time  of  dearth 
was  to  be  henceforth  a  regular  system  of  poor-relief  That  the 
treasury  would  be  sadly  crippled  by  such  a  burden  was  obvious. 
We  are  told  that  Gracchus  posed  as  a  guardian  of  the  treasury. 
By  what  sophistry  he  justified  the  corn-law  on  economic  grounds 


xxii]  The  province  Asia  263 

we  do  not  know.  But  it  is  certain  that  the  direct  financial  drain 
was  but  a  small  part  of  the  evils  created  or  fostered  by  the  law. 
Its  pauperizing  bounty  drew  more  immigrants  into  Rome.  The 
demand  for  corn  grew,  and  the  state  had  to  buy  it  in  the  cheapest 
markets.  This  encouraged  the  large-scale  agriculture  of  such 
lands  as  Sicily  and  Africa,  whence  slave-grown  corn  was  easily 
transported  by  sea.  Further,  it  discouraged  most  of  all  the 
remaining  small  farmers  of  Italy.  In  some  districts  men  con- 
tinued to  exist  as  true  country-folk,  living  mainly  on  the  produce 
of  their  labour.  To  many,  edged  out  by  the  pressure  of  great 
landlords,  the  increased  attractions  of  the  city  were  more  irre- 
sistible than  ever.  Thus  the  policy  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  in  quest 
of  sufficient  power  to  effect  reforms,  directly  tended  to  nullify  the 
agrarian  revival,  which  he  well  knew  to  be  the  first  necessity,  and 
which  had  been  the  first  object  of  his  brother.  We  can  see  now 
that  politics  were  travelling  in  a  vicious  circle,  from  which  there 
was  no  escape.  But  at  the  time  this  would  not  be  evident  to  a 
hopeful  mind. 

336.  The  corn-law  was  followed  by  other  measures  the 
order  of  which  is  uncertain.  The  land-law  of  Tiberius  was 
reenacted  and  the  judicial  powers  probably  restored  to  the 
commissioners.  Another  law  improved  the  conditions  of  mili- 
tary service,  removing  certain  grievances.  It  may  be  that  the 
law  dealing  with  the  province  of  Asia  belongs  to  this  stage. 
Evidently  this  new  province  was  not  as  yet  satisfying  the  ex- 
pectations of  Roman  financiers,  and  they  put  pressure  on  the 
tribune,  who  could  not  do  without  their  support.  The  law 
provided  that  the  dues  of  the  province  (tithes  in  kind,  customs, 
etc.)  were  henceforth  to  be  farmed  out  for  collection  to  Roman 
contractors.  The  imposts  in  the  several  departments  would  be 
put  up  to  auction  :  this  auction  was  to  be  held  in  Rome.  Thus 
a  peaceful  and  very  rich  country  was  handed  over  to  be  exploited 
by  unscrupulous  and  greedy  capitalists.  We  have  seen  what  this 
meant,  and  that  ordinary  governors  could  not  or  did  not  restrain 
the  iniquitous  exactions  of  these  persons.  It  was  cheaper  for  a 
governor  to  risk  a  prosecution  in  the  court  of  repetundae^  and  to 
buy  his  acquittal,  than  to  face  the  bitter  hostility  of  the  whole 
body  of  financiers  in  Rome.  Gracchus  surely  knew  that  he  was 
dooming  millions  of  the  human  race  to  utter  misery.  But  we 
must  judge  him  by  the  standard  of  his  own  day.     In  ages  of 


264  Public  works.     Reelection  [ch. 

civilization  based  on  slavery,  the  voice  of  humanity  could  seldom 
find  a  hearing.  Even  to  the  best  of  Romans  the  claims  of  the 
human  race  seldom  meant  more  than  the  claims  of  Roman 
citizens.  We  have  also  an  obscure  reference  to  some  measure 
for  insuring  that  public  trials  should  not  be  used  as  a  means 
of  ruining  men,  Romans  of  course.  This  probably  refers  to  some 
clause  or  law  to  check  judicial  commissions,  such  as  that  which 
condemned  the  followers  of  his  brother. 

337.  By  the  summer  of  123  Gracchus  had  a  number  of 
enterprises  in  full  swing.  Among  these  we  hear  particularly 
of  the  granaries  {horrea  Sempronid)  built  for  the  storage  of 
corn.  But  his  best  work  was  done  in  improving  communica- 
tions. New  roads  were  made  for  economic  rather  than  strategic 
purposes.  Old  ones  were  better  levelled  and  constructed,  and 
provided  with  better  milestones  and  bridges.  Over  a  host  of 
engineers  contractors  and  other  subordinates  the  tribune  exercised 
a  general  supervision.  The  amount  of  business  transacted  by 
him  caused  general  wonder.  The  tribunate  had  never  been 
meant  for  an  ofifice  to  undertake  the  direction  of  public  affairs ; 
but  Gracchus,  by  his  power  over  the  Assembly,  could  procure 
any  extension  of  his  own  authority  as  need  arose.  He  was  the 
first  man  in  Rome  for  the  moment_,  and  his  enemies  did  not  omit 
to  suggest  that  he  was  a  tyrant-demagogue  aiming  at  monarchy. 
What  happened  was  that  he  procured  the  election  of  his  nominee 
C.  Fannius  Strabo  to  the  consulship,  defeating  Opimius  who 
destroyed  Fregellae.  He  was  himself  again  elected  tribune,  and 
with  him  his  friend  Flaccus  the  consul  of  125,  now  home  from 
Gaul. 

338.  The  next  important  measure  was  most  likely  the  law 
dealing  with  the  jury-courts.  Gracchus  needed  the  support  of 
an  influence  that  he  could  play  off  against  the  irreconcileable 
hostility  of  the  Senate.  This  could  only  be  found  in  the  wealthy 
non-noble  class,  the  so-called  '  knights '  (equites).  They  were  now 
simply  a  class  of  capitalist  speculators,  the  younger  men  of  whom 
still  furnished  officers  to  the  army :  the  old  corps  of  Roman 
citizen  cavalry  was  no  longer  employed  in  the  field.  We  have 
seen  how  powerful  this  class,  numerous  and  used  to  cooperation 
in  companies,  was  in  public  life.  Gracchus  had  already  handed 
over  Asia  to  their  mercies.  He  now  gave  them  the  means  of 
preventing  any  interference  with  their  extortions.     The  new  law 


xxii]  The  jury-law.     Colonies  265 

took  away  from  the  senators  the  right  of  sitting  on  juries,  and 
gave  it  to  the  'knights.'  Henceforth  a  governor,  who  from  what- 
ever motive  checked  the  iniquities  of  the  revenue-farmers  abroad, 
was  liable  to  be  put  on  his  trial  before  a  jury  of  men  whose  first 
object  was  to  screw  an  income  out  of  enterprises  of  this  very  kind. 
Gracchus  is  said  to  have  denounced  the  scandalous  acquittals  of 
guilty  governors  by  senatorial  juries.  But  the  equestrian  juries 
were  no  better.  What  he  did  effect  was  to  weaken  the  Senate. 
The  law  was  only  carried  with  great  difficulty,  so  strong  was  the 
opposition.  But  there  were  henceforth  two  privileged  Orders 
recognized  by  statute,  for  the  Knights  were  now  a  regular  Order 
or  rank.  And  the  struggle  of  these  two  Orders  for  the  control 
of  the  public  courts,  in  order  to  use  the  privilege  of  judgment 
as  a  means  of  party  vengeance  or  private  gain,  became  a  leading 
political  issue  in  the  revolutionary  age.  To  win  a  momentary 
advantage  Gracchus  had  done  lasting  harm.  But  he  was  for 
the  moment  supreme.  Even  the  preparation  of  the  first  list 
of  the  new  iudices  was  not  left  to  a  praetor,  but  entrusted  to 
the  tribune.  Yet  there  was  no  guarantee  that,  having  carried 
so  much  legislation,  and  disturbed  so  many  interests,  he  would 
remain  in  power  long  enough  to  bring  his  reforms  into  practical 
working. 

339.  After  this  open  defiance  there  could  be  no  accom- 
modation between  the  tribune  and  the  Senate.  Even  the  known 
supporters  of  Gracchus  in  the  House  began  to  draw  back.  To 
keep  up  his  popularity  he  seems  now  to  have  taken  up  colonial 
projects.  We  hear  nothing  of  the  doings  of  the  land-commission, 
and  the  foundation  of  citizen  colonies  (if  places  could  be  found) 
may  well  have  been  a  more  attractive  proposal  than  the  offer  of 
isolated  farms.  Capua  and  Tarentum  were  suggested,  and  there 
was  public  land  round  both  of  them.  The  design  on  Capua  was 
dropped,  perhaps  because  of  the  objections  to  it  on  financial 
grounds.  To  turn  out  the  present  tenants  of  the  ager  Campanus 
meant  the  sacrifice  of  their  rents,  one  of  the  safest  revenues  of 
the  Roman  state.  To  Tarentum  colonists  were  actuallv  sent, 
and  the  city  officially  named  Neptunia.  Little  is  known  of  this 
matter.  But  the  Greek  character  of  Tarentum  was  at  all  events 
not  materially  altered.  The  scheme  for  a  transmarine  colony  at 
Carthage  was  perhaps  somewhat  later.  Meanwhile  the  year  123 
wore  out,  and  in  December  Gracchus  began  his  second  tribunate 


266  Competition  of  Drusus  [ch. 

with  new  colleagues.  Among  these  was  M.  Livius  Drusus,  a 
much-respected  noble,  in  whom  the  Senate  found  an  instrument 
for  offering  an  artful  indirect  opposition  to  the  policy  of  Gracchus. 
The  plan  was  to  outbid  the  reforming  demagogue  by  showy  pro- 
posals, not  meant  to  be  seriously  carried  out.  His  popularity 
once  undermined,  Gracchus  must  either  submit  or  take  the 
consequences. 

340.  The  chief  points  of  the  Livian  laws  are  best  seen  by 
placing  them  alongside  the  Sempronian  laws  with  which  they  were 
meant  to  compete. 

Gracchus.  Drusus. 

2  colonies  of  respectable  citizens.  12  colonies  of  indigent  citizens. 

Holders  of  allotments  under  the  The  quit-rent  of  the  allotments  to 

land-law  to  pay  a  quit-rent  to  the       be  remitted, 
state. 

Beside  these,  Gracchus  was  preparing  a  bill  for  granting  the 
Roman  franchise  to  the  Latins.  Drusus  met  this  by  a  bill  to 
grant  the  Latin  soldier  the  same  protection  against  cruel  military 
punishment  that  the  citizen  enjoyed.  Thus  he  would  remove  a 
notorious  grievance,  while  the  present  Roman  citizens  would 
retain  their  exclusive  right  to  the  perquisites  of  citizenship. 
The  programme  of  Drusus  was  more  attractive  to  the  Roman 
populace.  Bit  by  bit  the  sham  demagogue  weakened  the 
position  of  the  real  one.  Gracchus  could  not  block  the  pro- 
posals of  his  colleague  without  further  loss  of  popularity. 

341.  A  law  for  founding  a  colony  on  the  site  of  Carthage 
was  followed  by  one^  for  reorganizing  the  court  of  repetundae 
and  improving  its  procedure.  Conviction  was  to  be  followed 
by  restitution  of  twice  the  amount  extorted.  Senators  were 
expressly  excluded  from  the  juries ;  and  some  hold  that  this 
law,  and  no  other,  was  that  by  which  the  change  of  jurors  was 
effected.  By  another  law  {lex  Se7npronia  de  provinciis  consula- 
ribus)  Gracchus  deprived  the  Senate  of  a  means  of  putting 
pressure  on  consuls  year  after  year.  The  Senate  assigned  the 
departments  to  the  magistrates  after  each  election.  Some  of 
these  provmciae  were  far  more  desirable  than  others.  By  naming 
undesirable  posts  as  reserved  for  the  consuls  of  the  coming  year 
the  Senate  could  keep  the  best  things  out  of  the  reach  of  a 

^  Ux  Acilia  i'epetundariun.     See  §  443  below. 


xxii]  Provinces.     The  Allies  267 

consul  whom  they  wished  to  punish  for  contumacy.  The  new 
law  wisely  left  the  selection  of  'consular'  posts  in  the  hands 
of  the  Senate,  but  required  it  to  be  made  in  each  year  before 
the  elections  for  next  year  were  held,  while  it  was  still  uncertain 
for  whom  the  posts  were  being  selected.  The  Senate  was  still 
able  to  leave  a  man  in  command  as  proconsul,  by  not  assigning 
his  province  to  a  successor.  Surely  this  moderate  measure  shews 
us  the  tribune  at  his  very  best :  it  was  not  mere  playing  to  the 
mob,  but  a  practical  reform.  It  is  said  that  he  designed  to  give 
the  Assemblies  a  more  democratic  character.  The  plan  was  to 
do  away  with  the  privileges  of  the  property-classes  altogether  in 
the  Centuriate  Assembly.  The  first-voting  Century  {praerogativa) 
was  still  chosen  by  lot  from  the  First  Class.  Henceforth  it  was 
to  be  chosen  from  any  Class,  and  the  whole  order  determined  by 
lot.  Whether  Gracchus  actually  carried  a  law  to  this  effect  is  not 
known. 

342.  It  was  the  competition  between  Gracchus  and  Drusus 
in  the  early  months  of  the  year  122  that  decided  the  fate  of  the 
former.  To  be  in  earnest  was  a  fatal  disadvantage.  The  most 
awkward  question  was  that  of  the  Allies,  how  to  conciliate  them 
without  offending  the  Roman  mob.  Gracchus  had  a  bill  for 
granting  the  Roman  franchise  to  the  Latins,  and  perhaps  the 
'  Latin  right '  to  the  other  AlHes.  The  Latin  communities  might, 
if  they  preferred  it,  receive  the  right  of  appeal  instead  of  the 
citizenship,  thus  gaining  personal  protection  while  keeping  their 
local  autonomy.  The  grievances  of  the  Allies  were  by  this  time 
notorious,  but  we  have  seen  that  neither  Senate  nor  Assembly 
wished  to  remedy  them  by  an  extension  of  the  franchise.  It 
was  very  difficult  for  a  sincere  reformer  to  get  steady  support 
for  an  honest  treatment  of  this  question  in  the  teeth  of  jealous 
prejudices  easily  roused.  Opponents  of  Gracchus  had  a  fair 
ground  for  objecting  to  an  influx  of  Latins  at  the  time  of 
voting,  and  for  taking  steps  to  prevent  a  riot.  The  absence 
of  Gracchus  caused  delay.  He  had  gone  to  mark  out  the 
colony  at  Carthage.  This  scheme  too  was  violently  denounced. 
Evil  omens  were  eagerly  reported.  Roman  citizens  did  not 
come  forward  in  sufficient  numbers,  so  the  commissioners  in- 
vited other  Italians.  It  seems  that  Roman  voters  took  little 
interest  in  the  colony.  The  nobles  naturally  objected  to  having 
a  Gracchan  outpost  set  up  in  Africa,  and  the  capitalists  owning 


268  Failure  of  Gracchus  [ch. 

land  in  the  province  can  hardly  have  welcomed  the  scheme. 
Meanwhile  the  situation  had  become  worse  in  the  absence  of 
Gracchus.  Flaccus  was  alarming  people  by  real  or  suspected 
intrigues  with  the  Allies.  Fannius  had  joined  the  opposition. 
Opimius  was  standing  for  next  year's  (121)  consulship.  A  great 
effort  was  being  organized  for  repealing  the  law  establishing  the 
colony  at  Carthage.  Thus  in  the  middle  of  122  things  already 
looked  bad  for  Gracchus. 

343.      A   project   for   planting   a   large    number   of   citizen 
colonies  in  Italy  was  sure  to  annoy  the  Allies.     But  to  Drusus 
this  mattered  not :    he  was  acting  for  the  Senate,  not  for  the 
Allies,  and  the  project  was  a  sham.     The  proposal  to  enfranchise 
the  Latins  was  no  doubt  seriously  meant,  but  it  was  most  difficult 
for  Gracchus  to  commend  it  to  the  Roman  mob,  who  now,  having 
secured  cheap  corn,  wanted  more  favours,  not  for  the  Latins  but 
for  themselves.     He  addressed  meetings,  and  pleaded  the  cause 
of  the  Latins  bravely.     But  all  his  eloquent  exposure  of  their 
wrongs  fell  flat  on  the  ears  of  men  used  to  selfishness  and  un- 
used to  philanthropy.     When  Fannius  said  'don't  let  yourselves 
be  crowded  out  by  a  mass  of  new  citizens,'  this  was  something 
that  spectators  of  shows  could  understand.     The  Senate  induced 
Fannius  as  consul  to  issue  an  edict  forbidding  Allies  to  come 
within  five  miles  of  Rome  during  the  voting  on  the  bill,  and  the 
tribune  found  that  he  had  not  moral  force  behind  him  strong 
enough  to  enable  him  to  defy  the  consul.     So  the  hope  of  putting 
pressure  on  the  Assembly  by  a  great  concourse  of  Latins  was 
frustrated,  and  the  bill  did  not  pass.     A  last  vain  attempt  to 
recover  the  favour  of  resident  voters,  by  pulling  down  the  stands 
erected  for  a  gladiatorial  show,  and  so  clearing  the  space  for  the 
poorer  spectators,  was  made  by  Gracchus.     But  he  irritated  the 
other  tribunes,  and  gained  nothing.    The  elections  soon  followed. 
Gracchus  was  not  reelected  tribune.     His  enemy  Opimius  was 
elected  consul.    The  power  of  Gracchus  was  virtually  ended.    His 
opponents  made  ready  to  attack  his  policy,  first  and  foremost 
the  law  for  the  colony  lunonia  on  the  site  of  Carthage.     On  the 
loth  December  the  new  tribunes  came  into  office.     Notice  of  a 
bill  for  repealing  the  law  was  promptly  given.     On  the  first  of 
January  Opimius  entered  office,  and  an  early  date  was  fixed  for 
voting  on  the  bill. 

344.     We  have  a  very  confused  and  imperfect  record  of  the 


xxii]  His  death  269 

events  that  followed.  Gracchus,  now  a  mere  commissioner  under 
certain  laws,  was  sure  to  have  to  face  a  public  trial  very  shortly, 
and  it  seems  that  he  was  prepared  for  this  risk  but  averse  to 
violence.  Flaccus  and  others  were  for  a  fight.  So  the  Gracchans 
went  to  the  Assembly  with  hidden  daggers,  and  a  quarrel  led  to 
the  murder  of  an  attendant  of  the  consul.  The  Assembly  broke 
up.  Next  day  the  corpse  was  exposed,  and  no  pains  spared  to 
rouse  public  indignation  against  the  Gracchans.  Gracchus  tried 
to  express  his  horror  at  the  crime :  his  enemies  raised  the  cry 
that  he  was  interrupting  a  tribune,  traditionally  a  grave  offence. 
The  senatorial  majority  now  saw  their  way  to  making  an  end  of 
him.  The  Senate  met  and  passed  its  'last  order'  or  'decree,' 
calling  upon  the  consuls  to  '  see  that  the  commonwealth  took  no 
hurt'  When  this  famous  form  of  words  was  first  used  we  do 
not  know.  Its  effect  was  to  strengthen  the  executive  power  by 
declaring  a  state  of  siege.  It  was  supposed  to  remove  for  the 
moment  the  restrictions  on  the  imperium  within  the  city  {domt) 
so  as  to  make  it  equal  to  that  in  the  field  {fnilitiae).  It  rested 
on  no  statutory  enactment.  But  some  such  power  was  needed  in 
great  emergencies,  and  it  seems  to  have  been  thought  constitu- 
tional by  all  parties.  Whatever  was  done  under  such  authority 
was  the  act  of  the  acting  magistrate,  not  of  the  Senate.  Could 
he  be  afterwards  called  to  account  ?  To  this  question  we  must 
recur  in  a  later  chapter. 

345.  A  fight  to  the  death  was  now  inevitable.  Men  passed 
the  night  under  arms,  and  next  morning  Flaccus  and  the  more 
desperate  section  of  the  reform-party  occupied  the  Aventine  hill. 
Gracchus  did  not  desert  them,  though  he  still  hoped  for  peace. 
Negotiations  were  futile,  for  the  Gracchans  would  not  surrender, 
and  the  government-party  would  grant  no  other  terms.  So  the 
consul  led  his  forces  to  the  assault.  We  must  remember  that 
Roman  nobles  were  themselves  as  a  rule  fighting  men,  and  that 
each  one  would  be  escorted  by  sturdy  slaves,  not  to  mention  other 
retainers.  Opimius  had  also  some  mercenary  bowmen  from  Crete; 
for  mercenaries  were  already  a  part  of  the  military  forces  of  Rome. 
The  mass  of  the  population  seem  to  have  looked  on  at  the  rout 
and  massacre  of  the  ill-prepared  Gracchans.  We  need  not  relate 
the  deaths  of  the  leaders.  They  died  :  so  did  many  more;  in  the 
battle  about  250  fell,  and  a  number  were  put  to  death  later. 
Mourning  was  forbidden,  the  estates  of  Gracchus  and  Flaccus 


270  General  results  of  [ch. 

were  confiscated,  the  city  was  religiously  purified.  In  honour  of 
the  victory,  a  temple  of  Concord  was  restored  by  order  of  the 
Senate.  Plutarch  tells  us  that  it  was  regarded  as  an  insolent 
record  of  civil  bloodshed,  and  that  the  populace  honoured  the 
memory  of  the  lost  Gracchi.  But  the  Gracchi  were  gone,  and 
their  careers  had  at  least  proved  that  it  was  a  fatal  error  to  rely 
on  the  support  of  the  Roman  People. 

346.  Did  the  Roman  commonwealth  as  a  whole  find  itself 
the  better  for  the  reform-moyement  headed  by  the  Gracchi? 
I  think  not.  The  tribunate  had  once  more  become  active,  but 
it  had  never  been  a  good  office  for  governing  purposes.  In  the 
present  period  its  activity  was  almost  an  unmixed  evil,  for  the 
tide  of  tendency  was  steadily  running  towards  the  supremacy  of 
military  power.  The  tribunate  conferred  no  imperium.  Its  later 
history  is  that  of  fitful  and  often  violent  demagogy,  and  we  shall 
see  it  become  the  tool  and  satellite  of  military  leaders.  The  con- 
sulate, now  that  the  succession  of  consuls  to  important  provinces 
was  made  more  regular,  tended  to  become  a  home-magistracy, 
with  a  provincial  government  to  follow :  that  is,  eventually  pro- 
consulship  would  be  more  valued  than  consulship.  And  the  rise 
of  great  proconsuls  was  a  main  cause  of  the  fall  of  the  Republic. 
That  the  Senate  had  lost  ground  as  a  power  in  the  state  is  clear 
enough.  The  nobles  seemed  to  have  recovered  their  dominating 
position,  but  only  by  a  shameful  and  clumsy  resort  to  civil  warfare. 
The  prestige  and  moral  force  of  the  Senate  was  weakened,  yet  no 
new  and  better  organ  of  state  policy  was  found  to  take  its  place. 
This,  as  things  now  stood,  was  a  sheer  calamity.  The  Assemblies 
were  going  from  bad  to  worse.  The  open  endowment  of  the  mob 
by  the  corn-law  perpetuated  disorder,  for  the  state-paupers  became 
more  numerous  and  more  worthless,  and  their  votes  enabled  them 
to  insist  on  their  own  corruption.  That  the  attempt  to  recreate 
a  race  of  small  citizen-farmers  was  a  failure,  the  sequel  will  shew. 
One  class  alone  emerged  from  the  shock  of  the  Gracchan  disturb- 
ances with  a  clear  gain.  The  capitalist  Knights,  now  recognized 
as  an  Order  and  armed  with  the  control  of  the  public  courts,  were 
henceforth  well  able  to  make  their  power  felt.  But  their  interest 
seldom  coincided  with  the  true  interest  of  the  state,  and  neither 
their  present  opposition  to  the  senatorial  nobles,  nor  their  later 
combination  with  them,  contributed  to  the  health  and  permanence 
of  the  Republic. 


xxii]  the  Gracchan  movement  271 

347.  If  we  look  beyond  the  citizen  body,  to  raise  hopes 
in  the  Italian  Allies,  and  then  to  disappoint  them,  was  surely  a 
disastrous  result  of  agitation.  The  edict  of  Fannius  and  the 
fall  of  Gaius  Gracchus  proved  that  neither  Senate  nor  Assembly 
would  do  justice  to  those  on  whose  loyal  support  the  Roman  state 
depended  more  than  ever.  But  as  yet  the  Allies  had  no  common 
organization,  so  the  revolt  of  Fregellae  found  no  imitators.  The 
day  of  reckoning  came  thirty  years  later.  As  to  the  provincials 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  new  jury-law  changed  their  position 
for  the  worse.  The  class  that  supplied  governors  might  be  de- 
generating, but  an  honest  and  kindly  governor  was  not  unheard 
of  I  know  of  no  suggestion  that  a  Roman  money-lender  or 
revenue-farmer  ever  regarded  Roman  subjects  abroad  from  any 
other  point  of  view  than  his  own  immediate  profit.  Not  to  shear 
the  sheep  close  was  only  to  leave  wool  for  the  next  shearer.  This 
policy  filled  private  purses,  not  the  Roman  treasury,  and  it  reached 
its  full  perfection  under  the  system  of  Gaius  Gracchus. 

348.  It  would  be  unfair  to  blame  the  Gracchi  for  the  sad 
result  of  their  exertions.  They  miscalculated  the  means  at  their 
disposal,  and  paid  for  the  error  with  their  lives.  All  parts  of  the 
state  were  corrupt.  In  the  face  of  senatorial  opposition,  a  magis- 
trate could  only  depend  on  the  Assembly,  and  the  Assembly  could 
only  be  managed  by  continuous  and  progressive  bribery.  The 
short  tenure  of  office  paralysed  a  reformer.  The  unofficial  Greek 
demagogue  had  no  place  in  Rome.  Yet  the  Gracchi  both  acted 
as  if  the  Rome  of  their  day  had  been  the  Athens  of  Pericles. 
In  truth  there  remained  but  one  possible  means  of  gaining  the 
continuous  power  necessary  for  effecting  reforms.  This  was  armed 
force.  This  force  could  not  be  made  effective  in  mere  faction- 
fights.  Only  the  army  could  overawe  opposition,  and  an  army 
must  have  a  leader.  With  the  appearance  of  such  a  leader 
republican  government  would  become  utterly  unreal.  It  is  easy 
enough  to  see  these  things  now.  But  to  the  republican  aristocrats 
of  the  revolutionary  period  the  one  thing  clear  was  that  they  had 
to  fight  for  their  privileges.  Fight  they  did,  and  they  were  not 
finally  beaten  till  about  80  years  after  the  death  of  Gaius  Gracchus. 


CHAPTER   XXIII 

FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  C.  GRACCHUS  TO  THE  END 
OF  THE  JUGURTHINE  WAR.  121— 105  B.C. 

349.  The  years  included  in  this  chapter  form  a  period  of 
great  interest.  The  first  part,  say  121 — 112,  contains  the  reaction 
against  the  Gracchan  movement,  and  the  wars  connected  with 
the  advance  of  the  Roman  frontier  in  the  North.  The  second 
contains  the  war  with  a  client-prince,  and  the  scandals  connected 
therewith,  the  rise  of  Marius,  and  the  appearance  of  Sulla.  All 
through  the  connexion  of  internal  and  external  policy  is  close. 
It  is  a  time  of  transition,  in  which  we  see  the  gradual  revelation 
of  a  dissembled  truth,  that  the  real  power  in  the  state  could  no 
longer  be  grasped  by  civilians.  Marius  begins  the  inevitable 
predominance  of  military  men. 

350.  The  anti-Gracchan  reaction  is  chiefly  remarkable  for 
its  significant  Hmits.  The  senatorial  leaders  did  not  dare  to 
tamper  with  those  parts  of  the  Gracchan  policy  in  which  the 
mob  or  the  capitalist  equites  were  seriously  interested.  A  modi- 
fication of  the  corn-law,  carried  by  the  tribune  M.  Octavius,  was 
certainly  no  reversal  of  the  law,  whatever  it  may  have  been  in 
detail.  But  the  law  for  a  colony  at  Carthage  was  repealed.  The 
Gracchan  land-laws  were  indirectly  set  aside  by  piecemeal  legis- 
lation j  not  openly  attacked,  but  insidiously  undermined.  In  1 2 1 
or  120  the  clause  forbidding  the  sale  of  allotments  was  repealed. 
In  119  or  118  a  law  forbade  further  allotments,  thus  abolishing 
the  commission.  It  had  probably  done  nothing  since  the  death 
of  C.  Gracchus  and  Flaccus.  Carbo,  the  survivor,  had  come  to 
terms  with  the  reactionary  nobles,  and  safe  do-nothing  men  were 
most  likely  put  into  the  vacant  places.  Now  the  state  was  made 
to  guarantee  present  possessors  against  future  disturbance;   the 


CH.  xxiii]         The  anti-Gracchan  reaction  273 

reserved  quit-rents  were  to  form  a  fund  towards  the  provision  of 
cheap  corn  under  the  corn-law.  In  1 1 1  the  final  step  was  taken  : 
the  quit-rents  were  abolished,  and  the  '  possessions '  made  private 
property.  Thus  the  wealthy  could  resume  their  old  game  of 
absorbing  small  holdings  by  purchase,  and  even  hasten  the  pro- 
cess by  annoying  their  poorer  neighbours.  They  became  owners 
of  a  vast  area  of  what  had  been  ager  publicus.  The  old  name 
possessiones  remained  in  general  use,  attesting  the  origin  of 
numerous  large  estates,  but  they  were  practically  freeholds.  So 
the  result  of  all  the  efforts  to  repeople  Italy  with  free  farmers  was 
to  legalize  admitted  evils,  removing  all  checks  on  latifundia  and 
slave-gangs.  Meanwhile  the  state  lost  most  of  its  domains,  and 
had  to  pay  for  corn-doles  to  the  Roman  mob. 

351.  So  far  the  optimates  had  the  upper  hand  of  the 
populares,  and  their  victory  was  illustrated  by  the  treatment  of 
some  persons  concerned  in  the  events  of  recent  years.  Opimius 
had  put  citizens  to  death  without  trial,  acting  under  the  authority 
of  the  Senate's  '  last  decree.'  He  was  brought  to  trial,  defended 
by  the  Gracchan  renegade  Carbo,  and  acquitted.  Possibly  the 
whole  affair  was  got  up  with  a  view  to  give  a  public  recognition 
to  the  Senate's  assumption  of  sovran  power  in  emergencies ;  such 
certainly  was  its  effect.  Popilius,  exiled  in  123,  was  now  recalled: 
a  tribune  proposed  a  bill  for  the  purpose,  and  the  Assembly  passed 
it.  On  the  other  hand  the  rising  orator,  L.  Licinius  Crassus, 
impeached  Carbo  for  treason,  and  the  '  best  men '  could  not 
save  him.  Probably  they  did  not  try.  He  thought  it  best  to 
commit  suicide.  The  death  of  the  hated  turncoat  was  a  relief 
to  the  'popular'  party,  but  they  had  no  leaders,  arid  for  the 
present  were  helpless.  Such  was  the  state  of  things  in  120 — 119, 
but  in  the  latter  year  the  appearance  of  Gaius  Marius  in  politics 
was  a  sign  of  their  revival. 

352.  Marius  belonged  to  the  municipal  town  of  Arpinum, 
the  citizens  of  which  had  received  the  full  Roman  franchise  in  188. 
His  family  were  farmers  of  the  old  sort,  thrifty  folk,  certainly  not 
paupers.  When  Marius  went  with  Scipio  to  Numantia,  he  served 
as  an  eques^  and  was  received  with  favour  at  headquarters.  But 
he  was  not  rich,  and  to  the  last  he  retained  the  simple  and  even 
boorish  ways  of  his  youth.  He  was  ambitious,  but  it  was  not 
easy  for  him  to  rise.  He  was  not  at  his  ease  among  polished 
Roman  aristocrats,  and  they  looked  down  on  him.    On  his  return 

H.  18 


274  Marlus.     External  policy  [ch. 

from  Spain  he  seems  to  have  given  up  the  land  and  taken  to  the 
Hfe  of  a  publicafius^  sharing  state-contracts.  Thus  he  made  money 
and  became  known  to  the  numerous  small  capitalists,  a  connexion 
very  important  in  his  later  career.  He  became  a  hanger-on  of  the 
Caecilii  Metelli,  no  doubt  intending  to  use  the  influence  of  the 
most  powerful  Roman  family  of  the  day  for  his  own  advancement. 
With  their  support  he  was  elected  in  120  tribune  for  the  next 
year.  It  may  fairly  be  assumed  that  he  had  some  sympathy  with 
the  Gracchan  movements,  but  he  had  evidently  not  compromised 
himself  by  hasty  action.  As  tribune  he  was  bold  enough  to  force 
through  a  law  to  hinder  the  nobles  from  putting  pressure  on  their 
dependants.  Access  to  voters  while  voting  was  forbidden.  He 
had  to  defy  Senate  and  consuls  (one  of  them  a  Metellus),  and  he 
did  so.  But  he  opposed  a  bill  for  further  lowering  the  price  of 
corn  in  Rome.  His  independent  attitude  seems  to  have  lost  him 
support,  for  he  could  not  win  the  aedileship  in  117.  In  116  he 
won  the  praetorship  for  115  with  difficulty.  He  was  accused  of 
bribery,  and  it  was  said  that  his  acquittal  through  equal  division 
of  votes  was  only  gained  by  bribing  some  of  the  court.  In  114 
he  governed  the  Further  Spain  as  propraetor,  and  is  said  to  have 
done  good  service  in  suppressing  brigandage.  But  in  the  chief 
military  operations  of  these  years  120 — no  he  had  no  part. 

353.  The  attention  of  the  Roman  government  was  directed 
to  three  spheres  of  activity  abroad,  (i)  the  advance  into  Trans- 
alpine Gaul  (2)  the  Macedonian  frontier  (3)  the  secure  control  of 
the  Cisalpine  country,  not  yet  incorporated  in  Italy.  The  first 
of  these  was  a  continuation  of  the  movement  already  begun  in 
defence  of  Massalia,  Rome's  old  and  useful  Ally.  One  object 
was  to  gain  a  land-route  to  the  Spanish  frontier  under  Roman 
control.  It  would  also  be  convenient  to  hold  the  seaboard  of 
southern  Gaul  where  not  already  held  by  Massalia,  and  so  to 
prevent  molestation  of  the  sea-route  by  the  growth  of  local  piracy. 
And  there  was  no  lack  of  influences  in  Rome  to  promote  a  forward 
policy.  Consuls  hoped  to  win  triumphs  in  wars.  Capitalists 
hoped  that  a  Roman  advance  would  lead  to  the  annexation  of 
new  territories  as  a  field  for  financial  enterprise.  So  leading  men 
of  both  parties  were  ready  to  move  on.  Roman  diplomacy  had 
prepared  the  way  in  the  traditional  Roman  manner.  Rome  was 
already  allied  with  the  Aedui,  a  powerful  Gaulish  tribe.  The 
Aedui  wanted  to  get  the  better  of  their  enemies  the  Allobroges, 


XXIIl] 


Advance  into  Gaul 


275 


and  could  not,  the  latter  tribe  being  protected  by  their  alliance 
with  the  Arverni,  who  dominated  a  number  of  smaller  tribes,  and 
were  the  leading  power  of  south-central  Gaul.  The  Romans  were 
well  informed  as  to  the  relations  of  the  Gaulish  tribes,  for  Massaliot 
traders  knew  the  country.     Through  them  the  Gauls  had  long 


AEDVi 


oTolo 


NARBO 


Southern  Transalpine  Gaul,  shewing  the  probable  line  of  the  road  from  Italy 
to  Spain,  avoiding  the  strip  of  coast  belonging  to  Massalia. 


been  introduced  to  various  appliances  of  civilized  life :  Greek 
coins  were  rudely  copied  in  Gaulish  mints. 

354.  Rome  therefore  acted  deliberately  and  with  effect. 
In  122  the  consul  Cn.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  entered  Gaul  with 
an  army.  In  121  he  met  the  advancing  Allobroges  in  the  Rhone 
country,  and  defeated  them  with  heavy  loss.     The  Arverni  came 

18—2 


276  Macedonia.     Northern  Italy  [ch. 

to  their  aid,  but  the  new  consul  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  and  the 
proconsul  Domitius  joined  forces  and  gained  a  crushing  victory 
over  the  combined  Gauls.  Submission  followed,  but  Rome 
annexed  no  territory.  What  she  needed  was  a  free  hand  further 
to  the  South.  The  Arvernian  king  was  decoyed  into  Roman 
power  and  detained  in  Italy.  We  hear  of  his  great  wealth  and 
of  the  abundance  of  gold  hoarded  in  Gaul.  This  would  not  tend 
to  dull  the  Roman  appetite  for  annexation.  The  real  aims  of 
Roman  policy  were  shewn  in  the  next  steps.  A  road  was  built 
{via  JDomitia),  running  by  way  of  Aquae  Sextiae  (Aix)  to  the 
Rhone.  A  strip  of  land,  enclosing  the  Massaliot  territory,  and 
reaching  from  the  Alps  to  the  border  of  Spain,  was  annexed  and 
made  a  Province.  In  118  a  colony  of  Roman  citizens  was 
founded  in  the  West  of  the  new  province.  It  ,  was  at  Narbo 
(Narbonne),  and  served  as  a  military  and  trading  centre.  Its 
official  name  was  Narbo  Martius,  and  the  province  was  afterwards 
commonly  called  Narbonese  Gaul.  The  foundation  of  Narbo 
was  a  triumph  for  the  '  popular '  party  in  Rome ;  that  is,  for  the 
great  financial  interest,  who  overcame  the  opposition  of  the 
Senate. 

355.  In  the  years  119 — 115  there  were  small  wars,  out  of 
which  Roman  nobles  contrived  to  win  triumphal  honours,  in 
Dalmatia  and  against  the  tribes  of  the  north-eastern  Alps.  The 
pretext  was  of  course  the  pacification  of  the  northern  and  eastern 
frontier.  The  defence  of  Macedonia  was  a  more  serious  matter. 
There  was  generally  some  trouble  with  the  warlike  barbarians 
pressing  down  from  the  North.  In  114  a  Roman  army  was 
defeated  with  very  heavy  loss.  Later  governors  recovered  the 
lost  ground,  and  pushed  back  the  invaders  beyond  the  Danube. 
After  no  there  was  peace  for  a  time,  but  it  was  never  safe  to 
neglect  this  part  of  the  Roman  borders.  To  return  to  Italy,  the 
recent  advance  of  Rome  made  it  desirable  to  improve  communi- 
cations by  land  along  the  Ligurian  seaboard,  and  also  between 
that  difficult  coast  and  the  region  of  the  Po.  The  road  from 
Rome  {via  Aurelid)  led  as  far  as  Pisae  (or  perhaps  Luna).  Since 
148  the  Postumian  road  had  given  access  from  Genua  to  Cisalpine 
Gaul  by  a  difficult  pass.  Now  in  109  the  censor  M.  Aemilius 
Scaurus  undertook  a  great  piece  of  work.  His  via  Aemilia  ran 
from  Pisae  or  Luna  through  the  rocky  district  to  Genua,  then  on 
to  vada  Sabata  (Vado)  on  the  coast  some  30  miles  beyond.    After 


XXIIl] 


Politics  in  Rome 


277 


this  it  turned  back  northwards,  joined  the  via  Postumia  at  Dertona 
(Tortona)  by  an  easier  pass,'and  thus  opened  up  an  alternative 
route  to  Placentia  on  the  Po.  Dertona  became  a  colony.  The 
strategic  importance  of  the  new  road  was  of  course  the  motive 
for  making  it.  Before  ten  years  had  passed,  its  value  was  strikingly 
proved  in  a  way  perhaps  hardly  foreseen.  But  that  northern  bar- 
barians were  on  the  move,  and  might  become  dangerous,  was 
already  known. 

356.     In  Rome,  where  politics  were  now  a  struggle  between 
two  selfish  and  worthless  factions,   things  were  not  going  well. 


fiitte^^-^   '■      :l;'.V-^  "■, Tills.;.' ■    -    ■  ■■•,::V"'.T?,,i.«'.v?,;r 


;^i    -  Qotd/'uUd,^  of 

;,'"  *  Viciumulae 

W     •£  pored  14 


•  Comum 


Cisalpine  Gaul  with  Liguria  about  100  B.C.  Only  the  river  Po  and  the  chief 
roads  are  shewn.  The  advance  of  the  boundary  of  Italy  from  the  Aesis  to 
the  Rubicon  [?  82  B.C.]  is  indicated.     See  § 


The  rise  of  Scaurus  was  a  sign  of  the  times.  He  was  a  Patrician, 
of  a  family  that  had  come  down  in  the  world.  He  set  himself  to 
raise  it  again  by  recovering  wealth  and  position.  As  one  of  the 
'  best  men '  he  had  borne  a  leading  part  against  C.  Gracchus.  He 
lost  no  chance  of  coming  to  the  front,  posing  as  a  virtuous  patriot 
of  conservative  views.  Whether  he  was  quite  so  great  a  rogue  as 
the  '  popular '  party  thought  him,  is  hard  to  say.  It  is  certain 
that  he  made  solemn  respectability  a  very  paying  game  in  a  very 


278  Numldia  [ch. 

corrupt  age.  He  was  consul  in  115,  and  the  censors  of  that  year 
made  him  'first  man'  of  the  Senate  {princeps  senatus).  This 
place  he  kept  for  over  25  years.  We  have  seen  that  he  was 
censor  in  109.  Though  a  time-server,  he  was  masterful  when 
in  office.  In  114  there  was  a  grave  scandal.  Three  Vestal 
virgins  were  said  to  have  misconducted  themselves  with  Roman 
Knights,  and  the  pontifical  court  was  thought  to  have  shewn 
culpable  laxity  in  acquitting  two  of  them.  This  alarmed  the 
superstitious  masses.  In  113  a  special  court  was  appointed  to 
deal  with  the  matter,  and  punishments  and  public  purifications 
followed.  In  in,  the  year  of  the  reactionary  land-law,  a  new 
law^  against  extortion,  the  lex  Servilia  repetundarum^  was  carried 
by  the  tribune  C.  Servilius  Glaucia.  That  a  new  law  was  already 
wanted,  was  not  a  good  sign,  and  this  law,  like  its  predecessors, 
was  ineffective.  These  few  details  are  enough  to  shew  that  we 
need  not  be  surprised  to  find  much  evidence  of  corruption  in 
Rome.     Let  us  now  turn  to  the  story  of  the  Jugurthine  war. 

357.  Numidia.  To  the  West  of  the  Roman  province  of 
Africa  lay  the  kingdoms  of  Numidia  and  Mauretania.  Both  were 
independent.  With  the  latter  Rome  had  as  yet  no  regular  re- 
lations. In  Numidia,  since  the  days  of  Masinissa,  Roman  over- 
lordship  was  so  far  recognized  that  changes  in  the  royal  succession 
took  place  under  the  approval  and  guarantee  of  Rome.  But  the 
practical  freedom  of  this  client-kingdom  was  not  seriously  impaired 
by  Roman  interference.  Numidian  contingents,  by  request  or 
voluntary  offer,  served  Rome  in  foreign  wars.  Roman  traders 
and  financiers  settled  and  carried  on  business  in  Numidia.  There 
was  no  design  of  annexing  the  country :  that  things  should  go  on 
as  they  were  was  enough  for  Roman  interests.  But  Rome  as  an 
imperial  power  could  not  afford  to  let  herself  be  openly  defied. 
Nor  would  the  capitalisfs  now  powerful  in  Rome  allow  Roman 
business-men  to  be  left  helpless  at  the  mercy  of  a  foreign  potentate. 
Therefore  the  Senate  would  have  no  easy  task  in  case  trouble 
arose  in  Numidia.  To  assert  the  power  and  prestige  of  Rome  by 
armed  intervention  would  be  necessary,  and  to  do  this  effectively 
grave  difficulties  had  to  be  overcome.  That  Rome  had  no 
standing  army  was  an  old  difficulty,  in  fact  a  part  of  the  Roman 

1  Supposed  to  have  restored  to  the  Knights  the  complete  control  of  the 
public  courts,  interrupted  by  a  previous  lex  Servilia  carried  by  Caepio  after- 
wards consul  in  106.     But  this  matter  is  very  obscure. 


xxiii]  Jugurtha  279 

constitution.  A  new  army  had  to  be  created  for  each  war.  More- 
over, no  sooner  had  one  ordinary  consul  got  his  army  into  trim 
and  learnt  something  of  the  conditions  of  campaigning  in  a  strange 
land,  than  he  was  superseded  by  another  consul,  generally  of  the 
same  ordinary  type.  Time  had  not  lessened  these  obstacles  to 
efficiency.  Meanwhile  the  Senate  itself  had  deteriorated.  Many 
noble  members  needed  money  to  support  their  extravagance,  and 
could  not  be  trusted  to  refuse  a  bribe.  No  wonder  the  House 
acted  weakly,  and  sought  every  pretext  for  shirking  a  necessary  war. 
358.  The  relationships  in  the  Numidian  royal  house  are 
best  shewn  in  a  table 

Masinissa  (died  149) 

I *— I 1      ,    , 

Micipsa  Gulussa  MastanabaJ 

I ' 1  I  .       .      r  ' 


Adherbal  Hiempsal  Massiva  (Jugurtha)  Gauda 

Micipsa  had  outlived  his  brothers,  and  was  sole  king  till  his  death 
in  118.  He  left  the  kingdom  to  his  two  sons  and  his  bastard 
nephew  Jugurtha  as  joint  rulers,  hoping  that  the  last  would  be 
satisfied  with  a  share  and  that  the  succession  of  his  own  sons 
would  be  secured.  Of  course  the  plan  failed.  Hiempsal  soon 
fell  out  with  Jugurtha,  and  was  murdered.  War  between  the  two 
survivors  then  followed  :  Adherbal,  beaten  in  the  field,  fled  to 
Rome.  The  Senate  heard  his  appeal  for  restoration,  but  many 
members  were  bribed  by  agents  of  Jugurtha.  A  commission  was 
sent  out,  probably  in  116,  instructed  to  divide  the  kingdom 
between  the  two  princes.  The  commissioners  gave  Jugurtha 
the  richer  western  part.  Adherbal  received  the  eastern  part  with 
Cirta  (Constantine)  the  capital.  It  was  said  that  this  award  also 
was  the  result  of  bribery.  So  Jugurtha,  confirmed  in  the  view  of 
Roman  corruption  learnt  from  camp-gossip  at  Numantia,  felt  free 
to  work  his  will.  He  went  on  provoking  Adherbal  till  war  was 
renewed.  In  113  Adherbal  was  again  defeated  and  besieged  in 
Cirta.  He  awaited  a  reply  to  an  embassy  sent  for  succour  to 
Rome.  Meanwhile,  with  the  help  of  resident  Romans  and  others, 
the  strong  city  was  stoutly  defended.  An  incompetent  embassy 
from  Rome,  sent  to  stop  hostilities,  was  coolly  dismissed  by 
Jugurtha,  and  the  siege  went  on.  Adherbal  contrived  to  send 
another  message  to  Rome,  imploring  aid  and  pointing  out  that 
it  must  come  quickly  or  Cirta  would  fall. 


28o  Corrupt  mismanagement  [ch. 

359.  At  this  time  (112)  the  Roman  government  was  nervous 
on  account  of  recent  disasters  on  the  northern  frontier.  The 
Senate's  reluctance  to  engage  in  a  Numidian  war  was  natural, 
and  we  are  told  that  corrupt  members  were  acting  in  the  interest 
of  Jugurtha.  Another  embassy,  headed  by  Scaurus,  was  sent  to 
warn  the  king.  But  he  managed  to  get  rid  of  them  somehow. 
Cirta  was  starved  out :  terms  of  surrender  were  disregarded : 
Adherbal  and  his  garrison,  Romans  and  all,  were  massacred. 
Jugurtha  was  master  of  all  Numidia,  and  he  had  demonstrated 
the  futility  of  trusting  in  the  protection  of  Rome.  At  last  some- 
thing practical  had  to  be  done.  A  tribune-elect  took  up  the 
matter  and  forced  the  Senate  to  act.  Africa  was  named  as  a 
consular  province  for  the  next  year  (m),  and  in  due  course  the 
lot  assigned  it  to  L.  Calpurnius  Bestia,  consul-elect.  He  raised 
an  army,  and  in  iii  war  began.  Bestia  had  on  his  staff  the 
respectable  Scaurus  and  other  nobles.  After  some  successes, 
Bestia  consented  to  negotiate.  Soon  peace  was  concluded  be- 
tween the  parties,  on  terms  strangely  favourable  to  the  king. 
We  are  told  that  in  this  affair  also  corruption  was  the  true 
explanation  of  what  happened,  and  we  have  no  good  ground 
for  doubting  it.  But  Jugurtha  had  gone  too  far.  The  scandal 
roused  great  indignation  in  Rome,  and  in  moments  of  excitement 
the  influence  of  a  few  corrupt  nobles  could  not  check  the  popular 
wrath.  The  tribune  Memmius  carried  a  motion  for  an  inquiry, 
and  for  fetching  Jugurtha  to  Rome  under  safe-conduct.  The 
king's  evidence  was  needed  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  culprits. 

360.  To  understand  the  position  in  Rome  we  must  bear  in 
mind  certain  points.  The  common  people  and  their  leaders  were 
not  sharing  the  bribes  of  Jugurtha.  The  non-noble  capitalists 
were  angry  that  men  of  their  own  class  had  been  left  to  their  fate 
at  Cirta.  And  it  was  not  Jugurtha's  interest  to  ruin  such  men  as 
Scaurus  and  Bestia,  and  thus  spoil  his  own  game.  How  then  was 
he  to  come  to  Rome  and  yet  not  betray  his  associates  ?  Roman 
institutions  supplied  an  answer.  He  came,  and  he  bought  a 
tribune.  When  brought  before  a  mass-meeting  and  urged  to 
make  a  full  confession,  this  tribune  forbade  him  to  speak.  The 
activity  of  the  tribunate  had  not  been  revived  for  nothing,  and 
popular  rage  was  foiled.  Of  the  consuls  for  no,  Sp.  Postumius 
Albinus  was  to  succeed  Bestia  in  command.  He  wanted  a  triumph, 
and  is  said  to  have  prompted  Massiva,  then  a  refugee  in  Rome, 


xxiii]  Metellus  281 

to  claim  the  Numidian  throne.  Jugurtha  at  once  procured  his 
cousin's  murder.  His  agent  Bomilcar,  who  had  engaged  the 
assassin,  was  brought  to  trial,  and  bolted,  leaving  fifty  of  the 
king's  friends  to  forfeit  the  bail.  The  Senate  at  last  ordered 
Jugurtha  out  of  Italy.  War  began  again,  but  Albinus  could 
effect  nothing.  He  soon  had  to  return  to  Rome  to  hold  elections 
for  next  year,  and  a  deadlock  in  politics  kept  him  there  for  some 
time.  Meanwhile  his  brother  Aulus  was  left  in  charge  of  the 
army.  A  mismanaged  campaign  ended  with  a  crushing  disaster. 
The  survivors  were  made  to  pass  under  the  yoke,  and  Roman 
prestige  in  Africa  was  for  the  present  at  an  end.  Rightly  or 
wrongly,  the  consul  and  his  brother  were  supposed  to  have  been 
corrupted  by  Jugurtha. 

361.  Rome  was  now  full  of  suspicion  and  alarm,  and  the 
popular  indignation  at  last  found  vent.  C.  Mamilius,  tribune 
in  109,  carried  a  law  appointing  a  special  commission  to  inquire 
into  recent  scandals  and  punish  the  guilty.  The  leading  nobles 
were  in  a  fright,  but  we  are  told  that  one  of  them  at  least  coolly 
provided  for  his  own  safety.  Scaurus  contrived  to  get  himself 
elected  one  of  the  three  commissioners.  Nevertheless  the  inquiry 
was  carried  on  with  much  bitterness.  Bestia  and  Sp.  Albinus 
were  among  the  victims.  But  the  chief  result  was  that  henceforth 
some  regard  was  paid  to  efficiency  in  the  conduct  of  the  Numidian 
war.  The  consul  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus,  who  took  over  the  com- 
mand in  109,  was  a  noble  of  the  best  type,  honest  and  devoted 
to  duty.  In  reconstructing  the  army  he  had  the  help  of  two 
practical  soldiers  on  his  staff.  P.  Rutilius  Rufus,  a  man  •  of  Stoic 
principles,  distinguished  as  a  lawyer  and  noted  for  virtue,  reformed 
the  drill  and  swordsmanship  of  the  men.  Marius,  jealous  and 
ambitious,  but  a  masterly  handler  of  troops,  returned  to  military 
life  resolved  to  raise  himself  by  success  in  war.  Under  these 
men  discipline  and  efficiency  were  restored. 

362.  Jugurtha  had  now  to  learn  that  there  were  Romans 
who  would  neither  be  deceived  nor  bribed.  Metellus  advanced 
cautiously  into  Numidia,  gaining  ground  and  at  the  same  time 
pretending  to  negotiate.  He  tried  to  seduce  the  king's  envoys. 
In  a  battle  by  the  river  Muthul  Jugurtha  could  not  break  up  the 
Roman  army,  and  his  own,  though  not  defeated,  melted  away. 
Metellus  went  on,  occupying  posts  and  devastating  the  country. 
Jugurtha  with  new  and  inferior  forces  waged  a  guerrilla  warfare. 


\ 


282  Marius  consul  [ch. 

Such  campaigning  was  wearing  out  the  Roman  army.  Metellus 
tried  to  bring  on  a  pitched  battle  by  attacking  the  city  of  Zama. 
But  he  was  thwarted  by  a  defect  of  the  Roman  military  system. 
Deserters,  probably  Allies  or  auxiliaries,  seem  to  have  gone  over 
in  some  numbers,  and  the  king  learnt  the  design  from  them  and 
added  some  of  them  to  the  garrison  of  Zama.  The  siege  was 
a  failure,  and  Metellus  retired  into  winter  quarters.  Plotting 
was  resumed,  and  Bomilcar,  in  fear  for  himself,  turned  traitor. 
He  frightened  Jugurtha  into  a  surrender,  but  at  the  last  the  king 
would  not  put  his  person  in  the  consul's  power.  War  was  renewed, 
and  the  conquest  of  Numidia  was  yet  far  off.  Still  the  success  of 
Metellus  had  been  welcomed  at  Rome,  and  he  was  left  in  command 
for  the  next  year  (108)  as  proconsul. 

363.  But  there  was  trouble  at  headquarters.  Marius  had 
done  remarkably  good  service,  and  now  wanted  to  stand  for 
the  consulship.  Metellus  would  not  grant  him  leave  to  visit 
Rome  for  the  purpose  of  a  canvass.  The  ambition  of  the  '  new 
man '  seemed  to  the  great  noble  a  grotesque  presumption.  Marius 
set  to  work  in  his  own  way.  He  could  canvass  indirectly  by  con- 
triving that  letters  and  messages  from  Africa  should  carry  his  fame 
to  Rome  as  the  efficient  man  of  the  hour.  So  he  indulged  the 
rank  and  file,  and  took  particular  care  to  win  the  favour  of  the 
financiers  gathered  at  Utica,  weary  of  waiting  for  the  opportunities 
depending  on  the  victory  of  Rome.  While  the  campaign  of  108 
was  proceeding  in  Numidia,  the  people  at  home  were  being  pre- 
pared for  the  candidature  of  Marius.  The  discomfort  of  Metellus 
grew  worse,  as  the  stories  of  this  time  shew.  Jugurtha  was  again 
strong  in  the  field,  and  he  discovered  the  plot  against  him. 
Bomilcar  and  others  were  put  to  death,  but  henceforth  the  faith- 
less king  knew  not  whom  to  trust.  So  much  Metellus  had  gained. 
He  now  pushed  on  the  war  vigorously,  and  at  last  gave  Marius 
leave  of  absence.  In  the  summer  of  108  Marius  reached  Rome, 
just  in  time  for  the  election.  The  'popular'  party  carried  all 
before  them.  He  not  only  became  consul-elect  for  107,  but  was 
appointed  to  command  in  Numidia  by  a  vote  of  the  Assembly 
taken  in  defiance  of  the  Senate.  A  recent  defeat  (109)  in  Gaul 
no  doubt  tended  to  discredit  the  management  of  wars  by  the 
senatorial  nobles. 

364.  The  soldier-demagogue  now  had  a  free  hand,  for  the 
Senate  voted  all  he  asked.     But  he  did  not,  as  they  hoped,  wear 


xxiii]  The  new  army.     Sulla  283 

out  his  popularity  by  levying  troops.  Old  soldiers  volunteered 
for  service.  Paupers  'rated  by  the  head'  {capite  censi)  had 
hitherto  not  been  accepted  for  legionary  service,  at  least  not 
openly  and  wholesale.  The  tradition  that  the  infantry  of  the 
line  consisted  of  owners  of  property  was  not  extinct,  but  Marius 
made  an  end  of  it.  He  enlisted  men  solely  on  the  ground  of 
fitness  for  service.  He  meant  to  have  a  fighting  force  devoted 
to  himself,  and  the  formation  of  this  army  was  one  of  the  most 
decisive  steps  in  the  Roman _  revolution.  Military  efficiency  was 
gained,  but  from  this  time  forth  Roman  politics  were  never  free 
from  the  power  of  the  sword,  as  we  shall  see.  Contingents  of 
Allies  and  foreign  auxiliaries  were  raised  as  usual.  It  remained 
to  appoint  a  Quaestor.  The  office  was  of  great  importance,  for 
the  quaestor  with  a  field-army  was  the  consul's  right-hand  man. 
The  choice  of  L.  Cornehus  Sulla  was  a  momentous  one.  He  was 
a  Patrician,  a  man  of  education,  cool  and  unscrupulous,  who  had 
passed  a  somewhat  dissipated  youth.  His  adaptability  and  force 
of  character  were  destined  to  be  a  surprise  to  his  contemporaries, 
and  his  relations  with  Marius  to  be  the  cause  of  some  of  the  worst 
horrors  in  the  whole  history  of  Rome. 

365.  Before  Marius  reached  the  seat  of  war,  probably  in  the 
spring  of  107,  Metellus  had  gained  various  successes,  but  was 
little  if  at  all  nearer  to  capturing  Jugurtha.  And  a  victorious 
peace  was  impossible  so  long  as  the  king  remained  at  large. 
Moreover  Bocchus,  king  of  Mauretania,  was  now  induced  to 
intervene.  It  is  said  that  he  had  offered  to  join  Rome  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  and  that  Jugurtha's  friends  in  the  Senate 
had  procured  the  refusal  of  the  offer.  He  now  joined  Jugurtha. 
Metellus,  hearing  that  Marius  was  coming  to  supersede  him, 
ceased  his  active  campaigning,  and  soon  set  out  for  Rome,  where 
he  had  a  great  reception,  a  triumph,  and  the  nickname  of  honour 
Nuniidicus.  Marius  took  over  the  proconsul's  army  from  Rutilius, 
and  set  to  work.  It  seems  clear  that  his  operations  were  suc- 
cessful, but  the  chronology  and  the  details  are  most  obscure. 
The  important  point  to  notice  is  that  successful  campaigning 
was  not  productive  of  the  decisive  result  aimed  at.  But  the 
army  of  Marius  was  good,  and  Bocchus  became  alarmed  when 
he  found  that  no  impression  could  be  made  on  it,  even  when 
attacked  on  the  march  at  every  disadvantage  of  circumstance. 
Some  time  in   106  he  shewed  a  willingness  to  treat  for  peace 


284  Marius  and  Sulla  [ch. 

and  Marius  sent  Sulla  to  negotiate.  For  the  present  nothing 
came  of  the  conference,  but  further  successes  of  Marius  brought 
an  embassy  from  Bocchus.  The  envoys,  referred  to  Rome  by 
Marius,  brought  back  the  answer  that  the  king  could  only  earn 
Roman  friendship  and  alliance  by  doing  something  to  deserve  it. 
Bocchus  asked  for  a  second  conference  with  Sulla.  So  Sulla  was 
sent  again. 

366.  The  Mauretanian  king  had  now  to  choose  between 
surrendering  Sulla  to  Jugurtha  or  Jugurtha  to  Sulla.  His 
wavering  was  a  dramatic  episode,  famous  in  later  literature.  At 
length  the  nerve  of  the  barbarian  gave  way  under  the  cool  insist- 
ence of  the  Roman.  Sulla  brought  back  Jugurtha  a  prisoner, 
and  the  war  was  at  an  end.  Bocchus  became  an  ally  of  Rome, 
and  received  a  part  of  western  Numidia.  The  eastern  part  was 
assigned  to  Jugurtha's  half-brother  Gauda.  The  overlordship  of 
Rome  was  now  firmly  established  in  these  regions.  Near  the  end 
of  the  year  105  the  proconsul  Marius  returned  to  Rome  and  held 
his  well-earned  triumph.  Jugurtha  was  put  to  death  in  the  old 
style.  The  recent  news  of  a  terrible  disaster  in  the  Rhone  country 
had  revived  previous  alarms.  The  fear  of  an  invasion  by  the 
warlike  northern  barbarians  was  a  Roman  nightmare.  There 
was  no  time  to  be  lost,  so  constitutional  scruples  about  reelection 
were  set  aside.  Marius  found  himself  already  elected  consul  for 
104  and  appointed  to  the  chief  command  in  the  North.  But  the 
beginnings  of  the  troubles  in  which  his  career  was  destined  to 
involve  the  Roman  state  were  soon  apparent.  He  had  humbled 
the  great  noble  houses,  and  they  took  their  revenge  by  magnifying 
the  exploit  of  Sulla.  To  Sulla,  they  urged,  the  triumph  was  really 
due :  as  Marius  had  unfairly  stolen  the  glory  of  Metellus,  it  served 
him  right  to  be  robbed  of  his  own.    Henceforth  there  was  a  deadly 

"■rivalry  between  Marius  and  Sulla,  for  the  moment  not  openly 
expressed,  but  the  jealousy  of  the  elder  man  and  the  ambition 
of  the  younger  never  slept. 

367.  The  story  of  the  Jugurthine  war  has  revealed  to  us 
more  clearly  than  ever  the  internal  decay  of  Rome.  The  one 
class  in  the  state  consistent  and  able  to  make  themselves  felt 
whenever  they  chose  were  the  keen  and  selfish  capitalists.  In 
backing  the  'popular'  leaders  and  insisting  on  having  the  war 
vigorously  fought  to  a  finish,  they  were  surely  right.  Rome  could 
not  afford  to  abdicate  her  position  of  suzerainty  in  Numidia.    Nor 


xxiii]  Lessons  of  the  war  285 

would  Sulla  have  been  able  to  overawe  Bocchus,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  victories  of  Marius.  In  one  department  of  state  the  war 
led  to  an  increase  of  efficiency.  Numidian  campaigning  was  not 
a  series  of  pitched  battles.  To  deal  with  the  mobility  of  the 
enemy  it  was  necessary  to  give  more  attention  to  the  light  troops 
and  cavalry,  and  even  our  imperfect  record  contains  traces  of  an 
improvement  in  this  respect.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  these 
arms  were  made  up  of  Allies  and  auxiliaries.  The  Roman  citizens 
serving  in  the  legions  were  on  the  way  to  become  a  force  of  pauper 
volunteers,  attached  to  their  own  generals,  not  simple  patriots 
fighting  for  their  country.  This  change  was  no  sudden  one,  but 
the  new  model  developed  by  Marius  organized  a  tendency  that 
had  long  been  at  work,  and  conducted  it  to  a  logical  result. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

THE   INVASION  FROM  THE  NORTH.     109-101  B.C. 

368.  The  history  of  Rome  in  the  years  104 — loi  b.c.  in- 
cludes two  wars,  that  against  the  northern  barbarians,  and  the 
second  slave-war  in  Sicily.  The  contemporary  movements  and 
influences  at  work  in  Rome  are  of  great  interest.  The  end  of 
an  old  state  of  things  is  announced  by  the  predominance  of  an 
individual.  After  the  events  of  these  years,  government  by  an 
aristocratic  clique  has  lost  its  vigour,  and  we  enter  on  a  new  stage 
in  the  Roman  revolution,  a  scene  in  which  leading  figures  compete 
for  unconstitutional  power,  and  rival  claims  are  in  the  last  resort 
settled  by  the  sword. 

369.  For  some  years  the  northern  countries  had  been  trou- 
bled by  a  great  migration,  such  as  often  took  place  in  ancient  times 
when  uncivilized  peoples  were  driven  by  increase  of  numbers  to 
overflow  into  new  lands.  At  this  time  the  wanderers  were  drawn 
from  Germany  and  Switzerland.  Some  were  certainly  of  Teutonic 
stock,  some  probably  Celtic.  We  hear  of  them  under  the  names 
of  Cimbri,  Teutoni,  Tigurini,  Ambrones.  They  were  not  raiders, 
but  swarms  'trekking'  in  search  of  new  homes,  slowly  moving 
with  wives  and  children  in  long  caravans  of  covered  waggons. 
They  changed  their  direction  from  time  to  time  according  to 
circumstances.  When  they  started  is  uncertain.  The  Tigurini 
and  Ambrones  appear  to  have  joined  the  first  body  after  they 
entered  Gaul.  In  1 1 3  we  hear  of  them  further  eastward,  where 
they  routed  the  army  of  Carbo  in  Noricum.  After  this  we  find 
them,  about  iii  and  no,  on  the  move  in  Gaul,  masters  of  the 
open  country  in  their  line  of  march,  but  unable  to  capture  the 
Gaulish  strongholds  or  to  settle  down.  In  109  the  consul  M. 
lunius  Silanus  received  from  them  a  request  for  lands,  which  was 
sent  on  to  the  Senate  and  refused.  A  battle  in  the  Rhone  country 
ended  in  the  defeat  of  the  Romans  with  great  loss.     The  main 


CH.  xxiv]  The  northern  migration  287 

body  of  the  invaders  seem  to  have  been  still  content  to  seek  con- 
quests in  central  Gaul :  at  least  Roman  territory  was  not  directly 
menaced  till  107,  when  the  Tigurini  appeared  in  the  West.  The 
consul  L.  Cassius  Longinus  advanced  to  meet  them  and  guard 
the  Roman  province.  But  he  perished  with  a  great  part  of  his 
army,  and  the  remnant  only  escaped  by  agreeing  to  degrading 
terms.  In  106  the  consul  Q.  Servilius  Caepio,  one  of  the  regular 
nobles,  did  not  improve  matters.  He  recovered  the  city  of  Tolosa 
(Toulouse),  lately  lost.  In  it.he  captured  a  great  treasure,  for  the 
holy  places  there  contained  vast  hoards  of  gold.  This  gold,  seized 
for  Rome  as  prize  of  war,  mysteriously  disappeared,  and  never 
reached  the  Roman  treasury.  Rumour  accused  the  consul  of 
having  organized  the  robbery,  but  for  the  present  he  escaped  an 
inquiry  and  remained  as  proconsul  in  105.  To  relieve  public 
anxiety,  a  second  army  was  sent  to  Gaul  under  Cn.  Manlius 
Maximus.  He  was  a  'new  man,' put  forward  by  the  'popular' 
party.  As  consul  he  ranked  above  a  proconsul,  and  it  was 
Caepio's  duty  to  cooperate  with  him  loyally.  This  Caepio  did 
not  do.  The  neglect  of  mutual  support  led  up  to  the  bloody 
defeat  of  Arausio  (Orange),  in  which  two  Roman  armies  were 
practically  destroyed.  Rome  and  Italy  were  now  clearly  in  im- 
minent danger.  There  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  send  Gaius 
Marius  to  command  in  Gaul.  It  was  fortunate  for  Rome  that  the 
barbarians  did  not  at  once  push  on  into  Italy.  True  to  their  first 
design,  they  turned  aside  to  Spain,  hoping  there  at  last  to  find  a 
dwelling-place. 

370.  Before  we  speak  of  the  effect  of  this  series  of  disasters 
on  public  life  in  Rome,  let  us  see  what  the  one  trusted  man  did 
in  the  way  of  military  reform  during  the  respite  afforded  by  the 
departure  of  the  barbarians  to  Spain.  Many  points  are  somewhat 
obscure,  especially  as  to  the  order  and  date  of  the  various  changes. 
The  improvement  in  swordsmanship  was  due  to  Rutilius,  and  con- 
sisted in  training  the  legionaries  to  fence  by  thrusting  rather  than 
cutting,  a  practice  copied  from  gladiatorial  schools..  But  the  new 
organization  was  the  work  of  Marius,  probably  begun  in  Numidia, 
and  now  completed  in  Gaul.  Hitherto  the  third  line  {triarii)  had 
borne  spears.  They  were  now  armed  like  the  rest  with  javelins 
{ptla),  so  that  the  equipment  of  the  whole  legion  was  uniform. 
The  old  divisions  of  maniple  and  century  were  not  abolished,  but 
the  cohort,  a  larger  division  long  used  in  the  contingents  of  the 


288  Marius  and  the  new  model  [ch. 

Allies,  became  the  effective  tactical  unit.  A  legion  at  full  strength 
was  to  be  ten  cohorts  of  600  men  each.  Each  cohort  had  a 
standard,  and  Marius  added  the  famous  silver  eagle  as  a  standard 
for  the  whole  legion.  Romans  and  Allies  were  now  organized 
alike  :  we  may  note  that  the  galling  political  difference  still  re- 
mained. The  cavalry  were  not  neglected,  but  we  should  bear  in 
mind  that  Roman  equites  no  longer  served  as  a  corps.  The 
troopers  were  either  Allies,  or  foreigners  from  certain  provinces 
or  client  kingdoms,  and  the  latter  were  becoming  more  numerous. 
Light  troops  were  drawn  from  Liguria,  slingers  from  the  Balearic 
isles,  mercenary  bowmen  from  independent  Crete. 

371.  To  bring  so  composite  a  force  into  a  state  of  cohesion 
and  efficiency  was  a  work  of  time.  Yet  the  employment  of 
foreigners  was  more  than  ever  necessary,  owing  to  the  terrible 
losses  of  recent  years,  which  had  drained  so  much  of  the  best 
blood  of  Italy.  Abroad  too  all  was  not  well.  It  is  said  that 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia,  when  called  upon  to  furnish  a  contingent, 
replied  that  more  than  half  his  men  were  slaves  on  the  plantations 
of  Roman  capitalists,  and  therefore  he  had  none  to  send.  True 
or  not  as  an  excuse,  it  is  certain  that  piracy  and  kidnapping  sup- 
plied most  of  the  slaves  at  this  time  imported  from  the  East.  But 
the  formation  of  the  army  went  on,  and  the  army  of  the  new  model 
put  on  a  decisively  professional  character.  Circumstances  had 
long  compelled  the  enlistment  of  men  for  campaigns  of  more 
than  a  year.  This  necessity  was  now  accepted  as  normal;  soldiers 
took  the  oath  once  for  all,  and  served,  if  wanted,  continuously  for 
16  years.  Marius  also  took  great  pains  to  increase  the  mobility 
of  the  infantry,  by  reducing  the  baggage-train  and  inventing  ap- 
pliances by  which  the  soldier  could  carry  his  kit  with  ease  and  yet 
lay  it  aside  quickly  when  attacked  on  the  march.  Among  the 
officers  who  served  under  the  consul  were  Sulla  and  Q.  Sertorius, 
a  good  soldier  who  had  added  to  his  usefulness  by  learning  the 
Gaulish  tongue. 

372.  In  Rome,  the  years  of  disaster  followed  by  prepara- 
tion for  defence  were  naturally  a  time  of  unrest.  Commanders, 
whether  unlucky  or  blameworthy,  were  brought  to  trial  as  having 
imperilled  the  state  by  their  conduct.  Most  notable  was  the  case 
of  Caepio.     In  105  a  vote  of  the  Assembly  took  away^  his  im- 

^  He  was  not  consul  but  proconsul,  but  in  any  case  the  proceeding  was 
exceptional. 


xxiv]  Movements  in  Rome  289 

perium.  In  104  a  law  disqualified  a  person  so  deprived  from 
sitting  in  the  Senate.  Then  a  commission  was  appointed  to 
inquire  into  the  disappearance  of  the  Tolosan  treasure.  The 
nobles  were  not  able  to  prevent  this  measure.  Caepio  went  into 
exile  to  escape  condemnation,  and  ended  his  days  in  shame. 
The  'gold  of  Tolosa'  became  a  byword  for  ill-gotten  gain  bringing 
bad  luck.  Silanus,  the  man  defeated  in  109,  was  tried  before  the 
Tribe- Assembly  in  104,  but  was  acquitted.  In  104  a  notable  law 
changed  the  method  of  appointing  members  of  the  great  religious 
colleges.  These  close  corporations  had  hitherto  coopted  new 
members  to  fill  vacancies.  Only  the  choice  of  one  member  of 
the  pontifical  college  to  be  Chief  Pontiff  was  determined  by  the 
votes  of  17  Tribes  (a  minority  of  35)  selected  by  lot.  This 
method  was  now  introduced  for  all  appointments  of  pontiffs, 
augurs,  and  decemviri  sacrorum.  The  mover  was  the  tribune 
Cn.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  and  it  appears  that  he  was  induced 
to  agitate  for  this  change  by  irritation  at  being  passed  over  in 
favour  of  others  when  vacancies  occurred.  We  have  seen  above 
how  important  in  Roman  politics  the  religious  colleges  were. 
This  lex  Domitia,  like  the  trials  just  referred  to,  shews  the  acti- 
vity of  the  '  popular '  party  in  Rome.  They  were  busy  assailing 
the  noble  'best  men'  at  home,  while  their  champion  Marius 
represented  them  in  the  field.  If  the  reelection  of  Marius  as 
consul  year  after  year  violated  constitutional  rules,  the  interference 
with  the  religious  colleges  deprived  the  nobles  of  much  of  their 
power  to  check  the  hasty  action  of  Assemblies.  Hence  Sulla 
23  years  later,  when  he  had  overthrown  the  Marians,  repealed 
the  Domitian  law. 

373.  In  the  years  104 — 103  Marius  was  forging  the  weapon 
to  strike  the  enemy  when  the  time  came.  He  formed  a  military 
base  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone  and  secured  his  communications 
with  Italy  by  sea.  He  made  his  men  cut  a  new  channel  to  im- 
prove an  outfall  of  the  river.  No  great  campaign  was  undertaken, 
but  the  army  was  kept  in  fine  condition  and  discipline,  and  the 
Gaulish  tribes  carefully  watched.  Late  in  103  the  barbarian  host 
came  back  from  Spain,  having  failed  in  their  enterprise  and  doubt- 
less suffered  some  loss.  Marius  was  reelected  consul  for  the  fourth 
time.  The  popular  leaders,  in  particular  the  noisy  tribune  L.  Ap- 
puleius  Saturninus,  insisted  on  it,  and  Marius  was  nothing  loth. 
The  other  consul  for  102  was  Q.  Lutatius  Catulus,  a  noble  of  high 

H.  19 


290  Destruction  of  the  barbarians       [ch.  xxiv 

character,  but  more  of  a  literary  than  a  military  man.  The  work 
for  the  coming  year  was  determined  by  the  movements  of  the 
enemy,  who,  having  found  no  homes  for  permanent  settlement  in 
Gaul  or  Spain,  now  resolved  to  force  their  way  into  Italy.  Their 
plan  was  to  advance  in  two  bodies  by  separate  routes.  Teutoni 
and  Ambrones  were  to  pass  through  the  Roman  province  and 
enter  the  Po-country  by  way  of  Liguria.  Cimbri  and  Tigurini 
were  to  pass  round  the  great  Alpine  range  and  descend  upon  Italy 
from  the  North-East.  The  result  may  be  briefly  told.  Marius 
let  the  Teuton  caravan  trek  slowly  by,  and  followed  at  leisure, 
refusing  to  fight  till  his  own  good  time.  Near  Aquae  Sextiae 
his  chance  came.  In  two  battles  he  defeated  them  utterly.  Some 
prisoners  were  taken,  but  most  of  the  brave  barbarians  perished 
by  the  sword.  The  western  column  had  ceased  to  exist.  Mean- 
while the  Cimbric  column,  after  their  long  march,  broke  into  Italy. 
Catulus,  though  helped  by  Sulla,  who  had  now  parted  from  Marius, 
could  not  stop  them.  They  forced  the  passage  of  the  Athesis 
(Adige)  and  he  had  to  fall  back.  The  armies  wintered  in  the 
Cisalpine.  Marius  was  elected  consul  for  the  fifth  time,  and 
Catulus  was  continued  in  command  as  proconsul. 

374.  In  the  spring  of  loi  Marius  brought  his  army  to  share 
the  defence  of  Italy.  The  great  battle  of  Vercellae  (about  half 
way  between  Milan  and  Turin)  was  not  fought  till  the  summer, 
when  the  heat  told  against  the  northern  invaders.  Our  autho- 
rities, writing  from  sources  hostile  to  Marius,  give  the  chief  glory 
of  victory  to  Catulus,  but  popular  opinion  seems  to  have  regarded 
Marius  with  good  reason  as  the  hero  of  the  day.  The  carnage 
was  again  frightful ;  the  prisoners  many,  but  fewer  than  the  slain. 
The  presence  of  the  women  and  children  with  the  barbarian  war- 
riors explains  this  result.  The  women  drove  back  their  routed 
men-folk  on  the  Roman  swords,  and  slew  themselves  in  despair 
when  all  was  over.  The  military  resources  of  a  civilized  power, 
when  wielded  by  competent  hands,  were  as  yet  far  too  strong  for 
barbarian  hosts,  however  brave.  For  about  500  years  Italy  re- 
mained secure  from  northern  invaders,  and  Italy  did  not  soon 
forget  the  services  of  Marius.  But  for  the  present  the  most  serious 
question  was,  how  Rome's  great  military  workman  would  bear 
himself  in  political  life.  He  had  overshadowed  others  :  would 
he  now  use  his  preeminent  position  for  the  lasting  benefit  of  the 
Roman  state? 


CHAPTER   XXV 

THE  SECOND  SICILIAN  SLAVE-WAR,  AND  EXTERNAL 
AFFAIRS  105—92  B.C. 

375.  A  grave  internal  danger,  by  which  the  evils  at  work 
in  the  Roman  system  were  again  rudely  exposed,  was  contem- 
porary with  the  life-and-death  struggle  in  the  North.  The  partisans 
of  Marius  were  strengthened  by  the  horrors  of  a  second  slave-war 
in  Sicily,  which  gave  a  further  shock  to  the  nerves  of  the  Roman 
public.  This  war  was  preceded,  and  in  its  first  stages  accom- 
panied, by  smaller  outbreaks  in  Italy  itself,  all  symptoms  of  the 
morbid  state  of  rural  economy,  worse  than  ever  since  the  failure 
of  the  Gracchan  land-reform.  They  were  put  down,  in  one  case 
with  some  difficulty,  but  the  evil  of  the  plantation-system  remained. 
Discontent  was  not  extinct.  In  104  or  103  the  tribune  L.  Marcius 
Philippus  proposed  some  land-bill  of  a  radical  nature.  Evidently 
the  landlord  interest  was  too  strong  for  him :  he  could  not  carry 
the  bill,  and  the  matter  dropped. 

376.  The  spark  that  set  Sicily  aflame  was  an  order  of  the 
Senate  in  the  year  104.  The  excuse^  offered  by  Nicomedes  for 
not  sending  men  to  serve  in  the  northern  war  led  the  House  to 
vote  that  the  enslavement  of  free  allies  of  Rome  was  illegal,  and 
to  instruct  provincial  governors  to  redress  the  grievance.  C.  Lici- 
nius  Nerva,  governor  of  Sicily,  promptly  acted  on  this  order.  The 
ferment  produced  among  the  slaves  called  forth  a  protest  from  the 
slaveowners,  and  Nerva  ceased  the  work  of  liberation.  Disappoint- 
ment of  hopes  soon  produced  a  rising,  with  which  the  governor, 
having  no  sufficient  force  at  his  disposal,  was  unable  to  cope.    We 

1  See  §  371. 

19 — 2 


292  Second  Sicilian  slave-war  [ch. 

need  not  follow  the  war  in  detail.  It  followed  very  closely  the 
lines  of  the  great  insurrection  thirty  years  before.  A  Syrian  slave- 
king,  professing  to  be  a  prophet,  joined  by  a  warrior  leader  from 
the  West  of  the  island,  the  combination  of  the  two  slave-armies, 
the  defeat  of  Roman  detachments,  the  capture  of  Roman  arms, 
the  bands  of  the  poorer  freemen  engaged  in  brigandage,  all  re- 
peated the  phenomena  of  the  former  war.  But  the  forces  employed 
by  Rome  were  now  more  miscellaneous.  Beside  the  troops  from 
Italy  (not  the  pick,  of  course,)  there  were  auxiliaries  from  Greece 
and  Bithynia,  and  a  Mauretanian  contingent  sent  by  Bocchus. 
The  praetors  who  commanded  in  103  and  102  were  not  able  to 
suppress  the  rising.  Both  were  tried  and  punished  on  their  return 
to  Rome.  Meanwhile  the  state  of  the  province  was  deplorable. 
In  10 1,  after  the  destruction  of  the  Teutoni,  the  affair  of  Sicily 
was  more  seriously  taken  in  hand.  The  consul  M'.  Aquilius,  an 
officer  trained  under  Marius,  was  sent  to  restore  order  in  the  oldest 
province  of  Rome. 

377.  Aquilius  had  no  easy  task.  Devastation  had  gone  so 
far  in  this  granary-province  that  in  some  parts  it  was  necessary  to 
import  corn  and  advance  it  to  the  people  as  a  loan.  But  the  new 
consul  ended  the  war.  He  remained  as  proconsul  to  see  things 
through,  and  returned  to  Rome  in  99.  A  typical  Roman  of  his 
time,  his  better  qualities  were  marred  by  greed.  In  98  he  was 
tried  on  a  charge  of  extortion,  but  escaped,  mainly  through 
appealing  to  evidence  of  his  bravery  in  the  field.  And  now  Sicily 
settled  down  once  more  into  hopeless  acquiescence  in  the  abomi- 
nations of  the  plantation-system.  It  is  said  that  the  war  had  cost 
100,000  lives.  The  dead  would  be  mostly  slaves,  and  the  captives 
in  other  wars  of  this  time  would  find  a  ready  market.  How  Sicily 
was  henceforth  kept  quiet  may  be  gathered  from  the  story  of  what 
once  happened  under  the  administration  of  the  next  governor. 
A  fine  wild  boar  was  sent  to  grace  the  governor's  table.  Inquiry 
shewed  that  it  had  been  killed  by  a  slave-herdsman  with  a  spear. 
It  was  a  strict  regulation  of  the  province  that  no  slave  might  go 
armed.  So  the  governor  stifled  his  compassionate  feelings  (if  any), 
and  at  once  had  the  fellow  crucified. 

378.  In  outlying  parts  of  the  Roman  dominions  there  was 
also  trouble,  but  from  other  causes.  Rome  had  no  standmg  army, 
and  the  forces  at  the  disposal  of  provincial  governors  wei'e  seldom 
adequate  to  deal  with  any  serious  rising  or  invasion.     Spain  had 


xxv]  Troubles  abroad.     Piracy  293 

been  lately  invaded  by  the  Cimbri,  and  the  tribesmen  had  been 
left  unprotected  to  make  their  own  defence.  A  doubt  of  the 
power  of  Rome  either  to  defend  or  to  coerce  her  subjects  prob- 
ably contributed  to  produce  Spanish  rebellions.  Between  102  and 
94  there  were  risings  in  Lusitania  and  in  central  (Celtiberian) 
Spain.  After  fierce  and  brutal  warfare  peace  was  at  length  re- 
stored, but  it  seems  certain  that  the  whole  miserable  business  was 
the  outcome  of  Roman  neglect.  To  look  forward  a  few  years,  we 
may  remark  that  the  old  frontier  troubles  still  harassed  the  Mace- 
donian province.  It  was  indeed  in  these  days  a  department  full 
of  worry  and  danger,  and  a  governor  had  hard  work  to  make  head 
against  raids  and  invasions.  A  little  later,  when  the  hands  of  the 
Roman  government  were  tied  by  the  troubles  in  Italy,  we  find 
C.  Sentius  left  in  charge  year  after  year.  That  he  held  the  pro- 
vince for  Rome  under  great  difficulties  was  probably  due  to  his 
good  government :  for,  when  the  people  of  Macedonia  were  con- 
tented, good  local  forces  could  be  raised  for  defence.  But  one 
of  the  most  serious  questions  abroad  was  the  horrible  state  of 
things  created  by  the  rapid  development  of  piracy  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean. 

379.  Of  the  immense  demand  for  slaves  we  have  seen  proof 
enough.  The  supply  was  partly  met  by  prisoners  taken  in  wars, 
but  its  most  regular  source  was  the  slave-trade,  the  chief  centre 
of  which  was  at  Delos.  Sea-rovers  soon  found  it  profitable  to 
capture  men  by  sea  or  land  and  sell  them  in  the  Delian  slave- 
market,  and  this  form  of  enterprise  put  free  voyagers  and  residents 
on  the  seacoasts  in  constant  danger  of  enslavement.  Rhodes, 
now  the  humble  dependant  of  Rome,  could  no  longer  protect 
sea-borne  commerce  as  of  old.  Rome  kept  up  no  navy  in  time  of 
peace,  and  did  nothing  to  put  down  the  growing  evil  of  piracy. 
No  doubt  many  Roman  capitalists  were  profiting  directly  or  in- 
directly by  the  transactions  at  Delos,  and  in  no  hurry  to  raise  a 
clamour  against  iniquities  on  which  they  throve.  At  last  however 
things  became  so  bad  that  something  had  to  be  doiie.  In  103, 
with  Cimbric  and  Sicilian  wars  still  on  hand,  the  praetor  M.  An- 
tonius  (the  famous  orator)  was  sent  out  with  a  fleet,  doubtless 
chiefly  Greek.  He  did  something  to  check  piracy  for  the  time, 
by  taking  some  pirate  strongholds  in  the  western  or  rocky  Cilicia, 
one  of  their  favourite  haunts.  But  he  did  not  conquer  the  hill- 
country  inland ;  indeed  he  had  no  army  for  that  purpose.     It  may 


294  Eastern  affairs  [ch. 

be  that  a  large  part  of  Asia  Minor  was  nominally  annexed  as  a 
province  Cilicia.  No  real  occupation  took  place,  and  piracy  was 
soon  as  active  as  ever. 

380.     The  Syrian  and  Egyptian  kingdoms  were  now  in  decay. 
Since  the  death  of  Ptolemy  Physcon  in  117,  the  Cyrenaic  province 
had  been  under  a  prince  independent  of  Alexandria.     He  died  in 
96,  and  bequeathed  his  kingdom  to  Rome.     The  Senate,  loth  to 
accept  fresh  responsibilities,  would  not  annex  the  country  as  a 
Roman  province,  but  took  over  the  royal  domains  for  the  sake 
of  the  rents.     The  five  Greek  cities  were  declared  free  states, 
a  shirking  policy  doomed  to  failure.     In  short,  the  slackness  of 
Roman  policy  was  of  itself  enough  to  weaken  the  position  of  Rome 
as  the  leading  power  in  the  East.     But  there  was  also  a  great 
external  change  in  that  part  of  the  world.     The  place  of  the 
Successors  of  Alexander  had   been  taken   by  new  monarchies, 
one  of  which,  in  the  hands  of  an  able  and  ambitious  king,  had 
already  reached  a  degree  of  strength  unsuspected  by  Rome.    This 
was  the  kingdom  of  Pontus,  in  the  northern  part  of  Asia  Minor. 
Bithynia,  dependent  on  Rome,  had  not  a  free  hand.     Between 
it  and  Pontus  lay  the  weak  principalities  of  Paphlagonia,  and  the 
power  further  from  Rome  was  better  placed  for  a  policy  of  absorp- 
tion even  here.     Galatia,  still  tribally  divided,  was  weak  as  a  poli- 
tical unit,  and  its  mercenary  warriors  would  serve  any  master  in 
war.     Cappadocia  was  next  to  Pontus.  and  the  peoples  of  the  two 
were  connected  by  affinity  of  race.     In  the  further  East  were  two 
great  kingdoms.     Of  Parthia,  built  upon  the  ruin  of  the  Seleucid 
empire,  we  have  spoken  above.     It  represented  the  reaction  of 
East  against  West.     For  the  present  it  did  not  count  in  the  im- 
perial calculations  of  Rome.     Nor  in  truth  did  Armenia,  a  wide 
stretch  of  lands  chiefly  mountainous,  from  which  the  Euphrates 
and  Tigris  flow  to  the  South-East.     The  relations  between  these 
two  oriental  monarchies  were  not  always  friendly,  so  the  Armenian 
king  was  not  Ukely  to  provoke  a  quarrel  with  the  king  of  Pontus, 
his  neighbour  to  the  West.     In  all  these  countries,  though  the 
Hellenism  spread  by  the^conquests  of  Alexander  was  no  longer 
poUtically  a   ruling   force,  the   value   of  Greek   talent  and   the 
superiority  of  Greek  civilization  were  recognized,  and  the  events 
that  followed  could  hardly  have  occurred  without  the  cooperation 
of  the  Greeks. 

381.     Mithradates  (Vor  VI)  Eupator  succeeded  his  murdered 


xxv]  Mithradates  295 

father  on  the  Pontic  throne  in  1 2 1  as  a  boy  of  11  or  12  years. 
After  escaping  perils  at  home  he  fled  abroad.  Hardened  by  years 
of  wandering,  he  returned  about  113  and  assumed  the  government. 
His  bodily  strength  and  mental  vigour  were  remarkable,  and  under 
him  the  kingdom,  lately  mismanaged,  soon  began  to  revive.  The 
Greek  colonies  of  northern  Asia  Minor  were  already  many  of  them 
dependent  on  the  Pontic  kings  :  his  father  had  made  Sinope  the 
royal  capital.  But  there  were  other  Greek  colonies  scattered 
around  the  shores  of  the  Euxine  sea,  old  trading  centres,  mostly 
pressed  by  the  barbarous  peoples  at  their  back,  and  willing  to 
welcome  a  powerful  protector.  The  young  king  saw  the  advan- 
tages to  be  gained  by  undertaking  their  defence  and  converting 
them  into  loyal  dependencies  of  his  crown.  Success  would  give 
him  the  control  of  the  Euxine  and  the  mouths  of  navigable  rivers, 
and  enable  him  not  only  to  draw  a  revenue  from  the  Greek  com- 
merce but  to  create  a  powerful  navy  with  the  aid  of  Greek  seamen. 
He  raised  an  efficient  fleet  and  army  of  his  own  under  competent 
Greek  officers.  When  the  Greeks  of  the  Bosporan  (Crimean) 
kingdom,  which  comprised  several  cities  about  the  Cimmerian 
Bosporus  (strait  of  Kertch),  sent  to  beg  his  help,  he  was  ready  to 
appear  as  the  saviour  of  Greek  civilization  in  barbarous  lands. 
By  about  106  he  had  established  himself  as  sovran  protector  of 
these  and  other  Greek  cities,  and  added  their  resources  to  those 
of  his  ancestral  realm.  The  conquest  of  the  south-eastern  sea- 
board from  Colchis  to  the  Pontic  frontier  soon  followed,  and  also 
that  of  the  mountain  district  known  as  Lesser  Armenia.  Mithra- 
dates was  now  strong  enough  to  move  more  boldly,  in  fact  to  make 
trial  of  the  temper  of  Rome. 

382.  In  105  he  drew  Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  into  a  partition 
of  Paphlagonia,  then  into  a  joint  intervention  in  Galatia.  Soon 
the  two  fell  out  over  the  affairs  of  Cappadocia.  Till  then  they 
had  disregarded  protests  from  Rome.  Time  went  by,  and  the 
troubles  in  Cappadocia  at  last  led  the  Senate  to  send  orders  for 
the  evacuation  of  that  country,  about  96  B.C.  Mithradates  then 
induced  Tigranes  of  Armenia  (in  94  or  93)  to  invade  Cappadocia 
and  drive  out  the  new  king  recognized  by  Rome,  Ariobarzanes. 
In  92  Sulla  was  sent  as  propraetor  to  the  so-called  Cilician  pro- 
vince, with  orders  to  restore  the  ejectecl  king,  and  did  so,  supple- 
menting his  weak  force  with  auxiliary  levies.    He  even  pushed  on 


296  Sulla  [cH.  XXV 

to  the  Euphrates,  where  he  met  an  ambassador  from  the  Parthian 
king,  sent  with  friendly  intentions.  Sulla,  it  is  said,  did  not  lose 
the  chance  of  asserting  the  primacy  of  Rome.  Mithradates  thought 
it  wise  not  to  resent  openly  the  thwarting  of  his  designs. .  He 
waited  for  an  opportunity,  perhaps  aware  of  the  coming  struggle 
in  Italy.  Sulla  returned  to  Rome  in  91.  We  must  now  see  what 
had  been  going  on  in  Roman  public  life  during  several  momentous 
years. 


Plate    V 


12.     Coin  of  Mithradates  VI  Eupator,   75  B.C. 
obv.    Head  of  Mithradates. 

rev.    Stag,  feeding,  and  sun  and  crescent  moon,  in  ivy  wreath. 
BA2IAE0S  MIGPAAATOT  ETllATOPOS. 
See  §§  381—2. 


13- 


Coins  of  ItaUan  confederates,   90  B.C. 

{a)   obv.    Head  of  Mars.     VITELIV  {  =  Italia). 

rev.    Four  soldiers  taking  oath  of  alHance. 
{b)   obv.    Head  of  Bacchante. 

rev.    Samnite  bull  goring  Roman  wolf. 

Both  coins  bear  Oscan  inscriptions  and  the  name  of  Papius. 
See  §  402. 


CHAPTER   XXVI 

INTERNAL   HISTORY    104—91  B.C.     • 

383.  While  there  was  so  much  trouble  abroad,  things  were 
not  going  well  in  Rome.  The  struggle  of  factions  continued.  The 
populares,  thanks  to  military  necessities,  overcame  the  optimafes, 
but  neither  side  had  any  consistent  policy  likely  to  remedy  exist- 
ing evils.  Of  the  men  who  came  to  the  front  in  the  years  104 — 
100  as  popular  leaders  connected  with  Marius,  the  most  notorious 
were  Saturninus  and  C.  Servilius  Glaucia.  Roman  tradition  (from 
hostile  sources)  gives  them  both  bad  characters.  Saturninus  in 
truth  seems  to  have  been  a  hasty  demagogue  at  best,  to  some 
extent  an  imitator  of  the  Gracchi,  and  a  violent  opponent  of  the 
Senate.  Glaucia,  a  man  of  lower  type,  had  won  the  favour  of  the 
Equestrian  Order  by  a  law^  on  extortion  in  which  he  had  restored 
to  them  the  control  of  the  jury-courts,  taken  away  from  them  by 
a  previous  law.  Both  were  unscrupulous  mob-orators,  detested 
by  the  nobles.  Among  the  '  best  men '  none  was  more  respected 
than  Metellus,  now  known  as  Numidicus.  He  was  one  of  the 
censors  of  102,  and  would  have  turned  both  Saturninus  and 
Glaucia  out  of  the  Senate,  had  not  his  colleague  refused  his 
consent.  Metellus,  already  hated  by  Marius,  had  now  all  three 
leaders  of  the  'popular'  faction  eager  to  do  him  an  ill  turn. 
And  Rome  was  seething  with  intrigues.  The  various  stories 
shew  that  men  did  not  agree  as  to  the  credit  due  to  Marius  and 
Catulus  respectively  for  the  victory  over  the  Cimbri  in  loi,  or  as 
to  the  motives  of  the  former  in  sharing  a  joint  triumph  with  the 
proconsul  in  whose  province  the  battle  was  fought. 

384.  Marius  had  held  five  consulships.  The  great  emer- 
gency, by  which  the  disregard  of  constitutional  rules  might  be 

^  See  §  356. 


298  .  Position  of  Marius  [ch. 

excused,  was  at  an  end.  He  now  desired  a  sixths  thus  openly 
violating  republican  principles  for  the  sake  of  personal  ambition. 
This  desire  led  him  to  join  forces  with  Saturninus  and  Glaucia. 
Saturninus  had  lately  embroiled  himself  with  the  Senate  more 
than  ever,  by  insulting  an  embassy  from  Mithradates.  But  the 
coalition  triumphed.  Marius  was  elected  consul  for  the  year 
100,  Glaucia  praetor,  Saturninus  tribune.  But  the  elections  were 
stormy.  Blood  was  shed  in  riots,  and  it  is  said  that  Marius  owed 
his  success  partly  to  bribery.  In  the  obscurity  of  our  record  we 
can  detect  that  his  popularity  was  waning.  At  the  back  of  all 
movements  of  the  time  there  was  always  something  likely  to 
remind  citizens  of  the  claims  and  discontent  of  the  x^llies.  They 
were  apt  to  appear  in  Rome  and  bear  a  hand  in  disturbances. 
And  the  jealousy  of  citizens  had  lately  been  revived  by  an  act 
of  Marius.  Some  Allies  had  distinguished  themselves  in  the 
battle  with  the  Cimbri,  and  the  consul  had  promised  them  the 
Roman  franchise  as  a  reward.  He  defended  his  action  on  the 
ground  of  necessity  at  a  critical  moment.  But  there  seem  to 
have  been  about  1000  of  these  men,  and  Roman  jealousy  was 
easily  led  to  think  that  he  had  gone  too  far.  What  with  this 
affair  and  his  association  with  two  noisy  demagogues,  who  only 
agreed  with  the  great  soldier  and  with  each  other  for  their  own 
immediate  ends,  the  position  of  Marius  was  hardly  a  comfortable 
one,  and  the  political  situation  complicated,  not  to  say  dangerous. 
385.  Our  authorities  are  very  onesided,  for  Roman  history 
was  chiefly  written  by  nobles,  or  based  on  their  memoirs :  and 
men  of  the  noble  class  generally  hated  both  Marius  and  Saturni- 
nus. It  is  however  clear  that  Marius  was  now,  thanks  to  his  own 
services,  no  longer  indispensable ;  and  further,  that  he  was  a  failure 
in  political  life.  A  consul  in  Rome  depended  much  on  the  Senate, 
and  the  Senate  disliked  Marius,  both  as  a  '  new  man '  who  over- 
shadowed nobles  of  old  family,  and  for  clumsy  breaches  of  etiquette. 
Moreover  he  made  but  a  poor  figure  in  addressing  the  mob,  being 
no  orator,  and  at  a  loss  among  the  humours  of  mass-meetings. 
Nor  had  he  any  clear  scheme  of  policy.  He  wanted  to  be  popular, 
but  by  submitting  to  be  dragged  along  by  his  associates  he  made 
himself  ridiculous.  Yet  he  could  only  assert  his  own  dignity  by 
suppressing  them,  and  Saturninus  at  least  had  some  sort  of  policy, 
and  was  not  likely  to  take  suppression  tamely.  Before  we  proceed 
to  speak  of  the  measures  in  which  the  three  leaders  jointly  were 


xxvi]  The  Appulelan  laws  299 

concerned,  we  must  again  note  that  no  leader  could  carry  out 
any  considerable  policy  without  an  unconstitutional  continuation 
of  power.  J 

386.  Saturninus  was  the  active  legislator,  and  the  bunch  of 
measures  now  carried  were  named  kges  Appuleiae  after  him.  An 
agrarian  law  dealt  with  certain  lands  in  ,the  North,  occupied  by 
the  Cimbri,  and  recovered  through  their  defeat.  This  land  was 
regarded  as  having  fallen  to  the  Roman  state  by  conquest  (not  to 
the  disturbed  Cisalpine  Gauls),  and  it  was  now  to  be  distributed 
in  allotments  to  Roman  citizens.  The  law  passed.  What  steps 
were  taken  to  carry  it  out,  we  do  not  learn.  As  a  party  move  it 
was  turned  to  account.  In  order  to  prevent  the  Senate  from 
getting  it  annulled  like  the  Gracchan  land-laws,  a  clause  required 
all  senators  to  take  an  oath  to.  observe  it,  on  pain  of  losing  their 
seats  in  the  House  and  being  fined.  But  this  clause  had  also 
a  personal  aim.  The  story  is  that  Marius,  by  declaring  that  he 
would  not  swear,  led  Metellus  Numidicus  to  say  the  same. 
Marius  then  got  out  of  his  promise  by  equivocating,  which  Me- 
tellus was  too  honourable  to  do.  Saturninus  prepared  a  bill  to 
outlaw  the  recusant,  and  Metellus  would  not  let  his  sympathizers 
resist  the  bill  by  rioting.  He  went  into  exile,  and  the  bill  passed. 
Thus  a  great  and  good  noble  was  got  rid  of  for  the  time.  We 
have  no  Marian  version  of  this  affair.  Next  came  a  corn-law, 
reducing  the  price  of  corn  in  Rome  to  a  merely  nominal  figure. 
Already  the  sale  of  corn  below  cost-price  was  a  heavy  burden  on 
the  treasury.  The  city  quaestor  declared  that  it  was  impossible 
to  bear  the  cost  of  the  new  scheme,  and  the  Senate  found  tribunes 
to  block  it.  Neither  this  opposition  nor  a  riot  availed  to  stop  its 
passing.  Another  law  provided  for  the  foundation  of  some  colonies 
outside  Italy,  and  empowered  Marius  to  grant  the  Roman  franchise 
to  three  Allies  for  each  colony  founded.  The  colonial  designs 
were  not  fulfilled,  but  Marius  used  his  powers, — a  good  specimen 
of  the  doings  of  this  period,  and  probably  a  fair  indication  of  the 
sympathies  of  Marius. 

387.  It  is  unfortunate  that  we  have  no  clear  and  certain 
record  as  to  whether  Saturninus  did  or  did  not  carry  a  lex  Appu- 
leia  de  maiestate  establishing  a  standing  court  {quaestio  perpetud) 
for  the  trial  of  persons  charged  with  lessening  the  inherent  great- 
ness {maiestas)  of  the  state.  Trials  for  this  offence  were  common 
enough  later,  and  under  the  Empire  they  were  a  principal  means 


300  Marius  destroys  his  partners  [ch. 

of  repressing  the  freedom  of  literature.  The  term  maiestas  populi 
Romani,  an  undefined  something  which  inferior  confederates  of 
Rome  were  by  treaty  bound  to  uphold,  had  been  in  use  for  cen- 
turies. To  assume  that  a  citizen  had  by  his  own  act  impaired  this 
'majesty'  was  in  effect  to  declare  him  a  public  enemy  {perduellis). 
The  penalty  was  death,  the  court  was  the  Assembly  by  Centuries. 
Now  the  death-penalty  was  out  of  fashion,  and  convictions,  in  all 
but  the  most  flagrant  cases,  very  hard  to  secure.  We  have  seen 
that  the  plan  of  appointing  special  commissions  for  the  trial  of 
particular  cases  was  resorted  to.  If  the  Assembly  by  Tribes,  the 
old  court  for  the  procedure  by  fine-process^  could  so  delegate  its 
powers  to  temporary  courts,  why  should  it  not  do  so  once  for  all 
to  a  standing  court  ?  There  was  no  need  to  abolish  the  old  juris- 
diction of  either  Assembly,  and  certainly  no  such  course  was  taken. 
But  it  seems  on  the  whole  probable  that  a  standing  court  was  set 
up  by  Saturninus,  and  that  the  charges  to  be  brought  before  it 
were  expressed  in  general  terms;  while  the  definition  of  the  various 
acts  to  which  those  terras  properly  applied  was  left  to  grow  up 
gradually,  the  result  of  the  decisions  of  the  court  from  time  to 
time.  This  was  an  improvement,  in  so  far  as  it  was  a  speedier 
and  more  convenient  method  of  dealing  with  cases  of  gross  mis- 
conduct on  the  part  of  public  men  at  home  or  abroad.  But  it 
was  also  a  handy  weapon  to  enable  those  in  power  at  any  moment 
to  ruin  their  adversaries. 

388.  Whatever  was  the  scope  of  the  Appuleian  laws,  the 
means  of  carrying  them  was  force.  The  capitalist  class,  and 
Marius  with  them,  began  to  be  uneasy.  Saturninus  and  Glaucia 
could  no  longer  rely  on  the  consul.  They  resolved  to  fight  for 
their  own  continuance  in  office,  and  to  go  on  without  him. 
Saturninus  was  to  have  a  third  tribunate ;  Glaucia,  though  now 
praetor  and  so  not  yet  eligible,  was  to  be  consul.  But  the 
senatorial  leaders  saw  their  chance  in  the  reaction  of  opinion. 
The  demagogues  had  lost  even  rioting-power  by  estranging  old 
soldiers  who  followed  the  lead  of  Marius.  The  elections  for  99 
were  interrupted  by  grave  disorders.  A  competitor  of  Glaucia 
was  murdered.  Expecting  an  open  attack,  the  two  ringleaders 
got  together  a  band  of  ruffians  and  seized  the  Capitol.  The 
Senate  now  passed  the  '  last  order,'  calling  on  the  consuls  to  save 
the  state,  and  Marius  sulkily  complied.  He  had  to  embody  an 
armed  force  and  crush  his  own  associates.     With  the  help  of  a 


xxvi]  Weak  government  in  Rome  301 

general  rally  of  the  rich  and  their  slaves  he  drove  the  rebels  back 
to  the  Capitol,  and  compelled  them  to  surrender  by  cutting  off 
their  water-supply.  He  is  said  to  have  guaranteed  their  lives, 
but  the  victorious  party  massacred  them.  So  revolution  went 
forward  another  step.  A  democrat  consul  had  become  the  tool 
of  the  aristocrats,  and  made  it  easy  for  them  to  destroy  their 
opponents. 

389.      The  senatorial  nobility  were  for  the  third  time  restored 
to  power.      But  each  revolutionary  shock  left  the  government 
weaker.     Marius  was  the  first  man  in  Rome.     He  had  acted  so 
that  neither  political  faction  could  trust  him,  and  reduced  himself 
to  political  nullity.     He  only  served  to  block  the  way  for  other 
leaders,  and  without  leaders  Senate  and  Assembly  were  alike  in- 
effective.   Great  questions  called  for  settlement,  and  there  was  no 
strong  man  to  deal  with  them.    The  nobles  could  only  drift  along, 
and  make  arrangements  for  their  own  convenience.     It  remained 
the  sad  truth  that  popular  leaders,  so  long  as  they  retained  office, 
could  defy  the  Senate ;  and  that  force,  the  only  means  of  putting 
them  down,  was  more  and  more  taking  the  character  of  civil  war. 
The  power  of  law  was  in  fact  giving  way  to  the  power  of  the'' 
sword.     For  the  present  the  factions  were  concerned  to  see  how 
much  of  the  results  of  recent  movements  they  could  severally 
destroy  or  preserve.     The   Senate  declared  all  or  most  of  the 
Appuleian  laws  invalid,  as  having  been  passed  in  disregard  of 
formalities  and  omens.     But  a  colony  was  founded  in  Corsica, 
apparently  to   silence  and  get  rid  of  some  of  the  troublesome 
disbanded  soldiers  of  Marius.     This  was  the  first  of  the  regular 
military   settlements,   afterwards   a   common    form    of  pensions. 
The  recall  of  Metellus  was  blocked  for  the  present,  but  he  was 
restored  in  98.     At  this  time  we  hear  of  various  trials,  party 
moves,  the  outcome  of  the  doings  of  Saturninus  and  the  reaction 
that   followed.      One  of  them   seems  to   have   been  a  case  of 
maiestas.      If  this  were  so,  surely  Saturninus  had  legislated  on 
the  subject,  and  the  law  had  not  been  annulled. 

390.  In  98  the  aristocrats  made  an  effort  to  revive  some 
of  the  checks  on  the  hasty  action  of  Assemblies.  The  revived 
activity  of  the  tribunate  had  indeed  created  a  real  danger.  Two 
of  the  checks  already  existing  were  ( i )  the  prohibition  of  '  tack- 
ing,' that  is  the  combination  of  matters  unconnected  with  each 
other  in  a  single  bill,  (2)  the  requirement  of  24  days  notice  of 


302  Question  of  the  Allies  [ch. 

public  business.  The  consuls  of  the  year  now  carried  a  law 
{lex  Caecilia  Didia)  stringently  reenacting  both  these  rules. 
With  this  law,  and  the  usual  religious  hindrances,  the  Senate 
hoped  to  regain  much  of  its  former  power.  For  the  time  it 
might  seem  that  this  object  was  attained;  Saturninus  had  alarmed 
the  non-noble  capitalists,  and  the  two  wealthy  classes  could  pull 
together.  But  there  was  no  real  improvement  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  empire.  The  constitution  was  out  of  date,  and  there 
were  no  means  of  reforming  it.  With  great  perils  fast  maturing 
in  Italy  and  the  East,  a  dead  unsatisfactory  time  followed  for  a 
few  years.  Marius  left  Rome  in  98,  glad  to  escape  from  his  own 
blunders.  He  found  an  excuse  for  going  to  Asia  Minor.  His 
enemies  said  that  he  wanted  to  recover  his  importance  by  stirring 
up  a  new  war,  and  that  for  this  purpose  he  provoked  Mithradates 
by  insulting  remarks.  This  may  be  a  slander.  But  his  absence 
from  Rome  is  significant,  and  not  less  so  is  the  fact  that  just  now 
we  hear  nothing  of  the  doings  of  Sulla.  Sulla's  ambition  was  cer- 
tainly not  in  abeyance,  but  we  have  no  reason  to  think  that  he 
had  much  taste  for  politics.  He  was  probably  biding  his  time, 
while  richer  and  weaker  men  led  the  Senate.  In  93  he  was  praetor. 
Of  his  mission  to  the  East  in  92  and  his  return  in  91  we  have 
spoken  above. 

391.  How  far  the  feeling  of  present  security  had  blinded 
the  Roman  nobles  to  the  dangerous  disaffection  of  the  Allies, 
was  proved  by  an  act  of  the  consuls  of  the  year  95.  They  were 
no  ordinary  pair;  L.  Licinius  Crassus  the  famous  orator,  and 
Q.  Mucius  Scaevola,  afterwards  chief  pontiff,  the  greatest  jurist 
of  a  family  famed  for  producing  lawyers.  They  undertook  to 
deal  with  a  trouble  of  long  standing,  the  interference  of  Latins 
and  other'  Allies  in  Roman  Assemblies.  We  have  seen  that 
some  contrived  to  get  enrolled  as  Roman  citizens  without  legal 
right,  and  that  others  bore  a  hand  in  rioting.  These  practices 
were  not  easily  checked.  A  census  was  unavoidably  a  time  of 
hurry  and  some  confusion.  Once  it  was  over,  the  censors  went 
out  of  office.  And  the  police  of  Rome  was  too  inefficient  (there 
being  no  regular  force)  to  act  as  a  firm  and  impartial  preventive 
of  disorder.  What  the  consuls  did,  doubtless  with  the  Senate's 
approval,  and  very  likely  with  the  best  intentions,  was  to  carry 
a  lex  Licinia  Mucia^  of  which  we  know  few  details.  It  seems  to 
have  set  up  a  commission  to  try  cases  of  illegal  assumption  of 


xxvi]  Scandals  in   Rome  303 

Roman  citizenship.  It  is  not  quite  clear  what  was  the  extent 
of  their  powers.  At  least  they  were  able  to  expose  unauthorized 
claims  and  to  compel  offenders  to  revert  to  their  proper  local 
franchises.  It  does  not  follow  that  they  expelled  them  from 
Rome.  Mere  roughs,  who  had  come  to  riot  and  remained  to 
share  the  perquisites  of  citizens  (old  soldiers  probably  many  of 
them),  would  be  sent  back  to  their  homes  without  more  ado. 
The  law  was  evidently  milder  than  previous  acts  of  expulsion. 
Yet  it  caused  the  most  intense  irritation  throughout  Italy.  Times 
had  changed.  The  blood  of  Allies  had  been  freely  shed  for 
Rome  on  the  great  northern  battlefields,  and  after  long  patience 
this  fresh  snub  was  too  much.  Moreover  the  rough  men  sent 
home  were  centres  of  discontent  and  unrest.  Their  return  shewed 
that  the  selfish  mob  and  nobles  of  Rome  would  yield  only  to 
force,  and  the  conviction  spread  that  there  was  nothing  for  it  but 
a  war. 

392.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  on  the  other  stray  details 
which  shew  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  Roman  public  life.  Objects 
of  vice  and  luxury  were  rising  in  price.  We  hear  of  men  shirking 
unattractive  duties,  of  squabbles  over  the  repeal  of  a  sumptuary 
law,  of  trials  involving  much  scandal.  The  case  of  C  Norbanus 
in  95  is  interesting.  As  tribune  in  103  he  had  brought  about  the 
ruin  of  Caepio  on  the  charge  of  embezzling  the  'gold  of  Tolosa.' 
He  was  now  brought  to  trial  by  men  acting  for  the  senatorial 
nobles,  and  the  prosecution  was  strong  in  influence  and  talent. 
But  the  jury  were  capitalist  Knights,  who  had  not  forgotten  how 
Caepio  had  tried  ^  to  deprive  them  of  the  control  of  the  courts. 
Therefore  they  would  not  punish  Norbanus,  and  acquitted  him. 
The  charge  was  pretty  certainly  one  of  maiestas  {minuta),  which 
was  becoming  a  regular  political  weapon.  The  consul  Crassus, 
after  taking  part  in  this  prosecution,  went  off  to  northern  Italy, 
and  tried  to  win  the  honour  of  a  triumph  by  worrying  some  Alpine 
tribes.  But  his  colleague  Scaevola  prevented  the  scandal.  Among 
all  these  signs  of  degeneracy  in  public  men  the  trial  of  P.  Rutilius 
Rufus  stands  out  as  exceptionally  scandalous.  We  have  seen  this 
man  as  a  trusted  military  reformer.  He  was  a  great  lawyer,  and 
a  Stoic,  like  many  Roman  lawyers ;  a  man  of  high  principles,  and 
an  honest  patriot.  In  98,  when  Scaevola  was  governor  of  Asia, 
Rutilius  went  with  him  as  legatus,  and  was  left  in  charge  of  the 

1  See  §  356. 


304  Condemnation  of  Rutilius  [ch. 

province  for  three  months  after  the  propraetor  returned  to  Rome. 
These  two  good  men  by  upright  and  just  administration  upset 
the  calculations  of  Roman  financiers,  who  had  reckoned  on  the 
continuance  of  normal  conditions,  that  is  on  misgovernment 
favourable  to  gross  extortion.  The  capitalist  class  in  Rome  were 
furious.  As  the  pontiff  Scaevola  was  out  of  their  reach,  they 
watched  for  a  chance  of  vengeance  on  Rutilius. 

393.  In  92  Rutilius  was  brought  to  trial  on  a  charge  of 
extortion.  His  innocence  was  notorious.  But  the  Stoic  would 
neither  use  the  services  of  the  leading  orators,  nor  bid  for  pity 
in  the  customary  way.  He  proved  himself  innocent,  and  was  of 
course  found  guilty  by  a  capitalist  jury.  The  whole  of  his  estate 
proved  to  be  far  less  than  the  sum  named  in  the  charge  of  ex- 
tortion. Rutilius  passed  the  rest  of  his  days  in  exile  at  Smyrna, 
in  the  province  that  he  had  not  robbed.  He  gave  himself  to 
study,  and  wrote  on  Roman  history  in  Greek.  To  later  genera- 
tions he  was  a  well-known  name,  a  stock  example  of  unquestionable 
merit  and  public  ingratitude,  and  noble  writers  eagerly  recorded 
the  shame  of  an  Equestrian  jury.  Meanwhile  there  was  a  census 
in  the  year  92,  and  some  bickering  between  the  censors.  They 
agreed  however  in  ordering  the  suppression  of  some  Latin  schools 
of  rhetoric  lately  set  up  in  Rome,  which  they  thought  inferior  to 
those  conducted  by  skilled  Greeks.  But  the  Latin  schools  were 
soon  at  work  again.  Far  more  important  was  the  beginning  of  a 
movement  for  a  change  in  the  constitution  of  the  public  courts. 
This  was  not  in  the  direction  of  appointing  trained  judges  to 
preside.  Without  the  help  of  such  guidance  a  Roman  jury,  even 
if  honest,  was  ever  liable  to  go  wrong  j  but  no  such  help  had  yet 
been  devised.  The  aim  was  to  provide  better  jurors,  if  they  could 
be  found.  The  Equestrian  Order  had  used  their  power  scandal- 
ously; but  they  were  in  possession,  and  not  at  all  inclined  to  give 
up  a  profitable  monopoly.  A  serious  struggle  was  imminent,  and 
in  the  present  state  of  Roman  politics  there  was  a  danger  that  the 
jury-question  might  become  complicated  with  other  issues,  and 
raise  an  unexpected  storm. 

394.  M.  Livius  Drusus,  perhaps  son  of  the  opponent  of 
C.  Gracchus,  a  young  man  of  good  repute,  was  a  tribune  for  the 
year  91.  He  took  up  the  question  of  the  juries  as  an  independent 
politician,  but  from  the  Senate's  point  of  view.  He  had  the  pick 
of  the  House  at  his  back.    But  the  Knights  were  against  him,  and 


xxvij  Drusus  and  his  laws  305 

the  rabble  had  no  special  interest  in  what  did  not  concern  them- 
selves. To  conciliate  the  latter  he  produced  a  bill  for  founding 
some  colonies,  and  another  for  cheapening  corn.  But  his  project 
for  jury-reform  at  once  stirred  up  opposition,  not  only  from  the 
capitalist  body,  but  from  a  part  of  the  nobles.  The  chief  of  these 
was  the  consul  L.  Marcius  Philippus,  once  a  radical  of  commun- 
istic bent,  now  an  obstructive  aristocrat,  passionate  and  ready  of 
tongue.  It  was  evidently  known  that  Drusus  sympathized  with 
the  claims  of  the  Allies.  His  enemies  now  set  going  the  rumour 
that  he  meant  to  enfranchise  the  Italians,  and  so  to  swamp  the 
present  citizens.  Thus  they  appealed  to  the  selfish  populace, 
unwilling  to  share  their  perquisites  with  aliens.  Therefore,  of 
the  two  reforms  for  which  Drusus  really  cared,  the  jury-reform 
and  the  enfranchisement  of  the  Allies,  each  had  to  win  votes  on 
its  own  merits.  If  the  issues  got  confused  by  people  thinking 
of  both  schemes  at  the  same  time  (which  was  inevitable),  the 
unpopularity  of  the  enfranchisement-scheme  would  tell  against 
the  chances  of  carrying  the  reform  of  the  juries.  And  Drusus 
had  not  time  enough  to  meet  his  difficulties.  The  helplessness 
of  a  statesman  holding  office  for  a  year  only  was  shewn  more 
clearly  than  ever. 

395.  The  exact  scope  of  the  jury-bill  is  not  certain.  We  are 
told  that  the  proposal  was  to  add  300  picked  men  of  the  Eques- 
trian Order  to  the  Senate,  and  to  draw  the  jurors  from  the  Senate 
thus  enlarged.  We  also  hear  that  this  plan  pleased  neither  Order. 
Old  senators  did  not  wish  to  be  swamped  by  a  wholesale  creation 
of  new  members.  Knights,  the  rank-and-file  majority  at  least,  did 
not  wish  to  lose  their  present  power  of  safeguarding  their  provin- 
cial investments  by  teaching  governors  to  leave  Roman  capitalists 
a  free  hand.  A  furthe^  proposal  of  Drusus,  intended  to  punish 
jurors  for  taking  bribes,  only  strengthened  the  opposition.  At 
present  the  Equestrian  jurors  claimed  that  the  law  of  C.  Gracchus 
against  judicial  corruption,  being  aimed  at  the  former  senatorial 
juries,  did  not  apply  to  themselves ;  and  only  too  many,  whether 
Senators  or  Knights,  preferred  to  be  the  keepers  of  their  own 
venal  consciences.  So  the  year  wore  on  in  a  scene  of  much 
oratory  and  occasional  violence.  Drusus  was  highly  respected 
as  a  man,  but  losing  ground  as  a  politician.  His  temper  was 
at  times  unequal  to  the  strain  of  the  conflict.  His  enemies  had 
no  scruple  in  charging  him  with  fomenting  Italian  discontents, 

H.  2Q 


3o6  End  of  Drusus  [ch.  xxvi 

while  his  supporters  in  the  Senate  were  worried  and  frightened 
by  the  long  and  bitter  struggle.  The  consul  Philippus  denounced 
them  in  public  meetings.  Drusus  protested  in  the  Senate.  Crassus 
the  orator  backed  him  up  manfully,  but  died  a  few  days  after. 
Drusus  did  not  himself  seek  reelection,  and  the  tribunes  elected 
for  the  year  90  were  men  hostile  to  his  policy.  His  proceedings 
in  the  two  or  three  months  remaining  of  his  own  year  are  obscured 
by  the  defects  of  our  record.  The  following  account  is  an  abstract 
of  statements  derived  from  various  sources. 

396.  It  seems  that  Drusus,  unable  to  draw  back,  was  driven, 
like  other  reformers,  to  extend  his  programme.  We  hear  of  two 
agrarian  bills,  and  of  a  measure  for  debasing  the  currency,  in  the 
vain  hope  of  meeting  some  of  the  deficit  caused  by  the  cheapening 
of  corn.  All  this  was  sheer  demagogy,  and  he  was  now  embarked 
on  a  course  sure  to  alienate  the  Senate,  while  ftie  financiers  were 
against  him,  and  the  city  mob  not  to  be  relied  on.  He  may  have 
been  supported  by  some  non-resident  voters,  but  it  is  probable 
that  he  now  made  a  regular  bargain  with  the  leaders  of  the  Allies. 
Preparations  for  war,  in  case  of  refusal  of  their  claims,  were  already 
far  advanced  in  Italy,  and  Drusus  in  despair  seems  to  have  deter- 
mined to  carry  his  laws  by  force  with  their  help.  At  this  juncture 
a  form  of  oath,  said  to  have  been  taken  by  Drusus  and  the  Italian 
leaders,  binding  both  parties  to  mutual  support,  was  circulated  in 
Rome.  It  was  supposed  to  have  been  published  by  Philippus  to 
discredit  Drusus.  Drusus  could  not  stop  now.  He  forced  through 
a  number  of  his  schemes  in  a  combined  statute,  disregarding  re- 
cent laws  and  bad  auspices.  Philippus  called  a  meeting  of  the 
Senate,  and  the  House  declared  the  lex  Livia  not  binding  on  the 
people.  Drusus  did  not  as  tribune  block  this  order  of  the  Senate, 
but  prepared  to  put  his  franchise-bill  to  the  vote.  Before  he  could 
do  so  he  was  struck  down  by  an  assassin,  probably  an  agent  of 
some  of  the  Roman  capitalists.  So  ended  the  last  of  the  civilian 
reformers,  in  pursuit  of  ends  unattainable  by  peaceful  means. 
We  hear  nothing  of  any  relations  between  him  and  Marius,  nor 
was  any  such  connexion  likely.  The  problems  left  unsolved  by 
Drusus  could  not  be  solved  while  the  Republic  lasted.  The 
question  of  the  franchise  was  at  once  settled  by  the  sword.  Dis- 
banded soldiers  were  scattered  over  Italy,  men  trained  in  recent 
wars,  and  Rome  found  herself  called  upon  to  fight  for  her  existence 
at  a  moment's  warning. 


CHAPTER   XXVII 

THE   GREAT   ITALIAN    OR   MARSIC   WAR  90—87  B.C. 

397.  We  pass  now  to  a  scene  the  full  significance  of  which 
is  not  easily  to  be  grasped  by  minds  prepossessed  with  modern 
political  notions.  We  find  a  great  part  of  the  military  peoples 
of  Italy  in  arms  against  Rome,  and  that  what  they  really  wanted 
was  to  become  Romans.  It  is  certain  that  the  struggle  was  fierce 
and  devastating,  and  that  it  left  behind  it  so  much  smouldering 
discontent  that  it  was  continued  in  the  form  of  a  civil  war.  The 
unceasing  discord  of  Roman  factions  influenced  Roman  policy 
during  the  main  struggle,  and  its  events  reacted  upon  Roman 
factions.  As  to  the  causes  of  the  war  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
but  the  details  of  the  campaigns  are  utterly  obscure.  We  have 
nothing  that  can  be  called  a  continuous  narrative,  even  of  a 
partisan  colour.  Appian,  a  Greek  writer  of  the  second  century 
A.D.,  is  our  chief  witness,  and  his  account  is  meagre  confused  and 
inaccurate.  This  part  of  Livy's  work  is  lost.  So  too  is  the  con- 
temporary history  of  Sisenna.  A  few  details  survive  in  the  stray 
notices  of  other  writers.  But  we  have  enough  evidence  to  prove 
that  the  story  of  this  war  was  not  a  topic  on  which  Roman  pride 
was  tempted  to  dwell.  It  is  possible  therefore  that  our  lack  of 
information  may  be  partly  due  to  Roman  reticence,  and  not 
wholly  to  the  accidental  ravages  of  time.  As  things  stand,  our 
best  help  to  understanding  the  strategic  position  and  the  course 
of  the  war  is  to  be  found  in  good  maps :  for  beyond  all  doubt  a 
great  deal  turned  on  the  situation  created  by  the  political  and 
physical  geography  of  Italy. 

398.  In  former  chapters  we  have  seen  how  Rome  conquered 
the  Italian  peoples  one  by  one,  and  formed  them  into  a  confede- 
racy under  her  own  headship  on  terms  varying  in  the  several 

20 — 2 


3o8  Rome  and  the  Allies  [ch. 

cases,  but  on  the  whole  neither  onerous  nor  unfair.  We  have 
also  seen  how  in  her  earlier  days,  before  she  acquired  an  empire, 
Rome  incorporated  some  of  the  conquered  as  citizens ;  and  how 
these  half-citizens  were  in  course  of  time  admitted  to  the  full 
Roman  franchise.  But  the  Roman  Republic  had  now  long  been 
an  imperial  power,  and  in  Italy  incorporation  had  ceased.  Within 
the  confederacy  Roman  Citizen  and  Ally  were  in  painful  contrast : 
we  have  traced  the  elevation  of  the  one  and  depression  of  the 
other.  We  have  remarked  the  inevitable  growth  of  the  demand 
for  the  Roman  franchise,  and  the  resistance  to  the  claim.  At 
last,  after  long  patient  waiting,  great  hopes  had  been  raised,  and 
then  dashed  by  the  murder  of  Drusus.  But  even  now  the  most 
favoured  class  of  Allies,  the  old  Latin  towns  and  the  Latin 
colonies,  stood  by  Rome.  And  the  Greek  cities  of  the  South 
were  also  loyal.  Indeed  the  services  of  Rome  to  Italy  in  the 
past  had  been  great.  Her  system  had  been  too  strong  for 
the  Gauls,  for  Pyrrhus,  for  Hannibal.  Italy  had  been  enabled 
to  prevent  foreign  invaders  from  ruling  her  destinies.  But  then 
followed  a  time  in  which  a  Roman  empire  was  won,  largely  at 
the  cost  of  Italian  lives.  The  generation  living  in  B.C.  90  might 
know  as  a  tradition  the  services  of  Rome  to  Italy.  Those  of 
Italy  to  Rome  would  be  far  fresher  in  their  memories,  and  they 
had  a  constant  reminder  in  the  presence  of  men  who  had  fought 
with  honour  in  recent  wars.  In  short,  they  knew  their  own  value, 
and  meant  to  compel  Rome  to  receive  them  on  equal  terms. 
Only  in  one  part  of  Italy  can  we  surely  trace  a  grim  desire  for 
the  destruction  of  Rome.  A  shrunken  remnant  of  the  once  great 
Samnite  confederacy  still  kept  the  old  name,  the  old  Oscan 
dialect,  and  much  of  old  tradition  and  habits.  The  dalesmen, 
little  affected  by  the  Romanizing  of  Italy,  were  no  doubt  well 
aware  that  their  valiant  forefathers  had  suffered  many  things  from 
Rome,  and  brooded  over  stories  of  ancestral  wrongs. 

399.  The  change  in  the  Roman  attitude  towards  Allies  gave 
them  a  galling  consciousness  of  their  inferiority.  The  internal 
degeneration  of  Rome  was  meanwhile  no  secret.  If  Jugurtha 
knew  of  it,  so  surely  did  the  Italian  Allies.  This  would  not  tend 
to  make  them  more  contented.  They  could  not  like  the  policy 
of  the  corn-laws,  encouraging  the  growth  of  a  pauper  mob,  whose 
votes  carried  measures  without  regard  to  the  interests  or  feelings 
of  the  Allies.     Still  rebellion  was  not  to  be  lightly  undertaken. 


xxvii]  Loyal  and  rebel  districts  309 

There  must  be  a  reasonable  prospect  that  gains  would  outweigh 
losses.  In  particular  the  wealthier  AUies  in  the  various  com- 
munities were  probably  slow  to  move.  Roman  policy  had  always 
favoured  well-to-do  minorities  in  states  leagued  with  Rome,  and 
the  benefit  of  Roman  domain-lands  granted  to  Roman  con- 
federates was  probably  enjoyed  mainly  by  the  rich.  Now  the 
loyalty  of  these  men  would  be  shaken  by  the  land-laws.  Re- 
sumption of  the  lands  held  in  possession  by  Allies  may  not  have 
gone  far  in  practice :  mere  uncertainty  was  enough  to  create 
irritation.  Therefore,  when  it  became  clear  that  careful  organiza- 
tion was  necessary,  if  rebels  were  to  avoid  the  fate  of  Fregellae, 
leaders  were  forthcoming  to  head  a  combined  revolt.  At  the 
end  of  the  year  91  their  preparations  were  complete.  It  was 
not  the  Allies,  isolated  by  Roman  statecraft,  but  Rome,  distracted 
and  blind  to  her  danger,  that  had  to  face  the  great  crisis  un- 
prepared. 

400.  Want  of  space  forbids  a  full  discussion  of  the  map  of 
Italy,  but  a  few  important  points  must  be  noted.  There  were 
three  large  continuous  blocks  of  territory  held  by  Allies,  in  which 
disaffection  was  rife.  Northern  Etruria  and  Umbria  were  cut  off 
from  the  more  active  centres  of  rebellion  by  a  great  block  of 
territory  reaching  from  sea  to  sea,  which  was  either  Roman  or 
held  by  Latin  colonies  loyal  to  Rome.  In  it  were  imbedded  a 
few  communities  of  Allies,  one  of  which,  Asculum  in  Picenum, 
was  a  hotbed  of  rebellion.  The  desire  of  the  rebels  to  open 
communications  with  Etruria,  and  so  to  extend  the  revolt,  and 
the  determination  of  the  Romans  to  prevent  it,  made  Asculum 
a  place  of  strategic  importance  to  both  sides.  There  was  at  first 
no  open  rising  in  Etruria.  The  districts  mainly  concerned  in  the 
rebellion  lay  East  and  South- East  of  Rome.  The  group  of  hill 
peoples,  Marsi  Paeligni  Vestini  Marrucini,  seem  to  have  been 
still  as  of  old  loosely-federated  cantons.  As  soldiers,  the  men 
of  these  parts  were  the  flower  of  Italy.  Armed  and, trained  on 
the  Roman  model,  they  had  no  superiors  in  battle.  From  the 
Marsi  this  great  struggle  was  commonly  called  the  Marsic  war. 
But  united  action  on  their  part  had  hitherto  been  conducted 
under  Roman  generals  for  Roman  causes :  they  had  now  to  co- 
operate independently.  Further  South  were  the  peoples  whom 
we  may  roughly  call  Samnites.  For  the  Frentani  Hirpini  and 
Lucani  were  of  Samnite  blood  and  sympathies,  though  detached 


3IO 


[CH. 


Map  of  Italy  90  B.C.,  shewing  Roman  territory  in  dark-hatching  (Rome  is 
marked  with  a  cross),  the  Latin  Colonies  of  the  Roman  People  in  black, 
and  the  territory  of  Treaty-states  in  white.  The  dotted  line  AB  is  the 
official  limit  of  Italy  proper,  from  the  Macra  (West)  to  the  Aesis  (East). 
CD  is  the  Ime  from  the  Macra  to  the  Rubicon.  For  the  question  of  the 
advance  of  the  official  limit  see  §  440.  The  map  is  adapted  from  that  in 
Beloch's  Italische  Bund. 


xxvii]  Rome  holds  the  harbours  311 

from  the  reduced  League  that  still  bore  the  famous  name.  These 
peoples  were  spread  over  a  wide  area,  for  the  inland  parts  of 
Lucania  were  still  in  their  hands.  Combination  had  its  diffi- 
culties, for  some  Latin  colonies  and  a  block  held  by  transplanted 
Ligurians  formed  a  territorial  bar  between  the  northern  and 
southern  divisions.  Moreover  the  Latin  colony  of  Aesernia 
watched  the  northern  border,  while  Venusia  stood  in  the  way 
of  joint  action  further  South.  All  the  points  indicated  were  of 
great  strategic  importance  in  the  war.  In  Apulia  there  was  dis- 
content, but  the  presence  of  Samnite  forces  seems  to  have  been 
needed  to  kindle  serious  revolt. 

401.  On  the  other  hand,  the  city  of  Rome  was  shielded  by 
a  large  block  of  friendly  territory.  Southern  Etruria  and  Umbria 
with  Picenum  were  almost  wholly  Roman,  at  least  loyal.  East 
and  South  of  the  city,  beside  a  few  loyal  old-Latin  cities,  were 
the  districts  once  Sabine  Volscian  Auruncan  etc.,  now  all  Roman; 
the  former  peoples  having  either  become  Romans  or  disappeared. 
Northern  Campania  was  either  Roman  domain  or  held  by  colonies. 
The  southern  part  was  mainly  in  the  hands  of  Allies,  but  some 
(as  the  Greek  Neapolis)  were  loyal.  Campania  was  a  chief  seat 
of  war,  for  some  cities  were  drawn  into  revolt  by  the  inroad  of 
a  Samnite  army.  But  by  far  the  greatest  element  of  strength 
in  the  strategic  position  of  Rome  was  the  fact  of  controlling  all 
the  important  maritime  centres.  With  Brundisium,  Tarentum, 
Rhegium,  and  the  ports  of  the  bay  of  Naples,  in  Roman  hands, 
she  was  able  to  prevent  succours  reaching  the  rebels  from  abroad, 
while  she  could  and  did  import  foreign  auxiliaries  herself.  The 
Numidian  horseman,  the  mercenary  bowman  from  Crete,  probably 
the  Balearic  slinger  also,  bore  a  part  in  the  war  for  Rome.  Gauls 
seem  to  have  served  on  both  sides.  Imperial  Rome,  taken  at  a 
disadvantage,  had  to  seek  help  from  any  quarter.  In  the  earlier 
part  of  the  war  it  is  clear  that  the  confederate  rebels  were  able  to 
place  in  the  field  better  armies.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
of  officers  experienced  in  handling  large  bodies  of  troops  Rome 
had  probably  a  far  greater  number;  and  in  case  of  need  there 
were  Marius  and  Sulla. 

402.  Let  us  now  compare  the  political  organizations.  The 
outbreak  of  war  found  the  rebels  equipped  with  a  regular  con- 
federate constitution.  Corfinium  in  the  land  of  the  Paeligni  was 
renamed  Italia  and  made  the  capital.     A  Senate  of  500  delegates 


312  The  confederate  rebels  [ch. 

was  the  governing  body.  There  was  a  select  inner  council  for 
practical  deliberation.  The  magistracy  was  a  copy  of  Roman 
models.  Two  consuls,  each  with  six  praetors  under  him,  were 
to  command  in  the  two  main  theatres  of  war.  Q.  Pompaedius 
Silo  the  Marsian  had  the  northern  department,  C.  Papius  Mutilus 
the  Samnite  had  the  southern.  A  common  coinage  was  struck, 
with  symbolic  figures  :  the  legend  was  according  to  the  prevailing 
dialect,  Latin  for  the  Marsian  district,  Oscan  for  the  Samnite.  In 
short,  the  new  confederacy  presented  an  appearance  of  remark- 
able unity  and  imposing  strength.  Yet  at  this  distance  of  time  it 
should  be  clear  to  us  that  it  was  more  likely  to  be  effective  in 
the  first  rush.  All  would  be  eager  to  win  victories  in  battle.  But 
if  the  war  were  protracted,  and  if  great  sacrifices  had  to  be  made 
for  the  common  cause,  the  interests  and  aims  of  its  various 
members  might  diverge.  The  empire  of  Rome  was  a  property 
of  value.  To  extort  a  share  in  it  was  no  doubt  a  practical 
aspiration.  To  destroy  Rome  was  not  to  win  that  empire,  but 
to  lose  it,  for  the  subject  peoples  obeyed  not  Italy  but  Rome. 
If  Rome  offered  to  make  the  Italians  Romans,  the  rage  of  many, 
having  spent  its  first  fury,  would  be  cooled  by  self-interest.  They 
would  have  gained  their  object,  and  the  stubborn  hatred  of  the 
Samnite  would  be  left  to  fail.  If  the  great  leaders  aimed  at 
founding  a  new  Italian  compound  state,  this  was  surely  an 
ambition  not  likely  to  rouse  an  equal  enthusiasm  in  the  rank 
and  file  of  their  followers. 

403.  The  first  outbreak  of  the  revolt  occurred  at  Asculum. 
A  Roman  officer  was  murdered  and  all  Romans  in  the  town  were 
massacred.  In  a  few  days  the  confederate  rebels  were  in  arms. 
This  seems  to  have  been  at  the  end  of  the  year  91,  immediately 
after  the  death  of  Drusus.  But  even  in  this  hour  of  panic,  with 
a  terrible  war  at  their  doors,  Roman  politicians  did  not  cease 
their  factious  strife.  The  capitalist  influence,  hostile  to  Drusus, 
had  got  the  upper  hand,  and  the  magistrates  for  90  were  all  or 
mostly  in  their  interest  The  tribune  Q.  Varius,  a  half-breed  from 
Spain,  forced  through  a  law  appointing  a  special  commission  to 
try  all  persons  suspected  of  having  caused  the  revolt  of  the  Allies. 
Nobody  who  had  supported  Drusus  was  safe  from  a  charge  of 
treason  {maiestas).  A  few,  such  as  old  Scaurus,  were  acquitted, 
but  many  were  driven  into  exile.  In  the  Senate  too  the  same 
influences  prevailed.     The  House  ordered  the  suspension  of  the 


xxvii]  lex  Varia.      First  campaign  313 

ordinary  law-courts,  while  the  Varian  commission  went  on.  Mean- 
while the  preparations  for  war  were  hastily  made.  An  embassy 
from  the  rebels,  offering  to  negotiate,  was  dismissed  by  the  Senate. 
The  consuls  were  assigned  to  command  in  the  two  chief  seats  of 
war,  P.  Rutilius  Lupus  having  the  northern  department,  L.  lulius 
Caesar  Strabo  the  southern.  To  each  were  attached  five  legati  -, 
among  those  of  Lupus  was  Marius,  while  Sulla  was  with  Caesar. 
The  Varian  court  was  still  sitting  in  Rome  when  the  consuls  set 
out  for  the  front  with  their  armies. 

404.  The  southern  campaign  went  badly  for  Rome.  Aesernia 
was  lost.  A  large  part  of  Apulia  was  won  by  the  rebels,'  who  even 
took  the  great  fortress-colony  of  Venusia.  Mutilus  with  the  main 
Samnite  army  broke  into  Campania,  and  took  town  after  town. 
The  failure  of  the  Roman  forces  may  have  been  exaggerated,  but 
it  is  plain  that  they  could  not  hold  their  own.  And  even  the 
imperial  connexions  of  Rome  had  their  disadvantages.  A  son 
of  Jugurtha,  removed  from  Numidia,  had  been  placed  in  the 
custody  of  the  authorities  of  -Venusia.  There  he  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  rebels,  and  Mutilus,  finding  that  Caesar  had  under 
him  a  Numidian  contingent,  used  the  prisoner  to  entice  them 
to  desert.  The  consul  was  soon  glad  to  send  the  remainder 
home.  In  the  obscurity  of  our  record  we  can  see  that  in  the 
South  Rome  had  lost  ground.  In  the  North  the  Romans  fared 
somewhat  better,  though  they  suffered  grave  disasters.  Party- 
spirit  ran  high,  and  reached  the  camp.  Lupus  suspected  some 
of  his  officers  of  sending  news  to  the  enemy,  and  this  was  a  cause 
of  uneasiness.  Some  of  his  divisional  commanders  were  badly 
beaten,  and  in  a  great  battle  with  the  Marsi  the  consul  himself 
fell.  The  situation  was  saved  by  Marius.  But  Marius,  unpopular 
in  Rome,  and  probably  suspected  of  being  really  in  favour  of  the 
rebels'  claims,  was  not  placed  in  sole  command.  The  Senate 
joined  with  him  Q.  Servilius  Caepio,  one  of  the  chief  opponents 
of  Drusus.  But  Caepio  was  soon  outgeneralled  and  destroyed 
with  a  large  part  of  his  army.  Marius,  at  last  in  supreme  com- 
mand, had  once  more  to  retrieve  the  blunders  of  others,  and 
did  so.  In  some  quarters  of  the  northern  department  the  Roman 
generals  were  more  successful,  in  particular  Cn.  Pompeius  Strabo, 
who  seems  to  have  done  much  fighting,  and  eventually  to  have 
begun  the  siege  of  Asculum.  To  punish  this  town  as  a  warning 
to  others  was  a  main  object  of  the  Romans.     Moreover  it  was  in 


314  ^^^  lulia  90  B.C.  [cH. 

itself  an  important  post,  commanding  as  it  did  the  line  of  com- 
munication between  the  rebels  in  arms  and  the  Umbro-Etruscan 
districts.  A  rising  in  those  parts  was  likely,  and  the  strategy  of 
the  belligerents  was  directed  to  promote  or  prevent  it.  On  the 
whole  the  results  in  the  North  were  something  like  a  drawn  game. 
The  Roman  losses  were  great,  and  the  Senate  had  to  take  special 
measures  to  quiet  the  alarm  in  Rome.  But  Silo,  for  all  his 
victories,  had  not  achieved  his  aim  of  piercing  the  Roman  barrier 
to  the  North.  That  the  services  of  Marius  were  not  valued  as 
they  deserved  was  surely  due  to  party-jealousy.  At  the  end  of 
the  year  he  retired  from  command. 

405.  In  the  winter  of  90 — 89  the  Umbro-Etruscan  Allies 
rose  in  revolt.  The  rising  seems  to  have  been  rather  tardy  than 
deliberate,  prompted  by  news  of  the  Marsian  victories,  and  neither 
hearty  nor  well  organized.  To  draw  in  the  Roman  armies,  and 
stand  on  the  defensive,  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  cause  of 
Rome.  To  carry  on  an  offensive  war  in  northern  Etruria,  when 
so  much  lost  ground  had  to  be  recovered  in  the  South,  was  im- 
possible. The  resources  of  the  Roman  state  were  already  strained 
to  the  utmost.  Some  concession  had  to  be  made,  in  the  hope  of 
thus  detaching  some  of  the  more  lukewarm  rebels  from  the  cause 
of  Mutilus  and  Silo.  Late  in  the  year  90  the  consul  Caesar  came 
to  Rome  to  hold  elections,  and  he  carried  a  lex  lulia  by  which 
the  Roman  franchise  was  offered  to  all  communities  of  Allies  that 
either  had  remained  loyal  or  at  once  laid  down  their  arms.  This 
law,  far  more  than  the  doubtful  victories  dimly  recorded  of  Roman 
forces,  speedily  pacified  Etruria.  Probably  it  also  made  possible 
the  raising  of  recruits  there  for  the  Roman  legions.  But  its 
effects  were  felt  all  over  Italy.  It  now  rested  with  the  several 
communities  to  accept  or  decline  the  concession  which  most 
of  them  were  in  arms  to  extort.  Was  it  worth  while  to  go  on 
shedding  blood  and  laying  waste  the  land  of  Italy,  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  destroying  Rome?  The  advantages  of  becoming 
Romans  were  known  to  all,  and  who  could  suggest  a  better 
alternative?  So  some  accepted  the  offer  at  once,  and  the  re- 
solution of  others  was  weakened.  That  Roman  ingenuity  might 
yet  delay  complete  enfranchisement,  by  juggling  in  the  matter 
of  registration,  was  a  point  not  likely  to  attract  much  attention 
during  the  continuance  of  the  war. 

406.  In  the  campaign  of  89,  obscure  though  the  record  is, 


xxvii]  Second  campaign  315 

the  turn  of  the  tide  is  manifest.  It  was  arranged  that  Sulla 
should  command  in  the  South,  while  both  consuls  operated  in 
the  North.  Of  these  two,  Cn.  Pompeius  was  an  astute  and 
competent  man.  He  had  the  full  confidence  of  the  party  in 
power  at  Rome,  which  Marius  had  lacked.  The  great  success 
of  his  campaign  was  when  he  caught  a  rebel  army  on  its  way 
to  support  the  Etruscan  rising  and  defeated  it  with  heavy  loss. 
Evidently  there  was  at  this  time  a  wish  to  restore  peace  in  these 
parts  by  judicious  treatment  as  well  as  by  victories  in  battle. 
Pompeius  carried  out  this  policy  so  adroitly  that  he  gained  much 
popularity  in  the  northern  districts  as  the  people  gradually  re- 
turned to  their  allegiance.  His  son  Gnaeus,  afterwards  the  great 
Pompey,  was  with  his  father  in  camp.  To  him  the  goodwill 
earned  by  his  father  in  Picenum  was  an  inheritance  of  value  at 
a  later  day.  The  main  struggle  in  the  northern  department 
centred  in  the  siege  of  Asculum.  Great  efforts  were  made  to 
break  up  the  investment,  but  in  vain.  The  Romans  took  it  late 
in  the  year,  and  dealt  severely'  with  their  captives.  Meanwhile 
the  ravages  of  Roman  forces  had  made  the  Marsi  weary  of  the 
war.  We  shall  see  that  a  fresh  concession  on  the  Roman  side 
helped  to  induce  them  and  the  neighbouring  rebel  peoples  to  sue 
for  peace.  SilQ.  withdrew  to  the  South,  and  joined  the  Samnites. 
407.  In  the  South  great  exertions  ^ere  called  for.  A  large 
part  of  southern  Campania  had  to  be  recovered,  and  it  seems 
that  it  was  no  easy  matter  for  Sulla  to  raise  sufficient  forces  and 
maintain  discipline.  Somehow  he  managed  to  hold  his  ground, 
and  to  push  back  the  enemy.  Then  he  fell  upon  the  Hirpini 
and  compelled  them  to  submit.  The  southern  area  of  the  rebel 
confederacy  was  thus  cut  in  two,  and  Sulla  now  delivered  his 
main  stroke.  While  his  divisional  commanders  held  or  gained 
ground  in  Lucania  and  Apulia,  he  burst  into  Samnium,  routed 
the  army  of  Mutilus  with  great  slaughter,  took  towns,  and  stunned 
the  rebel  power  in  its  central  seat.  Even  allowing  for  exaggera- 
tions, it  is  clear  that  Sulla  conducted  his  campaign  with  remarkable 
skill  and  energy.  The  war  was  not  at  an  end,  but  in  the  South, 
as  in  the  North,  the  real  danger  was  past.  The  broken  Samnite 
League  was  no  longer  a  serious  menace  to  Rome.  The  re- 
maining local  conflicts,  such  as  the  siege  of  Nola,  would  be 
decided  in  time,  and  could  only  end  in  one  way.  Meanwhile 
the  movements  of  Mithradates  had  created  an  imminent  danger 


3i6  Three  franchise-laws  [ch. 

in  the  East.  Here  was  a  task  worthy  of  an  ambitious  soldier. 
Sulla  therefore  returned  to  Rome,  bent  upon  winning  the  consul- 
ship and  the  eastern  command. 

408.  Let  us  now  consider  what  was  happening  in  Rome 
during  this  momentous  year  89,  chiefly  the  legislation  that  went 
on  side  by  side  with  military  operations.  And  first  of  the 
franchise-laws.  To  grant  the  franchise  to  loyal  Allies  actually 
fighting  for  Rome  was  an  obvious  step.  A  lex  Calpurnia  con- 
ferred on  Roman  commanders  the  necessary  powers.  To  promote 
disunion  in  the  rebel  ranks  it  was  desirable  to  open  a  way  by 
which  individuals  might  become  Romans.  Thus  some  would 
come  over  at  once,  and  whole  communities,  now  wavering,  would 
be  likely  to  decide  for  peace.  A  period  of  60  days  of  grace  was 
allowed  for  application^  to  be  made  to  a  Roman  praetor.  It  is 
probable  that  the  lex  Plautia  Faptria,  in  which  this  offer  was 
made,  had  something  to  do  with  the  final  pacification  of  the  more 
accessible  peoples,  such  as  the  Marsi.  We  are  told  that  the 
Samnites  and  Lucanians  did  not  receive  the  franchise  at  this 
time.  Probably  the  clauses  of  the  law  were  so  drafted  as  to 
exclude  them :  they  were  still  in  arms,  and  had  as  yet  shewn 
no  sign  of  submission.  Another  question  that  arose  was  the 
treatment  of  Cisalpine  Gaul.  That  district  contained  {a)  citizen- 
colonies,  {b)  citizen  settlers  not  in  colonies,  {c)  Latin  colonies,  to 
which  the  lex  Julia  of  90  applied,  (d)  the  remnants  of  earlier 
inhabitants.  These  last,  particularly  those  South  of  the  Po,  were 
now  a  good  deal  Romanized.  A  lex  Po7?ipeia  of  the  consul  Cn. 
Pompeius  recognized  two  divisions  of  the  country,  Cispadane 
and  Transpadane,  and  treated  the  two  differently.  South  of  the 
Po,  the  non-Roman  population  received  the  franchise,  and  Cispa- 
dane Gaul  became  virtually  a  part  of  Italy.  In  the  Transpadane 
the  new  policy  was  to  choose  or  establish  urban  centres,  to  which 
batches  of  Gaulish  neighbours  were  severally  attached  in  sub- 
ordinate relations.  Each  city  had  the  constitution  and  privileges 
of  a  Latin  colony,  and  a  Romanizing  process  under  municipal 
conditions  was  effectively  promoted.  In  point  of  form  the  great 
Cisalpine  district  seems  to  have  remained  in  an  anomalous 
position.  It  was  neither  strictly  a  part  of  Italy,  nor  yet  a 
province.  To  this  matter  we  shall  have  to  return  in  a  later 
chapter. 

1  See  §  418. 


xxvii]  Effect  delayed  in  practice  317 

409.  These  laws  gave  to  certain  persons  or  classes  of  persons 
certain  rights.  But  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  Roman  civitas  did 
not  at  once  place  a  man  in  a  Roman  Tribe,  still  less  in  a  Century. 
And  a  citizen  could  only  vote  as  a  member  of  one  of  these  groups. 
Now  the  vote  was  desired,  not  as  a  privilege  to  be  often  used  by 
voters  dwelling  at  a  distance  from  Rome,  but  as  a  weapon  useful 
in  times  of  agitation,  as  a  means  of  preventing  the  passage  of 
measures  likely  to  injure  the  interests  of  non-residents.  Naturally 
the  new  citizens  were  wanting  to  know  in  what  groups  they  would 
be  enrolled  as  parts  of  the  Roman  community.  This  was  a  matter 
for  censors.  But  in  this  time  of  disturbance,  with  Italy  in  dis- 
order, it  was  no  doubt  a  matter  of  much  delicacy  and  difficulty, 
not  to  be  easily  despatched  in  a  hurry.  For  the  old  citizens  had 
to  be  considered,  and  they  feared  that  the  new  ones  might  outvote 
them.  Many  would  be  found  to  deprecate  hasty  action,  and  on 
plausible  grounds.  The  course  followed  was  truly  Roman.  There 
were  censors  in  the  year  89,  and  they  did  some  censorial  work. 
Surely  they  were  appointed  partly  to  carry  out  the  urgent  regis- 
tration, for  it  was  not  five  years  since  the  census  of  92.  But  no 
registration  took  place.  At  this  point  our  record  fails  us  utterly. 
Some  temporary  arrangement  seems  to  have  been  devised  now 
or  soon  after.  What  it  was  we  can  only  guess,  so  obscure  and 
conflicting  are  the  notices  of  our  authorities.  Two  inferences 
may  fairly  be  drawn  :  the  plan  adopted  was  found  unsatisfactory, 
and  it  was  not  long  in  force.  It  is  certain  that  the  franchise- 
agitation  continued  to  be  a  cause  of  friction  and  embarrassment 
for  several  years.  Piecemeal  concessions,  dimly  recorded,  shew 
that  it  became  a  question  of  party  politics  within  the  Roman 
state.  That  the  new  citizens  were  impatient  of  Roman  delays 
we  may  safely  assume.  For  what  really  ended  the  Italian  re- 
bellion was  the  belief  that  Roman  pride  had  at  last  stooped  to 
a  bona  fide  concession  of  equal  rights.  And  without  a  place 
in  a  Tribe  there  was  no  voice  in  legislation  :  without  a  place  in 
a  Century  there  was  no  voice  in  the  elections  of  consuls  and 
praetors,  and  therefore  (for  leading  men)  no  real  chance  of  being 
elected.     Discontent  was  inevitable  under  such  conditions. 

410.  Party-feelings  were  running  high  in  Rome.  We  can 
trace  three  parties  among  the  wealthier  classes,  from  whom  the 
politicians  were  drawn.  These  were  the  capitalist  Knights  and 
two  sections  of  the  nobility,  the  one  favouring  the  concessions, 


3i8  Troubles  and  intrigues  in  Rome  [ch. 

and  including  former  supporters  of  Drusus,  the  other  consisting 
of  stiff-necked  men,  resolved  to  concede  as  little  and  as  slowly 
as  possible.  The  first  had  to  bear  the  odium  of  the  Varian 
commission,  the  second  had  lost  some  of  their  best  members 
through  the  action  of  that  court.  The  favourable  turn  of  the 
war  strengthened  the  third  party,  to  which  Sulla  belonged.  A 
law  passed  in  this  year  (89)  is  a  sign  of  the  change  in  the  balance 
of  forces.  By  it  the  Knights  were  for  the  moment  deprived  of 
their  monopoly  of  the  public  jury-courts.  A  new  elective  system, 
in  which  the  yearly  list  {album)  of  qualified  jurors  was  made  up 
of  1 5  members  from  each  Tribe,  took  its  place.  This  lex  Plautia 
iudiciaria  marks  a  reaction,  but  the  capitalist  party  were  strong, 
and  the  law  was  only  in  force  for  about  two  years.  Another 
troublesome  matter  was  the  scarcity  of  ready  money.  Public  and 
private  finances  were  upset  by  the  war,  and  a  law  reducing  the 
weight  of  the  copper  as  to  \  ounce  {semuncia)  can  hardly  have 
eased  things  much.  Debtors  pressed  by  creditors  found  a  pro- 
tector in  the  praetor  Asellio.  Then  the  capitalists,  enraged  at 
official  obstruction,  murdered  the  praetor,  and  nobody  was 
punished  for  it. 

411.  The  consular  election  for  88  expressed  the  situation  so 
far  as  the  Centuries  were  concerned.  SuUa  and  Q.  Pompeius 
Rufus  were  elected.  This  Pompeius  was  a  man  of  the  same 
political  colour.  But  the  Tribes  elected  among  the  tribunes 
P.  Sulpicius  Rufus,  a  young  Patrician  who  had  become  a 
Plebeian  for  the  purpose.  He  was  one  of  the  concessionist 
nobles,  and  meant  to  push  on  the  enfranchising  policy.  It 
was  necessary  for  him  to  coalesce  with  the  capitalist  party,  and 
for  this  coalition  a  figure-head  was  wanted.  The  place  was 
filled  by  Marius.  Marius  was  now  about  68,  and  his  enemies 
called  him  worn  out.  They  derided  his  efforts  to  display  his 
vigour.  But  he  thirsted  for  a  seventh  consulship,  or  at  least 
for  the  command  against  Mithradates.  This  he  hoped  to  gain 
by  joining  Sulpicius.  The  recall  of  exiles,  and  the  complete 
equalization  of  old  and  new  citizens,  were  the  programme  re- 
sulting from  this  notable  bargain,  in  which  Marius  certainly  had 
the  best  of  it.  Sulpicius  set  to  work,  and  carried  his  laws  by 
sheer  force  of  armed  men.  Sulla  had  drawn  the  lot  for  the 
eastern  command.  Sulpicius  forced  the  Tribes  to  transfer  it 
from   the   consul   to    Marius,  a   private   citizen.     This   conduct 


xxvii]  Marius  Sulpicius  and  Sulla  319 

was  openly  revolutionary.  Sulla  went  off  to  his  army  before 
Nola.  He  had  the  real  power,  for  trained  armies  now  belonged 
to  their  general,  not  to  the  state.  Marius,  the  chief  creator  of 
such  armies,  must  have  been  blind  to  fancy  for  a  moment  that 
he  could  take  such  an  army  from  such  a  man  by  means  of  a 
forced  popular  vote  in  Rome.  The  other  consul,  who  had  fled 
with  Sulla,  was  probably  deprived  of  his  command  in  the  northern 
department.  There  was  still  work  to  be  done  there,  and  Cn. 
Pompeius  was  kept  in  charge  as  proconsul. 

412.  Sulla's  army  scorned  the  orders  from  Rome,  and  he 
set  out  for  the  city  with  six  devoted  legions.  All  attempts  to 
stop  them  were  futile.  Thus  early  in  88  B.C.  Rome  was  for  the 
first  time  invaded  by  a  Roman  army.  Marius  Sulpicius  and 
others  could  not  even  stay  tho^nset  of  the  troops  in  a  street- 
fight,  though  they  invited  the  help  of  slaves.  They  fled  for  their 
lives,  and  Sulla  at  once  had  them  outlawed,  with  a  price  set  on 
their  heads.  Sulpicius  was  murdered ;  Marius,  after  hairbreadth 
escapes  and  many  hardships,  managed  to  reach  Africa.  For  the 
moment  Sulla  was  supreme.  But  for  a  permanent  tyranny  things 
were  not  ripe ;  and  to  stay  at  home,  and  send  someone  else  to 
assert  the  dominion  of  Rome  in  the  East,  would  lead  to  dangerous 
consequences,  whether  the  substitute  succeeded  or  failed.  So  he 
resolved  to  patch  up  things  in  Rome,  and  go.  What  his  temporary 
arrangements  were  in  detail  is  very  uncertain.  He  seems  at  least 
to  have  tried  to  strengthen  the  Senate  by  a  law  requiring  all  bills 
to  have  the  sanction  of  the  House  before  being  offered  to  the 
vote  of  the  Tribes.  The  Assembly  by  Centuries  was  in  some 
way  modified  so  as  to  give  more  power  to  the  rich,  evidently 
as  a  check  upon  the  election  of  revolutionary  magistrates.  The 
Senate  was  filled  up  by  adding  300  new  members,  chosen  sup- 
porters of  the  aristocratic  party.  But  all  these  changes  could 
only  be  lasting  if  the  leading  men  were  strong.  When  Sulla 
sent  ofl"  his  army  to  Capua  on  the  way  to  embark  for  Greece, 
the  sulky  resentment  of  the  people  revived.  At  the  consular 
election  for  87  he  carried  one  aristocrat,  Cn.  Octavius,  as  consul; 
L.  Cornelius  Cinna,  a  Patrician,  but  of  the  opposite  faction,  gained 
the  other  place.  In  repealing  the  acts  of  Sulpicius,  Sulla  had 
restored  his  own  colleague  Q.  Pompeius  to  the  command  in  the 
North.  But  the  men  of  the  northern  army  would  not  have  him. 
He  was  murdered  in  a  mutiny,  and  Cn.  Pompeius  resumed  the 


320  The  situation  as  left  by  Sulla      [ch.  xxvii 

command.  Such  was  the  state  of  things  Sulla  was  leaving  behind 
him.  But  he  went  through  the  farce  of  binding  Cinna  by  solemn 
oaths  not  to  upset  arrangements  recently  made,  and  set  out  for 
the  East  early  in  87. 

413.  The  civil  warfare  and  revolutionary  doings  in  Rome 
during  the  year  88  were  only  possible  because  the  Italian  rebellion 
had  ceased  to  be  really  dangerous.  But  Italy  was  still  far  from 
being  at  rest.  In  the  North  there  were  uneasy  movements  among 
the  smaller  peoples,  and  an  army  of  observation  had  to  be  em- 
ployed. In  the  South  another  force  was  at  work  recovering 
Apulia.  The  Samnites  and  Lucanians  were  still  in  arms.  Silo 
the  Marsian  reorganized  the  Samnite  forces  and  held  his  ground 
till  the  Roman  armies  closed  in  upon  him,  and  he  fell  in  battle. 
So  the  war  died  out,  and  we  cease  to  hear  of  Italian  armies  as 
such  holding  the  field.  But  we  do  not  hear  of  any  formal  sub- 
mission and  pacification  of  the  stubborn  remnant  of  the  rebels. 
It  is  said  that  in  their  latter  days  of  depression  they  sent  an 
embassy  to  beg  the  aid  of  Mithradates.  But  the  Great  King 
now  had  his  hands  full,  and  the  ill-matched  combination  never 
took  effect.  After  the  death  of  Silo,  open  resistance  to  Rome 
was  at  an  end,  save  for  a  few  minor  affairs  such  as  the  siege 
of  Nola.  The  general  situation  in  several  parts  of  Italy  seems 
to  have  been  a  sort  of  uneasy  truce,  with  masses  of  discontented 
people  awaiting  developments.  Many  districts  had  suffered  from 
the  wasteful  ravages  of  war.  On  the  side  of  Rome,  a  change 
had  come  over  the  spirit  of  her  armies.  The  departure  of  Sulla 
removed  the  pick  of  the  Roman  troops,  doubtless  nearly  all  of 
them  old  citizens.  In  the  forces  left  behind,  the  ranks  were 
largely  filled  with  new  citizens  hastily  enrolled,  probably  far  more 
interested  in  securing  their  own  equal  rights  as  Romans,  than 
willing  to  wait  patiently  for  a  suitable  moment  to  assert  their 
claims.  Rome,  torn  by  faction,  needed  a  little  breathing-space 
to  settle  down  and  face  the  difficult  problems  of  the  hour.  But, 
with  things  in  the  state  in  which  Sulla  had  left  them,  such  a 
respite  would  have  been  a  miracle. 


CHAPTER    XXVIII 

MARIUS   AND   CINNA    87—86  B.C. 

414.  Italy,  full  of  dissatisfaction  and  unrest,  sadly  needed 
good  and  firm  government  under  a  great  lea:der.  Time  alone 
could  assuage  resentments.  But  there  was  much  to  be  done  at 
once,  if  things  were  to  settle  down  peaceably,  and  there  was  no 
one  to  do  it.  The  aristocrats,  left  by  Sulla  in  precarious  posses- 
sion of  power,  had  no  strong  man  to  lead  them.  Their  adversary 
Cinna  had  much  ambition  and  enterprise ;  he  speedily  proved 
that  he  had  neither  scruples  nor  real  capacity.  His  oath  of 
course  went  for  nothing.  He  at  once  produced  bills  to  recall  the 
men  outlawed  by  Sulla,  and  to  distribute  new  citizens  and  freed- 
men  among  all  the  35  Tribes.  An  open  conflict  with  the  mass 
of  old  citizens,  headed  by  his  colleague  Octavius,  ended  in  his 
having  to  fly  from  Rome.  The  Senate  voted  him  a  public 
enemy,  no  longer  consul,  and  had  a  harmless  man  of  their  own 
colour  elected  in  his  stead.  Such  a  step  could  only  have  been 
effective  if  followed  up  with  vigour,  but  vigour  was  just  what  these 
reactionary  nobles  lacked. 

415.  Cinna  was  not  the  man  to  be  put  down  by  votes. 
Sulla  had  taught  him  the  way  to  deal  with  Rome.  He  set  out  on 
a  tour  to  rally  the  new  citizens.  First  he  gained  the  support  of 
the  army  in  Campania,  then  of  a  number  of  cities,  where  the 
ex-Allies  welcomed  him.  After  picking  up  other  partisans,  he 
was  able  to  march  on  Rome  with  a  numerous  army.  In  the 
absence  of  Sulla  the  acting  government  was  weak,  but  they 
prepared  to  defend  the  city.  Not  being  able  to  raise  enough 
troops  by  their  own  exertions,  they  sent  for  Cn.  Pompeius  and  his 
army.  But  Pompeius  dallied.  He  was  not  really  in  favour  with 
either  faction,  and  seems  to  have  been  inclined  to  play  a  game  of 

H.  21 


32  2  Return  of  the  Marians  [ch. 

his  own.  His  slow  movements  gave  time  for  Cinna  to  organize 
his  forces,  and  for  other  combatants  to  appear.  Among  Cinna's 
supporters  were  Cn.  Papirius  Carbo,  an  active  and  turbulent 
partisan,  and  Q.  Sertorius,  an  officer  who  had  done  good  service, 
particularly  under  Marius.  Above  all,  Marius  himself  started 
from  Africa  and  landed  in  Etruria.  He  had  a  few  ships,  and 
quickly  raised  troops  among  the  new  citizens,  and  some  planta- 
tion-slaves also.  What  followed  may  be  called  the  Marian 
revolution,  for  Marius  was  the  chief  figure.  The  advance  on 
Rome  was  made  in  three  divisions.  A  battle  between  Sertorius 
and  Pompeius  was  indecisive,  and  therefore  in  favour  of  the 
assailants.  The  army  of  Pompeius  did  not  care  for  the  cause  of 
the  old  citizens,  and  discontent  spread  in  the  ranks.  Marius 
took  Ostia,  and  cut  off  the  city's  supply  of  corn.  Meanwhile  the 
Senate  was  hoping  for  aid  from  the  South,  where  there  were  still 
Italians  who  had  been  conquered  by  force  of  arms,  but  had  not 
as  yet  been  allowed  to  benefit  by  the  franchise-laws.  They  were 
now  offered  the  Roman  citizenship.  Metellus  {Fius,  son  of 
Numidicus\  who  commanded  an  army  of  observation  in  those 
parts,  was  ordered  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Samnites  and  march 
to  the  relief  of  Rome.  It  seems  that  the  Samnites  demanded  a 
guarantee  that  enfranchisement  should  mean  perfect  equality,  and 
that  Metellus,  in  heart  opposed  to  the  concession,  refused  to  give 
it.  So  the  Samnites  joined  the  Marian  side.  Metellus  led  a 
small  force  to  Rome;  but  the  aid  from  the  South  was  quite 
insufficient,  and  expected  reinforcements  from  the  North  were 
held  in  check  by  detachments  of  Marians. 

416.  Within  the  city  there  was  a  lack  of  cooperation  between 
the  leaders  which  soon  proved  fatal.  Pompeius  was  not  in 
earnest,  but  his  death  (perhaps  murder)  removed  a  bad  adviser. 
His  men  were  deserting.  Octavius,  a  refined  and  scrupulous 
patriot,  would  not  resort  to  desperate  measures,  such  as  arming 
slaves.  Metellus  would  not  take  command  so  as  to  supersede 
the  consul.  The  troops  passed  over  to  the  enemy,  and  food  was 
scarce.  Cinna's  terms  had  to  be  accepted.  He  was  reinstated 
in  the  consulship,  and  allowed  to  enter  Rome  on  the  faith  of  a 
mere  promise  to  shew  all  possible  mercy.  He  at  once  made  the 
Assembly  repeal  the  outlawries  enacted  under  Sulla.  This  done, 
Marius  consented  to  appear  in  the  city.  Octavius  as  consul 
waited  for  his  murderers;  Metellus  got  away  safe  to  Africa.    Then 


xxviii]  Cinna.      Financial  crisis  323 

began  the  massacres  in  which  Marius  took  revenge  for  his  past 
slights  and  sufferings.  With  a  gang  of  slaves  he  went  about 
Rome  indicating  victims,  who  were  cut  down  at  once.  The 
pursuit  and  murder  of  marked  men,  among  them  old  Antonius 
the  orator,  informations,  treacheries,  betrayals,  were  long-remem- 
bered episodes  of  this  horrible  time.  We  hear  that  there  were 
also  touching  instances  of  loyalty,  even  among  slaves,  and  that  as 
yet  it  was  not  a  Roman  practice  to  procure  a  citizen's  death  in 
order  to  get  his  property.  But,  after  at  least  five  days  of  murders, 
Cinna  and  Sertorius  found  means  to  destroy  the  ruffians  of 
Marius  and  stop  the  slaughter.  Sulla  was  now  declared  a  public 
enemy,  his  property  confiscated,  his  laws  annulled.  Marius  and 
Cinna  were  elected  consuls  for  the  next  year  (86),  now  close  at 
hand.  The  old  soldier  was  worn  out,  and  on  the  Ides  (13th)  of 
January  he  died.  Everything  the  Marians  had  done  had  been 
effected  by  fear  and  use  of  the  sword.  It  now  remained  for 
Cinna  to  shew  whether  he  could  give  a  practical  and  lasting  turn 
to  the  revolution. 

417.  Cinna  took  L.  Valerius  Flaccus  as  his  colleague  in 
place  of  Marius.  Among  the  reversals  of  recent  policy  we  may 
note  the  repeal  of  the  Plautian  law,  and  consequently  the  rein- 
statement of  the  Knights  in  control  of  the  public  courts.  But 
the  m.ost  serious  internal  trouble  at  the  moment  was  the  financial 
crisis.  Not  only  had  events  upset  the  money-market  and  destroyed 
credit :  the  Mithradatic  war  had  stopped  remittances  from  Asia 
and  produced  a  panic  in  capitalist  circles.  A  law  was  carried 
enabling  debtors  to  discharge  their  liabilities  by  paying  2570 
of  the  sums  owed.  So  desperate  a  remedy  could  not  really 
restore  credit,  and  the  financial  stringency  remained.  Political 
troubles  were  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  money  was  being  with- 
held from  circulation.  The  state  chest  suffered,  and  among  the 
efforts  made  to  fill  it  prosecutions  for  alleged  embezzlement  found 
a  place.  The  bad  state  of  the  currency  made  matters  worse. 
Bad  denarii  had  become  common  since  the  foolish  act^  of  Drusus, 
and  of  course  the  bad  drove  out  the  good.  The  money-changers 
alone  profited  by  this  state  of  things.  Something  had  to  be  done 
to  relieve  the  distress.  Tribunes  and  praetors  united  to  effect  a 
reform,  by  assaying  the  pieces  and  withdrawing  the  bad  ones 
from  circulation.     The  cost  of  this  reform  seems  to  have  fallen 

1  See  §  396. 

21— -2 


324  The  census  of  86  B.C.  [ch.  xxviii 

on  the  treasury,  but  it  was  a  good  move,  and  assaying  became  a 
regular  profession. 

418.  Another  urgent  matter  was  the  registration  of  the  new 
citizens.  In  86  there  were  censors,  again  before  the  period  of 
five  years  had  expired.  This  time  the  registration  was  carried 
out  somehow,  but  very  little  is  known  about  it.  Probably  the 
new  citizens  were  distributed  over  the  35  Tribes.  But  we  are  not 
to  assume  that  an  equal  number  were  put  into  each  Tribe :  that 
is  very  unlikely.  And  it  was  incomplete.  One  known  hindrance 
was  the  carelessness  of  the  praetors  whose  duty  it  had  been  to 
receive  applications^  under  the  law  of  89,  and  who  had  not  kept 
perfect  lists.  But  the  prospects  of  the  present  government  were 
clouded  by  the  news  from  abroad.  Sulla  was  gaining  wonderful 
victories.  Cinna  was  naturally  anxious.  He  wanted  to  guard 
against  the  danger  of  the  bold  outlaw's  return.  The  first  thing 
to  be  done  was  to  recover  the  control  of  the  veteran  army,  and 
Cinna  was  so  blind  to  the  lessons  of  experience  that  he  fancied 
himself  able  to  remove  Sulla  from  the  command  of  his  devoted 
troops.  He  sent  out  a  force  under  the  consul  Flaccus,  a  worthless 
fellow,  with  the  rough  soldier  C.  Flavius  Fimbria  to  guide  him. 
We  shall  see  what  came  of  this  absurd  project.  Meanwhile 
Cinna's  chief  associate  was  Carbo.  The  pair  assumed  the  consul- 
ships for  two  years  (85  and  84)  in  advance.  Constitutional 
government  was  in  abeyance  at  home.  Let  us  see  what  Sulla 
was  doing  in  the  East. 

1  See  §  408. 


CHAPTER   XXIX 

SULLA   IN    THE   EAST   87— 84  B.C. 

419.  We  have  seen  how  Mithradates  Eupator  took  advantage 
of  the  weakness  or  jealousies  of  neighbouring  powers  and  of  the 
reluctance  of  Rome  to  engage  in  distant  wars.  He  had  now  a 
large  empire,  a  full  treasury,  and  a  strong  fleet  and  army  under 
able  Greek  officers.  His  opportunity  for  further  aggression  came 
in  90,  when  Rome  had  her  hands  full  with  the  Italian  war.  No 
doubt  he  was  well  informed  of  the  wretched  state  of  the  province 
Asia,  which  was  being  bled  to  death  by  Roman  extortioners. 
There  he  could  appear  as  a  welcome  deliverer,  for  the  small 
Roman  force  kept  in  the  province  to  overawe  the  subjects  was 
quite  inadequate  for  its  defence.  He  set  a  pretender  on  the 
Bithynian  throne  and  reoccupied  Cappadocia.  No  Roman  force 
could  be  spared  to  restore  the  ejected  kings,  but  an  embassy  was 
sent  to  insist  on  their  restoration.  Mithradates  still  shrank  from 
open  war,  and  obeyed  for  the  moment.  But  the  sequel  shewed 
how  private  greed  was  apt  to  spoil  the  effect  of  Roman  diplomacy. 
M'.  Aquilius,  the  head  of  the  embassy,  was  avaricious,  and  his 
colleagues  probably  men  of  the  same  type.  Bribes  were  exacted 
from  the  restored  kings :  the  kings  had  to  borrow  from  Roman 
financiers.  Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  was  hard  pressed  by  his 
creditors,  till  he  was  driven  to  make  a  raid  into  Pontic  territory 
for  booty  to  satisfy  their  claims.  Mithradates  had  now  what  he 
wanted,  a  good  pretext  for  war.  He  could  gain  no  redress  by 
negotiation,  and  about  the  end  of  89  B.C.  hostilities  began. 

420.  The  foolish  miscalculations  of  the  Romans  were  soon 
exposed.  Their  inadequate  and  divided  forces,  mostly  raised  in 
Asia  Minor,  were  routed  and  scattered.  The  cities  of  Asia  (the 
province)  mostly  joined  the  king,  who  paraded  the  country  with 


326  Mithradates  and  the  Greeks  [ch. 

his  captive  Aquilius,  and  put  the  unlucky  man  to  death  at 
Pergamum.  At  sea  he  was  equally  successful.  The  Roman 
fleet  at  Byzantium  was  taken  or  scattered,  and  many  of  the 
islands  surrendered :  the  Aegean  was  commanded  by  the  Pontic 
navy,  and  communications  between  Italy  and  Asia  were  now 
practically  severed.  Rome  declared  war  in  88.  We  have  seen 
above  the  causes  that  delayed  effective  action,  and  left  Mithra- 
dates free  to  extend  his  designs.  A  few  maritime  republics,  such 
as  Rhodes  Byzantium  Cyzicus  and  Heraclea  Pontica,  stood  by 
Rome.  But  there  was  no  Roman  fleet  within  reach,  and  they 
were  helpless.  The  king's  first  move  was  to  procure  a  general 
massacre  of  the  Romans  in  Asia.  It  is  said  that  some  80,000 
thus  perished,  and  the  provincials  were  thereby  committed  to 
his  cause.  For  the  moment  he  remitted  some  taxes,  and  was 
a  popular  master;  but  the  people  were  in  fact  his  slaves.  He 
next  tried  to  conquer  Rhodes,  but  was  beaten  off".  Still  he  was 
supreme  at  sea.  He  knew  the  value  of  gifted  Greeks,  and  posed 
as  patron  and  champion  of  Hellenism.  So  he  resolved  to  make 
himself  master  of  the  old  Hellas,  and  chose  Athens  as  the  centre 
of  his  influence.  A  Professor  in  one  of  the  philosophic  schools 
served  as  his  agent,  and  the  dreamy  University  town  was  seduced 
from  its  alliance  with  Rome.  Hopes  of  a  revival  of  ancient 
glories  were  easily  aroused.  A  nominal  democracy  was  restored, 
in  effect  a  tyranny  under  the  Professor  Aristion^  who  raised  money 
by  the  plunder  of  the  rich.  Athens  was  now  a  dependency  of 
the  Pontic  empire,  and  her  possessions  were  occupied  by  the 
Pontic  fleet.  In  Delos  and  other  islands  another  great  massacre 
of  Romans  took  place.  The  Piraeus  and  Athens  were  held  by 
Pontic  garrisons,  and  most  of  the  Greek  states  were  induced  to 
declare  for  Mithradates. 

421.  But  little  help  was  to  be  got  from  the  Greek  states  in 
their  decay.  So  a  second  armament  was  sent  to  cooperate  with 
the  first.  This  force  made  descents  on  the  Thessalian  coast, 
but  was  checked  by  the  energy  of  C.  Sentius  the  long-resident 
governor^  of  Macedonia.  The  two  Pontic  armies  concentrated 
in  Boeotia.  At  this  point  Sulla  appeared  with  his  army  (season 
of  87)  and  the  enemy  fell  back  on  Athens  and  the  Piraeus.  The 
two  cities  were  separate,  for  there  were  now  no  Long  Walls.  Sulla 
began  the  siege  of  both.     But  he  needed  a  fleet  for  the  work  in 

^  See  §  378. 


xxix]  Chaeronea.     Orchomenus  327 

prospect,  and  sent  L.  Licinius  Lucullus  to  raise  one  among  the 
friendly  navkl  powers  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean.  The  Great 
King  dallied  at  Pergamum,  while  Sulla  was  changing  the  face  of 
things  in  Greece.  After  a  first  repulse  from  Athens,  he  renewed 
the  siege  in  the  winter  of  87 — S6,  while  the  Marians  were  holding 
Rome,  and  a  new  and  larger  Pontic  army  was  on  its  way  from 
the  North.  Even  the  news  of  his  outlawry  did  not  turn  him 
from  his  purpose.  He  defied  both  the  enemy  and  the  home 
authorities,  knowing  that  his  army  was  all  his  own.  Athens  at 
last  fell,  and  after  vast  efforts  the  Piraeus  also,  all  but  its  citadel 
Munychia.  This  too  was  abandoned  when  the  Pontic  force 
moved  away  by  sea  to  join  the  new  army  in  Boeotia.  Near 
Chaeronea  Sulla  brought  them  to  battle.  Fighting  against  great 
odds  ( I  to  4  or  more),  the  well-handled  veterans  utterly  routed 
the  king's  motley  host.  Mithradates  was  furious  at  the  news 
from  Greece,  and  made  ready  another  large  army.  To  fight  the 
Romans  at  a  distance  from  his  base  was  a  costly  undertaking. 
But  he  had  good  reasons  for  wishing  to  keep  them  busy  in  Greece. 
By  his  despotic  and  barbarous  acts  he  had  angered  the  Galatians, 
and  caused  much  discontent  in  Asia.  Ephesus  and  some  other 
cities  even  revolted.  By  his  cruelties  in  those  that  he  reconquered, 
and  by  a  general  policy  of  putting  the  city  governments  in  the 
hands  of  a  rabble,  paupers  or  aliens  or  liberated  slaves,  he 
destroyed  all  order  and  ruined  the  rich.  Such  a  patron  of 
Hellenism  was  the  Great  King  of  Pontus. 

422.  In  the  year  86,  after  the  battle  of  Chaeronea,  the 
Roman  army  under  Flaccus  and  Fimbria  appeared  in  northern 
Greece.  Sulla  went  to  meet  them,  but  they  did  not  feel  able 
to  face  him.  After  some  loss  by  desertions,  they  went  on  to 
Asia  by  way  of  Macedonia.  Sulla  turned  back  to  deal  with  the 
Pontic  armies,  now  once  more  concentrated  in  Boeotia.  Early 
in  85  he  defeated  them  with  great  slaughter  near  Orchomenus. 
Meanwhile  the  government  army  reached  Asia  Minor,  and 
Lucullus  had  at  last  raised  a  fleet  and  returned  to  the  Aegean. 
Mithradates  had  now  to  face  the  attack  of  two  Roman  forces 
acting  independently.  Fimbria,  who  murdered  Flaccus  and  took 
his  place,  defeated  the  king's  army  in  Asia.  He  called  upon 
Lucullus  to  close  in  with  his  fleet  and  capture  the  chief  enemy. 
Lucullus  refused,  and  the  king  escaped  by  sea.  In  a  sea-fight 
off  Tenedos  the  Roman-Greek  fleet  gained  a  great  victory  over 


328  Peace.     Sulla  in  Asia  [ch. 

that  of  Mithradates,  mainly  due  to  the  skill  of  the  Rhodians. 
Rome  now  had  the  upper  hand,  and  Mithradates  began  to 
negotiate  with  Sulla.  At  first  he  would  not  accept  Sulla's  terms, 
though  these  were  moderated  by  Sulla's  anxiety  to  get  back  to 
Italy.  Sulla  marched  northwards,  and  employed  the  time  of 
waiting  in  chastising  frontier  tribes  and  restoring  order  in  Mace- 
donia. Then  he  went  on  to  Asia  Minor.  At  a  meeting  with  the 
king  at  Dardanus  in  the  Troad  Sulla's  terms  were  accepted. 
Fimbria  did  not  give  much  trouble.  He  was  isolated,  having 
no  fleet ;  his  men  deserted  to  Sulla,  and  he  killed  himself.  The 
peace  of  Dardanus  was  a  restoration  of  the  status  quo.  Mithra- 
dates had  to  give  up  all  his  acquisitions,  and  be  content  with  his 
kingdom  as  it  stood  before  the  year  90.  There  were  the  usual 
surrenders  and  stipulations  in  favour  of  allies.  The  war-indemnity 
was  moderate,  for  Sulla  was  in  a  hurry  to  return. 

423.  It  was  necessary  to  resume  possession  of  Asia,  evacuated 
by  Mithradates.  No  treaty-clauses  could  prevent  Sulla  from 
punishing  cities  that  had  been  disloyal  to  Rome.  Moreover 
he  wanted  money  for  the  task  still  before  him.  He  exacted 
sums  so  enormous  that  many  communities  were  forced  to  mort- 
gage their  public  property.  For  the  ready  money  required  had 
to  be  borrowed  from  Roman  capitalists,  who  flocked  to  reap  the 
rich  harvest  of  usury.  The  richest  of  the  Roman  provinces 
entered  on  a  period  of  poverty  hopelessly  encumbered  with  debt. 
The  winter  of  85 — 84  was  a  season  of  peculiar  misery.  Sulla's 
army  wanted  a  rest,  and  he  put  them  into  winter  quarters  in 
provincial  cities  at  the  cost  of  the  inhabitants.  No  burden  borne 
by  Roman  subjects  was  so  dreaded  as  this.  And  the  present  case 
was  doubtless  an  extreme  one,  for  the  soldiers,  ever  prone  to 
outrage  the  households  on  which  they  were  billeted,  knew  that 
punishment  was  intended.  Most  of  Sulla's  administrative  arrange- 
ments were  sound,  and  long  remained  in  use.  But  the  working 
of  them  was  corrupted  as  before  by  the  financial  interests  of 
Roman  investors,  and  a  happy  time  for  Asia  was  far  ofl".  Sulla 
was  too  busy  or  indifferent  to  deal  with  another  evil  by  which 
the  coasts  and  islands  of  the  Aegean  were  suffering  great  losses. 
Piracy,  encouraged  by  recent  disorders,  had  increased  and  was 
increasing.  Sulla  ignored  it.  As  an  army  of  occupation  he  left 
in  Asia  the  Fimbrian  legions,  with  L.  Licinius  Murena  in  command, 
and  crossed  the  sea  to  the  Piraeus  in  the  season  of  84  b.c. 


xxix]  Athens.     Sulla's  return  329 

424.  Sulla  and  his  army  wintered  in  Greece.  There  was 
much  to  be  done  at  Athens  and  elsewhere,  and  the  preparations 
for  his  return  to  Italy  in  defiance  of  the  Marians  had  to  be  made 
with  care.  He  was  interested  in  Greek  arts  and  letters,  and  at 
Athens  he  came  upon  a  literary  treasure,  which  he  transferred  to 
Rome.  This  was  a  collection  of  the  most  important  works  of 
Aristotle,  long  supposed  lost,  but  lately  rediscovered.  But  Sulla's 
favourite  companions  were  actors  and  musicians.  There  were  in 
Athens  also  various  Romans,  driven  out  of  Italy  by  disgust  at  the 
government  of  Cinna  and  Carbo.  Among  them  was  a  young  and 
wealthy  man  of  Equestrian  rank,  T.  Pomponius  Atticus.  This 
man  is  notable  for  the  part  played  by  him  during  all  the  later 
period  of  revolution  and  civil  wars.  He  early  learnt  to  take 
neither  side  in  a  quarrel,  but  to  help  men  in  their  time  of  trouble 
and  earn  their  goodwill  in  case  they  returned  to  power.  Atticus 
gained  the  favour  of  Sulla,  and  used  his  influence  on  behalf  of 
the  Athenians.  He  helped  them  over  pressing  difficulties  by 
lending  money  to  the  state  on  reasonable  terms,  but  he  wisely 
insisted  on  punctual  repayment.  He  became  immensely  popular 
in  Athens,  and  lived  there  more  than  20  years.  Sulla  invited  him 
to  return  to  Italy,  but  his  Epicurean  temperament  made  him  prefer 
to  keep  out  of  the  stormy  politics  of  Rome.  Early  in  83  Sulla 
safely  landed  his  army  at  Brundisium.  He  was  well  received,  but 
he  had  not  more  than  40,000  men.  But  the  army  was  a  real  one, 
and  the  prestige  of  his  luck — the  luck  of  which  he  always  boasted 
— was  a  force  of  incalculable  value.  His  veterans  swore  to  stand 
by  him,  and  they  made  ready  to  face  great  odds.  In  the  last  two 
years  he  had  sent  despatches  to  the  Senate,  ignoring  his  outlawry. 
He  protested  against  the  acts  of  the  Marian  party,  and  gave 
warning  of  the  redress  that  he  would  exact  on  his  return.  But 
he  shewed  his  insight  into  the  situation  of  affairs  in  Italy  by 
announcing  that  he  did  not  intend  to  reverse  the  enfranchisement 
of  the  new  citizens.  Thus  he  sought  to  weaken  or  remove  an 
apprehension,  natural  enough,  and  to  pave  the  way  for  detaching 
new  citizens  from  the  Marian  cause. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

CINNA,   CARBO,  AND    SULLA  85—82  B.C. 

425.  In  the  year  85  the  dominant  faction,  led  by  Cinna, 
were  above  all  things  anxious  to  retain  their  power,  and  we  know 
that  they  had  still  two  years  in  which  to  prepare  for  the  impending 
struggle.  But  they  were  never  able  to  inspire  general  confidence 
and  organize  Italy  as  a  Roman  whole.  In  the  Southern  parts 
men  were  still  in  arms.  Romans  of  rank  were  slipping  away, 
either  to  join  Sulla  or  to  hide  in  Africa  or  Spain.  At  home  the 
Senate  was  uneasy,  distrustful  of  the  ruling  Marians,  but  loth  to 
oppose  them,  for  fear  of  a  massacre.  All  that  Cinna  and  Carbo 
could  do  was  to  raise  troops,  but  they  could  not  raise  enthusiasm 
for  their  cause,  or  provide  able  and  inspiring  leaders.  If  the 
Marians  meant  to  hold  their  ground,  a  Man  was  wanted,  and  was 
not  forthcoming.  To  drift  into  civil  war  for  sheer  lack  of  plans 
and  rational  vigour,  was  the  worst  of  political  crimes.  Cinna  was 
weak  enough  to  let  the  Senate  negotiate  with  Sulla,  but  meanwhile 
he  went  on  forming  armies.  He  contemplated  taking  the  offensive 
against  Sulla,  and  began  to  send  troops  over  the  Adriatic.  But 
the  men  did  not  like  the  prospect  of  a  civil  war  abroad.  In  a 
mutiny  at  Ancona  Cinna  was  killed  early  in  the  year  84,  and 
Carbo  was  left  sole  consul. 

426.  The  Roman  government  had  never  been  in  worse 
hands.  Carbo  would  not  provide  himself  with  a  colleague.  The 
Senate  was  for  the  time  helpless,  under  a  consul  obstinate  without 
firmness,  and  rash  without  the  nerve  to  meet  emergencies.  Sulla's 
reply  to  the  Senate's  conciliatory  offers  was  alarming.  He  sneered 
at  a  guarantee  of  safety,  and  made  it  plain  that  he  meant  to  effect 
a  revolution  on  his  own  lines  by  the  aid  of  his  army.  He  repre- 
sented not  only  himself,  but  numbers  of  exiles  and  refugees :  a 


CH.  xxx]         Policy  and  success  of  Sulla  331 

general  restoration  of  properties  and  privileges  was  a  part  of  his 
demand,  to  be  enforced  by  the  sword.  Carbo  and  the  Senate  no 
longer  pulled  together.  That  the  importance  of  the  new  citizens 
was  recognized,  is  clear  from  an  obscure  record  of  an  attempt 
to  please  them  by  some  concession  at  this  juncture.  This  was 
probably  a  countermove  to  the  reassuring  message  of  Sulla, 
referred  to  above.  Whatever  it  may  have  effected,  in  the  way 
of  attaching  the  discontented  to  the  Marian  cause,  was  neutralized 
by  the  blundering  of  the  Marian  leaders.  The  consuls  elected 
for  83,  L.  Cornelius  Scipio  Asiaticus  and  C.  Junius  Norbanus, 
were  active  men,  but  unequal  to  the  crisis.  Carbo  went  to  the 
Cisalpine  as  proconsul,  to  raise  another  army.  Sertorius,  the  one 
good  officer  they  had,  was  kept  in  the  background.  In  short,  for 
want  of  a  strong  directing  head,  they  were  putting  their  trust  in 
numbers.  Far-sighted  men  began  to  detect  signs  of  their  coming 
failure.  Such  was  Carbo's  quaestor  C.  Verres.  He  robbed  the 
military  chest  and  went  off  to  Sulla. 

427.  The  government  could  not  rely  on  the  unanimous 
support  of  Italy.  For  instance,  the  long-Romanized  district  of 
Picenum  needed  watching.  Sulla  was  free  from  such  anxieties, 
and  was  undoubted  master  in  his  own  camp.  At  Brundisium  he 
was  joined  by  Metellus  with  a  force  from  Africa.  Stray  refugees 
rallied  to  him  as  the  news  of  his  return  spread.  Among  his 
partisans  was  M.  Licinius  Crassus,  who  had  been  through  many 
adventures.  Most  cheering  was  the  arrival  of  young  Cn.  Pompeius 
with  three  legions  raised  in  Picenum.  And  all  accessions  to  his 
numbers  meant  genuine  accessions  of  strength.  With  able  and 
loyal  lieutenants  and  soldiers  devoted  to  his  cause,  he  pushed  on 
boldly.  He  defeated  Norbanus  in  Apulia,  met  Scipio  in  northern 
Campania,  and  by  sham  negotiations  gained  time  to  corrupt  his 
half-hearted  troops.  The  consul's  army  went  over  to  him  in  a 
body.  Sertorius,  disgusted  with  these  failures,  went  away  to  his 
province  in  Spain.  So  far  Sulla  had  done  well.  But  the  Marian 
forces  in  the  field  were  still  far  more  numerous  than  his  own. 
The  fear  that  he  would,  if  victorious,  annul  the  privileges  of  the 
new  citizens  had  enabled  Carbo  to  raise  immense  armies  in  the 
North.  Therefore  he  employed  the  winter  of  83 — 82  in  negotiating 
with  various  new-citizen  communities,  probably  the  Marsi  and 
other  peoples  of  that  group.  It  is  said  that  he  concluded  with 
them  a  regular  treaty,  pledging  himself  not  to  disturb  them  in 


^^2  Collapse  of  the  Marians  [ch. 

their  privileges.  Of  the  Samnites  we  hear  nothing  at  present. 
They  were  probably  watching  events ;  at  least  they  did  not  come 
to  terms  with  Sulla. 

428.  The  real  tug  of  war  came  in  the  campaign  of  82.  On 
the  way  to  Rome  Sulla  met  an  army  commanded  by  the  younger 
Marius.  At  a  spot  called  Sacriportus  a  stubborn  fight  ended  in 
a  SuUan  victory,  partly  the  result  of  desertions.  Samnites  among 
the  prisoners  were  butchered.  Marius,  who  was  now  consul  with 
Carbo,  fled  with  a  remnant  to  Praeneste.  He  sent  orders  to 
Rome  for  the  murder  of  some  nobles  known  to  be  in  favour  of 
Sulla.  Among  those  who  were  thus  put  to  death  was  the  great 
lawyer,  the  chief  pontiff  Scaevola.  Sulla  left  a  force  to  besiege 
Praeneste,  and  pushed  on  to  Rome.  The  chief  Marians  fled,  so 
he  placed  partisans  of  his  own  in  charge,  and  hastened  northwards. 
Metellus  Pompey  and  Crassus  were  at  work  in  Picenum  and 
Umbria,  gaining  ground.  Carbo  met  Sulla  in  Etruria,  but  could 
gain  no  decisive  success.  South  and  North,  the  Marian  cause, 
for  all  its  great  armies,  was  failing.  Neapolis  was  taken  by  a 
SuUan  force ;  the  Cisalpine  was  invaded  and  won.  The  efforts 
to  relieve  Praeneste  failed.  Treachery  began  to  play  a  leading 
part  in  the  war.  Norbanus  escaped  to  Rhodes,  only  to  commit 
suicide  later,  in  order  to  avoid  extradition.  Carbo  himself  left 
his  army  and  fled  to  Africa.  The  main  strength  of  opposition 
to  Sulla  lay  in  the  desperate  valour  of  a  great  Samnite  and 
Lucanian  army,  whose  hostility  was  not  so  much  to  Sulla  as  to 
Rome.  With  the  addition  of  some  remaining  Marians,  they  may 
have  been  80,000  strong,  led  by  Pontius  Telesinus,  perhaps  a 
descendant  of  the  old  hero  of  the  Caudine  Forks.  Foiled  in 
other  directions,  they  suddenly  marched  on  Rome.  Sulla  was 
only  just  in  time  to  meet  them  in  battle  outside  the  walls  by  the 
CoUine  Gate.  This  fierce  struggle  was  a  fitting  close  to  a  bloody 
drama.  Sulla's  own  wing  of  the  army  was  beaten,  but  that  under 
Crassus  was  completely  victorious.  Not  till  midnight  was  it  certain 
that  Rome  was  saved. 

429.  Sulla  took  a  short  way  with  those  whom  he  regarded 
as  rebels.  Samnites  were  slaughtered  in  thousands.  The  Senate, 
alarmed  by  their  shrieks,  were  requested  to  attend  to  the  business 
of  the  House.  After  the  fall  of  Praeneste,  and  the  suicide  of 
Marius,  the  same  course  was  followed.  With  the  exception  of 
some   sparks   of  local   resistance,  the  civil  war  had  now  been 


xxx]  Sulla  supreme  333 

stamped  out.  There  was  still  work  to  be  done  in  some  of  the 
provinces.  But  to  all  appearance  the  Marian  party,  the  champion 
of  the  new  citizens,  the  opponent  of  the  senatorial  nobility,  was 
so  crushed  that  it  could  never  revive.  We  shall  see  that  this  was 
not  really  so.  Taking  Rome  and  Italy  together  (for  Rome  had 
practically  absorbed  Italy)  the  party  crushed  by  Sulla  were  a 
majority.  We  shall  see  that  the  non-noble  capitalists  were  in 
general  Marian,  and  this  class  represented  the  most  united  and 
consistent  influence  in  Rome.  To  suppress  them  was  beyond 
the  power  even  of  a  Sulla.  The  present  ruin  of  the  Marian  cause 
was  due  to  the  lack  of  a  sound  condition  of  politics.  There  was 
no  great  leader  in  the  state,  no  one  man  able  to  give  loyalty  and 
cohesion  to  the  armies.  On  the  other  side  there  was  a  master, 
under  whom  willing  and  capable  men  worked  in  effective  harmony. 
Victory  at  once  made  the  outlawed  Sulla  supreme  in  the  Roman 
world.  That  the  Republic  as  a  form  of  government  was  helpless, 
and  a  monarchy  inevitable,  was  probably  not  yet  understood.  But 
in  viewing  the  course  of  events  from  a  distance  of  many  centuries 
we  can  see  that  this  was  the  truth. 


CHAPTER    XXXI 


SULLA   82—78  B.C 

430.  We  have  seen  how  the  change  of  circumstances  in  the 
Roman  Republic,  political,  military,  economic,  moral,  had  placed 
one  man  in  an  autocratic  position.  We  are  now  to  see  how  the 
character  and  temperament  of  this  one  extraordinary  man  reacted 
on  circumstances,  how  he  dealt  with  the  problems  of  the  time, 
and  what  kind  of  solutions  he  offered.  Whether  Sulla  saw  that 
things  were  not  ripe  for  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy  in  Rome, 
we  do  not  know,  nor  does  it  matter.  That  he  did  not  want  to 
take  up  such  a  permanent  burden  of  responsibility,  is  certain. 
When  he  had  crushed  opposition,  and  restored  the  Senate  to 
something  like  its  old  power,  adding  various  practical  reforms  to 
remove  some  known  abuses,  he  had  done  enough.  Back  he 
went  to  his  pleasures :  if  his  logical  machine  was  doomed  to 
break  down,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  its  chief  part,  he  could  not 
help  it.  His  abdication  surprised  his  contemporaries,  and  in- 
terested later  generations.  Indeed  it  is  a  strange  story,  but  to 
Sulla  it  was  a  natural  step.  He  was  the  same  man  from  first  to 
last,  and  he  died  in  his  bed. 

431.  Murders  following  the  massacre  of  prisoners  were  a 
cause  of  alarm  in  Rome.  Sulla  consented  to  relieve  anxiety  by  a 
regulated  procedure.  A  notice-board  briefly  gave  a  list  of  names 
of  persons  doomed  to  die.  Rewards  were  offered  for  killing  or 
betraying  any  of  those  '  posted  '  {proscripti) ;  to  hide  or  protect 
them  was  forbidden  under  severe  penalties.  But  supplementary 
lists  were  soon  posted.  The  strain  of  uncertainty  was  terrible 
enough,  but  we  are  told  that  over  4000  names  actually  appeared 
on  the  lists.     Under  the  terror  and  temptations  Roman  society 


CH.  xxxi]  Proscription  335 

for  the  time  broke  down.  None  knew  whom  to  trust,  relative  or 
friend,  free  or  slave.  Old  moral  principles  were  no  longer  a  part 
of  Roman  life,  influencing  all  Romans;  family  ties  were  weaker. 
The  best  were  powerless  to  save  their  dearest :  the  worst  could 
pay  off  old  grudges  or  profit  by  others'  ruin  :  it  was  the  villain's 
hour.  The  proscription  developed  as  days  went  by.  Murder 
first,  and  posting  afterwards,  was  one  of  the  improvements.  Next 
it  was  found  convenient  to  post  the  name  of  one  murdered  before 
the  proscription  began,  so  as  to  insure  indemnity  for  a  stale  crime. 
Catiline,  afterwards  notorious,  is  said  to  have  done  this  to  hush 
up  the  murder  of  his  own  brother.  But  sheer  greed  of  gain  was 
a  powerful  motive,  giving  horrid  effect  to  the  proscription.  Of 
course  it  fell  almost  entirely  upon  men  of  property ;  and  the 
sharing  of  plunder,  particularly  the  chance  of  buying  up  con- 
fiscated estates  at  a  fraction  of  their  value,  was  a  great  temptation. 
Buyers  would  be  scarce,  for  to  appear  possessed  of  ready  money 
was  itself  a  danger.  Among  the  speculators  who  throve  on  the 
bargains  made  at  this  time  was  Crassus,  the  millionaire  of  Cicero's 
time.  As  the  majority  of  the  Knights  had  been  on  the  Marian 
side,  they  furnished  a  great  number  of  victims.  We  shall  see 
that  Sulla  tried  to  get  rid  of  them  as  an  Order,  that  is,  to  undo 
the  work  of  C  Gracchus. 

432.  So  murders  and  confiscations  went  on  without  mercy 
or  shame.  Sulla  coolly  spoke  of  the  forfeited  property  as  his 
booty  {praeda)  or  prize  of  war,  and  presided  at  sales  by  auction. 
Among  the  vile  creatures  whom  he  rewarded,  the  most  dreaded 
and  hated  was  his  favourite  Greek  freedman  Chrysogonus.  Romans 
were  indeed  slaves  when  they  had  to  fawn  on  freedmen.  But 
there  was  small  prospect  of  any  reversal  of  the  confiscations. 
Too  many  influential  people  were  directly  or  indirectly  interested 
in  securing  their  possession  of  ill-gotten  gains.  The  terror  was 
kept  up  by  signal  acts  of  cruelty  and  revenge.  A  relative  of 
Marius  was  caught  and  sacrificed  by  a  slow  death  at  the  tomb  of 
Catulus,  who  had  been  driven  to  escape  the  Marian  massacres  in 
87  by  suicide.  The  ashes  of  old  Marius  were  cast  into  the  river 
Anio,  and  his  Cimbric  trophies  pulled  down.  These  are  only 
specimens.  And  the  proscriptions  spread  all  over  Italy.  Fugi- 
tives were  hunted  down,  and  men  suffered  in  country  towns, 
either  as  notorious  Marians,  or  merely  to  enable  a  Sullan  partisan 
to  seize  a  desirable  estate.     That  refugees  were  not  safe  abroad 


336  Sulla  Felix  [ch. 

we  have  seen^  above.  None  dared  to  provoke  Sulla.  But  Sulla 
was  a  Roman,  with  a  Roman  turn  for  formalities.  At  what 
precise  stage  of  his  proceedings  he  ceased  to  act  simply  as 
conqueror,  and  began  to  legalize  his  position,  is  not  clear.  His 
outlawry  had  doubtless  been  cancelled,  but  he  was  now  a  pro- 
consul who  had  entered  the  city  without  special  leave,  and  had 
thereby  lost  his  imperium.  He  soon  procured  confirmation  of 
his  past  acts  as  consul  and  proconsul,  and  perhaps  a  law  con- 
ferring on  him  full  powers.  A  more  perfect  commission  was  to 
follow.  Meanwhile  he  paraded  his  claim  to  be  regarded  as  the 
favoured  of  fortune  by  assuming  the  additional  surname  of  Felix. 
Twins  were  born  to  him :  he  named  them  both  '  lucky '  {Faustus 
and  Faustd).  He  shared  the  common  superstition  of  the  age  in 
this  matter. 

433.  Even  in  the  Provinces  there  was  no  strong  opposition 
to  the  fortunate  Sulla.  He  sent  a  praetor  to  turn  Sertorius  out 
of  Spain,  and  for  the  present  Sertorius  had  to  go.  Of  the  corn- 
provinces,  important  to  a  ruler  of  Rome,  Sardinia  had  been 
recovered.  Sicily  and  Africa  were  held  by  Marian  governors, 
and  the  resident  Roman  capitalists  seem  to  have  been  on  the 
Marian  side.  Among  the  fugitives  in  those  parts  was  the  consul 
Carbo,  who  raised  a  fleet  in  Africa  and  proceeded  to  Sicily. 
Hiarbas  king  of  Numidia  was  induced  to  support  their  cause  in 
Africa.  Sulla  sent  young  Pompey  to  remove  these  obstacles  to  a 
general  peace.  No  doubt  the  state  of  Italy,  much  devastated  by 
years  of  active  or  smouldering  war,  was  a  special  reason  for 
prompt  attention  to  the  great  food-producing  countries.  Despite 
his  age  (24),  Pompey  was  invested  with  imperium  and  placed  in 
full  command.  He  was  required  to  divorce  his  present  wife  and 
marry  a  step-daughter  of  Sulla.  This  he  did,  and  so  became  a 
connexion  of  the  great  autocrat.  The  proceeding  would  not 
seem  so  strange  to  Romans,  who  generally  married  oif  their 
children  with  view  to  the  best  bargain,  as  it  might  to  us.  But 
the  case  of  another  young  man  offered  a  curious  contrast.  Gaius 
lulius  Caesar,  one  of  the  old  Patrician  lulii,  was  doubly  con- 
nected with  the  Marian  leaders.  He  was  married  to  Cinna's 
daughter  Cornelia.  His  aunt  lulia  had  been  the  wife  of  the 
elder  Marius  and  mother  of  the  younger.  He  was  of  course  in 
great  danger,  but,  when  ordered  to  put  away  Cornelia,  he  refused. 

1  See  §  428. 


xxxi]  The  new  dictatorship  337 

Sulla  was  with  difficulty  persuaded  to  spare  him.  He  is  said  to 
have  told  the  intercessors  that  the  pleasure-loving  and  attractive 
youth  had  in  him  the  making  of  a  more  dangerous  person  than 
Marius.     Caesar  wisely  left  Rome  for  the  time. 

434.  It  would  seem  that  Sulla  was  already  bearing  the  title 
of  Dictator.  The  steps  to  effect  this  were  probably  taken  late  in 
the  year  82.  One  consul  was  dead,  the  other  an  outlaw.  In 
order  to  strain  the  constitution  as  little  as  possible,  the  procedure 
by  way  of  interregnum  was  chosen,  and  the  traditional  powers  of 
an  interrex  slightly  extended.  L.  Valerius  Flaccus,  the  '  first  man ' 
{princeps)  of  the  Senate,  was  employed  to  do  what  was  required, 
of  course  acting  under  full  instructions  from  Sulla,  ^^e  carried 
through  the  Assembly  a  lex  Valeria^  which  confirmed  all  Sulla's 
acts  in  advance,  and  set  him  above  the  law.  The  title  of  '  dictator 
for  drafting  statutes  and  setting  the  commonwealth  in  order' 
{legibus  scribundis  et  rei  publicae  constituendae)  practically  covered 
everything.  It  was  a  commission  of  autocracy,  not  limited  to  a 
stated  term,  but  tenable  at  the  will  of  the  holder  until  such  time 
as  he  might  conceive  his  task  to  be  fulfilled.  The  office  had 
little  but  the  name  in  common  with  the  old  dictatorship ;  it 
differed  widely,  in  the  mode  of  appointment,  in  duration,  in  the 
imperial  scope  of  its  powers.  For  times  had  changed  since  the 
old  office  had  gone  out  of  favour  and  fallen  into  disuse.  To  be 
supreme  in  Rome  carried  with  it  the  dominion  of  the  whole 
Roman  world.  When  we  find  Sulla's  position  spoken  of  as  a 
Kingdom  or  Tyranny,  the  expression  is  about  the  truth.  Nor 
indeed  did  he  seriously  try  to  dissemble  the  absolute  nature  of 
his  power.  He  now  set  to  work  establishing  the  so-called  'Sullan 
Constitution,'  a  remodelling  of  institutions  in  a  reactionary  spirit, 
the  aim  being  to  restore  the  state  of  things  existing  before  the 
Gracchan  movement.  For  making  such  an  attempt  it  was  neces- 
sary to  ignore  the  past.  What  Scipio  Aemilianus  had  been  unable 
to  maintain,  Sulla  could  not  really  restore.  The  sequel  shewed 
that  the  permanent  tendency  was  against  the  predominance  of  an 
aristocratic  council.  The  Senate,  replaced  in  the  seat  of  power, 
could  only  overcome  demagogues  by  coalescing  with  leaders  of 
armies.  It  could  not  really  stand  alone.  To  undo  what  the 
Gracchi  and  Marius  had  done  was  impossible.  But  we  need  not 
wonder  that  Sulla,  like  most  men,  was  no  prophet :  he  could  not 
judge  the  present  with  knowledge  of  that  which  was  to  come. 
H.  22 


7,^S  The  reactionary  [ch. 

435.  To  weaken  the  tribunate  was  an  obvious  step.  As 
revived  by  the  Gracchi,  the  office  certainly  was  Uable  at  any 
moment  to  upset  the  balance  of  the  constitution.  Sulla  meant 
to  reduce  it  to  its  original  function  of  auxi/mm,  the  protection  of 
Plebeians  from  the  harsh  use  of  the  magistrates'  imperium.  His 
law  therefore  took  away  from  tribunes  the  right  of  proposing  laws 
or  impeaching  presumed  offenders  before  the  Assembly.  The 
power  of  intercessio  was  limited  in  scope,  and  it  was  provided  that 
no  man  who  had  been  tribune  should  be  eligible  for  any  curule 
office.  Thus  the  tribunate  would  no  longer  serve  as  a  cheap 
means  of  courting  popular  favour,  and  would  not  attract  restless 
and  ambitious  men.  So  it  was  muzzled.  The  rules  governing 
the  sequence  of  magistracies  also  needed  a  thorough  revision. 
The  lex  Villia  had  often  been  disregarded  in  recent  years,  and 
illegal  reelections  and  continuations  of  office  had  been  very 
common.  The  separation  of  civil  and  military  life  had  already 
gone  far,  and  the  old  requirement  of  ten  years  military  service 
was  practically  obsolete.  The  details  of  Sulla's  new  law  are 
uncertain,  but  a  scale  of  age-limits  and  compulsory  succession  of 
offices  was  arranged.  At  30  a  man  became  of  age  for  the  quaes- 
torship,  at  39  for  the  praetorship,  at  42  for  the  consulship.  For 
the  aedileship,  if  held  at  all,  the  age  was  36.  Sulla  was  evidently 
bent  on  raising  the  minimum  ages,  and  preventing  men  from 
stepping  into  higher  office  without  passing  through  the  regular 
stages.  He  also  raised  the  number  of  praetors  to  8  (why,  we 
shall  see),  and  that  of  quaestors  to  20.  It  seems  certain  that 
he  also  made  the  quaestorship  confer  membership  of  the  Senate. 
Reelection  to  an  office  was  only  allowed  after  an  interval  of  ten 
years.  All  these  rules  aimed  at  keeping  open  the  flow  of  pro- 
motion and  fixing  a  rigid  system.  They  were  designed  to  check 
the  rise  of  prominent  leaders,  and  to  distribute  power  on  aristo- 
cratic lines  among  the  members  of  a  ruling  caste. 

436.  What  with  massacres  and  proscriptions,  deaths  in  war 
or  in  the  course  of  nature,  and  the  flight  of  Marians,  the  Senate 
was  no  doubt  reduced  in  numbers.  Sulla  wanted  the  body  to  be 
numerous,  both  on  general  grounds,  and  because  he  meant  the 
senatorial  Order  to  provide  the  juries.  So  once  more^  he  added 
to  it  300  of  the  *  best  Knights';  that  is,  capitalists  who  had  taken 
his   side.     This   addition   made   the   Senate   apparently   strong. 

^  See  §  412. 


xxxi]  policy  of  Sulla  339 

Then  by  a  law  he  deprived  the  Equestrian  Order  of  their  control 
of  the  public  courts,  and  gave  it  to  the  senators.  Coming  after 
the  proscriptions,  these  blows  left  the  non-noble  capitalists  a 
thinned  and  weakened  Order.  But  their  ranks  were  constantly 
being  recruited,  as  men  with  small  capital  began  a  business 
career,  and  Rome  could  not  do  without  them.  Sulla  had  not 
crushed  them  out  of  politics,  as  he  perhaps  imagined.  Another 
law  dealt  with  the  great  religious  colleges.  The  number  of  the 
members  was  raised,  and  by  repeal  of  the  Domitian  law  of  104 
the  old  plan  of  filling  up  vacancies  by  cooptation  was  restored. 
Among  the  practical  needs  of  the  time,  it  was  most  desirable  to 
bring  the  civil  affairs  of  life  back  into  their  ordinary  course. 
This  could  only  be  done  by  closing  all  proceedings  connected 
with  the  proscriptions.  Accordingly  the  ist  June  81  was  fixed  as 
the  date  for  ending  them.  Thus  confidence  would  gradually 
revive,  and  business  with  it.  But  two  of  the  results  of  the  pro- 
scriptions remained  in  force.  The  sons  of  the  men  proscribed 
were  still  disqualified  from  holding  public  office.  The  slaves 
included  in  the  confiscated  estates  had  been,  or  now  were, 
emancipated  in  large  numbers.  It  was  Sulla's  policy  to  interest 
an  active  body  of  new  citizens  in  the  permanence  of  his  settle- 
ment. He  enfranchised  many  (10,000  it  is  said)  as  freedmen 
of  his  own,  thus  becoming  the  patron  of  a  devoted  following. 
They  were  Cornelii^  taking,  as  was  customary,  their  patron's 
gentile  name. 

437.  Sulla  had  found  it  necessary  to  remind,  not  only 
Romans  in  general,  but  his  own  partisans  also,  that  he  was  master. 
When  one  presumed  so  far  on  his  services  as  to  persist  in  his 
candidature  for  the  consulship  of  81  in  defiance  of  orders,  the 
dictator  had  him  killed  openly  in  the  Forum.  It  was  now  time 
to  remind  the  public  of  his  own  immense  services  in  the  East. 
On  the  27th  January  81  he  held  his  great  triumph  for  the 
victories  over  Mithradates.  The  notable  feature  of  the  splendid 
show  was  the  procession  of  restored  exiles.  But  it  was  the  civil 
war,  not  the  Mithradatic,  in  which  these  men's  restoration  had 
been  won.  Sulla  merely  avoided  openly  triumphing  over  Roman 
citizens.  Meanwhile  Pompey  had  recovered  Sicily,  and  put  Carbo  ^ 
to  death.  He  went  on  to  Africa,  destroyed  the  Marian  force, 
and  placed  Hiempsal  on  the  throne  of  Numidia  in  the  room  of 
Hiarbas.     Later  in  the  year  81  Sulla  celebrated  a  great  festival, 

22 — 2 


340  Sulla's  land-settlement  [ch. 

the  ludi  Victoriae,  in  special  commemoration  of  the  battle  by  the 
CoUine  gate.  It  is  recorded  that  members  of  noble  families,  in 
deference  to  the  dictator's  wishes,  appeared  as  drivers  in  chariot- 
races.  Probably  this  outrage  on  Roman  proprieties  indicates  a 
wish  to  degrade  a  few  suspected  persons  :  for  it  was  Sulla's  policy 
in  general  to  elevate  the  nobility.  The  festival  also  included 
lavish  feasting  of  the  whole  people.  At  this  time  Roman  religious 
scruples,  and  Sulla's  own  superstition,  were  illustrated  in  a  way 
worth  notice.  His  wife  Metella  was  very  ill.  Sulla  was  a  pontiff, 
and  his  house  must  not  be  polluted  by  the  presence  of  a  corpse. 
So,  though  fond  of  Metella,  he  divorced  her  and  sent  her  to  die 
in  another  house.  Her  death  was  a  great  grief  to  him.  Such  is 
the  story,  preserved  by  Plutarch. 

438.  Of  all  the  works  of  Sulla,  none  was  more  directly 
productive  of  troublesome  consequences  than  his  land-settlement. 
He  had  an  army  of  100,000  men  to  disband  and  to  satisfy. 
Grants  of  land  were  the  only  possible  means  of  pensioning  them. 
By  planting  them  here  and  there  in  groups  he  would  establish 
garrisons  of  men  whose  rights  depended  on  the  maintenance  of 
the  Sullan  settlement.  To  provide  allotments  he  had  probably 
some  of  the  land  confiscated  in  the  proscriptions.  But  one  form 
of  the  punishment  of  communities  for  their  support  of  the 
Marians  was  the  confiscation  of  their  territories.  The  blocks  of 
land  thus  set  free  for  distribution  were  convenient  for  planting 
settlers  in  groups,  and  it  was  on  these  blocks  that  many  of  the 
'Sullan  men'  were  placed.  Wholesale  evictions  of  former  holders 
were  necessary,  and  a  great  deal  of  land  changed  hands  in 
various  parts  of  Italy.  The  pity  was  that  the  soldiers,  long  used 
to  a  life  of  violence  and  hardship  with  intervals  of  revelling  and 
wantonness,  seldom  could  settle  down  to  the  monotonous 
drudgery  of  rural  life.  A  clause  in  Sulla's  colony-laws  forbade 
the  sale  of  the  allotments.  But,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Gracchan 
land-laws,  the  prohibition  was  evaded  or  ignored.  Most  of  the 
settlers  soon  got  rid  of  their  plots,  which  passed  into  the  hands  of 
capitalist  land-grabbers.  The  ejected  holders  had  been  ruined. 
The  new  holders  were  a  failure.  The  two  classes  might  hate  each 
other,  but  in  discontent  and  destitution  there  was  perhaps  not 
much  to  choose  between  them.  Some  of  Sulla's  men  seem  to  have 
been  settled  in  towns  on  the  coast,  as  at  Puteoli  and  Pompeii, 
where  they  were  soon  at  loggerheads  with  the  old  burgesses. 


xxxi]  and  ks  effects  341 

439.  The  chief  groups  of  Sullan  colonists  appear  to  have 
been  planted  in  Etruria  and  parts  of  Campania  and  Samnium. 
In  some  cases  there  was  resistance,  and  a  few  communities  were 
punished  by  Sulla  with  loss  of  civic  rights  as  Romans.  At  Vola- 
terrae  a  siege  was  necessary :  it  only  surrendered  early  in  79. 
No  doubt  the  record  of  many  severities  has  perished  :  certainly 
the  Samnite  dalesmen  were  not  spared.  After  Sulla  the  Roman- 
izing of  Italy  was  rapidly  completed.  Latin  drove  out  Oscan  and 
any  Etruscan  that  remained.  Greek  alone  kept  its  hold  in  a  few 
maritime  cities  of  the  South.  But  the  land-settlement  was  an 
economic  disaster,  and  still  more  a  social  one.  The  new  lati- 
fundia  might  be  farmed  with  more  judgment,  and  in  blocks  less 
continuous,  than  those  of  50  or  100  years  earlier.  Rich  men 
now  commonly  owned  land  in  several  districts,  and  kept  a  slave- 
bailiff  and  slave-gang  on  each  farm.  Land  was  in  fewer  hands 
than  ever,  and  the  remnant  of  small  farmers  was  still  further 
reduced.  Brigandage  became  a  crying  evil.  To  raise  a  band 
was  easy.  Ruined  and  desperate  freemen  were  numerous,  and 
slaves,  inured  to  hardship,  or  even  trained  as  gladiators,  were 
always  to  be  had.  And  the  government  made  no  effort  to  secure 
order  by  a  force  of  regular  police.  As  for  Sulla,  his  garrisons  of 
soldiery  lasted  his  time.  His  methods  of  finance  seem  to  have 
been  as  arbitrary  as  his  policy  in  the  matter  of  the  land.  If  it  be 
true  that  he  stopped  the  sale  of  corn  below  cost  price  to  the  city 
populace,  it  was  so  far  well.  But  only  a  strong  government  could 
have  kept  such  a  policy  in  force,  and  no  such  government  was 
set  up  by  Sulla.  He  is  said  to  have  wrung  money  out  of  the 
subject  peoples  by  direct  exactions,  and  by  the  sale  of  exemptions 
from  future  burdens.  He  spent  lavishly,  and  enriched  his 
favourites,  by  gifts  and  remission  of  debts.  Yet  it  was  afterwards 
found  better  to  let  many  of  his  arrangements  stand,  for  fear  of 
worse  confusion  in  upsetting  them. 

440.  A  most  important  part  of  the  Sullan  system  was  the 
changes  in  the  regular  magistracy.  In  particular,  magistracy  and 
pro-magistracy  stood  side  by  side.  Circumstances,  such  as  the 
need  of  keeping  an  efficient  man  in  charge  of  a  province  for 
more  than  a  year,  led  to  the  frequent  employment  of  proconsuls 
and  propraetors  abroad.  But  the  normal  governors  were  praetors 
or,  in  case  of  a  serious  foreign  war,  consuls.  Whether  a  magis- 
trate or  a  pro-magistrate  was  in  charge,  was  largely  a  matter  of 


342  Magistracy  and  pro- magistracy  [ch. 

chance.  Now  there  was  work  for  praetors  at  home,  and  Sulla 
meant  to  find  them  more.  Consuls  too  were  wanted  in  Rome. 
The  dictator  devised  a  logical  reform  by  creating  a  Home  service 
and  a  Provincial  service  neatly  correlated  to  each  other.  A  man 
was  to  serve  first  as  magistrate  at  home,  then  as  pro-magistrate 
abroad.  It  was  a  truly  momentous  step.  The  unpaid  jealously- 
watched  office  came  first :  the  almost  absolute  power,  with  the 
coveted  opportunities  of  enrichment,  now  the  real  objects  of 
desire,  came  necessarily  later.  Pro-magistracy  was  henceforth 
by  law  to  be  the  recognized  crown  of  a  successful  career.  It 
would  become  more  and  more  imperial,  while  the  Home  magis- 
tracy tended  to  become  municipal.  The  numbers  corresponded 
exactly.  Two  consuls  and  eight  praetors  had  to  be  provided  for. 
There  were  already  nine  provincial  governorships.  Sulla  added 
a  tenth.  Cisalpine  Gaul.  He  moved  forward  the  official  boundary 
of  Italy  from  the  Aesis  to  the  Rubicon,  and  perhaps  on  the 
western  side  from  the  Macra  to  the  Varus.  The  new  province 
was  a  peculiar  one.  The  Cispadane  part  was  already  Roman, 
and  the  Transpadane  fast  becoming  Romanized.  But  Sulla  did 
not  choose  to  extend  the  franchise  as  a  general  boon  beyond  the 
Po.  So  the  Cisalpine  became  a  Province.  It  was  notable  for 
two  reasons.  To  greedy  governors  it  offered  no  easy  field  for 
extortion.  To  an  ambitious  man  it  was  the  best  of  all  bases  of 
power,  for  it  was  immensely  prosperous,  and  its  growing  popula- 
tion furnished  a  plentiful  supply  of  good  recruits  to  Roman 
armies. 

441.  On  Sulla's  plan  there  would  be  in  each  year  two  posts 
proconsular  and  eight  propraetorian.  The  Senate  was  to  say 
which  were  which,  and  the  consuls  and  praetors  apportioned  the 
vacancies  among  themselves  by  lot  or  agreement.  Smooth  work- 
ing of  the  system  was  promoted  by  rules  for  the  transfer  of 
command  from  an  outgoing  governor  to  his  successor.  Other 
provisions  were  meant  to  protect  the  subjects  from  exactions  on 
the  part  of  the  governor  or  his  staff.  But  we  must  especially 
notice  the  point  that  the  whole  scheme  presupposed  the  unbroken 
continuation  of  a  magistrate's  imperium  in  pro-magistracy.  If 
the  two  should  ever  be  separated  by  an  interval,  the  separation  of 
the  services  would  produce  two  independent  magistracies.  We 
shall  find  that  this  actually  happened  about  30  years  later.  The 
scheme  also  took  no  account  of  the  accidents  that  were  likely  to 


xxxi]  The  public  courts  343 

disturb  the  regular  course  of  successions,  or  of  a  possible  increase 
in  the  number  of  provinces.  This  lex  Cornelia,  rigid  and  logical, 
needed  a  strong  central  authority  to  work  it  with  due  allowance 
for  circumstances.  And  Sulla  did  not  and  could  not  create  any 
such  authority.  In  dealing  with  the  Home  magistracy,  Sulla's 
increased  number  of  quaestors  (20)  had  a  double  importance. 
These  junior  officials  passed  into  the  Senate,  and  kept  the  House 
full  without  interference  of  censors.  Sulla  distrusted  censorial 
action.  It  was  capricious,  and  radical  censors  might  change  the 
Senate's  character.  So  he-  arranged  to  do  without  censors.  Some 
parts  of  censorial  duty  were  left  to  the  consuls.  As  to  the  com- 
plete registration  of  citizens  in  Tribes  and  Centuries,  he  was 
probably  not  loth  to  let  it  wait.  In  fact  there  was  after  86  no 
census  until  the  year  70,  when  the  revived  activity  in  that  depart- 
ment was  an  effect  of  the  movement  that  broke  up  the  political 
constitution  of  Sulla. 

442.  We  now  come  to  the  reconstruction  and  development 
of  the  pubhc  courts,  the  most  permanent  part  of  Sulla's  work. 
First  let  us  briefly  sketch  the  machinery  that  had  been  in  use 
hitherto.  We  have  seen  that  in  very  early  times  the  magistrate, 
acting  on  behalf  of  the  community,  imposed  a  penalty  on  a 
person  guilty  of  an  act  regarded  as  an  offence  against  the  state. 
Also  that  it  was  possible  for  the  offender  to  appeal  to  the  people 
in  Assembly  against  the  sentence  of  the  magistrate.  The  estab- 
lishment of  the  right  of  appeal  as  an  integral  part  of  Roman 
citizenship  was  one  of  the  most  significant  and  well-attested 
movements  in  the  early  Republic.  In  the  older  and  smaller 
Rome  this  rude  method  of  making  the  people  the  judge  of 
offences  against  itself  seems  to  have  sufficed.  Side  by  side  with 
the  trials  for  high  treason  [perduellio)  before  the  Centuries  there 
grew  up  the  fine-processes  before  the  Tribes.  But  these  pro- 
cedures had  this  in  common,  that  the  Assembly  was  called  upon 
to  decide  whether  a  particular  offender  should  be  punished  or 
not.  Therefore  the  people  could  and  did  take  other  circum- 
stances into  account  in  judging  his  conduct.  It  was  in  fact  a 
moral  judgment,  and  as  such  it  contained  the  germ  of  criminal 
law.  But  these  popular  trials  were  a  clumsy  affair,  and,  as  Rome 
grew  and  the  citizens  were  more  widely  scattered,  they  were  sure 
to  become  less  and  less  satisfactory.  Cases  occurred  calling  for 
secrecy  and  despatch,  and  it  was  found  convenient  to  appoint 


344  Development  of  the  system  [ch. 

special  judicial  commissions  {quaestiones  extraordinariae),  to  hold 
inquiries  into  the  facts  of  particular  cases  and  pass  judgment 
thereon.  From  the  judgment  of  such  a  court  there  was  probably 
no  appeal,  the  Assembly  having  delegated  its  powers.  In  this  as 
in  other  matters  it  seems  that  the  Senate  at  times  assumed  the 
right  of  appointing  such  commissions  on  its  own  authority. 
There  was  little  to  tempt  the  people  to  resent  this  encroachment, 
for  public  offences  were  seldom  committed  by  the  poor.  The 
next  step  was  the  transition  from  occasional  to  permanent  courts. 
A  beginning  was  made  by  the  Calpurnian  law  of  149  B.C.  The 
need  of  a  regular  means  of  checking  extortion  in  the  Provinces 
had  been  felt,  for  the  state  suffered  through  rebeUions  caused  by 
the  greed  of  individuals.  So  the  Assembly  once  for  all  delegated 
its  powers  in  this  class  of  cases  to  a  standing  commission,  the 
quaestio  repetundarufn.  At  first  it  was  virtually  a  civil  court,  only 
empowered  to  award  simple  compensation.  But  the  court  was 
not  a  magistrate,  free  to  accept  or  reject  the  advice  of  assessors 
{consilium).  It  was  a  voting  jury;  a  praetor  presided,  and 
announced  its  verdict,  from  which  there  was  no  appeal. 

443.  Compensation  developed  into  punishment.  The  Acilian 
law  of  122  required  payment  of  double  the  amount  extorted,  and 
the  state  undertook  to  exact  the  money.  The  Servilian  law  of 
1 1 1  extended  the  liability.  Not  only  the  governor  of  a  province, 
but  all  persons  who  had  shared  his  plunder,  could  now  be  com- 
pelled to  make  restitution.  This  was  the  law  in  force.  It  is  to 
be  noted  that  the  transition  from  the  notion  of  a  wrong  or  *  tort ' 
to  that  of  a  charge  or  *  crime '  was  accompanied  by  that  from 
claimant  {petitor)  to  prosecutor  {accusator).  The  standing  courts 
were  first  set  up  to  protect  the  provincials,  who  had  to  be  repre- 
sented by  Roman  protectors  {patroni).  Any  citizen  was  allowed 
to  act  thus  as  their  counsel.  As  standing  courts  were  created  for 
the  trial  of  cases  between  Roman  citizens  (some  such  appear  to 
have  existed  before  Sulla),  this  general  right  to  act  was  retained, 
and  young  orators  found  an  opening  for  winning  notoriety  by 
conducting  cases  before  the  juries.  So  paironus  had  put  on  a 
special  meaning  as  'counsel.' 

444.  Sulla's  great  work  was  to  consolidate  and  extend  the 
system  of  quaestiones  perpetuae  so  as  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
time.  A  whole  group  of  his  Cornelian  laws  dealt  with  the  pubHc 
courts,  reorganizing  those  already  in  existence  and   setting  up 


xxxi]  The  several  courts  345 

new  ones.  Each  of  these  statutes  enumerated  the  offences  placed 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  particular  court.  The  time  was  not 
yet  come  for  a  scientific  definition  of  crimes.  It  sufficed  that  an 
act  was  an  offence  under  this  or  that  statute,  which  treated  it  as 
criminal  and  imposed  a  penalty  on  the  guilty.  In  public  Hfe  it 
was  often  possible  to  regard  an  act  as  criminal  from  more  than 
one  point  of  view.  Thus  the  term  '  treason  against  the  state ' 
{matestas)  could  be  strained  to  cover  almost  any  conduct  injurious 
to  the  common  weal.  So  a  simple  method  was  found  without 
precise  definitions :  a  prosecutor  alleged  that  a  particular  person 
had  broken  a  particular  law.  In  course  of  time  the  decisions  of 
courts  would  accumulate,  and  out  of  them  definitions  would 
gradually  grow.  In  short,  the  system  contained  the  germ  of  a 
regular  criminal  jurisprudence.  That  the  growth  was  slow  was 
due  not  to  the  defects  of  the  system  itself,  but  to  the  mischievous 
influences  of  Roman  party-politics  and  corruption  on  the  action 
of  the  courts. 

445.     Of  the  courts  established  by  the  leges  Corneliae  iudi- 
ciariae  seven  can  be  traced  with  more  or  less  certainty. 

(i)  repetundarum.  The  penalties  for  extortion  were  in 
some  way  increased,  perhaps  by  raising  the  money-penalty  and 
by  adding  that  of  outlawry. 

(2)  pecidatus.  Misappropriation  of  state  property  made  a 
man  liable  to  enforced  restitution,  probably  to  some  degree  of 
infamia^  that  is  disqualification  for  public  positions  and  acts. 
Conviction  of  this  crime  (or  of  extortion)  was  followed  by  assess- 
ment of  damages  {litis  aestimatio\  in  which  juries  often  leant  to 
leniency. 

(3)  maiestatis  {minutae).  Penalty,  outlawry  {aquae  et  ignis 
inter dictio). 

(4)  de  ambitu.  Corrupt  practices  at  elections.  Penalty, 
ten  years  disqualification  from  office. 

(5)  inter  sicarios.  The  law  was  that  de  sicariis  et  veneficis^ 
kept  in  force,  and  supplemented,  for  many  centuries.  The  court 
*  among  the  assassins'  dealt  with  murder,  arson,  and  heinous 
cases  of  judicial  corruption.  The  penalty  was  capital,  that  is 
outlawry.  Only  parricidium,  murder  of  a  near  relative,  was 
punished  with  death. 

(6)  defalsis.  Forgery,  coining,  etc.  Penalty,  at  least  a 
high  degree  of  infamia,  perhaps  outlawry. 


34^  The  juries.     Young  Pompey  [ch. 

(7)  iniuriariim.  Assault,  defamation,  insult,  seem  to  have 
been  brought  under  a  criminal  prosecution.  This  matter  is 
obscure.  The  civil  actio  iniuriarum  for  compensation  was  not 
abolished. 

446.  Sulla  attempted  to  form  a  consistent  system,  capable 
of  amendment  and  expansion.  He  succeeded,  because  he  simply 
developed  what  he  found  existing,  on  the  lines  indicated  by 
previous  developments :  a  contrast  to  the  failure  of  his  political 
reforms,  guided  by  reactionary  aims.  The  chairmen  of  courts 
under  his  scheme  were  as  follows.  Of  eight  praetors,  two 
{urbanus  and  peregrinus)  were  required  for  the  civil  jurisdiction. 
Six  were  left  for  the  public  or  criminal  courts.  But  the  number 
required  was  uncertain,  for  there  might  be  several  cases  for  trial 
before  any  of  the  divisional  courts,  and  cases  sometimes  dragged 
on  to  a  great  length.  The  precedent  was  adopted  of  putting  an 
additional  chairman  {index  quaestionis)  in  charge  when  a  praetor 
was  not  available.  The  roll  of  jurors  {album  iiidicum)  was  made 
up  in  each  year  from  the  list  of  the  Senate.  The  juries  for 
particular  cases  were  chosen  by  lot,  with  certain  rights  of  chal- 
lenge {reiectio)  reserved  to  the  parties  concerned.  The  jurors 
voted  by  ballot-tickets,  on  which  they  scratched  letters  denoting 
'guilty'  or  'not  guilty'  or  'not  proven,'  and  a  majority  decided 
the  verdict.  Beside  the  laws  above  referred  to,  Sulla  carried 
others,  for  instance  some  futile  sumptuary  laws.  The  crime  of 
public  violence  {^ns)  was  probably  dealt  with  in  77  after  his  death 
by  a  lex  Flautta,  as  a  supplement  to  his  work. 

447.  While  Sulla  was  busy  in  Rome,  there  had  been  trouble 
in  the  East.  Murena  wilfully  provoked  Mithradates,  and  dis- 
obeyed an  order  to  let  the  king  alone.  After  a  defeat  he  returned 
to  Rome  in  obedience  to  a  more  peremptory  summons.  Peace 
was  restored,  but  Mithradates  remained  uneasy,  and  the  evil  of 
piracy  was  becoming  unendurable.  In  the  same  year  (81)  the 
victorious  Pompey  claimed  a  triumph  for  his  success  in  Numidia. 
It  was  against  all  precedent,  for  he  had  not  ■  been  praetor  or 
consul ;  indeed  he  was  only  a  young  man  of  Equestrian  rank, 
aged  26.  After  attempts  to  evade  the  claim,  Sulla  consented, 
and  Pompey  began  his  long  career  of  precedent-breaking.  In  80 
Sulla  was  not  only  dictator,  but  consul  with  Metellus  Pius. 
Metellus  had  to  be  sent  to  Spain,  where  Sertorius  was  now  at  the 
head  of  a  rebellion.     Sulla  had  to  restore  order  in  a  few  places  in 


xxxi]  The  end  of  Sulla  347 

Italy.  The  restoration  of  the  CapitoHne  temple,  burnt  during 
the  civil  war,  was  begun.  The  new  law-courts  started  work  with 
the  new  juries,  and  the  first  case  in  the  murder-court  was  a 
charge  of  parricide,  connected  with  events  arising  from  the  pro- 
scriptions. In  this  trial  a  young  man  from  Arpinum,  M.  TuUius 
Cicero,  made  a  successful  defence  against  the  leader  of  the 
Roman  bar,  Q.  Hortensius,  and  the  secret  influence  of  Sulla's 
great  freedman  Chrysogonus.  Henceforth  Cicero  stood  in  the 
front  rank  of  forensic  orators. 

448.  Sulla  was  weary,  and  longing  to  retire  and  enjoy  low 
company  in  private  life.  His  public  policy  had  been  such  as  to 
make  retirement  (the  great  difficulty  of  tyrants)  reasonably  safe. 
He  refused  to  be  elected  consul  for  79,  and  laid  down  the 
dictatorship  early  in  that  year.  At  his  Campanian  villa  near 
Puteoli  he  gathered  round  him  a  congenial  crew  of  parasites. 
He  went  on  writing  his  memoirs.  Though  one  of  the  consuls' 
elected  for  78  was  coming  forward  as  leader  of  a  counter-revolu- 
tion, and  Rome  was  disturbed,  Sulla  did  not  hesitate  to  interfere 
despotically  in  the  affairs  of  the  Puteolan  municipality.  In  a  fit 
of  rage  he  broke  a  blood-vessel  and  died.  His  adherents  insisted 
on  giving  him  a  splendid  funeral,  at  which  his  body  was  burned, 
contrary  to  the  custom  of  the  Cornelian  clan.  By  his  will  he 
made  Lucullus  (not  Pompey)  the  guardian  of  his  young  son. 
Lucullus  was  his  literary  executor  also.  His  death  left  others  to 
compete  for  the  first  place.  He  had  for  the  moment  restored 
the  senatorial  nobility  to  power,  but  he  could  not  remove  their 
selfishness  and  jealousies,  and  restore  them  to  harmony  and 
vigour.  Nothing  could  prevent  the  rise  of  individuals,  so  an 
autocrat  would  surely  come.  But  this  great  change  was  not  to 
come  at  once,  or  in  any  other  way  than  as  the  result  of  sheer 
exhaustion.  With  all  the  tendencies  of  the  age  working  against 
them,  the  Roman  aristocrats  made  a  stubborn  fight  in  defence  of 
their  Republic.  It  was  their  form  of  patriotism,  and  many  of 
them  were  wholly  or  partly  influenced  by  high  motives.  In  the 
next  period  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  Aristocrat  and  Republican 
are  two  names  for  the  same  thing. 

1  See  §451- 


CHAPTER   XXXII 

ROME   AND    ITALY   78—70  B.C. 

449.  At  the  time  of  Sulla's  death  the  Roman  government 
was  face  to  face  with  a  number  of  troublesome  problems.  In 
Italy  there  was  much  discontent.  The  normal  condition  of  the 
Italian  communities  was  that  of  municipia,  towns  in  which  each 
burgess  enjoyed  the  local  franchise  and  the  Roman  franchise 
also.  Each  borough  had  its  own  local  senate  and  magistrates. 
By  rights  the  incorporation  of  Italy  in  Rome  should  have  been 
complete,  but  it  was  not.  In  Etruria  and  Samnium  there  were 
communities  punished  by  Sulla  with  exclusion  from  Roman 
privileges.  Moreover,  censorial  revision  being  for  the  present 
in  abeyance,  it  is  hardly  doubtful  that  many  new  citizens  were 
as  yet  unregistered  in  Roman  Tribes.  Few  can  have  been  placed 
in  Centuries;  and  it  was  by  the  Centuriate  Assembly  that  the 
chief  magistrates  were  elected.  But  what  made  the  existence  of 
political  discontent  a  serious  matter  was  the  economic  disturbance 
caused  by  Sulla's  land-settlement.  The  dispossessed  men,  whether 
they  remained  near  their  old  homes  or  migrated  to  Rome,  were 
a  disaffected  element,  ready  to  join  in  revolutionary  movements. 
Many  of  them  would  surely  be  old  citizens,  suffering  for  real  or 
imputed  sympathy  with  the  Marian  cause,  and  hostile  to  the  rule 
of  the  Sullan  nobles.  There  were  in  fact  strong  forces  at  work, 
tending  to  promote  a  counter-reaction  against  the  political  institu- 
tions of  Sulla. 

450.  And  even  in  Rome  the  Marian  party  was  by  no  means 
dead.  The  city  populace,  accustomed  to  be  fed  and  courted, 
wished  to  recover  its  former  importance.  The  Assemblies  were 
still  constitutionally  the  sovran  power.  The  Senate  was  ruled  by 
a  Ring  of  aristocrats,  and  the  jealousies  of  noble  cliques  were 


CH.  xxxii]  Counter-reaction  349 

hardly  a  secret.  Demagogues  with  a  'popular'  policy  had  a 
prospect  of  support  from  the  non-noble  capitalists.  For  the 
Equestrian  Order  speedily  revived  after  the  proscriptions,  and 
longed  to  recapture  the  control  of  the  public  courts ;  while  the 
senatorial  juries,  whether  lax  or  severe,  could  not  escape  incurring 
unpopularity.  This  situation  naturally  resulted  in  a  confused 
struggle,  the  two  factions  being  at  issue  on  the  question  of  up- 
holding or  overthrowing  the  Sullan  constitution.  In  the  course 
of  some  nine  years  one  great  truth  was  fully  demonstrated,  that 
the  real  source  of  power  in  the  Roman  state  was  the  sword.  So 
long  as  the  leaders  of  armies  worked  in  harmony  with  the  Senate, 
the  Senate  could  hold  its  ground  fairly  well.  Once  they  found 
their  interest  in  coalescing  with  the  popular  party,  the  Senate 
could  make  no  stand.  The  armies  of  the  new  model  obeyed 
their  own  leaders,  not  the  Senate.  The  work  of  Marius  could 
not  be  undone,  for  it  expressed  the  genuine  tendencies  of  the 
age.  Sulla  himself  had  carried,  the  process  a  step  further,  by 
teaching  them  that  the  soldier  must  look  to  his  master,  not  to 
the  Senate,  for  the  rewards  of  service.  This  was  the  vital  fact 
underlying  Roman  politics,  the  fact  governing  the  course  of  the 
revolution  in  all  its  later  stages. 

451.  The  troubles  abroad,  in  Spain  Macedonia  and  Asia 
Minor,  will  be  referred  to  below.  It  should  however  be  noted 
here  that  P.  Servilius  Vatia,  consul  in  79,  had  been  sent  out  to 
put  down  the  pirates  infesting  the  eastern  seas.  He  gained  suc- 
cesses both  by  sea  and  land;  for  he  marched  up  into  the  hill- 
country  of  Isauria  and  earned  the  title  Isauricus.  But  he  did  not 
make  an  end  of  piracy,  as  we  shall  see.  The  most  urgent  danger 
with  which  the  government  had  to  deal  was  at  home  in  Italy. 
The  consuls  of  78  were  M.  Aemilius  Lepidus  and  Q.  Lutatius 
Catulus.  The  former,  a  restless  vain  man,  was  for  some  reason 
hostile  to  Sulla's  policy.  He  had  been  supported  in  his  candi- 
dature by  Pompey,  against  the  express  warning  of  Sulla.  Sulla 
died :  the  two  consuls  quarrelled  over  the  question  of  the  public 
funeral.  After  this  Lepidus,  relying  on  the  general  discontent, 
began  to  assail  parts  of  the  Sullan  arrangements.  He  proposed 
to  recall  exiles,  to  restore  the  dispossessed  holders  to  their  lands, 
and  to  renew  the  supply  of  cheap  corn  in  Rome,  which  last  pro- 
posal he  seems  to  have  carried.  His  conduct  only  added  to  the 
general  unrest.    He  was  not  a  thorough  democrat,  for  he  opposed 


350  Lepidus.     Pompey  L^h. 

a  movement  for  reviving  the  powers  of  the  tribunate.  Catulus 
could  not  check  him,  and  the  Senate  only  required  the  colleagues 
to  swear  not  to  engage  in  civil  war.  Lepidus  raised  an  army, 
having  a  pretext  in  his  proconsular  province  for  the  year  77, 
Transalpine  Gaul.  A  war  followed,  th'e  record  of  which  is  utterly 
confused.  The  government  forces  eventually  defeated  him  in 
Etruria,  and  he  sailed  with  his  army  to  Sardinia,  where  he  made 
another  failure.  He  died  in  the  island,  and  the  best  part  of  his 
army  was  taken  by  his  lieutenant  M.  Perperna  to  join  Sertorius 
in  Spain.  The  most  important  fact  in  the  story  of  this  obscure 
war  is  that  for  miHtary  skill  the  Senate  had  to  rely  on  Pompey. 
What  precise  part  he  bore  in  the  operations  is  not  clear.  At  any 
rate  he  stamped  out  the  revolt  with  severity,  and  found  pretexts 
for  keeping  his  army  together.  By  this  means,  as  we  shall  see, 
he  was  able  to  advance  his  claims  to  further  promotion.  Sulla 
had  not  been  dead  two  years,  when  a  young  military  man  was 
already  in  a  position  to  bend  the  Senate  to  his  will. 

452.  Lepidus  had  failed,  but  the  Marian  reaction  in  Rome 
was  a  real  movement,  only  needing  a  leader.  The  news  of  Sulla's 
death  brought  Caesar  back  from  the  East,  where  he  had  been 
serving  against  the  pirates.  He  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  silly 
venture  of  Lepidus,  but  he  soon  took  his  natural  place  in  politics 
by  conducting  public  prosecutions,  in  which  he  contrived  to  expose 
the  iniquities  of  the  ruling  caste.  The  acquittal  of  the  accused  by 
senatorial  juries  was  no  proof  of  their  innocence :  it  only  served 
to  bring  discredit  on  senatorial  juries.  Meanwhile  the  Senate  had 
to  face  the  fact  that  the  Spanish  rising  under  Sertorius  had  not 
yet  been  put  down  by  Metellus,  and  that  the  reinforcement  under 
Perperna  had  given  a  more  Italian  character  to  the  war.  They 
did  not  wish  to  send  out  Pompey,  and  thereby  to  increase  his 
consequence.  But  his  intrigues,  backed  by  the  presence  of  his 
army,  prevailed.  He  was  given  command  with  proconsular 
imperium,  on  an  equal  footing  with  Metellus.  So  the  Senate 
had  to  yield  to  Sulla's  pupil,  and  to  violate  Sullan  principles. 
While  the  home  government  was  embarrassed  by  affairs  abroad, 
the  Marian  revival  went  on.  In  76  a  tribune  openly  agitated 
for  the  restoration  of  the  former  tribunician  power.  And  this 
question  was  of  course  the  critical  point  in  the  movements  of 
the  time.  For  the  present  nothing  came  of  it,  but  in  75  the 
agitation  continued,  and  the  populace  was  irritable,  owing  to  a 


xxxii]  New  Provinces.     The  LucuUi  351 

scarcity  of  corn.  There  was  rioting,  and  C.  Aurelius  Cotta,  one 
of  the  consuls  of  the  year,  saw  the  need  of  concession.  He  carried 
a  law  repealing  the  disqualification  of  ex-tribunes  from  holding 
further  office.  So  an  important  detail  of  Sulla's  system  was 
abolished,  and  the  tribunate  once  more  became  a  post  worthy 
the  ambition  of  enterprising  men. 

453.  In  the  year  74  the  troubles  abroad  were  worse  than 
ever.  Spain,  the  Macedonian  frontier  warfare,  the  revival  of 
piracy,  above  all  the  preparations  of  Mithradates,  were  causes 
of  great  anxiety.  At  the  same  time  it  was  necessary  to  decide 
on  a  policy  in  reference  to  two  bequests  of  territory.  The 
Cyrenaica,  bequeathed  to  Rome  in  96,  had  not  yet  been  taken 
over  as  a  province,  and  now  in  75  Bithynia  had  been  left  to 
Rome  by  the  will  of  Nicomedes  III.  No  doubt  the  financial 
interests  in  Rome  were  pressing  for  formal  annexation,  and  the 
two  countries  were  accordingly  made  provinces.  This  step  made 
inevitable  a  double  war,  for  both  the  king  of  Pontus  and  the 
pirates  were  certain  to  oppose  it.  The  command  against  Mithra- 
dates was  coveted  by  one  of  the  consuls,  L.  Licinius  Lucullus, 
who  had  been  trusted  by  Sulla,  and  was  a  military  rival  of  Pompey. 
The  lot  assigned  him  Cisalpine  Gaul,  but  an  unexpected  vacancy 
occurred  in  Cilicia,  and  by  private  influence  he  got  himself  trans- 
ferred to  that  province,  and  eventually  entrusted  with  the  charge 
of  the  Pontic  war  by  land.  His  colleague  M.  Aurelius  Cotta  had 
Bithynia  and  the  naval  part  of  the  war.  The  praetor  M.  Antonius, 
a  son  of  the  great  orator,  was  appointed  to  command  against  the 
pirates.  At  home  the  agitation  against  the  senatorial  government 
continued,  and  a  grave  judicial  scandal  (the  condemnation  through 
bribery  of  a  man  said  to  be  innocent)  was  used  to  inflame  popular 
indignation.  Thus  the  capitalist  Knights  were  drawn  into  sym- 
pathy with  the  agitators. 

454.  The  continuance  of  the  troubles  abroad  will  be  spoken 
of  in  the  next  chapter.  We  should  note  here  that  M.  Lucullus, 
consul  in  73,  succeeded  to  the  province  of  Macedonia,  where  he 
commanded  for  two  years'  with  good  results.  The  great  event 
of  73  was  the  exposure  of  the  ever-present  danger  in  Italy  itself, 
arising  from  the  institution  of  slavery.  We  have  seen  what  rural 
slavery  meant,  and  have  referred  to  the  training  of  slaves  as 
gladiators.      Both   these   employments   called   for   strength  and 

^  See  §  462. 


352  Spartacus  L^h. 

hardihood.  The  average  slave  labourer  or  swordsman  would  be 
an  able-bodied  man,  more  than  a  match  for  the  average  freeman. 
Economic  and  social  changes  had  reduced  the  number  of  freemen 
in  many  parts  of  rural  Italy.  And  there  was  no  regular  police 
force.  At  Capua  a  school  of  gladiators  broke  out.  Rural  slaves 
joined  them.  The  rout  of  two  Roman  forces  sent  to  put  down 
the  rising  furnished  the  rebels  with  weapons.  Their  numbers 
rose  to  70,000,  and  southern  Italy  was  at  their  mercy.  Prepara- 
tions had  to  be  made  for  a  serious  war  conducted  by  an  organized 
army.  The  rebellion  lasted  two  years,  causing  great  devastation 
in  the  country,  and  embarrassment  to  the  government  in  Rome. 
The  Marians,  led  by  the  tribune  C.  Licinius  Macer,  kept  up  the 
agitation  against  the  Sullan  system.  Young  Caesar  also  bore  a 
leading  part  in  the  movement.  He  had  again  been  in  the  East, 
where  he  went  through  various  adventures,  and  was  now  back  in 
Rome.  Macer  and  he  could  not  as  yet  restore  the  full  powers  of 
the  tribunate,  but  they  carried  a  law  for  recall  of  the  men  in  exile 
on  account  of  the  rising  of  Lepidus.  And  under  their  pressure 
the  consuls  carried  a  law  {lex  Terentia  Cassia)  providing  for  the 
yearly  purchase  of  a  quantity  of  corn,  to  be  retailed  to  the  urban 
populace  at  a  cheap  rate.  It  was  meant  to  secure  a  regular  supply, 
and  to  please  the  mob  by  removing  the  risk  of  sudden  dearth. 
Sicily  in  particular  was  the  source  of  supply  in  view.  In  this 
year  Verres,  after  his  year  as  city-praetor,  began  his  three  years 
of  propraetorship  in  Sicily,  where,  among  other  misdeeds,  he  de- 
monstrated the  iniquitous  plundering  to  which  the  provincials 
could  be  subjected  by  a  governor  licensed  to  deal  in  corn. 

455.  In  72  things  were  better  abroad,  but  in  Italy  defeats  of 
several  Roman  armies  by  the  slave-rebels  marked  the  course  of  the 
servile  war.  Yet  the  rebellion  was  really  failing.  Its  great  leader, 
the  Thracian  Spartacus,  could  not  control  his  men,  now  flushed 
with  victory.  They  would  not,  as  he  wished,  force  their  way  to 
the  North,  and  try  to  regain  their  native  homes  in  Gaul  Germany 
or  Thrace  by  passing  the  Alps.  They  broke  up  into  separate 
armies,  and  did  not  act  together.  By  turning  back  southwards 
they  lost  their  only  chance  of  escape.  The  Senate  had  at  last 
to  find  an  efficient  man  to  reconquer  a  large  part  of  wasted  Italy. 
They  chose  Crassus,  Sulla's  lieutenant,  who  had  turned  to  civil 
life  since  the  battle  of  the  Colline  gate.  By  severe  discipline 
Crassus  restored  the  tone  of  the  Roman  troops.     He  defeated 


xxxii]        Coalition  of  Pompey  and  Crassus  353 

the  enemy's  forces  in  detail,  and  penned  up  the  main  body  in 
the  Bruttian  peninsula.  Spartacus  bargained  with  some  pirates 
cruising  off  the  coast  to  transport  their  army  to  Sicily,  but  they 
exacted  payment  in  advance  and  sailed  away.  After  this  the 
desperate  rebels  broke  away  to  the  northward,  but  were  beaten 
in  detail.  Crassus  did  most  of  the  work  of  the  war.  But  Pompey, 
returning  from  Spain,  had  the  luck  to  meet  and  destroy  a  detach- 
ment of  fugitives  on  their  way  to  the  North.  For  this  he  claimed 
a  good  share  of  the  credit  due  to  Crassus.  We  need  not  dwell  on 
the  ruin  caused  in  Italy  by  the  slave- war,  or  on  the  crucifixions  and 
other  horrors  that  marked  its  close. 

456.  The  year  71  brought  four  successful  commanders  to 
Rome,  all  claiming  triumphs,  Metellus  Pius  and  Pompey  from 
Spain,  M.  LucuUus  from  Macedonia  and  the  frontier  war,  Crassus 
from  the  war  with  Spartacus.  The  coming  political  crisis  involved 
the  fate  of  the  Sullan  constitution.  All  turned  on  the  relations 
between  Pompey  and  the  Senate.  Would  the  nobles  secure  the 
attachment  of  the  young  general  who  had  risen  to  be  the  first 
soldier  of  Rome,  by  gratifying  his  unconstitutional  ambitions  ? 
If  not,  would  he  combine  with  the  popular  leaders  and  defy  the 
Senate  ?  He  had  held  no  public  office,  yet  he  claimed  both  a 
triumph  and  the  right  to  stand  at  once  for  the  consulship.  The 
Senate  would  not  by  their  own  act  make  Pompey  their  master, 
so  they  refused  what  they  could  not  prevent.  Pompey  had  been 
judicious  in  his  references  to  the  Spanish  war,  ignoring  the  Marian 
element  in  the  hostile  army,  and  so  not  seeming  to  seek  a  triumph 
over  fellow-citizens.  He  had  captured  letters  from  men  in  Rome 
to  Sertorius,  and  had  burnt  them.  Common  folk  cared  little  for 
the  rules  by  which  his  claim  to  the  consulship  was  barred,  and  the 
Knights  were  eager  to  oust  the  senators  from  the  jury-courts. 
The  popular  leaders  saw  their  chance.  Everything  favoured  the 
designs  of  Pompey.  Crassus  joined  forces  with  him,  and  the  two 
came  to  terms  with  the  popular  agitators.  Such  a  coalition  was 
irresistible.  The  programme  agreed  upon  included  judicial  reform, 
but  the  revival  of  the  tribunate  was  the  first  article.  The  new 
citizens  were  probably  conciliated  by  an  assurance  that  a  census 
should  be  held  and  the  registration-question  settled  at  last.  The 
whole  affair  was  an  attack  on  Sulla's  aristocratic  system.  It  an- 
nounced that  the  aristocratic  caste  were  no  longer  free  to  share 
preferments  among  themselves  on  a  footing  of  normal  equality. 
H.  23 


354  The  measures  of  70  b.c.  [ch. 

If  eminent  nobles  could  not  gain  special  promotion  from  the 
Senate,  they  could  and  would  get  it  from  the  Assembly.  To  put 
down  such  men  by  force  was  no  longer  possible :  effective  eminence 
came  by  the  successful  command  of  armies.  The  days  when  the 
Gracchi  had  been  destroyed  were  a  story  of  the  past. 

457.  So  Pompey  got  the  better  of  the  Senate.  We  need  not 
enlarge  upon  the  various  triumphs,  the  votes  of  the  Assembly  by 
which  all  the  formal  hindrances  were  swept  aside,  or  the  election 
of  Pompey  and  Crassus  as  consuls  for  the  year  70.  The  spirit  of 
Pompey  was  well  shewn  in  the  dramatic  choice  of  the  last  day 
of  71  for  his  triumph.  Next  morning  he  entered  on  office  as 
consul.  The  man  who  thus  defied  precedent  and  constitutional 
law  had  been  Sulla's  pupil.  He  was  now  to  bear  a  leading  part 
in  the  destruction  of  his  master's  system.  The  jealousy  between 
him  and  Crassus  was  smoothed  over  for  the  time.  The  tribunate 
was  restored  to  its  former  powers.  The  question  of  jury-reform 
was  taken  in  hand,  but  differences  of  opinion  arose,  and  for  the 
present  no  project  became  law.  Censors  were  appointed  and  a 
census  seriously  carried  out.  The  Senate  was  purged  of  64  un- 
worthy members,  perhaps  in  the  hope  that  the  removal  of  men 
suspected  of  corruption  on  juries  might  avert  judicial  reform. 
The  registration  of  citizens  was  more  than  usually  complete. 
The  numbers  given  may  not  be  wholly  trustworthy  (910,000, 
compared  with  463,000  in  the  year  86),  but  no  doubt  there  was 
a  great  increase  on  those  of  the  last  census.  What  with  elections, 
public  shows,  and  the  prospect  of  registration,  it  appears  that  the 
summer  of  70  drew  an  immense  concourse  of  citizens  to  Rome. 
Full  details  are  lacking,  but  it  is  clear  that  this  census,  the  last 
one  effectively  carried  out  under  the  Republic,  was  of  great  im- 
portance in  consolidating  the  union  of  Italy  under  the  Roman 
franchise. 

458.  While  the  jury-question  awaited  solution,  public  interest 
was  aroused  by  the  famous  trial  of  Verres.  He  had  been  left  in 
charge  of  Sicily  for  three  years,  and  his  oppressions  and  extortions 
had  been  extreme,  a  scandal  even  in  an  age  teeming  with  evil 
precedents.  Leading  residents,  natives  and  Romans  too,  looked 
for  a  trusty  protector  in  Rome,  to  bring  the  wicked  governor  to 
justice.  They  wanted  a  man  who  would  not  be  bought  off  by  the 
gold  of  Verres.  They  turned  to  Cicero,  whose  conduct  as  quaes- 
tor at  Lilybaeum  five  years  before  had  earned  their  confidence. 


xxxii]  Cicero  and  Verres  355 

Cicero  was  a  '  new  man,'  and  his  policy  was  to  oblige  people  by 
undertaking  the  defence  of  accused  persons,  not  to  be  notorious 
as  a  prosecutor.  But  here  was  a  chance  of  fame.  Senatorial 
juries  were  themselves  just  now  on  their  trial,  and  he  might  force 
even  senators  to  condemn  a  fellow-senator  whom  in  ordinary 
circumstances  they  would  certainly  acquit.  The  Marian  party, 
including  the  Equestrian  Order,  would  applaud  his  efforts ;  and 
his  own  sympathies  were  with  that  Order,  from  which  he  had 
sprung,  and  opposed  to  the  unwise  and  cruel  oppression  of  Roman 
subjects.  He  took  up  the  case  with  energy.  Every  kind  of  ob- 
stacle was  put  in  his  way,  and  time  was  precious.  If  the  trial  were 
protracted  into  the  next  year,  magistrates  friendly  to  Verres  would 
be  in  power,  and  official  favour  would  procure  an  acquittal.  But 
Cicero  overcame  every  hindrance.  In  the  trial  itself  he  even 
sacrificed  the  tempting  opportunity  of  displaying  his  oratorical 
powers.  Hortensius,  the  leader  of  the  Bar,  was  for  the  defence, 
but  he  could  do  nothing  against  the  overwhelming  evidence  on 
which  Cicero  rested  his  simple  case.  Bribery  too  was  tried  in 
vain.  Verres  went  into  exile.  To  explain  this  strange  result  is 
easy.  The  jury  were  afraid  of  causing  a  fresh  scandal  at  this 
critical  juncture,  and  Cicero  had  taken  good  care  to  remind  them 
of  the  imperilled  interests  of  their  Order.  He  even  threatened 
that  any  one  guilty  of  corruption  in  this  case  would  be  prosecuted 
by  himself  without  fail.  So  Cicero  won  the  primacy  of  the  Roman 
Bar.  He  followed  up  his  success  by  composing  and  publishing  a 
great  pamphlet  on  the  subject.  It  was  in  the  form  of  a  speech, 
an  elaborate  pleading  such  as  he  would  have  delivered  in  court, 
if  the  case  had  come  to  a  second  hearing  after  the  ordinary 
adjournment.  This  stage  had  not  been  reached,  for  the  case 
of  Verres  broke  down  on  the  first  hearing.  The  great  'second 
pleading '  took  a  permanent  place  in  Roman  literature.  For  the 
present  it  carried  the  fame  of  Cicero  far  and  wide.  That  the 
picture  of  the  iniquities  of  Verres  was  overdrawn,  is  more  than 
likely.  But  the  trial  was  over,  and  to  Verres  in  exile  at  Massalia 
the  invective  of  Cicero  was  a  matter  of  small  concern. 

459.  Late  in  this  year  70  the  question  of  the  juries  was  at 
last  dealt  with  in  a  law  carried  by  the  praetor  L.  Aurelius  Cotta. 
It  was  a  compromise.  The  senatorial  monopoly  was  doomed. 
A  proposal,  that  the  senatorial  and  equestrian  Orders  should  each 
furnish   half  of  each  jury,  was   made,  but   fell   through.     The 

23—2 


356  lex  Aurelia  iudiciaria  [ch.  xxxii 

Knights  insisted  on  more  than  a  half  share.  The  lex  Aurelia 
made  each  jury  consist  of  three  equal  sections  or  panels  {decuriae), 
senators,  equites^  and  tribuni  aerarii.  These  last  seem  to  have 
been  a  class  of  lesser  capitalists,  and  the  name  was  probably  an 
old  survival.  At  any  rate  the  senators  could  no  longer  shield 
the  criminals  of  their  own  Order.  But  bribery  and  party-feeling 
remained  the  canker  of  the  public  courts.  The  political  effect 
of  the  change  was  great.  Following  the  revival  of  the  tribunate, 
it  recorded  the  fall  of  the  Sullan  constitution.  The  Marian  or 
'  popular '  party  had  already  regained  the  upper  hand.  This  did 
not  mean  that  Rome  was  on  the  way  to  be  ruled  by  a  Demos  of 
the  Greek  model.  Neither  Assembly  nor  Senate  could  really 
decide  anything  of  vital  importance  without  the  leave  of  the 
army-leaders  who  from  time  to  time  held  the  power  of  the  sword. 
This  was  henceforth  the  main  fact  of  Roman  politics,  to  which 
many  good  citizens  strove  to  shut  their  eyes. 


CHAPTER   XXXIII 

WARS  ABROAD.  SERTORIUS  AND  MITHRADATES. 

79—67   B.C. 

460.  In  this  period,  though  Spain  was  generally  quiet,  the 
natives  were  not  yet  so  far  tamed  and  Romanized  as  to  resist 
the  temptation  to  rise  in  arms  on  a  favourable  opportunity.  This 
is  more  especially  true  of  the  Lusitanian  tribes  in  the  West.  But 
Sertorius,  who  left  Italy  in  83,  was  at  first  unable  to  revive  the 
Marian  cause  by  raising  a  Spanish  rebellion.  With  a  handful  of 
Marian  comrades  he  went  through  a  series  of  adventures  by  sea 
and  land,  and  it  was  not  till  the  year  80  that  he  received  and 
accepted  an  invitation  to  head  a  Lusitanian  rising.  He  organized 
the  native  forces  on  the  model  of  a  Roman  army,  but  turned  their 
superior  mobility  and  knowledge  of  the  country  to  good  account. 
He  managed  the  people  well,  trusting  to  their  generous  loyalty 
and  humouring  their  superstitions.  Civil  order  was  promoted  by 
just  administration,  and  he  was  soon  in  high  repute  over  a  great 
part  of  Spain.  He  even  established  a  Roman  school  for  the  sons 
of  native  chiefs.  For  Sertorius  did  not  seek  to  lessen  or  destroy 
the  influence  of  Rome :  it  was  to  overthrow  the  government  of 
Sulla  and  the  aristocratic  faction  that  he  fought.  A5  Marian 
fugitives  rallied  to  him,  he  employed  them  in  military  and  civil 
posts,  and  even  formed  a  Roman  council  or  Senate  of  the  leading 
partisans.  His  victories  over  the  governors  of  the  Spanish  pro- 
vinces so  much  alarmed  Sulla,  that  in  79  the  trusted  Metellus  Pius 
was  sent  to  put  down  the  rising.  But  the  career  of  Sertorius  was 
not  checked,  and  in  77,  as  we  saw  above,  he  was  pined  by  Perperna 
with  a  considerable  army  from  Italy.  This  was  probably  not  an 
unmixed  gain.     The  war  was  henceforth  more  of  a  civil  war,  and 


35^  Sertorlus.     The  East  [ch. 

the  great  leader  was  exposed  to  the  malign  influences  of  Perperna's 
ambition  and  jealousy. 

461.  We  have  seen  how  Pompey  contrived  to  get  himself 
sent  to  Spain  on  the  same  footing  as  Metellus.  But  the  campaign 
of  76  was  a  failure,  and  that  of  75  not  much  better.  Mithradates 
thought  it  worth  his  while  to  come  to  a  friendly  arrangement  with 
Sertorius.  The  pirates  supplied  means  of  communication  and 
some  sort  of  understanding  was  entered  into.  The  state  of  things 
was  serious.  Pompey,  at  his  urgent  request,  was  reinforced,  for 
fear  the  war  should  spread  to  Italy.  The  tide  now  began  to  turn, 
not  through  marked  improvement  on  the  Roman  side,  but  rather 
in  consequence  of  the  gradual  failure  of  Sertorius.  Perhaps  the 
Spaniards  were  tired  of  the  war  :  his  Roman  helpers  were  certainly 
a  hindrance.  Their  conduct  alienated  the  natives,  and  it  is  said 
that  Sertorius  by  various  severities  was  making  himself  hated.  In 
the  year  72  he  was  assassinated,  and  Perperna,  who  had  been  the 
chief  conspirator,  succeeded  to  the  command.  Pompey  soon  after 
defeated  and  captured  Perperna,  and  put  him  to  death.  The  re- 
bellion quickly  collapsed,  order  was  restored,  and  the  Marian  party 
were  no  longer  represented  by  a  force  in  arms.  But  it  was  thought 
wise  to  encourage  those  Spaniards  who  had  done  good  service  for 
the  Roman  government.  Pompey,  probably  at  his  own  suggestion, 
was  authorized  by  a  special  law  to  bestow  the  Roman  franchise  on 
deserving  individuals.  One  of  the  recipients,  a  native  of  Gades, 
who  took  the  name  L.  Cornelius  Balbus,  migrated  to  Rome,  and 
became  a  very  important  person.  He  is  best  known  as  the  chief 
private  agent  of  Caesar.  In  7 1  Pompey  and  Metellus  returned  to 
Rome. 

462.  When  we  turn  to  the  East,  we  find  Roman  interests  in 
danger  from  several  quarters.  A  weak  and  fitful  policy  exposed 
Macedonia  to  chronic  warfare.  No  practical  and  effective  measures 
had  been  taken  to  suppress  piracy.  And  the  king  of  Pontus  had 
been  busy  with  preparations  which  might  at  any  time  issue  in  a 
serious  war.  The  frontier  wars  in  Macedonia  employed  governor 
after  governor,  but  victories  brought  no  rest.  Dardanians  and 
Thracians,  to  the  N.  and  N.E.  of  the  province,  were  driven  to 
invade  the  Roman  territory  by  the  pressure  of  ruder  barbarians 
behind  them,  and  emissaries  of  Mithradates  helped  to  make  the 
Thracian  tribes  more  troublesome  than  ever.  Rome  kept  no 
strong  standing  army  in  the  province,  and  made  no  further  an- 


xxxiii]  Piracy  359 

nexations.  So  the  tide  of  frontier  warfare  ebbed  and  flowed 
fitfully  and  wastefully,  with  little  prospect  of  lasting  peace.  At 
this  time  the  governors  as  a  rule  each  held  office  for  two  years. 
When  war  broke  out  with  Mithradates,  it  was  more  necessary  than 
before  to  reestablish  the  supremacy  of  Rome  in  these  parts.  The 
king  drew  support  from  both  the  barbarian  tribes  and  the  Greek 
coast-cities.  M.  Terentius  Varro  Lucullus  (a  Lucullus  adopted  by 
a  Varro)  commanded  there  in  73 — 71,  and  his  successes  were  a 
great  help  to  his  brother  L.  Lucullus  in  the  Pontic  war.  He  made 
no  real  conquest  of  Thrace,  but  he  greatly  strengthened  the  posi- 
tion of  Rome  and  weakened  Mithradates. 

463.  Piracy  and  kidnapping  were  again  in  full  swing,  and  the 
demand  for  slaves  in  the  Roman  dominions  was  a  never-failing 
encouragement  to  this  form  of  enterprise.  Rome  shirked  the 
duty  of  maintaining  the  police  of  the  seas.  The  expedition  of 
Servilius  had  gained  him  the  title  Isauricus,  but  had  no  lasting 
effect.  He  went  off  to  triumph  in  Rome,  and  the  pirates,  scat- 
tered for  a  moment,  quickly  rallied.  Crete  and  the  mountainous 
western  Cilicia  were  their  chief  haunts,  but  they  infested  the  whole 
Mediterranean,  and  were  a  nuisance  even  in  the  Adriatic.  Their 
numbers  were  recruited  by  ruined  men  from  Italy,  deserters,  and 
rough  adventurers  from  all  quarters.  Acting  in  independent 
bodies,  they  felt  a  common  interest  and  helped  each  other.  At 
last  their  operations  threatened  a  stoppage  of  the  Roman  corn- 
supply,  and  the  government  was  forced  to  attempt  their  complete 
suppression.  Half-measures  had  been  proved  useless,  so  in  74  it 
was  decided  to  hunt  them  down  in  all  parts  of  the  Mediterranean, 
and  to  give  a  single  commander  wide  powers  for  the  purpose. 
M.  Antonius,  a  son  of  the  great  orator,  was  chosen.  He  had 
imperium  as  a  proconsul  over  the  sea  and  coasts.  Governors 
of  provinces  had  to  back  him  up,  and  he  made  requisitions 
accordingly.  He  then  set  to  work,  apparently  without  any  suffi- 
cient organization.  That  the  conquest  of  Crete  was  a  necessary 
part  of  the  work  in  hand,  was  doubtless  true.  But  Antonius 
failed  miserably  in  attempting  it.  A  treaty  that  he  was  driven 
to  make  with  the  Cretan  leaders  was  not  ratified  in  Rome,  and 
the  proconsul  died  in  the  island,  having  lived  long  enough  to  be 
nicknamed  Creticus  in  derision.  This  again  brings  us  to  the  year 
71.  The  Mithradatic  war  was  by  no  means  at  an  end,  and  the 
failure  of  naval  demonstrations  had  left  behind  grave  causes  for 


360  Tigranes  [ch. 

anxiety.  Was  it  certain  that  the  islands,  the  bases  of  Rome's 
naval  power,  were  now  safe?  If  not,  how  was  it  possible  to 
secure  free  communication  with  her  armies  and  possessions  in 
the  East? 

464.  To  understand  the  relations  of  Rome  and  Mithradates 
at  the  time  when  the  war  began  in  74,  we  must  turn  back  to  remind 
ourselves  that  the  Armenian  and  Parthian  monarchies  were  now 
the  chief  powers  in  the  further  East.  The  Egyptian  and  Syrian 
dynasties  had  practically  ceased  to  count.  A  Scythian  invasion 
weakened  Parthia  for  a  time.  Tigranes  of  Armenia  took  the 
opportunity,  and  in  83  annexed  some  Parthian  provinces,  includ- 
ing Syria,  which  had  lately  fallen  under  Parthian  influence.  Now 
Tigranes  and  Mithradates  were  for  the  present  working  in  harmony. 
But  the  Pontic  king  was  well  aware  that  he  must  beat  back  Rome, 
if  he  meant  to  gratify  his  imperial  ambition.  The  Armenian  had 
evidently  no  notion  that  he  must  support  Mithradates  at  once,  or 
it  would  be  too  late.  He  went  on  with  his  own  plans,  trying  to 
remodel  his  empire  after  the  fashion  of  Alexander's  Successors. 
He  too  must  have  a  great  capital  city,  and  surround  himself  with 
Greek  civilization.  So  he  made  one,  which  he  called  Tigrano- 
certa,  and  to  it  he  transplanted  a  number  of  'Greeks,'  drawn  from 
Cilician  and  Cappadocian  cities.  Rome  did  not  interfere,  and 
Tigranes  was  not  likely  to  learn  from  his  courtiers  that  interference 
was  possible,  or  that  the  Pontic  kingdom  might  prove  an  insuffi- 
cient buffer.  The  story  of  Mithradates  and  Tigranes  was  very  like 
that  of  Philip  and  Antiochus  more  than  100  years  earlier.  The 
kings  were  not  loyal  to  each  other,  and  Rome  dealt  with  them 
one  by  one. 

465.  The  death  of  Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  in  75  brought  on 
the  inevitable  conflict.  We  have  seen  that  Rome  accepted  the 
bequest  of  Bithynia,  and  in  74  annexed  it  as  a  province.  Mithra- 
dates accepted  the  challenge.  He  had  a  large  well-trained  army, 
and  among  his  officers  were  Romans,  in  exile  through  the  troubles 
of  recent  years.  He  had  a  strong  fleet  under  Greek  commanders. 
He  knew  that  most  of  the  peoples  of  Asia  Minor  secretly  sym- 
pathized with  him  as  leader  of  a  reaction  against  Rome,  though 
the  Galatian  tribes  were  not  yet  so  orientalized  as  to  prefer  a 
despot.  His  connexions  with  the  pirates  and  Sertorius  have  been 
referred  to  above;  also  the  appointment  of  L.  Lucullus  and  M. 
Gotta  to  conduct  the  war  on  behalf  of  Rome.     At  first  the  king 


xxxiii]  Mithradatic  war  361 

carried  all  before  him.  He  found  Cotta  at  Chalcedon,  and  de- 
feated both  his  fleet  and  his  army.  He  overran  the  northern  part 
of  the  province  Asia,  and  sat  down  to  besiege  Cyzicus.  This  city, 
a  republic  protected  by  its  Roman  alliance,  he  was  bent  on  taking. 
But  the  place  was  stoutly  defended,  and  the  great  numbers  of  the 
Pontic  army  were  an  embarrassment,  for  food  ran  short.  Lucullus 
came  up  in  time  to  cut  off  supplies  by  land.  At  last  Mithradates 
had  to  raise  the  siege  and  take  away  the  demoralized  remnant  of 
his  host,  thinned  by  pestilence  and  famine.  The  want  of  an 
effective  Roman  fleet  prevented  Lucullus  from  ending  the  war. 
But  Mithradates,  though  still  powerful  at  sea,  had  shewn  how 
disastrous  the  miscalculations  of  a  self-willed  autocrat  might 
easily  be. 

466.  Lucullus  saw  that  the  first  necessity  was  to  get  the 
upper  hand  at  sea.  A  new  fleet  was  raised,  and  the  Aegean 
cleared  by  two  naval  victories.  A  squadron  under  Cotta  now 
entered  the  Euxine.  On  the  Bithynian  coast  stood  the  Greek 
city-republic  Heraclea  Pontica.  Into  it  Mithradates  had  thrown 
a  barbarian  garrison,  and  forced  the  citizens  to  resist  the  Romans. 
A  siege  of  about  two  years  was  the  consequence,  and  in  the  end 
the  king's  officers  betrayed  the  place  to  Cotta,  who  gave  it  over 
to  massacre  or  slavery  at  the  hands  of  the  Roman  troops.  The 
scandal  was  grave,  and  likely  to  discourage  submission  to  the 
Roman  arms.  Efforts  were  made  at  Rome  to  punish  Cotta, 
and  a  law  was  passed  for  making  all  possible  amends  to  the 
Heracleots,  but  it  seems  that  little  could  be  done  to  undo  the 
past.  Lucullus  at  least  was  not  to  blame.  In  his  campaigns 
^of  73  and  72  he  won  most  of  the  cities  on  the  Pontic  coast, 
and  in  a  march  up  the  country  met  and  defeated  the  king, 
Mithradates  fled  into  Armenia,  but  Tigranes,  still  busy  with  his 
own  affairs,  did  not  employ  his  forces  to  support  the  refugee. 
Meanwhile  the  chief  Pontic  cities  were  falling  into  Roman  hands, 
and  in  the  year  70  it  looked  as  if  the  conquest  of  Pontus  were 
assured.  Lucullus  left  his  lieutenants  to  do  this  work,  while  he 
was  attending  to  administration  further  West.  It  appears  that 
he  had  been  granted  full  power  over  the  province  Asia  during 
the  war.  He  found  it  in  great  misery,  the  result  of  the  general 
indebtedness  incurred  in  meeting  the  demands  of  Sulla.  The 
enormous  public  debts  could  not  be  quickly  discharged  by  the 
cities,  so  they  had  gone  on  mounting  till  in  some  twelve  years 


362  Services  of  Lucullus  [ch. 

time  they  stood  at  six  times  the  original  amount.  Public  pro- 
perties were  sold,  private  individuals  had  to  sell  their  children. 
Roman  bankers  and  brokers  were  making  a  golden  harvest,  while 
the  province,  a  chief  source  of  Roman  revenue,  was  drifting  to 
bankruptcy. 

467.  The  proconsul  was  a  just  man,  and  an  honest  servant 
of  Rome.  No  mild  remedy  was  of  any  use.  He  reduced  the 
legal  rate  of  interest  to  i  7o  P^'*  month,  and  arranged  a  scheme 
of  payment  by  fixed  instalments  for  the  discharge  of  private  debts. 
Public  debts  were  to  be  paid  in  double,  not  sixfold.  We  hear 
that  within  four  years  he  cleared  off  the  infamous  burden,  and 
set  the  province  going  afresh.  Thus  he  ruined  his  own  pros- 
pects, for  it  was  at  this  juncture  fatal  to  offend  the  Roman  capi- 
talists, who  had  recovered  from  the  blows  of  Sulla,  and  were  now 
eager  to  humble  the  nobles  and  regain  their  power  in  the  provinces 
by  controlling  the  courts.  He  was  bitterly  denounced  in  Rome, 
and  accused  of  prolonging  the  war  for  his  own  glory.  While  the 
capitalists  watched  for  a  chance  of  procuring  his  recall,  Lucullus 
was  not  without  his  troubles  in  the  field.  The  legionaries  of  this 
age  were  good  fighting  men,  but  hard  to  keep  in  hand.  They 
were  sadly  addicted  to  plunder,  and  objected  to  continued  hard- 
ship. And  Lucullus  had  not  the  gift  of  winning  the  personal 
devotion  of  his  men.  Hence  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  dis- 
cipline became  greater  as  time  went  by  and  the  army  was  com- 
pelled to  winter  in  inhospitable  regions  after  exhausting  campaigns. 
And  when  it  was  reported  from  Rome  that  his  recall  was  imminent, 
even  his  officers  began  to  lose  their  loyalty,  and  the  proconsul's 
control  was  at  an  end.  A  general  unpopular  both  in  his  own 
camp  and  in  Rome  could  only  clear  the  ground  by  his  victories 
for  a  more  popular  man  to  win  the  glory. 

468.  To  kill  or  capture  Mithradates  was  the  only  visible 
means  of  securing  Roman  supremacy  and  peace.  So  in  the  year 
70  Lucullus  sent  to  demand  his  extradition.  Tigranes  refused, 
the  Roman  envoy  declared  war,  and  Tigranes  at  length  prepared 
for  the  struggle.  Lucullus  was  now  less  uneasy  as  to  the  safety 
of  his  rear.  His  brother  had  quieted  the  Thracians,  and  a  son 
of  Mithradates  had  sought  the  friendship  of  Rome.  This  was 
Machares,  who  had  been  deputed  by  his  father  to  rule  the 
Bosporan  (Crimean)  kingdom.  The  disloyalty  of  sons  was  often 
a  source  of  trouble  in  the  oriental  dynasties,  and  Machares  no 


xxxiii]  Causes  of  his  failure  363 

doubt  hoped  to  become  an  independent  king.  Lucullus  boldly 
marched  up  the  country  to  attack  the  Armenian  in  his  own  land. 
He  besieged  Tigranocerta.  Tigranes  advanced  with  an  immense 
army  to  reHeve  it.  This  host  the  Roman  routed  and  scattered 
with  great  slaughter,  though  the  odds  were  about  one  to  twenty. 
The  new  capital  city  was  taken^  and  the  population,  forcibly 
collected  there  to  give  it  a  Greek  character,  once  more  dispersed. 
Lucullus  passed  the  winter  of  69 — 68  in  the  land  of  Gordyene 
by  the  upper  Tigris,  while  Mithradates  was  allowed  by  Tigranes 
to  organize  a  new  army.  Both  sides  wished  to  gain  the  support 
of  the  Parthians.  But  the  Parthian  king  stood  neutral.  Lucullus 
resolved  to  win  his  alliance  by  force,  but  the  plan  had  to  be  given 
up  owing  to  the  mutinous  refusal  of  his  own  troops.  The  cam- 
paign of  68  was  directed  to  the  North,  in  hope  to  take  Artaxata, 
the  old  capital  of  Armenia,  and  conquer  the  whole  kingdom.  But 
it  was  to  no  purpose  that  he  met  and  defeated  Mithradates.  His 
men  would  not  face  the  mountains  and  the  weather,  and  he  had 
to  turn  back.  In  the  same  winter-quarters  as  before  he  passed 
the  winter  of  68 — 67,  troubled  by  his  mutinous  legions.  They 
were  utterly  weary,  and  the  two  legions  left  by  Fimbria  had  served 
18  years  in  the  East.  The  officers  were  unsettled  by  news  from 
Rome,  and  the  intrigues  of  Roman  politics  found  their  way  into 
the  camp. 

469.  By  the  season  of  67  it  had  become  very  necessary  to 
hurry  back  into  Pontus,  where  Mithradates  was  carrying  all  before 
him.  This  movement  left  Tigranes  free  to  invade  Cappadocia. 
All  the  efforts  of  Lucullus  were  foiled  by  the  disobedience  of  his 
troops.  And  the  certain  news  of  his  recall  practically  ended  his 
authority.  His  enemies  in  Rome  had  carried  their  point,  and  a 
new  governor  was  coming  to  Bithynia  and  Pontus.  Commissioners 
presently  arrived  to  organize  Pontus  as  a  Province.  But  they 
could  do  nothing,  for  meanwhile  Mithradates  had  reconquered 
most  of  his  kingdom,  and  Lucullus  was  helpless.  Clearly  matters 
could  not  be  left  in  this  state.  The  actual  sequel  will  be  described 
below.  The  story  of  Lucullus  is  an  instructive  one.  His  personal 
merits  and  defects  had  no  doubt  a  powerful  influence  on  the 
fortune  of  his  campaigns.  But  it  was  the  poHtical  movements  in 
Rome  that  were  the  main  cause  of  his  final  failure.  A  man  at 
once  honest  and  ambitious  had  in  these  days  a  difficult  game 
to  play.     To  be  scrupulous  and  strict  abroad  was  to  lose  the 


364  Movements  in  Rome  [ch.  xxxiii 

favour  of  greedy  soldiers.  To  be  just  to  provincials  was  to  incur 
the  hatred  of  greedy  capitalists.  And  long  absence  from  Rome 
gave  opportunity  to  the  machinations  of  a  rival.  Lucullus  was 
the  Senate's  man,  and  the  Senate  were  no  longer  able  to  protect 
him.  The  events  of  the  year  70  had  made  the  Assembly,  under 
the  revived  power  of  the  tribunes,  the  effective  disposer  of  patron- 
age. The  alliance  of  a  military  leader  with  a  tribune  was  now  the 
simplest  means  of  controlling  the  affairs  of  Rome.  As  Marius  had 
used  Saturninus,  so  now  we  shall  find  that  tribunes  were  the  tools 
of  Pompey. 


CHAPTER   XXXIV 

AFFAIRS    IN    ROME   69—66  B.C.,   AND   THE 
PREEMINENCE    OF    POMPEY   67—62  B.C. 

470.  The  fall  of  Sulla's  political  fabric  gave  Roman  public 
life  a  fresh  start  under  changed  conditions.  The  chief  active 
characters  require  a  brief  notice.  The  party  of  senatorial  nobles 
was  led  by  Q.  Lutatius  Catulus,  consul  in  78  and  now  first  man 
{princeps)  of  the  Senate,  but  its  chief  orator  was  Hortensius, 
consul  in  69  with  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus.  Hortensius  drew  the 
lot  for  the  charge  of  the  inevitable  Cretan  war,  but  resigned  it  to 
his  colleague,  not  wishing  to  leave  Rome.  C  Calpurnius  Piso, 
consul  elect  for  67,  was  of  th6'  same  party.  He  is  said  to  have 
won  his  election  by  bribery,  and  to  have  bought  off  those  who 
threatened  to  prosecute  him.  The  popular  or  Marian  party  had 
various  champions,  but  their  efficiency  was  henceforth  largely  due 
to  the  growing  influence  of  Caesar.  As  a  Patrician,  Caesar  could 
not  be  tribune.  But  he  was  in  favour  with  the  populace,  and 
already  on  the  way  to  be  a  great  leader  of  men,  through  his 
unfailing  nerve,  his  intellectual  vigour,  and  his  personal  charm. 
He  spent  money  lavishly,  and  borrowed  with  apparent  reckless- 
ness ;  but  there  was  probably  method  in  it  from  the  first.  Money 
well  invested  was  a  condition  of  the  rise  to  power  in  the  Rolche  of 
this  age.  Caesar  got  value  for  his  outlay,  and  his  creditors  were 
interested  in  his  welfare.  Cicero,  the  'new  man,'  was  not  yet 
a  political  orator,  but  was  steadily  raising  his  public  position  by 
successful  pleading  in  the  courts.  As  quaestor  in  75  and  aedile 
in  69  he  had  entered  on  an  official  career.  His  political  con- 
nexion was  with  the  Equestrian  Order  from  which  he  sprang, 
and  we  shall  see  that  this  connexion  coloured  his  whole  public 


366  Crassus,  Pompey,   Caesar  [ch. 

life.  But  the  two  most  important  figures  of  the  time  were  Pompey 
and  Crassus.  They  watched  each  other  jealously.  Crassus  sought 
popularity  by  using  his  vast  wealth  in  bounties  and  entertainments, 
and  by  the  judicious  employment  of  moderate  gifts  as  an  advocate. 
He  obliged  serviceable  people  with  loans,  and  tried  to  win  his 
way  by  affability.  But  his  self-seeking  was  too  transparent,  and 
Crassus  by  himself  was  never  able  to  capture  public  confidence. 
Pompey's  position  was  different.  In  miUtary  reputation  he  stood 
first,  and  his  line  was  to  keep  out  of  common  political  squabbles. 
He  posed  as  the  Indispensable  Military  Man,  ready  at  a  pinch  to 
repair  the  blunders  of  others,  but  too  self-respecting  to  cheapen 
his  services  by  quitting  his  seclusion  on  ordinary  occasions.  At 
the  recent  census  he  was  (as  an  eques)  asked  whether  he  had 
served  the  campaigns  required  by  law.  He  repUed  'Yes,  and 
all  under  my  own  command.'  That  is,  he  had  broken  all  pre- 
cedents ;  a  position  not  easy  to  reconcile  with  heavy  constitutional 
dignity.  These  two  pupils  of  Sulla  had  overcome  the  opposition 
of  the  Senate  by  coalescing  with  the  leaders  of  the  popular  party. 
But  they  were  not,  like  Caesar,  true  Marians.  They  gratified 
their  immediate  ambitions  by  upsetting  their  master's  system. 
So  in  party-politics  their  position  was  ^ready  ambiguous,  while 
that  of  Caesar  was  clear. 

471.  Caesar  was  elected  quaestor  for  68,  and  appointed  to 
serve  in  the  Further  Spain.  _  Before  his  departure  he  had  to 
celebrate  the  funerals  of  his  aunt  Julia,  widow  of  Marius,  and' 
of  his  own  wife  Cornelia.  At  the  former  he  displayed  the  face- 
mask  of  old  Marius,  thus  announcing  the  revival  of  the  memory 
of  a  popular  hero,  and  defying  the  Sullan  nobility.  In  Spain  he 
did  the  usual  work  for  the  governor,  and  returned  as  soon  as  he 
could  in  67.  On  his  way  back  (by  land)  he  found  the  people  of 
Transpadane  Gaul  preparing  to  claim  the  Roman  franchise.  He 
encouraged  them,  but  for  the  present  the  opposition  of  the  Senate 
blocked  the  way.  But  the  Transpadanes  remained  attached  to 
him,  and  he  did  not  forget  them.  In  Rome  he  found  things  in 
a  ferment.  The  pirates  were  bolder  than  ever.  While  Metellus 
had  his  hands  full  in  Crete,  and  Lucullus  was  known  to  be  in 
difficulties,  the  sea-rovers  worked  their  will  in  the  western  seas. 
They  had  even  landed  in  Campania  and  Latium,  and  carried  off 
travellers  on  the  Appian  way.  At  last  they  raided  Ostia,  and  did 
great  damage,  and  began  to  capture  corn-ships.    The  Senate  would 


xxxiv]  The  lex  Gabinia  367 

do  nothing,  for  fear  of  having  to  entrust  Pompey  with  exceptional 
powers.  The  prospect  of  famine  roused  the  hungry  mob,  and 
'popular'  tribunes  were  ready  to  lead  an  attack  on  the  Senate 
and  its  policy.  The  two  most  active  were  A.  Gabinius  and 
C.  Cornelius.  Pompey  was  privately  in  league  with  them.  The 
opportunity  of  receiving  a  great  commission  over  the  heads  of 
ordinary  nobles  was  just  what  he  wanted.  With  his  support  and 
that  of  the  capitalists,  alarmed  by  the  possible  loss  of  investments, 
it  was  possible  to  assail  the  nobility  with  success.  So  the  year  67 
was  marked  by  important  legislation. 

472.  First  let  us  take  the  lex  Gabinia  for  suppressing  piracy. 
The  proposal  was  to  appoint  a  single  commander.  The  whole 
Mediterranean  was  to  be  his  '  province,'  and  for  50  miles  inland 
he  was  to  have  equal  powers  with  the  local  governors.  Provision 
was  made  for  a  strong  fleet,  a  large  staff  of  lieutenants,  and  ample 
supplies  of  money.  In  short,  there  were  to  be  no  more  half- 
measures  :  Rome  was  hungry,  and  in  earnest.  No  name  was 
mentioned  in  the  bill,  but  all  knew  who  was  meant.  Catulus, 
Hortensius,  and  the  consul  Piso  led  the  opposition.  Caesar 
supported  Gabinius.  Two  tribunes  had  undertaken  to  block 
proceedings,  but  Gabinius  dealt  with  one  of  them  as  Tiberius 
Gracchus  had  dealt  with  Octavius,  and  the  obstructor  gave  way 
rather  than  be  deposed  from  office  by  a  vote  of  the  Tribes.  The 
bill  became  law,  Pompey  was  then  appointed  to  command,  and 

the  revival  of  confidence  at  once  sent  down  the  price  of  corn. 
Whatever  the  consequences  of  this  great  commission  might  be, 
the  scandalous  inefficiency  inseparable  from  the  rule  of  a  jealous 
aristocracy  had  for  the  moment  been  overcome. 

473.  There  were  other  abuses,  dear  to  those  who  profited 
thereby,  and  hateful  to  those  who  did  not.  The  nobles  were 
no  longer  in  direct  possession  of  power  as  designed  by  Sulla. 
Indirectly  they  were  still  powerful  by  reason  of  their  wealth,  and 
they  lost  no  chance  of  enriching  themselves  in  order  to  cover 
their  expenses.  One  very  invidious  source  of  gain  was  found  in 
blackmailing  foreign  embassies  and  provincial  deputations.  The 
envoys  had  to  fee  a  consul  to  obtain  a  prompt  hearing  in  the 
Senate,  and  then  to  bribe  senators  in  order  to  secure  a  favourable 
answer.  These  operations  implied  the  borrowing  of  money  at 
high  interest  from  Roman  capitalists,  for  it  was  in  practice  not 
possible  to  evade  the  bankers  in  whose  transactions  all  wealthy 


368  Corrupt  senators.     Piso  [ch. 

Roman  investors  were  concerned.  So  the  money  went  round 
and  round,  to  the  profit  of  the  nobles.  They  got  handsome 
returns  on  their  own  money,  lent  through  bankers  or  syndicates 
for  the  purpose  of  bribing  themselves.  No  doubt  non-noble 
capitalists  shared  the  pickings  arising  from  high  interest,  though 
not  the  bribes.  The  foreigners  were  driven  to  burden  their 
people  at  home  with  debts  that  could  not  be  repudiated.  And 
a  favourable  order  of  the  Senate,  when  procured,  could  be  re- 
scinded or  ignored.  Now  the  Senate  as  a  body  was  not  likely 
to  reform  this  abuse,  however  much  the  better  members  might 
desire  it.  The  tribunes,  backed  by  popular  feeling,  offered  legis- 
lative remedies.  Gabinius  proposed  to  forbid  loans  to  provincials 
in  Rome,  and  to  make  such  debts  not  recoverable  in  the  provinces. 
Cornelius  dealt  in  the  same  way  with  the  case  of  foreign  embassies. 
The  latter  bill  was  defeated  on  the  pretence  that  an  old  order  of 
the  Senate  in  reference  to  Crete  had  done  all  that  was  required. 
But  the  bill  of  Gabinius  became  law.  A  law  to  compel  the  Senate 
to  receive  deputations  in  February  also  passed.  But  bribery  did 
not  cease.  Cornelius  also  proposed  to  increase  the  penalties  for 
bribery  at  elections,  including  some  punishment  for  mere  agents. 
This  bill  the  Senate  contrived  to  delay,  handing  it  over  to  the 
consuls  for  reintroduction  in  an  amended  form.  The  consul 
meant  was  Piso\  for  his  colleague  M'.  Acilius  Glabrio  was  gone 
or  going  out  to  Bithynia. 

474.  Piso  was  a  troublesome  man.  While  politicians  were 
wrangling,  Pompey  had  organized  his  forces  in  spite  of  every 
hindrance,  in  particular  from  the  obstructive  lieutenants  of  Piso, 
who,  though  detained  in  Rome,  was  governor  of  Narbonese  Gaul. 
A  naval  campaign  of  squadrons  cooperating  from  several  centres  in 
40  days  forced  the  pirates  to  leave  the  seas  West  of  Italy  and  fall 
back  on  their  strongholds  in  the  East.  The  corn-supply  of  Rome 
was  now  safe,  and  Pompey  was  warmly  welcomed  when  he  paid 
a  flying  visit  to  the  city.  Piso  still  gave  trouble,  but  Pompey 
wisely  discouraged  Gabinius  from  trying  to  depose  him  by  a 
special  law.  By  an  arbitrary  decree  the  Senate  enabled  Piso 
to  do  business  in  the  Assemblies  unhampered  by  religious 
hindrances.  He  managed  to  hold  the  consular  and  praetorian 
elections,  but  only  with  great  difficulty,  by  pressing  country 
voters  to  attend.  The  bribery  bill  as  revised  was  a  milder 
^  Hence  the  law  was  passed  as  Ux  Calpurnia. 


xxxiv]  Cornelius,     concordia  ordinunt  369 

measure  than  the  original  draft  of  Cornelius.  In  all  the  As- 
semblies there  was  rioting,  and  this  bill  was  only  carried  through 
by  force.  Cornelius  now  sought  a  way  to  punish  the  Senate  for 
thwarting  him.  He  found  it  in  assailing  the  claim  of  the  House 
to  grant  special  dispensations  from  the  laws. 

475.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Republic  such  dispensations 
had  been  granted  with  a  proviso  requiring  the  consent  of  the 
Assembly.  The  Senate  gradually  dropped  this,  and  assumed 
full  powers.  Now  the  activity  of  the  Assembly  was  revived, 
and  the  right  of  the  Senate  challenged.  It  was  strictly  speaking 
unconstitutional,  and  quite  unjustifiable  when  (as  sometimes 
happened)  the  order  was  passed  in  a  thin  House.  The  bill  of 
Cornelius  reserved  the  power  to  the  Assembly.  But  again  the 
senatorial  party,  headed  by  Piso,  were  able  by  use  of  force  to 
prevent  its  passing.  Eventually  a  compromise  was  agreed  to, 
and  a  law  carried  by  which  the  Senate  retained  its  usurped  power, 
provided  that  200  members,  at  least  were  present  in  the  House 
at  the  passing  of  the  order.  So  the  nobles  made  the  best  bargain 
they  could.  But  the  efforts  to  restrict  the  arbitrary  action  of  the 
governing  class  were  not  yet  ended.  Praetors  now  and  then 
assumed  the  right  of  deviating  in  judicial  practice  from  the 
principles  laid  down  in  their  notices  iedicta)  published  when  they 
entered  on  office.  Cornelius  carried  a  law  requiring  juridical 
praetors  to  abide  by  their  edicts.  Other  bills  were  also  brought 
forward,  but  did  not  pass.  Among  all  the  strife  and  disturbances 
of  this  year  67,  an  important  change  was  going  on  in  party 
politics.  Senators  and  Knights  not  only  sat  together  on  juries ; 
they  had  a  real  common  interest,  at  least  in  Home  affairs,  as  the 
party  of  the  Rich.  They  were  beginning  to  draw  together.  Both 
sections  dreaded  mob-rule.  Already  they  were  so  far  united  that 
the  popular  tribunes  could  not  carry  all  before  them.  So  long  as 
no  military  leader  was  present  to  dominate  Rome,  the  two  wealthy 
Orders  in  combination  could  direct  the  government.  And  this 
*  harmony  of  the  Orders '  did  in  fact  develope,  so  that  it  became 
the  mainstay  of  the  Republican  constitution.  In  this  year  the 
Equestrian  Order  were  gratified  by  a  law  assigning  them  the 
honorary  privilege  of  reserved  seats  in  the  theatre,  14  rows 
behind  those  kept  for  senators. 

476.  Meanwhile  Pompey  was  completing  the  best  of  his 
many  achievements.      His  squadrons  closed  in  on  the  pirates, 

H.  24 


370  Pirates  crushed,     lex  Manilla  [ch. 

and  drove  them  from  most  parts  of  the  eastern  seas.  They 
were  brought  to  bay  off  their  old  haunts  in  PamphyHa  and 
western  CiUcia,  and  at  length  forced  to  give  battle.  In  fighting 
they  were  at  a  disadvantage,  for  their  light  vessels  were  built  for 
speed,  suited  to  chase  or  run.  Off  Coracesium  they  were  utterly 
defeated  by  the  Roman  ships  of  war.  After  this  Pompey  wisely 
offered  them  honourable  terms.  Their  strongholds  surrendered, 
and  in  49  days  campaign  he  had  restored  peace  on  the  waters. 
He  destroyed  all  their  war-material,  and  planted  the  pirates  as 
reformed  characters  here  and  there  in  various  parts  of  the  Roman 
world.  Thus  he  broke  up  their  motley  bands,  while;  he  added 
colonists  to  cities  or  districts  in  need  of  population.  He  had  in 
short  really  grappled  with  a  serious  problem  and  had  solved  it. 
A  deputation  from  Crete  begged  him  to  accept  their  surrender 
and  save  them  from  the  blood-and-iron  methods  of  Metellus. 
This  led  to  a  quarrel  between  the  two  proconsuls,  but  Metellus, 
backed  by  the  Senate,  finished  his  work,  made  Crete  a  Province, 
and  had  a  triumph  and  the  title  Creticus. 

477.  There  was  joy  in  Rome  at  the  success  of  Pompey,  and 
men  were  now  ready  for  a  proposal  to  turn  his  abilities  to  account 
in  connexion  with  the  Pontic  war.  Things  could  not  be  left  in 
their  present  state.  The  power  of  Rome  must  be  reasserted 
in  the  East,  and  it  was  likely  that  some  annexations  might  be 
necessary.  The  prospect  of  extended  fields  of  enterprise  was 
attractive  to  capitalists :  even  senators,  though  unwilHng  to  have 
so  much  power  entrusted  to  one  man,  were  willing  to  see  the 
number  of  provincial  governorships  increased.  C.  Manilius,  one 
of  the  tribunes  for  66,  took  the  matter  up.  He  carried  a  law  for 
the  appointment  of  Pompey  to  the  eastern  command.  The 
powers  conferred  by  the  lex  Manilla  were  extraordinarily  wide. 
The  Gabinian  law  was  not  repealed,  so  Pompey  was  made 
supreme  on  both  land  and  sea,  in  fact  given  a  free  hand  to 
carry  out  a  complete  settlement  of  the  East  according  to  his 
own  views  of  the  real  interest  of  Rome.  The  immense  patronage 
at  his  disposal,  and  the  uncertain  duration  of  this  great  commis- 
sion, placed  him  in  a  position  to  oblige  numbers  of  people.  Even 
while  absent,  he  would  be  able  to  influence  politics  in  Rome, 
courted  and  feared  as  the  uncrowned  emperor  of  the  East.  Yet 
the  bill  became  law.  Catulus  and  Hortensius  spoke  against  it, 
but  even  the  senators  were  divided  on  the  question.      Caesar 


xxxiv]  End  of  Mithradates  371 

supported  it,  and  Cicero,  now  praetor,  made  his  first  political 
speech  on  the  popular  side. 

478.  Pompey  hastened  to  supersede  Lucullus,  who  had  now 
to  submit  to  all  the  mortifications  that  his  successor  chose  to 
inflict.  Pompey  was  jealous  and  ungenerous  all  through  his 
career.  Lucullus  on  his  return  to  Rome  was  persecuted  by  the 
'  popular '  faction.  Only  strerfuous  efforts  of  the  '  best  men '  at 
last  procured  him  the  honour  of  a  triumph.  But  he  was  disgusted 
with  political  life,  and  very  seldom  took  part  in  public  affairs. 
He  lived  in  an  elegant  and  luxurious  style,  a  refined  and  wealthy 
noble,  surrounded  by  literary  men,  and  famed  for  his  splendid 
mansions^nd  his  fishponds.  But  his  campaigns  in  the  East  had 
broken  the  power  of  Mithradates,  and  he  was  certainly  a  man 
of  great  merit,  worthy  of  a  better  fate.  He  had  laboured,  and 
Pompey  entered  into  his  labours.  Pompey  understood  how  to 
manage  soldiers  far  better  than  Lucullus.  Even  the  Fimbrian 
legions  were  ready  to  continue,  their  long  service  under  him. 
Mithradates  was  easily  defeated,  and  in  65  he  withdrew  with  the 
relics  of  his  army  to  his  Bosporan  kingdom.  There  he  got  rid 
of  his  son  Machares,  and  began  to  raise  new  forces,  intending, 
it  is  said,  to  renew  the  struggle  with  Rome  by  passing  through  the 
Danube  countries  and  descending  on  Italy  from  the  North.  For 
about  two  years  he  was  scheming  and  raging,  beset  by  disaffection 
and  treachery.  At  la^t  his  favourite  son  Pharnaces  rebelled 
against  him,  and  seduced  the  army.  The  old  king  found  no 
refuge  but  in  death.  We  have  no  reason  to  think  that,  if  he 
had  driven  Rome  out  of  Asia  Minor,  civilization  would  have 
gained  by  his  victory.  Reaction  of  East  against  West  oq  the 
lines  of  Mithradates  was  at  bottom  a  reversion  to  the  ancient 
system  of  an  empire  under  a  Great  King  or  Sultan.  He  used 
Greeks  for  his  own  purposes,  as  the  Romans  did,  but  it  is  most 
unlikely  that  under  his  rule  the  Greeks  would  have  flourished 
better  than  they  did  afterwards  under  the  Romans.  In  him  we 
see  both  thie  weakness  and  the  strength  of  absolute  monarchy. 
In  the  Roman  Republic  we  see  the  enormous  difficultly  of  setting 
in  motion  a  really  irresistible  power.  The  friction  caused  by  the 
Senate's  jealousy  of  exceptional  men  had  always  to  be  overcome. 
In  overcoming  it,  the  authority  of  the  Senate  suffered,  but  there 
was  no  other  body  able  to  do  the  Senate's  work.  So  the  Republic 
was  shaken  by  the  rise  of  individuals  to  unrepublican  power.     As 

24 — 2 


372  Pompey  s  progress  and  [ch. 

Metellus  fell  and  Marius  rose  through  the  party-movements  con- 
nected with  the  Jugurthine  war,  so  Lucullus  fell  and  Pompey  rose 
through  the  intrigues  occasioned  by  the  war  with  Mithradates. 

479.  The  great  proconsul,  doubly  commissioned  to  act  for 
Rome  with  ample  forces  by  sea  and  land,  made  a  victorious 
progress  through  countries  and  peoples  accustomed  from  time 
immemorial  to  bow  before  overwhelming  power.  His  delight 
in  solemn  ceremony  was  congenial  to  the  East.  To  ensure  the 
due  publication  of  his  exploits  to  the  literary  world,  he  took  with 
him  the  Greek  Theophanes  as  a  court-historiographer.  The  over- 
throw of  Mithradates  was  quickly  followed  by  the  full  submission 
of  Tigranes.  In  65  a  successful  campaign  among  the  Albanians 
and  Iberians  taught  those  restless  peoples  to  respect  the  power 
of  Rome.  Pompey  made  no  regular  conquest  of  that  region,  and 
did  not  attempt  to  pass  the  mountain  barrier  of  the  Caucasus. 
Turning  southwards  again,  he  came  to  terms  with  the  Parthian 
king,  Phraates.  The  Euphrates  was  recognized  as  the  boundary 
of  the  two  empires,  so  that  Mesopotamia  was  Parthian  territory. 
Neither  party  wished  for  war,  but  the  relations  between  the  two 
were  hardly  those  of  sincere  friendship.  Armenia  was  reduced 
to  its  former  extent :  the  Parthian  recovered  some  provinces 
annexed  by  Tigranes,  and  Pompey  decided  to  annex  Syria  as  a 
province  to  Rome.  That  country  had  been  cut  off  from  Armenia 
by  Lucullus,  and  a  surviving  Seleucid  prince,  Antiochus  XIII,  was 
at  present  its  nominal  ruler.  In  and  around  the  district  properly 
known  as  Syria  were  a  number  of  principalities  now  practically 
independent,  though  once  vassals  of  Antioch.  There  were  also 
a  number  of  Greek  cities,  self-governing  and  desirous  of  peace 
and  order.  The  Jewish  kingdom  had  grown  through  profiting 
by  the  decay  of  Syria  and  Egypt.  It  was  now  disturbed  by  the 
competition  of  two  rivals  for  the  office  of  High  Priest.  What 
the  whole  country  needed  was  a  strong  central  power,  able  to 
keep  the  peace.  What  Pompey  did  was  to  substitute  Rome, 
represented  by  a  governor,  for  the  kings  of  the  house  of  Seleucus. 

480.  In  order  to  settle  the  Jewish  dispute  it  was  necessary 
to  reduce  the  temple  of  Jerusalem,  occupied  as  a  fortress  by  the 
faction  against  whose  candidate  Pompey  had  decided.  The  siege 
gave  trouble,  and  the  proconsul  thought  fit  to  rebuke  the  rebellious 
spirit  of  the  Jews  by  a  deHberate  outrage.  He,  a  Gentile,  insisted 
on  entering  the  Holy  of  Holies.    But  he  did  not  seize  the  treasures 


xxxiv]  the  settlement  of  the  East  37 


3 


of  the  temple.  In  his  scheme  for  the  Syrian  province  the  Jewish 
kingdom  was  included  with  others.  In  fact  the  province  was  an 
aggregate  of  tributary  principalities  and  cities.  The  latter  were 
mostly  'Greek';  that  is,  more  or  less  effective  centres  of  the 
Hellenistic  civilization  fostered  by  the  Seleucid  kings.  Pompey 
recognized  the  value  of  these  communities  as  promoting  order 
and  prosperity.  Both  in  Syria  and  elsewhere  he  encouraged 
them  by  grants  of  privileges,  by  strengthening  those  that  for 
any  reason  had  fallen  into  decay,  and  by  new  foundations.  This 
policy,  imitated  by  emperors  in  later  times,  served  to  hellenize 
the  East  under  the  protection  of  Rome,  and  much  of  the  later 
history  of  these  regions  was  profoundly  affected  thereby.  Another 
important  point  in  the  great  Pompeian  settlement  was  the  recogni- 
tion of  monarchy  as  a  form  of  government  suited  to  peoples  in 
a  certain  stage  of  civilization.  We  do  not  now  hear  of  the  deposi- 
tion of  a  king  as  the  grant  of  '  freedom '  so-called.  The  proconsul 
awards  thrones  as  a  matter  of  course.  These  kings  or  chiefs  hold 
their  places  under  Rome,  as  a  part  of  the  Roman  system,  during 
good  behaviour.  It  is  their  duty  and  their  interest  to  save  Rome 
trouble  and  expense.  This  policy  also  became  a  regular  principle 
of  Roman  imperial  practice.  Pompey  left  Syria  in  63,  and  spent 
the  winter  in  organizing  northern  Asia  Minor.  Pharnaces  had 
sent  him  the  corpse  of  Mithradates,  which  he  ordered  to  be 
buried  with  honour  aX  Sinope  in  the  sepulchre  of  the  Pontic 
kings. 

481.  The  details  of  the  eastern  settlement  were  briefly  these. 
Of  Provinces,  Cilicia  and  Bithynia  were  both  enlarged  by  the 
inclusion  of  districts  to  the  East.  Syria  was  new.  Of  Client 
kingdoms,  Ariobarzanes  was  recognized  in  Cappadocia,  and  a 
native  prince  in  inland  Paphlagonia.  Another  minor  principality 
was  Commagene  to  the  North  of  Syria.  In  Galatia  the  three 
tribes,  each  under  four  tetrarchs,  were  left  as  before,  but  the  real 
head  was  Deiotarus,  the  friend  of  Rome.  He  received  a  grant 
of  eastern  Pontus,  and  soon  rose  to  be  ruler  of  Galatia.  Two 
monarchs  were  recognized  as  Kings  allied  with  Rome,  Tigranes 
in  his  ancestral  kingdom  of  Armenia,  and  Pharnaces  in  the 
Cimmerian  Bosporus.  We  should  note  that  the  Province  Asia 
remained  as  organized  by  Sulla.  Lycia  remained  a  *  free '  federal 
League  allied  with  Rome.  Egypt  and  its  dependency  Cyprus 
were  not  touched.      Pompey  wisely  let  the    Egyptian  question 


374  Pompey's  return  [ch.  xxxiv 

alone.  In  fixing  boundaries  of  the  recognized  divisions  of  territory, 
and  in  determining  the  relations  between  the  various  communities 
and  the  sovran  power,  no  doubt  many  delicate  problems  had  to 
be  considered.  In  general  the  proconsul  seems  to  have  followed 
existing  arrangements  so  far  as  possible,  and  the  settlement  as 
a  whole  was  a  reasonable  and  practical  one.  That  he  had  under- 
stood how  to  manage  oriental  peoples  was  shewn  a  few  years  later, 
when  the  eastern  part  of  the  empire  shared  his  fortunes  in  the 
great  civil  war. 

482.  In  the  year  62  Pompey  travelled  homewards.  He  was 
in  no  hurry,  and  he  was  bent  upon  displaying  himself  in  the  cities 
of  the  Aegean  and  engaging  the  chief  centres  of  Greek  culture  to 
spread  his  fame.  At  Mitylene,  Ephesus,  Rhodes,  Athens,  and 
other  places,  he  appeared  as  patron,  in  some  as  benefactor, 
granting  privileges  or  giving  money.  Poets  and  rhetoricians 
performed  before  him  and  sang  his  praises.  His  army  was 
contented  with  the  rewards  and  profits  of  service.  Rome  was 
anxiously  awaiting  his  return,  not  without  reason,  as  we  shall 
see.  He  did  not  reach  the  city  till  early  in  61.  During  the 
last  four  years  he  must  have  received  from  time  to  time  news 
of  strange  doings  in  Rome,  which  will  form  the  subject  of  the 
next  chapter. 


CHAPTER    XXXV 

CICERO   AND    CATILINE.     66— 63  B.C. 

483.  While  Pompey  was  away  in  the  East,  the  course  of 
events  in  Rome  was  proving  the  extreme  need  of  a  strong  govern- 
ment and  the  impossibility  of  forming  one.  His  absence  on  the 
one  hand  left  others  free  to  push  their  own  designs.  The  prospect 
of  his  return,  on  the  other  hand,  weighed  on  the  minds  of  all 
prudent  men,  and  enjoined  caution.  What  if  he  chose  to  play 
the  part  of  a  Sulla?  Faction,  corruption,  violence,  were  the 
staple  of  Roman  politics.  Personal  interests  overrode  public 
considerations,  and  behind  all  was  a  peculiarly  mischievous 
influence,  the  pressure  of  debt  on  reckless  spendthrifts.  It  was  a 
difficult  time  for  patriots',  such  as  Cicero  and  M.  Porcius  Cato. 
Both  were  loyal  republicans,  strongly  opposed  to  any  movement 
imperilling  the  republican  constitution.  The  immediate  danger 
lay  in  the  promotion  of  individuals  in  defiance  of  constitutional 
rules.  The  demand  for  efficiency  was  a  good  cry  for  the  popular 
party.  Cicero  knew  very  well  that  the  policy  of  the  senatorial 
nobles  meant  inefficiency,  and  he  had  openly  supported  the 
Manilian  law.  But  he  also  knew  that  such  commissions  as  that 
given  to  Pompey  must,  if  often  repeated,  make  an  end  of  the 
Republic.  He  therefore  felt  drawn  to  the  party  of  the  'best  men,' 
arfd  the  endeavour  to  create  a  strong  government  by  cooperation 
of  the  two  wealthy  Orders  became  the  aim  of  his  political  life. 
He  was  an  opportunist,  ready  to  sacrifice  some  of  his  principles 
to  gain  ends  that  seemed  more  important.  Cato  was  very 
different.  A  hard  temperament,  developed  by  Stoic  training, 
made  him  more  the  fighting  man  of  the  republican  cause.  But 
the  "Republic  was  an  essentially  aristocratic  institution,  and  neither 
of  these  men  were  typical  aristocrats,  such  as  Catulus^  Lucullus, 


37^  The  anti-Pompeian  intrigues  [ch. 

the  Metelli,  and  others.  Cato  acted  on  principle,  an  eccentric 
being.  Cicero,  whom  circumstances  were  about  to  thrust  into  a 
front  place,  was  a  'new  man,'  with  a  vast  reverence  for  the  great 
houses,  and  conscious  that  to  them  he  was  no  better  than  an 
upstart. 

484.  But  it  was  the  movements  of  the  '  popular  '  party  that 
made  the  time  of  Pompey's  absence  important  in  the  history  of 
Rome.  And  direct  proposals  and  indirect  intrigues  alike  derived 
most  of  their  force  from  the  presence  of  Crassus  and  Caesar.  It 
is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  two  were  wire-pulling  behind 
the  scenes.  Crassus  was  the  elder  and  a  millionaire,  creditor  of 
many  men,  of  Caesar  among  them.  But  it  was  Caesar's  cleverness 
and  popularity  that  supplied  the  real  guidance  and  driving-power. 
In  the  year  66  political  strife  continued  in  the  form  of  trials 
before  the  public  courts,  and  rioting.  The  consuls  elected  for 
65,  P.  Autronius  Paetus  and  P.  Cornelius  Sulla,  were  prosecuted 
for  bribery  and  unseated.  Catiline  was  only  prevented  from 
being  a  candidate  by  a  threatened  prosecution  for  extortion  in 
Africa,  where  he  had  been  propraetor  in  67.  A  plot  was  laid  to 
murder  the  two  new^consuls,  and  recover  the  consulships  for 
Paetus  and  Sulla  by  force.  It  failed;  and  was  renewed,  and  was 
thwarted  a  second  time.  Catiline  and  3?  turbulent  young  man, 
Cn.  Calpurnius  Piso,  were  probably  concerned  in  it.  But  later  in 
the  year  (65);  when  Catiline  was  on  his  trial,  the  very  consul  who 
had  foiled  the  plot  appeared  with  others  to  support  the  accused. 
And  the  Senate  was  induced  to  make  a  special  appointment  for 
Piso  in  Spain.  These  mysterious  affairs  need  explanation.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  jealousy  of  Pompey  was  at  the  bottom  of  both. 
Catiline  was  likely  to  be  useful  to  Crassus  and  Caesar.  Piso  was 
sent  to  Spain  to  raise  forces  there  and  form  a  military  base  for 
the  party  opposed  to  Pompey.  In  the  Senate  many  were  desirous 
to  prevent  the  rise  of  Pompey  to  autocratic  power.  It  is  to  be 
inferred  that  a  common  interest  had  led  the  two  anti-Pompeian 
sections  to  sink  differences  and  work  together. 

485.  In  the  year  65  there  were  censors.  Both  were  opposed 
to  the  aggrandisement  of  Pompey,  Catulus  as  a  republican, 
Crassus  as  a  rival.  But  here  their  agreement  ended.  Crassus, 
prompted  by  Caesar,  was  for  enrolling  the  Transpadane  '  Latins ' 
as  citizens,  and  for  declaring  Egypt  a  Province.  Catulus  was 
against  both  schemes.     So  the  censors  presently  resigned  without 


xxxv]  Caesar  and  Cato  '^'j'] 

acting,  and  there  was  no  census.  Catulus  thus  prevailed  for  the 
moment,  and  a  law  {lex  Papia)  was  even  carried  for  expulsion  of 
aliens  from  Rome.  So  the  Transpadanes  were  repulsed  in  the 
old  style.  The  annexation  of  Egypt  was  desired  as  a  means  of 
checking  Pompey,  for  it  was  to  be  occupied  by  Caesar.  But 
this  plan  was  too  much  for  the  aristocrats,  who  wanted  to  lower 
Pompey  without  raising  up  a  rival  claimant  to  excessive  power. 
The  trial  of  Catiline  ended  in  an  acquittal  in  spite  of  his  notorious 
guilt.  He  secured  a  corrupt  jury  by  bribing^  his  accuser,  and 
then  bribed  a  majority  of  jurors.  The  trial  of  C.  Cornelius, 
deferred  from  the  last  year,  also  ended  in  acquittal.  He  was 
attacked,  on  a  charge  of  maiestas,  for  having  when  tribune  in  67 
treated  a  colleague  with  disrespect  in  a  legislative  Assembly. 
The  aristocrats  wanted  to  ruin  him,  but  the  popular  party  would 
not  let  him  be'  sacrificed.  Such  was  the  working  of  the  public 
courts. 

486.  The  state  of  things  is  illustrated  by  the  doings  of  two 
junior  magistrates.  Caesar  was  aedile.  He  made  full  use  of  the 
office  to  win  popularity  by  shows  and  bounties  of  unprecedented 
splendour.  He  borrowed  and  spent  vast  sums  himself,  and 
managed  to  join  forces  with  his  colleague  M.  Calpurnius  Bibulus 
so  dexterously  that  he  got  all  the  credit  for  what  both  had  spent. 
One  night  he  had  the  old  trophies  of  Marius  set  up  in  the  places 
whence  Sulla  had  removed  them.  Thus  he  reminded  the  Roman 
commons  of  their  popular  hero,  with  whom  he  claimed  connexion. 
The  aristocrats  were  angry,  and  Catulus  protested  ;  but  none 
dared  to  remove  the  trophies.  Cato  was  city  quaestor,  in  charge 
of  the  treasury,  with  its  store  of  specie  and  documents.  He  set 
about  reforming  the  management,  neglected  by  his  slack  prede- 
cessors. Subordinates  were  no  longer  allowed  to  control  a  lazy 
superior.  Cato  learnt  the  business,  and  made  good  progress  with 
getting  rid  of  arrears.  While  he  remained  in  office  he  was,  both 
as  official  and  as  a  senator,  a  check  on  jobbery.  He  made  an 
effort  to  recover  for  the  state  the  sums  paid  out  by  Sulla  as  blood- 
money.  In  the  next  year  (64)  there  were  several  trials,  and  a  few 
convictions.  The  Marian  populares  seized  the  opportunity  to 
prosecute  some  of  Sulla's  agents  for  murders  in  the  time  of  pro- 
scriptions.    Caesar  was  then  presiding  in  the  murder-court,  and 

1  That  is,  by  procuring  his  corrupt   collusion  in  the  matter  of  reiectio 
iudicum.     See  §  446. 


2i7^  The  consular  election  of  64  B.C.  [ch. 

the  prosecutions  went  on  briskly :  but  he  was  said  to  have 
managed  matters  in  favour  of  Catiline,  who  was  acquitted.  So 
the  incorruptible  Cato,  a  champion  of  the  republican  aristocrats, 
gave  an  opportunity  to  the  other  side,  which  Caesar  and  his 
'  popular '  associates  had  no  scruple  in  turning  to  account. 

487.  The  news  of  Pompey's  successes  in  the  East,  and  the 
uncertainty  as  to  what  would  be  the  effect  of  his  return,  weighed 
heavily  on  Roman  party-politics.  The  senatorial  nobles  feared 
him  as  a  possible  autocrat.  They  were  willing  to  see  a  rival 
power  created  to  thwart  him,  but  not  to  assist  that  rival  power  to 
become  itself  dangerous.  The  financial  interest,  and  their  spokes- 
man Cicero,  were  loyal  to  the  absent  chief  whom  they  had 
supported.  Crassus  and  Caesar  were  bent  upon  strengthening 
themselves  before  it  was  too  late.  Their  present  aim  was  to 
capture  the  consulships  for  63,  and  thus  to  get  control  of  the 
constitutional  machinery.  Catiline,  already  twice  prevented  from 
being  a  candidate,  was  now  free  to  stand.  If  he  were  elected 
with  a  suitable  colleague,  Caesar  and  Crassus  would  be  masters  of 
Rome.  The  elections  in  the  summer  of  64  were  therefore  mo- 
mentous. Of  seven  candidates  only  three  need  mention.  Cicero 
the  '  new  man '  had  at  first  only  the  support  of  his  Equestrian 
connexion,  of  some  non-residents  from  municipal  towns,  and  of 
persons  attached  to  him  by  his  services  as  orator  or  by  skilful 
canvassing.  This  was  not  enough  :  he  must  be  backed  either  by 
the  '  popular '  party  or  by  the  '  best  men.'  At  one  time  he 
thought  of  joining  forces  with  Catiline,  whom  he  had  been  not 
unwilling  to  defend  in  court,  though  convinced  of  his  guilt.  But 
other  arrangements  had  been  made.  The  destined  partner  of 
Catiline  was  C.  Antonius,  a  son  of  the  great  orator  and  brother 
of  the  man  who  failed  in  Crete.  He  was  a  man  of  bad  character, 
deeply  in  debt,  and  sure  to  be  a  tool  of  Catiline  and  his  employers. 
Catiline  himself  was  a  leading  spirit  in  the  corrupt  circles  of  dissi- 
pated society.  The  '  best  men '  were  lukewarm  or  divided,  and 
he  seemed  likely  to  succeed,  and  to  carry  in  Antonius. 

488.  New  men  seldom  reached  the  consulship,  and  the 
tradition  was  now  backed  by  the  influence  of  Caesar  and  the 
purse  of  Crassus.  But  Catiline  and  Antonius  could  not  abstain 
from  words  and  acts  that  betrayed  their  intention  to  rule  Rome 
by  revolutionary  violence.  Once  the  aristocrats  saw  what  was  in 
prospect,  they  swallowed  their  pride,  and  threw  all  their  strength 


xxxv]  Cicero  and  the  situation  379 

into  support  of  Cicero,  in  order  to  keep  out  the  dangerous 
Catiline.  This  gave  Cicero  the  lead.  He  was  returned  first,  and 
Antonius  just  secured  the  second  place.  The  'best  men'  had 
very  nearly  been  caught  napping.  Shortly  before  the  election, 
when  they  were  already  alarmed,  Cicero  had  strengthened  his 
position  by  a  powerful  address  to  the  Senate.  This  was  the 
'  speech  in  the  white  gown,'  the  robe  of  a  candidate.  He  not 
only  denounced  Antonius  and  Catiline,  but  exposed  the  intrigues 
that  were  going  on.  He  did  not  name  Crassus  and  Caesar,  but 
he  described  them,  and  convinced  the  House  of  the  reality  and 
true  source  of  the  danger.  By  this  speech  he  announced  that  he 
had  broken  with  the  popular  party  for  good.  The  support  of  the 
two  wealthy  Orders  made  him  consul :  how  to  keep  the  great 
nobles  and  the  Knights  in  harmony  was  henceforth  his  problem. 
His  first  anxiety  was  to  prevent  Antonius  from  giving  trouble  as 
his  colleague  in  office.  This  he  did  cheaply.  The  provinces 
selected  for  the  consuls  of  6"3  to  hold  in  62  were  Macedonia  and 
Cisalpine  Gaul.  Antonius  drew  the  latter,  where  there  was  little 
prospect  of  plunder  to  restore  him  to  solvency.  Cicero  offered 
him  Macedonia  in  exchange.  The  bankrupt  gladly  accepted  the 
offer,  and  agreed  to  abstain  from  factious  opposition.  Cicero  did 
not  want  to  be  drawn  away  from  Rome  by  a  provincial  charge, 
and  obliged  a  friend^  by  getting  Cisalpine  Gaul  transferred  to 
him.  Thus,  before  he  entered  on  office,  he  deprived  the  popular 
leaders  of  the  help  of  their  partisan  consul. 

489.  Rome  was  now  on  the  eve  of  a  party  strugggle  between 
opthnates  and  populares.  For  the  moment  there  was  no  great 
army  at  hand  to  overawe  either  side,  so  the  factions  were  left  to 
fight  it  out  with  the  means  at  their  disposal.  The  war  of  prose- 
cutions dragged  on  for  a  good  part  of  the  year  64,  and  then  died 
down.  The  wire-pullers  of  the  popular  party  were  not  idle. 
They  still  hoped  to  find  a  base  of  military  power  in  Spain. 
Piso's  enterprise  had  failed,  for  the  Spaniards  killed  him  :  a 
certain  P.  Sittius  was  now  sent  out  as  a  private  adventurer  to 
watch  opportunities.  The  real  director  of  all  their  movements 
was  Caesar,  who  alone  understood  how  to  manage  Crassus,  and 
most  of  the  tribunes  for  63  were  at  their  service.  In  facing  them 
the  aristocrats  were  at  some  disadvantage.  For  his  year  of  office, 
Cicero  must  hold  the   first   place.     But   he  was  a  very  recent 

1  Q.  Metellus  Cekr. 


380  The  agrarian  law  [ch. 

recruit  in  their  ranks.  Great  nobles  did  not  like  being  led  by  a 
New  Man.  They  were  willing  to  make  full  use  of  his  high 
character  and  his  eloquence.  But  they  did  not  mean  to  let  him 
lead  them  into  trouble,  or,  if  things  went  wrong,  to  make  any 
sacrifices  in  support  of  an  upstart.  If  the  new  consul  was  to 
carry  them  with  him  in  an  emergency,  he  would  need  all  his 
cleverness  and  tact.  Moreover  tribunes,  who  entered  office  on 
the  loth  December,  always  had  the  start  of  consuls.  When 
Cicero  became  consul  on  the  ist  January  63,  a  number  of  pro- 
posals were  already  before  the  people,  though  the  actual  text  of 
the  bills  was  not  in  all  cases  already  published.  This  democratic 
programme  included  the  restoration  of  the  children  of  Sulla's 
victims  to  full  civic  rights,  reduction  of  debts,  the  relief  of  the 
two  consuls  unseated  for  bribery  in  66  by  lessening  the  penalty, 
and  a  grand  scheme  for  allotments  of  land.  Some  of  these  pro- 
posals were  either  foiled  or  withdrawn  or  deferred.  The  agrarian 
scheme  at  once  became  the  battlefield  of  a  struggle  in  which  the 
consul's  power  as  an  orator  was  put  to  an  exceptional  strain. 

490.  The  bill  stood  in  the  name  of  the  tribune  P.  Servilius 
Rullus,  but  its  real  author  was  Caesar.  It  professed  to  be  a 
beneficent  scheme  for  settling  the  pauper  mob  of  Rome  on  allot- 
ments in  Italy,  which  (following  earlier  precedents)  were  to  pass 
from  father  to  son,  but  the  holders  were  to  have  no  power  of 
sale.  But  where  was  the  state  to  find  land  for  the  purpose? 
There  was  very  little  state-land  left  in  Italy,  and  hardly  any  that 
was  not  already  held  by  state-tenants  paying  rent.  The  wild  hill- 
pastures  were  unsuited  for  allotments.  To  resume  the  lands 
assigned  by  Sulla  was  impossible  :  the  storm  raised  would  wreck 
the  bill.  Purchase  from  private  owners  was  the  only  possible 
plan.  Therefore  the  real  gist  of  the  bill  lay  in  the  means  pro- 
posed for  raising  the  money.  This  was  in  short  a  power  of  selling 
(with  a  few  trifling  exceptions)  all  the  state-domains  in  Italy  or 
abroad.  For  instance,  all  Bithynia,  and  the  new  annexations  of 
Pompey,  were  part  of  the  immense  area  affected.  The  language 
was  so  loose  that  Cicero  could  declare  that  the  sale-clauses  might 
be  held  to  include  Egypt,  which  the  last  genuine  Ptolemy  was 
said  to  have  bequeathed  to  Rome.  Of  course  an  actual  sale  of 
all  these  lands  was  out  of  the  question.  Power  was  therefore 
given  to  lay  a  rent  or  tax  on  what  was  not  sold.  From  these 
sources,  and  from  the  booty  lately  acquired  in  the  East,  a  vast 


xxxv]  Oratorical  triumphs  of  Cicero  381 

fund  would  be  raised.     The  purchase-clauses  devoted  this  to  the 
purchase  of  land  in  Italy  for  allotment  to  the  poor. 

491.  These  powers  were  to  be  vested  in  a  commission  of 
ten,  who  were  authorized  to  decide  what  was  and  was  not  state 
property.  They  were  to  hold  the  imperium  of  propraetors  in 
order  to  enforce  their  orders.  They  were  to  decide  what  to  buy 
and  what  not.  Candidates  for  election  had  to  appear  in  person, 
and  thus  Pompey  was  excluded.  Indeed  there  is  little  doubt 
that  the  whole  scheme  was  designed  by  Caesar  to  set  up  an 
authority  in  opposition  to  Pompey.  If  it  had  become  law,  Caesar 
would  have  been  master  of  the  commission,  and  would  have  used 
it  for  his  own  ends.  In  opposing  it  Cicero  delivered  four 
speeches.  His  line  was  to  shew  that  the  professed  object  of  the 
bill  was  not  the  real  one,  and  to  expose  the  infinite  openings  for 
favouritism  and  jobbery  created  by  it.  This  would  be  heard 
without  surprise.  Moreover  the  city  mob  did  not  want  to  leave 
the  pleasures  and  perquisites  of  city  life  for  hard  work  on  lonely 
farms.  And  they  would  not  have  access  to  the  great  fund  that  it 
was  proposed  to  raise.  So  the  project  evoked  no  popular  enthu- 
siasm, and  Cicero  with  great  skill  reminded  them  of  all  they 
stood  to  lose  by  accepting  the  offered  boon,  if  it  ever  came  to  a 
real  offer.  So  the  bill  had  to  be  withdrawn.  Cicero  had  scored 
a  point.  Caesar  was  for  the  time  foiled,  but  there  was  no  lack  of 
questions  that  might  be  raised  to  embarrass  the  party  in  power. 
Attacks  followed  thick  and  fast,  and  the  consul  was  compelled  to 
meet  them.  But,  if  worried  without  mercy,  he  was  at  heart  not 
sorry  for  the  chance  of  proving  that  his  oratorical  gifts  were  equal 
to  the  task. 

492.  When  the  rabble  (probably  prompted)  raised  a  clamour 
against  the  reservation  of  seats  in  the  theatre  for  the  Knights, 
Cicero  talked  them  into  good  humour.  Then  the  right  of  the 
Senate  to  proclaim  martial  law  in  emergencies  by  issuing  its  '  last 
decree'  was  called  in  question  under  the  form  of  a  trial.  An 
aged  senator,  C.  Rabirius,  was  said  to  have  been  the  actual 
slayer  of  Saturninus  in  the  affray  of  the  year  100.  He  was  now 
impeached  under  an  obsolete  procedure  on  a  charge  of  high 
treason  {perduellio).  The  Assembly  by  Centuries  had  to  deal 
with  the  case  on  appeal,  and  the  consul  addressed  a  meeting  in 
his  defence,  or  rather  in  defence  of  the  Senate.  The  formal  vote 
of  the  Centuries  was  never  taken,  for  the  Assembly  was  broken 


382  Caesar  chief  pontiff  [ch. 

up  by  a  trick  as  obsolete  as  the  procedure.  If  further  proceedings 
were  threatened,  nothing  came  of  it.  The  matter  was  allowed  to 
drop,  and  the  Senate  retained  their  challenged  power.  So  too 
the  proposal  to  rehabilitate  the  children  of  Sulla's  victims  was 
defeated  by  Cicero  on  the  plea  that  at  the  present  juncture  more 
harm  than  good  would  result.  It  was  not  a  question  of  much 
interest  to  the  pauper  mob.  But  they  grudged  the  perquisites 
monopolized  by  the  rich,  and  from  this  point  of  view  a  reform 
attempted  by  the  consul  was  popular.  Senators  who  wanted  to 
travel  on  their  own  private  business  contrived,  by  favour  of  the 
House,  to  do  so  at  the  public  cost.  A  man  made  a  titular 
legatus  without  duties  was  said  to  have  a  legatio  libera,  and  such 
'  free  deputations '  were  a  vexatious  addition  to  the  burdens  of 
Rome's  provincial  subjects.  Cicero  tried  to  abolish  the  practice 
by  law,  but  all  he  could  carry  was  a  limitation  to  a  duration  of 
one  year.     And  this  was  ineffectual. 

493.  The  real  strength  of  Caesar  as  a  popular  favourite 
appeared  in  the  contest  for  the  place  of  chief  pontiff,  vacant  by 
the  death  of  Metellus  Pius.  This  post,  tenable  for  life,  made  the 
holder  the  head  of  the  state  religion,  chairman  of  the  pontifical 
college,  trustee  of  sacred  property,  judge  of  religious  questions 
and  scruples,  and  gave  him  in  these  capacities  a  great  political 
power.  Pompey  was  absent.  Caesar  first  procured  the  abolition 
of  the  system  of  selection  by  the  college  itself  (which  Sulla  had 
restored),  reverting  to  the  election  by  17  of  the  35  Tribes.  He 
then  stood  against  two  older  men  of  high  rank,  and  bribed 
heavily.  He  refused  an  offer  of  a  large  sum  if  he  would  retire. 
He  won,  and  the  charge  of  Roman  religious  affairs  passed  under 
the  presidency  of  a  freethinker.  Thus  the  earHer  part  of  the  year 
was  a  time  of  much  conflict  and  disturbance.  The  aristocrats 
had  managed  to  hold  their  ground  fairly  well,  thanks  to  the 
efforts  of  Cicero.  And  now  the  elections  for  62  were  coming  on. 
There  were  four  candidates  for  the  consulships.  D.  lunius 
Silanus  and  L.  Licinius  Murena  were  men  of  ordinary  type,  and 
were  on  the  side  of  the  government,  as  was  also  Servius  Sulpicius 
Rufus,  the  first  jurist  of  the  day.  The  fourth  was  Catiline, 
probably  supported  by  Crassus  and  Caesar,  though  less  warmly 
than  before.  He  was  drifting  away  from  party-politics,  and  his 
most  earnest  backers  werp  the  debauched  and  embarrassed  men 
and  women  who   saw  their  only  hope  in  a  general  attack   on 


xxxv]  The  conspiracy  of  Catiline  383 

property  and  cancelling  of  debts.  He  might,  if  consul,  be  a 
thorn  in  the  side  of  the  rich.  But  men  of  property  were  now  on 
their  guard,  and  his  chances  of  success  doubtful  at  the  best.  Nor 
would  Caesar  and  Crassus  have  allowed  him  to  carry  out  a  policy 
of  repudiation.     Still  he  persisted  in  his  candidature. 

494.  There  were  plenty  of  discontented  men  in  Italy,  par- 
ticularly in  northern  Etruria.  A  number  of  impoverished  fellows, 
ready  for  mischief,  were  gathered  at  Faesulae  under  one  C.  Man- 
lius,  an  old  Sullan,  who  was  in  league  with  Catiline,  and  was  to 
bring  up  a  large  gang  for  the  election.  Others  were  busy  bribing 
voters.  Only  Sulpicius  refrained.  He  complained  to  the  Senate, 
and  the  House  not  only  voted  certain  practices  illegal  under  the 
existing  law,  but  instructed  the  consuls  to  prepare  a  new  one. 
With  the  help  of  suspension  of  religious  hindrances,  Cicero 
hurried  through  a  severe  lex  Tullia  in  time  for  the  election  in 
July.  Meanwhile  Catiline  was  becoming  desperate.  He  used 
language  in  the  Senate  that  .sounded  as  a  threat  of  bloody  revolu- 
tion. To  his  supporters  he  was  said  to  have  spoken  in  plainer 
terms.  Cicero  called  for  a  denial  of  the  report  in  the  Senate,  but 
Catiline  replied  with  insult  and  defiance.  Cicero  took  pre- 
cautions against  open  violence,  and  held  the  election.  Sulpicius 
had  spoilt  his  own  chances  by  relying  on  bribery-laws  instead  of 
bribing.  So,  for  fear  of  letting  in  CatiUne,  some  voters  threw 
over  the  lawyer  and  gave  their  second  votes  to  Murena,  who  was 
elected  together  with  Silanus.  Sulpicius  at  once  announced  that 
he  would  prosecute  Murena  under  the  Tullian  law,  and  Cato 
promised  to  support  the  charge.  The  defeat  of  Catiline  threw 
him  back  upon  his  own  ruined  and  desperate  circle.  What  had 
been  an  infamous  association  at  once  became  an  anarchist  con- 
spiracy. 

495.  How  was  it  that  a  plot  for  overthrowing  the  govern- 
ment could  seem  to  have  any  prospect  of  success  ?  Manlius  and 
his  band  went  back  to  Faesulae,  where  he  raised  and  armed  more 
men.  As  there  was  no  standing  police-force,  the  only  way  of 
dispersing  his  army  was  by  raising  troops  for  the  government. 
This  the  consul  had  not  yet  been  authorized  to  do.  The  Senate, 
shaken  by  the  popular  movements  of  recent  years,  was  timid. 
Men  were  afraid  to  commit  themselves  to  a  strong  policy  on  the 
faith  of  rumours  that  might  prove  to  be  exaggerated.  Cicero 
might  enjoy  playing  a  leading  part :  noble  members  must  take 


384  Cicero  and  the  conspiracy  [ch. 

care  that  the  New  Man  did  not  lead  them  into  an  untenable 
position.  So  the  insolence  of  Catiline  had  been  allowed  to  pass 
without  any  strong  resolution  of  the  House,  and  the  consul  could 
not  yet  take  public  action  against  the  conspiracy.  The  forces 
under  Manlius  were  not  of  themselves  enough  to  overthrow  the 
government,  but  the  government  had  none  ready.  Italy  would 
not  of  its  own  accord  rise  and  put  down  the  rebels.  All  turned 
on  the  course  of  events  in  Rome.  Manlius  was  waiting  for  orders 
from  the  city.  The  city  was  full  of  gossip  and  suspicion,  and 
reported  prodigies  infected  the  superstitious  rabble  with  alarm. 
There  was  no  lack  of  desperate  ruffians  prepared  to  pillage  and 
destroy.  What  really  saved  Rome  was  not  the  inner  strength  of 
the  government,  but  the  inner  weakness  of  those  who  plotted  to 
overthrow  it.  Their  aims  were  inconsistent.  To  raise  outside" 
Rome  a  force  able  to  carry  all  before  it,  rural  slaves  must  be 
enlisted  wholesale.  In  Rome  itself,  a  mere  disorderly  outbreak 
of  plunder  and  massacre  would  give  the  spoils  of  the  rich  to  the 
roughest  elements  of  the  city  mob.  This  was  not  what  the  ruined 
spendthrifts  desired.  They  wanted  the  spoils  of  the  rich  for 
their  own  use,  to  enjoy  a  fresh  start  in  luxury  and  dissipation.  A 
new  slave-war  was  not  to  their  taste,  so  Catiline  forbade  the 
arming  of  slave-gangs  in  Etruria.  Their  domestic  slaves  might 
be  useful  in  the  city  when  the  hour  came  for  rising,  but  infinite 
care  would  be  needed  to  ensure  that  the  plunder  should  fall  into 
the  right  hands,  their  own.  This  manifestly  required  organiza- 
tion, and  therefore  time.  And  the  same  waiting  that  gave  time 
to  Catiline  also  gave  time  to  Cicero. 

496.  While  the  conspirators  plotted  and  took  oaths  in  secret 
meetings,  the  consul  watched  them  through  spies  as  best  he 
could.  And  now  the  passions  of  one  of  the  gang  led  to  a 
betrayal.  Enamoured  of  a  mercenary  Roman  lady  named  Fulvia, 
this  man  divulged  his  secret.  She  reported  it  to  the  consul,  who 
engaged  her  as  a  paid  spy.  Henceforth  he  got  regular  news  of 
their  plans  and  doings,  and  certain  knowledge  of  the  names  of 
the  leading  men.  They  were  a  motley  company,  ranging  from 
senators  to  freedmen.  A  few  Knights  were  of  the  number,  and 
some  came  from  municipal  towns.  All  were  men  who  had  failed, 
all  wanted  money.  No  strong  leader  for  the  rising  in  the  city 
(for  Catiline  would  command  their  field-army)  had  been  found. 
The  disreputable  P.  Cornelius  Lentulus  was  a  lethargic  figure- 


xxxv]  Catiline  outgeneralled  385 

head.  C.  Cornelius  Cethegus  was  hasty  and  unwise.  We  should 
bear  in  mind  that  the  two  parts  of  the  enterprise  needed  to  be 
carried  out  in  exact  combination,  and  that  from  Rome  to  Faesulae 
was  about  200  miles  journey.  A  day  late  in  October  was  fixed 
for  the  rising,  and  Cicero  knew  it.  But  in  order  to  deal  with  it 
he  needed  the  authority  given  by  the  '  last  decree '  of  the  Senate, 
and  the  Senate  still  hung  back.  One  day  he  produced  in  the 
House  a  packet  of  sealed  letters,  addressed  to  various  senators, 
mysteriously  delivered  to  Crassus  the  night  before.  When  opened, 
all  were  found  to  contain  warnings  of  the  massacre  designed  by 
-  Catiline,  and  a  member  told  the  House  some  news  that  had 
reached  him  of  the  doings  at  Faesulae.  Whether  the  whole 
affair  had  been  got  up  by  the  consul  to  alarm  first  Crassus  and 
then  the  Senate,  we  cannot  tell.  At  all  events  it  had  that  effect. 
It  was  the  21st  October,  and  Cicero  assured  members  that  the 
day  fixed  for  the  outbreak  was  close  at  hand.  The  decree  was 
passed.  The  consul  at  once  took  steps  for  the  public  safety. 
The  date  named  went  by,  and  no  rising  occurred.  Men  began 
to  fancy  that  Cicero's  nervousness  had  made  much  out  of  little. 
But  at  the  very  end  of  October  news  came  that  Manlius  had 
begun  the  revolt.  It  was  clear  that  he  had  acted  on  orders  which 
there  had  not  been  enough  time  to  countermand. 

497.  The  project  of  Catiline  was  wrecked.  The  consul's 
plans  had  been  ready  before  he  was  authorized  to  act,  and  amid 
the  general  alarm  of  all  who  had  anything  to  lose  he  acted  boldly. 
Troops  were  raised,  important  positions  were  guarded,  and  a 
force  levied  in  Picenum  to  protect  the  North.  Rome  was  patrolled 
by  soldiers.  Catiline,  anxious  to  join  Manlius,  and  wanting  to 
leave  Rome  in  confusion,  now  formed  detailed  plans  for  a  simul- 
taneous conflagration  in  several  parts  of  the  city,  with  a  massacre 
of  the  wealthy.  But  he  dared  not  start  till  the  consul  had  been 
got  rid  of.  So  it  was  agreed  at  a  secret  meeting  that  Cicero  was 
to  be  murdered  next  morning,  and  the  ground  thus  cleared  for 
the  city-conspirators.  This  plan  failed,  Cicero  having  timely 
warning.  Next  day  (8th  November)  the  consul  gave  the  Senate 
a  full  account  of  the  designs  of  Catiline,  who  even  now  appeared 
in  the  House.  Cicero  told  him  to  go  and  join  his  rebel  army. 
It  was  to  no  purpose  that  he  posed  as  a  Patrician  of  the  once 
illustrious  Sergian  house,  and  sneered  at  the  New  Man  who 
posed  as  the  saviour  of  Rome.  The  members  would  have  no 
H.  25 


386  The  Allobrogian  envoys  [ch. 

more  of  him,  and  that  night  he  left  for  Faesulae.  On  the  9th 
Cicero  addressed  a  public  meeting.  It  was  necessary  to  calm 
popular  excitement,  in  particular  to  let  dangerous  characters  know 
that  disorder  and  robbery  would  be  promptly  suppressed.  But 
he  was  far  from  easy  in  his  own  mind.  The  other  chief  con- 
spirators were  still  in  Rome.  He  knew  that  he  must  do  nothing 
to  compromise  the  senatorial  aristocrats  on  whose  behalf  he  was 
holding  the  post  of  danger.     So  he  continued  to  walk  warily. 

498.  While  the  actual  conflict  was  still  delayed,  Murena's 
trial  in  the  bribery-court  came  on.  Cicero  with  Hortensius  and 
Crassus  conducted  the  defence.  They  had  a  weak  case.  It  was 
not  the  innocence  of  the  accused,  nor  the  consul's  witty  speech, 
in  which  he  made  fun  of  lawyers  (Sulpicius)  and  Stoic  precisians 
(Cato),  that  gained  an  acquittal.  The  jury,  men  of  property,  felt 
that  this  was  hardly  the  moment  for  vindicating  purity  of  election 
regardless  of  consequences.  Cicero  pointed  out  the  danger  of 
having  only  one  consul  in  office  at  the  beginning  of  the  new  year, 
and  this  consideration  was  enough.  So  the  government  party 
kept  their  two  official  heads  for  the  year  62.  Meanwhile  the 
precautions  taken  in  Rome  and  elsewhere  served  their  purpose. 
The  only  serious  rising  was  that  in  Etruria.  Attempts  were  made 
to  damage  Cicero  by  representing  Catiline  as  an  injured  innocent, 
but  they  failed.  Towards  the  end  of  November  the  conspirators 
began  to  get  tired  of  waiting  for  Catiline,  who  could  not  come. 
An  army  under  the  consul  Antonius  lay  between  him  and  Rome, 
and  other  forces  menaced  him  from  other  sides.  At  last  Cethegus 
moved  Lentulus,  and  the  outbreak  in  the  city  was  fixed  for  the 
19th  December,  the  day  of  the  festival  Saturnalia.  This  long 
delay  was  a  blunder.  Still  the  consul,  though  eager  to  arrest  the 
leaders,  dared  not  do  so.  Nothing  short  of  the  most  damning 
evidence  would  make  it  safe  for  him  to  lay  hands  on  Roman 
nobles.  Accident  solved  the  difficulty.  The  Allobroges,  a  tribe 
in  Transalpine  Gaul,  worried  by  Roman  usurers,  sent  a  deputation 
to  seek  relief  from  the  Senate.  These  envoys,  approached  on 
behalf  of  the  city  conspirators,  and  invited  to  bear  a  part  in  the 
movement  by  procuring  cavalry  from  home  for  Catiline's  army, 
thought  it  more  to  their  people's  interest  to  do  a  service  to  the 
Roman  government.  Cicero  heard  their  story,  and  told  them  to 
approve  the  plot  and  to  promise  help,  but  to  insist  on  having 
documentary  proofs  written  and  sealed  by  the  chief  conspirators. 


xxxv]  Arrest  of  the  city  conspirators  387 

These  they  procured,  and  set  out  with  them  for  Gaul  by  way  of 
Faesulae  on  the  night  of  the  2nd  December,  accompanied  by  one 
of  the  men  in  the  plot.  Not  far  from  Rome  the  road  crossed  the 
Tiber  by  the  Mulvian  bridge.  Here  an  ambush  had  been  laid, 
and  the  whole  party  were  taken. 

499.  Early  on  the  3rd  the  consul  had  a  search  made.  A 
store  of  arms  and  combustibles  was  found  in  the  house  of 
Cethegus.  He  laid  his  evidence  before  the  Senate,  the  hand- 
writing and  seals  of  the  letters  were  verified,  and  the  guilt  of  the 
men  was  perfectly  clear.  Lentulus,  who  was  a  praetor,  was  called 
upon  to  resign  his  office,  and  did.  He  and  the  rest,  five  in  all, 
were  placed  in  the  custody  of  some  senators,  of  whom  Caesar 
and  Crassus  were  two.  All  the  proceedings  were  carefully  re- 
ported, and  copies  sent  out  to  all  parts  of  Italy.  The  House 
voted  their  thanks  to  Cicero,  and  a  public  thanksgiving,  as  though 
for  a  great  victory  in  war.  To  calm  the  multitude,  and  reconcile 
them  to  the  measures  of  the  government,  he  addressed  a  public 
meeting.  He  claimed  to  have  saved  the  poor  from  having  their 
dwellings  burnt  and  being  left  without  shelter,  and  this  by  men 
who  were  willing  to  have  brought  their  old  enemies,  the  Gauls, 
into  Italy.  He  declared  their  present  safety  to  be  the  work  of 
Divine  providence.  But  he  also  hinted  that  he,  their  human 
protector,  might  himself  yet  need  their  loyal  support  to  defend 
him  from  the  assaults  of  enemies  provoked  in  the  course  of  his 
patriotic  duty.  For  the  present  he  was  popular.  What  awaited 
him  in  the  sequel  we  shall  see  below.  On  the  4th  some  futile 
attempts  were  made  to  implicate  Crassus  and  Caesar  in  the  plot, 
and  a  plan  for  rescuing  the  prisoners  was  foiled.  But  the  main 
interest  was  in  the  meeting  of  the  Senate  on  the  5th,  when  the 
House  decided  what  was  to  be  done  with  the  guilty  five.  The 
Senate  was  not  a  court  of  justice.  If  the  men  were  to  suffer 
death  or  banishment,  it  would  be  by  the  act  of  the  consul.  In 
the  field  he  could  have  sent  them  to  execution,  for  the  full 
imperium  {militiae)  included  this  power.  Could  the  '  last  decree ' 
of  the  Senate  be  held  to  legalize  the  infliction  of  the  extreme 
penalty  by  one  who  only  had  the  imperium  {domi)  in  its  lesser 
degree?  That  was  the  practical  question  for  the  consul,  now 
near  the  end  of  his  year  of  office,  to  consider. 

500.  Of  the  famous  debate  we  can  only  note  the  main  point 
raised  in  the  speeches  of  Caesar,  praetor-elect,  and  Cato,  tribune- 

25 — 2 


388  End  of  Catiline  [ch.  xxxv 

elect.  Caesar  deprecated  the  proposal  to  put  the  men  to  death 
as  un-Roman,  unwise,  and  sure  to  cause  a  reaction  in  public 
feeling.  Thus  he  played  on  the  fears  of  the  timid  and  self- 
regarding  majority.  But  his  alternative  proposal  was  no  more 
within  the  Senate's  powers  than  the  death-penalty,  and  it  was  in 
truth  only  a  complicated  and  ingenious  sham.  That  he  dared  to 
make  it  shews  his  cool  audacity.  After  some  feeble  speeches 
from  wavering  members,  Cicero  asked  for  a  prompt  decision,  and 
(as  he  could  hardly  help  doing)  promised  to  carry  it  out,  be  it 
what  it  might.  The  men  were  public  enemies,  for  the  Senate 
had  said  so,  and  not  citizens,  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the 
laws  hinted  at  by  Caesar.  It  was  Cato  who  nerved  the  members 
to  vote  boldly,  in  logical  consistency  with  their  'last  decree.' 
The  execution  of  the  guilty  as  criminals  taken  in  the  act  would 
ruin  the  enterprise  of  Catiline.  He  carried  his  point.  Cicero, 
with  the  moral  support  of  the  Senate,  put  the  five  to  death  in  the 
dungeon  under  the  Capitoline  hill. 

501.  Cicero  was  now  at  the  height  to  which  he  had  long  and 
eagerly  aspired.  He  had  been  the  successful  champion  of  the 
nobles  and  men  of  property  in  general.  Caesar  was  under  a 
cloud.  His  life  was  threatened.  Till  the  first  of  January,  when 
he  would  enter  on  his  praetorship,  the  chief  pontiff  avoided  the 
sittings  of  the  Senate.  Meanwhile  a  few  small  outbreaks  in  Italy 
were  easily  suppressed,  and  the  government  forces  were  closing  in 
on  Catiline.  The  news  from  Rome  thinned  his  ranks.  M.  Petreius, 
deputed  by  the  unwilling  Antonius,  was  in  command  of  the  army 
that  met  the  desperate  remnant,  about  3000  men  only,  near 
Pistoria  on  the  5th  of  January.  The  battle  was  fierce  and  bloody. 
Catiline,  and  all  the  free  Romans  with  him,  died  fighting.  So 
ended  one  who  may  have  been  not  so  great  a  villain  as  our 
tradition  represents  him.  There  were  persons  to  whom  his  fall 
was  a  matter  of  regret. 


CHAPTER    XXXVI 


THE   YEARS    OF   UNCERTAINTY  62—60  B.C. 

502.     Early  in  62  Antonius  went  off  to  misgovern  the  Mace- 
donian province,  leaving  Cicero,  now  a  private  citizen,  in  Rome. 
The  events  of  the  year  63  had  shewn  that  the  civil  government 
could  still  assert  itself  without  depending  on  the  master  of  an  army. 
But  it  had  only  done  so  with  infinite  difficulty,  though  helped  by 
several  instances  of  good  luck,  and  though  the  master  of  the  one 
great  army  was  far  away.     No  real  revival  of  the  Republic  had 
taken  place,  as  the  circumstances  of  Pompey's  return  soon  proved. 
His  six  years  in  the  East  had  accustomed  him  to  an  imperial  posi- 
tion, and  left  him  out  of  touch  with  Roman  politics.    His  inclination 
to  stand  aloof  in  conscious  preeminence  was  stronger  than  ever, 
and  he  now  required  from  other  men  a  deference  which  few,  and 
least  of  all  the  Roman  aristocrats,  were  willing  to  shew.     But  his 
preeminence  was  a  fact.     His  error  was  in  supposing  that  in  Rome 
he  could  stand  on  it,  and  control  affairs,  without  the  support  of  a 
party.     Neither  optimates  nor  populares  really  wanted  him.     Both 
were  willing  to  turn  him  to  account  for  party  ends.     The  ruler  of 
the  East,  the  patron  of  kings,  was  in  Rome  a  sort  of  half-made 
Emperor.     He  could  not  be  ignored.     Who  would  capture  the 
great  man's  favour?     Would  the  republican  constitution  absorb 
him  as  one  of  the  senatorial  aristocrats  ?    Or  would  he  once  more 
strain  and  weaken  the  constitution  by  an  alliance  with  the  popular 
leaders  ?     In  any  case,  would  he  be  a  real  leader  and  guide,  with 
a  pohcy  of  his  own,  or  would  he  fall  under  the  influence  of  another? 
These  were  the  important  questions,  awaiting  their  answers  from 
events,  when  Pompey  returned  to  Rome. 


390  The  competition  for  Pompey  [ch. 

503.     On  his  homeward  journey  in  63  he  had  heard  of  the 
conspiracy  and  hoped  to  be  recalled  in  haste  to  deal  with  the 
crisis.    He  sent  Q.  Metellus  Nepos  to  Rome  in  time  to  be  elected 
tribune  for  62.     Nepos  was  elected,  but  when  he  entered  office 
(10  Dec.  62,)  it  was  too  late  to  send  for  Pompey.     He  knew  that 
the  great  man  would  be  mortified  to  find  that  people  at  home  had 
contrived  to  do  without  him,  so  he  set  about  making  trouble  for 
Cicero.     As  tribune-elect  he  had  questioned  the  legality  of  some 
of  the  consul's  acts.     And  now,  at  the  end  of  the  year,  when 
Cicero  wanted  to  make  a  speech  on  laying  down  office,  he  refused 
as  tribune  to  let  him  do  more  than  take  the  customary  oath.    The 
year  62  in  short  opened  badly  for  the  'Father  of  his  country'  as 
Cato  called  him.    Relatives  of  the  men  put  to  death  and  of  those 
afterwards  tried  and  banished  were  hostile.     Nepos  continued  to 
denounce  him,  and  the  displeasure  of  Pompey  could  be  traced 
in  the  behaviour  of  his  agent.     Now  Cicero  above  all  men  had 
been  loyal  to  the  absent  Pompey.    He  at  least  was  only  too  ready 
to  play  a  second  part  to  his  hero,  to  be  a  Laelius  to  this  new  Scipio. 
He  said  so  in  a  letter  describing  his  own  exploits,  and  looked  for 
congratulations,  which  never  came.     His  offence  was  that  he  had 
done  what  Pompey  would  have  been  willing  to  do.     Meanwhile 
Caesar  had  found  a  cheap  and  ready  means  of  winning  the  great 
man's  favour.     The  Capitoline  temple  had  been  dedicated  by 
Catulus,  but  was  not  complete.     Caesar  proposed  that  Pompey 
should  be  appointed  to  complete  it.     This  was  a  sly  blow  at 
Catulus,  a  great  compliment  to  Pompey,  who  never  had  enough 
of  compliments,   and   a  way  of  soothing   any   annoyance   that 
Pompey  might  feel  at  not  being  chief  pontiff.     The  proposal  had 
to  be  dropped  owing  to  the  opposition  of  the  nobles,  but  it  served 
Caesar's  purpose  all  the  better,  by  shewing  Pompey  how  jealous 
of  him  they  were.     So  too  with  the  proposal  to  recall  Pompey  in 
the  interests  of  order.    Nepos  still  urged  it,  and  Caesar  supported 
him.     Much  squabbling  and  rioting  took  place,  Cato  heading  the 
opposition.     Blood  was  shed,  and  the  Senate  had  great  difficulty 
in  getting  quiet  restored. 

504.  The  truth  is  that  the  government  was  incurably  weak. 
The  mob  resented  attempts  to  suppress  their  favourite  Caesar, 
and  even  Cato  consented  to  a  further  cheapening  of  corn  at  the 
state  cost,  in  order  to  quiet  them.  Pompey  was  coming,  and  no 
politician  could  tell  what  his  own  position  would  be,  till  the  great 


xxxvi]  Clodius  391 

man  came  and  took  his  place  in  public  life.  Cases  connected 
with  politics  were  being  heard  in  the  public  courts.  Cicero  suc- 
cessfully defended  P.  Cornelius  Sulla  and  the  poet  Archias.  The 
"former  was  charged  with  public  violence  {vis),  and  the  aim  was  to 
implicate  him  in  the  conspiracy  of  Catiline.  The  latter  was  ac- 
cused of  improperly  assuming  the  Roman  franchise,  and  the  attack 
was  really  meant  to  annoy  the  Greek  poet's  patron  Lucullus.  Both 
these  pleadings  left  the  orator  more  deeply  committed  to  the  party 
of  the  'best  men,'  and  dependent  on  maintaining  the  recent  har- 
mony of  senators  and  knights.  His  position  was  not  an  easy  one. 
Pompey's  return  was  now  very  near.  One  of  the  consuls  elected 
for  61  was  a  nominee  of  his.  At  the  end  of  62  a  grave  scandal 
became  the  talk  of  Rome.  The  rites  of  the  Good  Goddess  {Bona 
Dea),  celebrated  in  December,  were  held  this  year  in  Caesar's 
house. '  Only  females  were  admitted.  P.  Clodius,  a  dissolute 
young  Patrician  enamoured  of  Caesar's  wife  Pompeia,  managed 
to  enter  in  female  dress,  and  •  was  detected.  The  festival  was 
adjourned,  and  the  pontiffs  pronounced  his  act  a  sacrilege.  Caesar 
took  it  coolly,  but  divorced  Pompeia.  Superstition  however  was 
still  strong  among  the  masses,  and  the  rites  violated  were  a  public 
function  on  behalf  of  the  state.  The  Senate  took  the  matter  up, 
and  a  bill  was  proposed  for  a  special  court  of  inquiry  with  a  select 
jury.  While  this  was  still  under  discussion  in  January  61,  Pompey 
arrived  in  Rome.  He  had  reached  Brundisium  in  December,  and 
had  surprised  everybody  by  dismissing  his  army,  to  reassemble 
later  for  his  triumph. 

505.  The  Senate  had  now  a  great  opportunity.  But  aristo- 
cratic jealousy  was  too  strong  to  allow  the  House  to  grasp  it. 
They  did  not  welcome  the  great  man  heartily  and  at  once  approve 
his  settlement  of  the  East.  And  Pompey's  determination  not  to 
make  himself  cheap  tended  to  keep  him  and  the  nobles  apart. 
Cicero  was  uneasy  at  finding  that  he  would  not  commit  himself 
to  any  definite  approval  of  the  recent  acts  of  the  government. 
Meanwhile  the  bill  for  the  trial  of  Clodius  was  carried  through 
after  much  opposition  in  a  modified  form.  The  jury  was  to  be 
chosen  by  lot  in  the  usual  way.  Some  thought  that  an  acquittal 
was  impossible,  but  the  jury  were  venal,  and  were  bought  by 
Crassus.  A  plea  of  alibi  set  up  by  Clodius  had  been  disproved 
by  Cicero ;  but  this  did  not  affect  the  verdict,  while  it  angered 
Clodius.     A  wrangle   between   them  in  the  Senate  only  made 


392  Caesar  In  Spain  [ch. 

Clodius  more  determined  to  have  his  revenge.  But  Cicero  had 
no  notion  that  he  had  injured  his  own  prospects  by  this  affair. 
True,  he  had  offended  Crassus  and  Caesar,  but  he  fancied  that 
he  could  trust  to  the  protection  of  Pompey.  Before  the  elections 
this  year  (6i)  a  curious  bribery-law  was  carried  at  the  wish  of  the 
Senate.  It  is  said  that  a  man  who  paid  bribes  was  to  go  on  paying 
the  same  sum  yearly  for  the  rest  of  his  life.  The  aristocrats  it 
seems  were  at  last  finding  corruption  both  burdensome  and  in- 
effective. The  growing  practice  of  employing  bands  of  armed 
men  was  making  it  difficult  to  be  sure  of  polling  bought  votes. 
Moreover,  there  were  long  purses  ready  to  be  used  in  opposition 
to  the  politics  of  their  party.  It  was  not  easy  to  compete  with 
such  a  man  as  Crassus.  Hence  no  doubt  much  of  the  aversion 
to  bribery.  A  few,  like  Cato,  would  object  to  it  on  principle. 
But  neither  they  nor  fresh  laws  could  prevent  it. 

506,  Caesar  had  meanwhile  hurried  off  as  propraetor  to  his 
province,  the  Further  Spain.  Crassus  quieted  his  creditors  by 
becoming  security  for  his  debts.  In  Spain  he  found  the  means 
of  gaining  some  military  experience.  His  civil  administration 
was  successful.  In  particular  he  reformed  and  improved  the 
city  of  Gades,  partly  to  oblige  his  useful  subordinate  Balbus,  the 
man  whom  Pompey  had  made  a  Roman.  Caesar  had  found  out 
the  value  of  this  remarkable  man,  who  became  his  most  trusted 
agent.  Before  the  middle  of  the  year  60  he  had  done  all  he 
wanted  to  do  in  the  West,  and  returned  to  Rome,  having  gained 
reputation,  and  with  money  in  hand.  During  his  absence  Pompey 
had  mismanaged  matters  sadly.  He  was  ambitious,  but  he  tried 
to  have  his  way  without  being  either  politic  or  masterful,  and  this 
would  not  do  in  Rome.  At  the  end  of  September  he  held  his 
great  triumph.  It  was  a  show  of  unprecedented  splendour. 
Notable  captives  had  been  carefully  collected  during  his  eastern 
progress.  The  records  of  his  victories  were  followed  by  those 
of  provinces  annexed  and  cities  founded,  and  the  crowd  were 
reminded  of  strange  peoples  subdued  and  new  revenues  acquired 
for  Rome.  The  great  enemy  Mithradates  was  dead,  and  on  this 
occasion  none  of  the  captives  exhibited  were  put  to  death.  About 
this  time  news  came  from  Gaul  of  a  rebellion  of  the  Allobroges, 
whose  grievances  seem  to  have  gone  unredressed.  The  governor 
managed  to  quell  it,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  as  a  sign  of  coming 
trouble  in  the  North. 


xxxvi]  Important  questions  in  Rome  393 

507.  The  reassembling  of  soldiers  for  Pompey's  triumph  was 
of  necessity  a  reminder  of  their  claims.  Each  man  had  received 
a  bounty  on  discharge,  but  the  money  was  wasting,  and  they  wanted 
a  provision  for  life.  In  the  republican  system  there  was  no  stand- 
ing army  and  no  scheme  of  pensions.  Now  that  the  old  assump- 
tion, that  the  farmer-soldier  went  back  to  his  farm  on  the  return 
of  peace,  was  quite  obsolete,  veterans  needed  something  to  live 
upon.  This  could  only  be  land:  most  occupations  of  a  humble 
kind  were  left  to  slaves.  Therefore  they  looked  to  their  com- 
mander for  allotments.  That  they  were  not  as  a  rule  likely  to 
make  good  farmers,  did  not  matter.  Pompey  did  not  want  to  turn 
out  present  holders,  and  plant  colonies  of  his  adherents,  as  Sulla 
had  done.  But  he  did  want  to  provide  for  his  veterans,  and  there 
was  no  time  to  be  lost.  There  was  money  coming  in  from  the 
new  tributes,  and  he  had  paid  into  the  treasury  large  capital  sums. 
So  he  was  anxious  to  get  a  purchase-scheme  to  work  without  delay. 
Then  there  was  the  general  question  of  his  eastern  settlement. 
He  claimed  that  the  Senate  should  approve  his  acts  as  a  whole. 
But  he  had  now  no  embodied  army,  and  the  jealous  nobles  were 
not  afraid  to  thwart  him.  He  had  made  enemies  of  some,  such 
as  LucuUus  and  Metellus^;  others  were  not  sorry  to  humble  him; 
Cato  was  opposed  on  principle  to  predominant  men.  So  a  majority 
were  for  discussing  the  eastern  settlement  point  by  point,  and  the 
matter  of  allotments  was  provokingly  delayed. 

508.  There  were  just  now  two  awkward  questions  before  the 
House.  Both  threatened  to  cause  a  split  between  senators  and 
knights,  and  so  to  overthrow  the  aristocratic  government.  One 
was  a  proposal  to  make  all  jurors  liable  to  the  penalties  for 
judicial  corruption.  Hitherto  the  letter  of  Sulla's  Cornelian  law 
had  been  held  to  apply  to  senators  only.  The  other  was  a  de- 
mand from  the  capitalists  who  had  bought  the  revenues  of  the 
province  Asia.  They  said  they  had  paid  too  much,  and  wanted 
the  bargain  cancelled.  Crassus  egged  them  on.  Cicero,  fearing 
the  result  of  a  quarrel  between  the  two  wealthy  Orders,  opposed 
the  first  and  supported  the  second,  but  in  vain.  Cato  was  against 
an  opportunist  policy.  Pompey  did  not  seize  the  chance  of  putting 
pressure  on  the  Senate  for  his  own  purposes.  So  these  matters 
dragged  on  into  the  next  year,  while  friction  and  ill  feeling  deve- 
loped.    The  year  60  began  badly.    A  land-bill  for  allotments  was 

^  Creticus. 


394  Caesar  and  the  great  Coalition     [ch.  xxxvi 

proposed  by  a  tribune,  containing  purchase-clauses,  but  also  others 
upsetting  arrangements  made  in  recent  times.  After  much  wrang- 
ling, the  Senate  being  against  it,  Pompey  caused  his  satellite  tribune 
to  let  the  matter  drop  for  the  time.  There  was  much  uneasiness 
at  the  news  from  Gaul.  Rome's  allies  the  Aedui  had  suffered  a 
disastrous  defeat  from  other  tribes,  aided  by  Germans.  The  Roman 
province  was  raided  by  Helvetii.  An  embassy  was  sent,  and  things 
were  reported  quieter,  but  we  shall  see  that  this  was  not  for  long. 
A  strange  proposal  for  abolishing  the  dues  levied  at  Italian  ports 
was  carried  through  by  Metellus  Nepos,  probably  at  the  instigation 
of  Pompey.  The  sacrifice  of  revenue  was  a  very  questionable 
policy.  The  differences  between  Senate  and  knights  were  still 
causing  irritation.  Clodius  was  bent  on  gaining  the  tribunate,  as 
a  means  of  agitation  and  revenge.  But  he  was  a  Patrician,  and 
he  found  that  he  must  become  a  Plebeian  by  adoption.  This 
design,  like  many  other  things,  was  hindered  by  formal  difficulties. 
But  a  momentous  change  in  public  affairs  was  near.  About  the 
middle  of  the  year  Caesar,  propraetor  and  chief  pontiff,  returned 
from  Spain. 

509.  Caesar  wanted  two  things,  a  triumph  and  the  consulship. 
A  personal  candidature  would  mean  entering  the  city  and  breaking 
the  imperiui7i  required  for  the  triumph.  The  Senate  would  not 
give  him  leave  to  be  a  candidate  in  absence,  so  he  gave  up  the 
triumph.  He  was  elected  consul,  but  his  colleague  was  his  old 
fellow-aedile  Bibulus,  brought  in  by  the  money  of  the  aristocrats 
as  a  man  likely  to  hold  his  own  against  a  restless  partner.  The 
precaution  was  futile.  Official  power  in  these  days  could  not 
stand  against  military  prestige  and  great  wealth.  Caesar  was 
not  the  man  to  be  stopped  by  shadows.  He  had  come  to  terms 
with  Pompey  and  Crassus,  contributing  to  the  combination  his 
popularity,  his  energy,  his  wits.  They  helped  him  to  the  consul- 
ship. He  was  to  help  them  as  consul.  They  were  both  disgusted 
with  the  Senate.  Their  mutual  jealousies  were  overcome,  and 
Caesar  undertook  to  gratify  their  wishes  and  ambitions.  It  was 
however  Caesar  who  (as  usual)  had  the  best  of  the  bargain.  An 
irresistible  private  coalition  was  to  dominate  all  the  machinery  of 
the  Republic.  This  was  the  triumph  of  realities  over  forms.  A 
long  and  bitter  struggle  was  still  to  come,  but  its  inevitable  end 
was  already  beginning  to  appear. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

CAESAR'S   FIRST  CONSULSHIP  AND  THE  REMOVAL  OF 
CICERO  AND  CATO  59—58  B.C. 

510.    When  Caesar  entered  on  office  in  January  59,  a  time  of 
strong  government  began.     The  real  holders  of  power,  the  three 
partners,  could  control  all  state  authorities.     They  were  an  un- 
official coalition,  not  recognized  by  the  constitution,  and  so  not 
bound  by  its  legal  or  traditional  restraints.     Of  the  two  consuls, 
one  belonged  to  the  coalition,  and  was  therefore  able  to  reduce 
his  stubborn  colleague  to  impotence.     A  later  generation  loosely 
applied  to  the  Three  the  name  Triumvirs,  properly  used  of  three 
official  commissioners,  which  they  were  not.     The  weak  points  of 
the  coalition,  such  as  the  inevitable  divergence  of  interests,  and 
the  insuperable  difficulty  of  filling  up  a  death-vacancy  by  coopta- 
tion,  will  appear  in  the  course  of  the  narrative.     The  point  to  be 
noted  here  is  that  to  contemporaries  it  was  not  Caesar  but  Pompey 
who  seemed  the  chief  partner.     The  more  people  came  to  un- 
derstand that  the  partnership  was  the  great  fact  underlying  the 
movement  of  public  affairs,  the  less  important  Caesar's  official 
position  would  seem  to  be.     Caesar  as  consul  punctually  carried 
out  his  compacts  with   Pompey  and  Crassus.      Therefore  they 
shared  the  resentment  of  those  who  disliked  the  common  policy 
of  the  coalition.     Caesar's  year  of  office  would  come  to  an  end, 
and  some  men  evidently  imagined  that  an  effective  reaction  might 
follow.     Even  Cicero  hardly  grasped  the  truth  that  Caesar,  when 
he  went  out  of  office,  would,  under  the  changed  conditions,  not 
go  out  of  power.     We  shall  see  that  it  was  Caesar  who,  with  his 
clearness  of  mind  and  firmness  of  purpose,  gave  effectiveness  to 
the   so-called  Triumvirate  :    also  that  while  consul  he  laid  the 


39^  Caesar  as  consul  [ch. 

foundations  of  the  military  strength  which  enabled  him  a  few- 
years  later  to  become  master  of  the  Roman  world. 

511.     Caesar  began  work  at  once.     By  some  means  he  pro- 
vided for  the  daily  publication  of  proceedings  {acta)  of  the  Senate 
and  Assembly.     Hitherto  the  reporting  of  acta  setiatus  had  been 
very  irregular  and  incomplete.     Only  the  official  copies  of  orders 
actually  passed  were  kept  in  the  treasury.     Other  matters  were 
recorded  in  the  note-books  of  presiding  magistrates,  which  were 
their  private  property.     The  House  was  in  fact  henceforth  to  be 
more  under  observation.      But  Caesar,  though  resolved  not  to 
suffer  obstruction,  would  not  unnecessarily  provoke  his  senatorial 
adversaries.     He  made  overtures  to  Bibulus,  of  course  in  vain. 
Bibulus  and  the  aristocrats  knew  that  no  cooperation  with  Caesar 
was  possible  for  them.    The  consul's  first  measure  was  a  land-law, 
chiefly  a  scheme  for  using  the  great  sums  of  money  accruing  from 
Pompey's  conquests  to  purchase  land  for  allotments.     He  laid 
this  moderate  proposal  before  the  House  in  the  most  conciliatory 
manner.    He  was  met  with  wilful  obstruction,  in  which  Cato  bore 
a  leading  part.    At  last  he  told  the  Senate  that  he  would  be  driven 
to  proceed  without  them.     He  now  began  to  lay  bills  before  the 
Assembly  direct.     The  aristocrats  had  thus  lost  the  chance  of 
pressing  amendments  in  debate.     They  tried  to  prevent  the  bills 
from  passing.     But  they  were  weak  for  want  of  able  leaders. 
Catulus  was  lately  dead,  Metellus  Celer  died  early  in  this  year, 
Lucullus  hated  political  brawls,  and  was  getting  old,  Cicero  was 
helpless  now  that  senators  and  knights  had  fallen  out.     Cato  and 
Bibulus  were  not  prepared  to  go  to  unconstitutional  lengths  :  sup- 
ported by  timid  and  lazy  nobles,  they  were  no  match  for  Caesar. 

512.  It  was  in  the  course  of  the  public  discussion  of  the 
land-bill  that  the  truth  in  reference  to  present  poHtics  came  out. 
Bibulus  would  concede  nothing.  Caesar  appealed  to  Pompey  and 
Crassus,  both  private  citizens,  and  both  approved  the  bill.  Thus 
he  openly  set  the  support  of  powerful  men  against  that  of  a  magis- 
trate. There  was  still  the  risk  of  armed  violence  being  used  to 
defeat  it.  He  turned  to  Pompey,  and  asked  whether  his  support 
could  in  that  case  be  relied  on.  Pompey  replied  that  he  would 
meet  force  with  force.  There  was  no  withstanding  such  a  threat 
from  the  chief  to  whom  his  veterans  were  looking  for  a  lead. 
The  bill  became  law  without  any  more  serious  disorder  than  the 
disregard  of  a  tribune's  veto,  and  a  few  broken  heads.     What  was 


xxxvii]  and  the  coalition  policy  397 

new  and  revolutionary  was  the  method  by  which  Caesar  had 
checkmated  the  senatorial  aristocrats.  As  they  had  used  force 
under  cover  of  their  '  last  decree '  to  thwart  political  opponents, 
so  he  used  the  menace  of  military  power  to  overawe  those  who 
would  obstruct  his  measures  with  gangs  of  rioters.  The  consul 
defied  his  colleague  and  the  Senate.  The  odium  of  the  menace 
employed  fell  on  Pompey,  not  on  the  consul.  A  clause  in  the 
law  required  all  senators  to  swear  to  maintain  it,  and  after  much 
protesting  all  (even  Cato)  did  so.  Of  its  working  we  know  nothing. 
We  shall  have  to  refer  to  it  below. 

513.  Some  time  early  in  the  year  Caesar  carried  a  law  for 
confirming  Pompey's  eastern  settlement  as  a  whole.  Rough  means 
had  to  be  used  to  overcome  the  opposition  of  Lucullus;  but 
Lucullus,  thoroughly  browbeaten,  retired  into  private  life  and 
gave  no  more  trouble.  Pompey  was  also  interested  in  the 
Egyptian  question.  The  spurious  Ptolemy,  known  as  the  Piper 
(Auletes),  was  hated  by  his-  subjects,  and  wanted  to  strengthen 
himself  by  procuring  from  Rome  his  recognition  as  king.  His 
application  was  favoured  by  Pompey.  While  the  usual  negotia- 
tions with  greedy  senators  dragged  on,  Caesar  took  the  matter  in 
hand,  and  carried  a  law  declaring  him  king,  and  an  ally  and  friend 
of  the  Roman  people.  Of  course  the  Piper  had  to  pay  a  large 
sum  for  the  favour,  and  so  to  borrow  from  Roman  financiers. 
But  the  Senate  had  been  overridden  by  the  consul,  and  the 
senators  did  not  get  the  money.  Now  came  the  turn  of  Crassus. 
Another  of  Caesar's  laws  relieved  the  farmers  of  the  Asiatic  re- 
venues of  a  third  of  the  price  according  to  their  contract.  This 
scandalous  job  detached  the  capitalist  class  from  the  aristocrats, 
and  strengthened  the  Triumvirs.  Cato's  policy  had  been  a  failure. 
In  all  these  transactions  it  was  the  Senate  that  suffered.  Caesar 
proved  to  his  partners  that  he  was  a  man  who  kept  his  bargains. 
And,  if  they  gained  their  desires  through  his  bold  and  revolutionary 
proceedings,  they  also  bore  most  of  the  discredit. 

514.  Legislation  could  now  go  on  freely.  Even  religious 
hindrances  gave  way  before  the  chief  pontiff  and  his  followers. 
A  law  carried  by  the  praetor  Q.  Fufius  Calenus  required  the  three 
sections  of  each  jury  to  vote  separately.  Henceforth  the  separate 
numbers  were  known,  and  this  rule  may  have  been  some  little 
check  on  the  prevailing  corruption.  A  law  of  the  tribune  P.  Vati- 
nius  extended  the  right  of  accuser  and  accused  to  challenge  jurors. 


398  Cicero  and  the  coalition  [ch. 

This  too  was  probably  an  improvement.  These  measures  were 
really  Caesar's.  He  was  a  genuine  reformer,  and  the  obstruction 
of  Bibulus  and  Cato  had  been  overcome.  Before  these  laws 
passed,  C.  Antonius  was  brought  to  trial  for  his  misdeeds  as 
governor  of  Macedonia.  Cicero,  his  old  colleague  in  63,  felt 
bound  to  defend  him ;  but  the  man  was  not  merely  guilty.  He 
was  hated  by  all  parties.  He  had  associated  with  Catiline,  and 
then  sold  himself  to  Cicero.  His  condemnation  was  celebrated 
as  a  triumph  by  some  of  Catiline's  surviving  friends.  Now  Caesar 
had  his  eye  on  Cicero,  whose  talents  he  admired.  In  pleading 
for  Antonius,  Cicero  had  been  driven,  for  want  of  a  good  case, 
to  refer  to  the  unhappy  state  of  public  affairs.  He  was  in  fact  an 
incorrigible  opponent  of  the  coalition.  Caesar  was  going  shortly 
to  leave  Rome  for  a  considerable  time,  and  he  did  not  mean  to 
let  the  orator  undo  his  work  in  his  absence.  So  he  at  once  carried 
through  the  adoption  which  made  Clodius  a  Plebeian,  eligible  for 
the  tribunate.  Pompey  was  present  as  augur.  But  Cicero  took 
no  heed  of  this  warning,  and  continued  to  delude  himself  with 
the  belief  that  silly  little  popular  demonstrations  of  discontent 
with  the  doings  of  the  three  '  tyrants '  (as  he  called  them)  were 
a  serious  menace  to  their  power.  He  gauged  their  strength  by 
the  shuffling  hesitation  of  Pompey,  who  wanted  to  be  both  popular 
and  powerful.  He  did  not  discover  that  Caesar,  who  cared  nothing 
for  the  disapproval  of  opponents,  was  the  managing  director  of  the 
Triumvirate.  Yet  this  was  the  most  important  fact  of  the  present 
situation.  This  coalition  was  not  a  temporary  union  for  the 
purposes  of  a  passing  moment,  but  a  farsighted  attempt  to  wrest 
the  real  control  of  the  government  from  the  selfish  and  in- 
competent nobles.  Its  policy  was  more  than  a  mere  pooling  of 
personal  ambitions,  for  it  included  a  genuine  tendency  to  promote 
practical  reform.  Now  it  was  Caesar  who  gave  it  this  character. 
Its  permanent  nature  was  shewn  in  the  new  marriage  arrange- 
ments made  about  this  time.  The  most  significant  of  these  was 
the  marriage  of  Pompey  to  Caesar's  daughter  Julia,  a  happy 
union.  The  great  partners  lived  in  harmony  till  the  domestic 
tie  was  severed  by  Julia's  death. 

515.  A  province  had  to  be  found  for  Caesar  after  his  consul- 
ship. Bibulus  did  not  want  to  quit  Rome,  and  the  Senate  feebly 
tried  to  thwart  Caesar  by  naming  the  most  trivial  spheres  of  duty 
as  the  '  consular '  provinces.     A  law  carried  by  Vatinius,  Caesar's 


xxxvii]    Caesar's  province.     Second  land-law       399 

man,  assigned  him  Cisalpine  Gaul  with  Illyricum  for  a  term  of 
five  years  from  the  first  of  March  (59  B.C.),  with  three  legions. 
To  this  the  Senate,  moved  by  Pompey  and  Crassus,  added  the 
Further  Gaul  (Transalpine),  with  another  legion.  This  was  for 
one  year  only,  but  could  be  renewed.  Here  was  another  of 
the  great  commands,  forewarnings  of  the  coming  Empire.  In 
appearance  it  was  small  compared  with  that  of  Pompey  in  the 
East.  But  it  comprised  the  best  recruiting-ground  for  Roman 
armies,  the  rich  and  populous  Cisalpine,  a  district  already  attached 
to  Caesar.  And  by  a  second  Vatinian  law  he  received  powers 
enabling  him  to  shew  some  favour  to  his  old  friends  the  Trans- 
padanes.  The  whole  plan  was  cleverly  devised.  Pompey  had 
now  given  to  Caesar  the  opportunities  he  sought.  Caesar  could 
build  up  a  power  such  as  Rome  had  not  yet  seen.  None  could 
guess  that  in  a  few  years  time  he  would  have  added  the  great  un- 
conquered  mass  of  northern  Gaul  to  the  Roman  dominions,  and 
be  at  the  critical  moment  the  only, leader  in  possession  of  a  devoted 
veteran  army.  Nor  is  it  likely  that  Caesar  himself  at  this  stage 
foresaw  into  what  gigantic  undertakings  his  fortune  was  leading  him. 
516.  It  would  seem  that  Caesar's  first  land-law,  perhaps  only 
meant  as  an  instalment,  did  not  suffice  to  satisfy  Pompey's  claims 
on  behalf  of  his  soldiers.  A  second  Julian  land-law  was  now 
carried,  with  enough  use  of  force  to  quell  opposition.  In  it 
provision  was  made  for  resumption  of  the  leased  state-land  in 
Campania,  to  be  distributed  in  allotments.  The  policy  of  this 
measure  was  very  doubtful,  but  the  thing  had  to  be  done.  The 
law  was  carried  out.  Under  it  Capua,  a  mere  group  of  houses 
for  about  150  years  past,  became  a  municipal  town  with  a  local 
government  of  its  own.  But  as  to  the  scope  and  working  of  the 
law  there  is  great  uncertainty.  It  is  most  probable  that  the 
parcels  of  land  were  allotted  to  a  number  of  Pompey's  old 
soldiers,  married  men  with  families  being  preferred.  There  was 
not  enough  to  provide  for  them  all,  and  that  the  allottees  included 
some  of  the  ordinary  city  rabble  (as  certain  writers  say)  is  most 
unlikely.  It  is  even  alleged  that  a  great  migration  took  place,  so 
that  the  deserted  rural  districts  of  Italy  were  repopulated.  This 
is  not  borne  out  by  the  facts  of  a  few  years  later,  and  appears  to 
be  a  mistake  of  one'  who  wrote  in  the  third  century  a.d.  At 
any  rate  the  passing  of  this  law  marks  the  complete  supremacy 

1  Dion  Cassius. 


400  Movements  in  Rome  [ch. 

of  the  Triumvirate.  Bloodshed  in  Rome  for  the  time  ceased, 
for  sufficient  force  was  used  to  make  riotous  opposition  hopeless. 
Cato  was  simply  removed  when  troublesome.  Bibulus  shut 
himself  up  in  his  house,  whence  he  issued  all  manner  of 
obstructive  notices  and  protests.  His  aim  was  to  provide  the 
Senate  with  a  pretext  for  declaring  Caesar's  laws  invalid :  but  this 
the  Senate  could  not  do  while  the  coalition  ruled  Rome. 

517.     Still   there   were    signs   of  discontent   manifested    on 

public    occasions,    and   the    opposition    hoped   that   a   political 

reaction   might   come.      The   Triumvirs   let    it   be   known   that 

such  demonstrations  must  cease,  and  they  ceased.     Bibulus  still 

protested   in  pungent  edicts,   for   which  Caesar   cared   nothing. 

To  Pompey  they  were  a  great  annoyance,  for  they  censured  the 

policy  in  which  he  was  concerned,  and  he  loved  being  above 

criticism.     Clodius,  now  a  candidate  for  the  tribunate  in  58,  was 

blustering.     Cicero   was    still   not   alive    to  his    coming  danger. 

Pompey  assured  him  that  Clodius  meant  no  harm,  and  the  orator 

fancied  that  his  many  friends  could  and  would  protect  him.     But 

he  saw  that  the  Roman  Republic  was  a  mere  name,  and  turned 

to  advocacy  and  literature  in  sorrow  and  disgust.    Rome  was  now 

a  very  uncomfortable  place  for  republican  statesmen.     In  August 

occurred  the  obscure  affair  of  the  informer  Vettius,  who  pretended 

to  reveal  a  plot  for  murdering  Pompey.    The  design  was  probably 

to  alarm  Pompey  and  keep  him  under  the  influence  of  Caesar. 

After  it  had  served  its  purpose,  the  informer  was  got  rid  of     The 

matter  dropped,  but  a  number  of  the  aristocratic  party  had  been 

made  uneasy  by  the  mention  of  their  names.     At  this  time  Cicero 

was  engaged  in  the  defence  of  his  friend  L.  Valerius  Flaccus  on 

a  charge  of  extortion  in  the  province  Asia.     Flaccus  had  helped 

Cicero  in  the  affair  of  Catiline,  and  the  real  aim  of  the  prosecution 

was  to  punish  him  for  the  part  he  took  on  that  occasion.     It  was 

another  of  Caesar's  moves.     Cicero's  speech  was  on  lines  exactly 

opposite  to  those  followed  in  his  accusation  of  Verres.     His  case 

was  a  bad  one,  but  the  jury  could  not  resist  his  appeal,  not  to  let 

Flaccus  be  made  a  victim  of  Catilinarian  reaction.     So  Flaccus 

was  acquitted,  and  the  provincials  of  Asia  got  no  redress.     But 

the  matter  did  not  end  here.     Cicero  had  shewn  that  he  was  not 

to  be  turned  from  the  policy  adopted  by  him  as  consul.     He  was 

devoted  to  the  '  harmony  of  the  Orders,'  and  all  that  it  implied. 

Caesar  could  not  go  off  to  Gaul,  leaving  the  orator  at  work  in 


xxxvii]  Caesar  and  Clodius  401 

Rome.  Cicero  must  be  removed,  and  he  would  not  accept 
offered  posts  and  withdraw  on  a  decent  pretext.  One  course 
only  remained.  Caesar  signified  to  Clodius  that  he  would  have 
a  free  hand  to  deal  with  Cicero. 

518.  Some  time  before  the  elections,  which  Bibulus  contrived 
to  defer  till  October,  perhaps  in  July,  Caesar  carried  one  of  his 
measures  of  reform,  the  lex  lulia  repetundarum.  Its  aim  was  to 
improve  provincial  administration.  In  particular  it  restricted 
the  right  of  governors  to  make  war,  a  power  often  abused,  and 
endeavoured  to  lessen  the  burdens  laid  on  the  provincials  by  the 
proceedings  of  accusers  collecting  evidence.  It  guarded  against 
the  falsification  of  official  accounts  by  requiring  two  copies  to  be 
kept  in  the  province,  besides  the  one  sent  to  Rome.  It  provided 
for  safe  custody  of  documents,  and  for  shortening  the  procedure 
of  a  trial.  A  good  law,  no  doubt,  and  one  long  kept  in  force. 
But,  so  long  as  corruption  prevailed  in  Rome,  no  laws  could 
really  put  an  end  to  extortion  abroad.  Caesar  did  what  he  could. 
And  now  the  offices  for  the  next  year  (58)  had  to  be  filled.  The 
aristocrats  must  not  be  allowed  to  resume  power  and  undo  the 
work  of  the  coalition.  The  Three  were  unofficial  usurpers,  and 
to  their  rule  there  was  no  alternative  but  a  return  to  anarchy. 
They  had  made  their  arrangements.  L.  Calpurnius  Piso  and 
A.  Gabinius  were  chosen  consuls,  and  among  the  tribunes  was 
Clodius.  Opposition  was  futile.  When  a  young  man  proposed 
to  prosecute  Gabinius  for  bribery,  he  had  a  narrow  escape  from 
being  murdered  by  ruffians  acting  for  the  Triumvirs.  While 
Caesar's  army  was  being  organized,  the  plans  for  the  next  year 
were  carefully  laid.  He  evidently  guessed  that  Pompey  and 
Crassus  would  not  be  able  to  direct  affairs  effectively  in  his 
absence.  Clodius  was  to  see  that  Cicero  and  Cato  were  sent 
away  from  Rome.  The  consuls  were  to  back  up  Clodius. 
Clodius  was  to  see  that  the  inferior  provinces  assigned  to  these 
consuls  by  the  Senate  were  exchanged  for  richer  ones  by  a  vote 
of  the  Assembly.  This  was  to  be  their  reward  for  subservience. 
All  these  arrangements  bear  the  stamp  of  Caesar.  He  certainly 
used  power  well,  but  he  never  forgot  that,  to  do  this,  he  must  get 
power  and  keep  it.  And  he  was  coolly  indifferent  as  to  the 
means.  Still  people  regarded  Pompey  as  the  real  chief,  and  he 
was  too  vain  to  undeceive  them :  indeed,  under  Caesar's  dexterous 
management,  he  shared  the  delusion  himself. 

H.  26 


402  The  proceedings  of  Clodius  [ch. 

519.  Thus,  when  Clodius  entered  on  office  (10  Dec.  59),  his 
programme  was  ready.  He  at  once  gave  notice  of  four  measures, 
the  passing  of  which  would  make  him  for  the  time  master  of 
Rome.  First,  the  mob  were  to  be  won  by  abolishing  the  small 
payment  still  required  for  the  state-corn.  Secondly,  they  were 
to  be  organized  for  political  action,  by  reviving  the  sham  gilds 
{collegia)  suppressed  by  order  of  the  Senate  in  the  year  64. 
Thirdly,  the  use  of  religious  hindrances  was  to  be  so  restricted 
as  to  be  no  check  on  legislation.  Fourthly,  the  expulsion  of 
members  from  the  Senate  was  to  be  permitted  only  after  open 
challenge  of  a  member's  fitness  and  the  joint  condemnation  of 
the  two  censors.  This  last  was  to  prevent  censors,  appointed  in 
Caesar's  absence,  from  ejecting  Caesarian  senators.  Early  in  58, 
with  Gabinius  and  Piso  consuls,  and  Caesar  on  the  watch  outside 
with  his  army,  the  four  bills  became  law.  Rome  was  at  the 
mercy  of  Clodius  with  his  organized  gangs,  including  all  sorts 
of  ruffians,  even  slaves.  The  next  stage  was  the  introduction 
of  three  bills  forming  a  consistent  scheme.  One  assigned 
Macedonia  to  Piso,  and  Syria  to  Gabinius,  as  their  provinces  for 
57 — 56.  Another  was  aimed  at  Cicero,  to  procure  his  banishment. 
A  third  provided  a  means  of  getting  rid  of  Cato.  Perhaps  the  first 
here  named  was  to  be  voted  on  last ;  at  any  rate  the  consuls 
were  bound  to  support  all  three  in  order  to  benefit  by  the  one. 

520.  Cicero  had  been  lulled  into  security  by  the  assurances 
of  Pompey  and  Caesar.  He  had  expected  an  attack  in  the  form 
of  a  trial  before  a  public  court,  for  maiestas  no  doubt.  With  a 
jury  of  well-to-do  citizens  his  eloquence  would  probably  prevail. 
But  Clodius  named  no  names.  His  bill  outlawed  any  person 
who  had  put  to  death  a  Roman  citizen  without  a  regular  trial  and 
sentence.  Once  it  became  law,  Clodius  had  only  to  impeach 
Cicero  before  the  Assembly,  and  the  orator  stood  no  chance. 
The  present  Assembly  was  certain  to  do  the  bidding  of  Clodius. 
The  Father  of  his  country  was  in  dire  straits.  Vainly  he  humbled 
himself  in  the  hope  of  defeating  the  bill.  Caesar  affected  to 
desire  that  the  matter  should  go  no  further,  but  he  repeated  his 
opinion  of  the  illegality  of  the  execution  of  the  conspirators,  and 
Clodius  knew  what  this  meant.  Crassus  was  hostile.  Pompey, 
true  to  himself,  shuffled,  and  referred  Cicero  to  the  consuls  in 
office.  No  comfort  was  to  be  got  from  Gabinius  or  Piso,  who 
had  sold  themselves  (or  rather  Cicero)  for  a  price.  Private  friends 
and  supporters  could  do  nothing.     Only  force  could  avail  them 


xxxvii]  Cicero  and  Cato  removed  403 

now,  and  Caesar  had  managed  matters  so  that  force  was  on  the 
other  side.  Therefore  the  general  conclusion  was  that  Cicero 
must  make  up  his  mind  to  go.  Some  useless  efforts  were  made 
to  induce  the  consuls  to  intervene  against  Clodius.  But  about 
the  middle  of  March  the  crisis  came.  Cicero  left  Rome  just 
before  Clodius  carried  his  three  laws,  and  went  into  exile. 
Clodius  quickly  procured  his  outlawry  and  the  confiscation  of 
his  property.  He  was  not  to  remain  within  400  miles  of  Italy : 
within  that  limit,  to  kill  him  was  ho  murder.  He  fied  eastwards 
by  way  of  Dyrrachium.  At  Thessalonica  he  was  still  within  the 
zone  of  danger,  but  Cn.  Plancius,  quaestor  to  the  governor  of 
Macedonia,  protected  him,  so  that  he  was  not  compelled  to  move 
on.  There  the  great  orator,  to  whom  the  life  of  Rome  was  every- 
thing, passed  weary  months  in  a  state  of  collapse  and  despair. 

521.  The  removal  of  Cato  was  not  less  adroitly  managed. 
A  law  was  carried  by  Clodius  to  annex  the  island  of  Cyprus. 
He  then  urged  the  appointment  of  a  thoroughly  trustworthy 
commissioner  with  full  powers,  to  see  that  the  Roman  state  was 
not  defrauded  of  any  part  of  its  new  property.  Cato  was  the 
very  man,  and  Cato  was  forced  to  go,  though  sorely  against  his 
will.  He  could  not  on  his  own  principles  definitely  refuse  to 
obey  the  order  of  the  Assembly,  even  though  controlled  by 
Clodius.  For  fear  he  should  do  the  work  speedily  and  return 
too  soon,  he  was  also  charged  with  the  duty  of  settling  some 
matters  in  dispute  at  Byzantium.  Cyprus  was  taken  over  without 
a  war.  The  reigning  Ptolemy,  a  brother  of  the  Piper,  poisoned 
himself.  Cato  left  his  nephew  M.  Brutus  to  take  possession  of 
the  royal  property,  while  he  dealt  with  the  Byzantine  questions. 
Brutus,  reared  in  Cato's  high  principles,  was  like  other  noble 
Romans.  He  took  the  opportunity  of  being  first  in  the  field 
to  invest  capital  in  the  new  country.  The  Cypriotes,  no  doubt 
called  upon  for  payments  in  cash,  were  driven  to  borrow  from 
him  at  ruinous  interest,  and  he  remained  some  years  in  the  East, 
wringing  a  fortune  out  of  the  subjects  of  Rome.  Cato  did  all 
his  business  thoroughly  and  in  corruptibly.  Cyprus  was  made  a 
part  of  the  great  province  Cilicia.  Over  ^^i, 500,000  is  said  to 
have  been  collected  for  the  Roman  treasury.  Cato  did  not  return 
to  Rome  till  the  year  56.  Meanwhile  many  things  had  happened. 
Caesar  had  only  waited  to  see  the  three  Clodian  laws  safely  passed 
in  March  58,  and  then  set  out,  none  too  soon,  for  Gaul. 

26 — 2 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII 

CAESAR  IN   GAUL   58—56  B.C. 

522.  It  may  be  well  to  begin  this  chapter  by  distinguishing 
the  various  countries  to  which  the  name  Gallia  was  applied  by 
the  Romans.  First,  there  was  the  Cisalpine  province,  the  southern 
or  Cispadane  part  of  which  had  the  Roman  franchise,  while  the 
Transpadane  enjoyed  only  the  'Latin  right.'  It  was  often  spoken 
of  as  the  Hither  or  Nearer  Gaul;  also  as  the  'gown-wearing' 
Gaul  {togata);  the  Romanizing  of  the  people  being  shewn  in 
wearing  the  costume  of  Rome.  Beyond  the  Alps  lay  Trans- 
alpine or  Further  Gaul.  Of  this  the  southern  part  was  the  Roman 
province  of  Narbonese  Gaul,  which  in  the  region  of  the  Rhone 
extended  right  up  to  the  lake  of  Geneva,  but  further  to  the  West 
was  a  narrow  strip  of  territory  reaching  inland  about  100  miles 
from  the  sea.  It  enclosed  the  territory  of  Massalia,  Rome's  old 
and  valued  ally.  The  chief  Roman  city  in  it  was  Narbo.  In 
that  and  other  cities  many  Romans  were  settled,  and  Roman 
habits  were  spreading  :  but  the  old  native  garb,  the  trews  {bracae), 
still  prevailed,  so  that  Gallia  bracata  was  a  name  often  given  to 
the  Narbonese  province.  North  and  West  of  this  lay  the  great 
mass  of  independent  Gaul,  often  called  by  the  general  name  of 
Gallia  comata,  from  the  native  fashion  of  wearing  the  hair  long. 
The  free  Gauls  were  grouped  in  a  great  number  of  tribal  units  of 
very  various  degrees  of  strength.  The  weaker  tribes  followed  the 
lead  of  the  stronger.  In  every  part  of  the  country  there  was 
some  tribe  either  accepted  as  leader  or  engaged  in  winning  a 
dominant  position  by  overcoming  a  rival.  There  was  thus  a 
certain  loose  confederation  in  many  parts,  but  no  sort  of  general 


CH.  xxxviii]  The  Gauls  405 

union.  The  people  were  not  all  of  one  stock.  A  short  dark 
race,  probably  akin  to  the  Iberians  or  Ligurians,  were  still  spread 
over  a  wide  area,  but  were  dominant  only  in  the  South-West, 
under  the  general  name  of  Aquitani,  between  the  Garonne  and 
the  Pyrenees.  The  ruling  race  of  central  Gaul,  the  Galli  proper, 
were  known  as  Celtae^  and  belonged  to  the  stock  now  called 
Celtic.  In  the  far  North  were  a  number  of  tribes,  known  by  the 
general  name  of  Belgae,  probably  in  the  main  Celtic,  but  said  to 
be  partly  German.  The  name  KeA-rot  or  Celtae  was  sometimes 
used  of  Germans  as  well  as  of  Gauls.  Caesar  distinguished  the 
two,  but  both  races  are  described  as  fair  and  tall. 

523.  Some  tribes  were  much  more  civilized  than  others. 
Roman  traders  were  now  doing  business  beyond  their  own 
frontier,  and  the  influence  of  Massalia  had  been  felt  for  centuries. 
Barges  plied  on  the  rivers.  The  Belgic  tribes  were  in  general 
ruder  and  more  warlike  than  those  more  to  the  South.  Most  of 
the  Gaulish  tribes  were  now  ruled  by  an  aristocratic  caste  of 
nobles  or  '  knights,'  and  presided  over  by  a  yearly  magistrate ; 
but  a  few  seem  to  have  been  still  under  chiefs  or  'kings.'  Wealth 
was  generally  in  few  hands,  and  the  rich  kept  bands  of  retainers, 
and  competed  for  power.  As  in  Asia  Minor,  and  as  formerly  in 
Italy,  the  typical  Gaul  was  lively  impatient  fickle  boastful  and 
fond  of  display.  The  golden  collar  of  the  Gaulish  noble  was 
one  of  the  forms  in  which  the  precious  metal  was  hoarded. 
A  mysterious  religion  pervaded  the  country,  strengthening  the 
resistance  to  foreign  invaders,  but  apparently  unable  to  create  a 
national  spirit  and  promote  union.  The  priestly  class,  the  Druids, 
had  considerable  power.  The  rites  included  human  sacrifices, 
the  dogmas  the  belief  in  the  immortality  and  transmigration  of 
souls.  As  the  Gaulish  tribes  lacked  political  cohesion,  and  were 
loth  to  make  sacrifices  in  a  common  cause,  so  their  military 
efficiency  was  greatly  impaired  by  the  lack  of  discipline  and 
willingness  to  obey.  The  bravery  of  Gauls  was  undoubted,  and 
Gaulish  mercenaries  had  served  for  centuries  in  many  lands. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  had  perished  in  the  service  of  Carthage 
alone.  But  in  their  own  country,  under  their  own  institutions, 
though  able  to  place  great  forces  in  the  field,  they  could  not 
produce  an  army.  Previous  victories  over  the  Roman  legions 
in  the  South  had  been  due  to  the  mismanagement  of  Roman 
generals. 


4o6  Roman  or  German  ?  [ch. 

524.  For  some  years  past  affairs  in  Gaul  had  been  tending 
to  a  crisis.  Rome  had  annexed  a  part  of  the  South,  but  was 
more  concerned  to  enjoy  this  possession  than  to  extend  it. 
Having  secured  the  land-route  to  Spain,  and  destroyed  the 
Cimbro-Teuton  invaders,  she  was  not  desirous  of  further  wars, 
and  pursued  a  pacific  policy.  As  usual,  diplomacy  looked  beyond 
the  frontier.  We  have  seen^  her  allied  with  the  Aedui,  whose 
misfortunes  caused  great  anxiety,  and  revived  Roman  interest  in 
Gaulish  questions.  It  was  not  likely  that  a  policy  of  sitting  still 
and  sending  occasional  embassies  would  long  suffice  to  keep  the 
Roman  province  unmolested.  Pressure  from  another  quarter  had 
changed  the  situation  in  Gaul.  As  the  Romans  had  come  north- 
wards along  the  Rhone,  so  Germans  were  coming  southwards 
along  the  Rhine.  Thousands  of  them  were  already  settled  to 
the  West  of  that  river,  and  many  more  were  ready  to  follow.  In 
the  recent  troubles,  those  Gauls  who  called  in  the  aid  of  Germans 
had  utterly  defeated  those  who  vainly  relied  on  that  of  Rome. 
Roman  prestige  was  consequently  low.  In  all  Gaulish  tribes 
there  was  a  *  national'  party,  to  whom  the  presence  of  either 
Roman  or  German  was  alike  unwelcome.  This  section  was  now 
strong  even  among  the  Aedui,  where  a  pro-Roman  party  had  till 
lately  monopolized  power.  The  Gauls  seem  to  have  been  quite 
unaware  of  their  own  comparative  weakness.  No  one  could  then 
guess  that  a  mighty  struggle  was  close  at  hand,  in  which  the  real 
issue  would  be,  not  Gaulish  freedom,  but  whether  Roman  or 
German  should  be  master  in  Gaul  for  about  400  years. 

525.  At  this  moment  there  was  a  further  complication.  The 
Helvetian  Celts,  pressed  by  the  Germans  behind  them,  were 
about  to  migrate  in  a  body,  to  seek  new  homes  in  the  West. 
Whether  they  had  in  view  some  particular  district,  and  how  far 
it  is  true  that  they  had  great  schemes  of  conquest  in  Gaul,  are 
matters  of  doubt.  At  all  events  the  death  of  Orgetorix,  the  first 
leader  of  the  movement,  who  was  said  to  have  conspired  with 
two  chief  men  in  the  tribes  of  the  Aedui  and  Sequani,  did  not 
stop  their  migration.  The  project  was  known  in  Rome  early  in 
the  year  60.  In  59  Caesar,  as  consul  and  prospective  governor 
of  Roman  Gaul,  had  to  deal  with  the  question.  He  was  busy 
in  Rome,  so  he  wisely  did  what  he  could  to  avoid  having  a 
collision  with  the  Germans  and  with  the  Helvetii  at  the  same 

1  See  §  508. 


xxxviii]        The   Helvetli.      Caesar's  work  407 

time.  Ariovist  the  king  of  the  intruding  Germans  was  recognized 
as  a  Friend  of  the  Roman  people,  and  the  compliment  served  to 
defer  the  inevitable  conflict  for  a  while.  In  March  58  news  came 
that  the  Helvetii  were  on  the  move.  There  was  no  time  to  be 
lost,  for  to  allow  all  Gaul  to  be  disturbed  by  the  migration  of  ^ 
whole  people  would  surely  lead  to  serious  consequences.  At  the 
very  least  it  would  create  an  impression  of  Roman  impotence,  for 
the  wanderers  meant  to  enter  Gaul  by  way  of  Roman  territory. 
And  this  was  certain  to  strengthen  the  anti-Roman  partisans  in 
the  Gaulish  tribes.  Here  was  a  danger  menacing  the  province. 
Caesar  therefore  only  waited  till  he  had  set  Clodius  to  work,  and 
set  out  post-haste  for  Gaul.  He  had  only  one  legion  at  the  front 
as  yet,  but  he  reached  Genava  in  time  to  prevent  the  Helvetii 
crossing  the  Rhone  by  the  bridge  there,  which  he  broke  down. 
Debarred  from  taking  the  easier  route  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  they  now  sent  to  ask  his  leave  to  pass  that  way.  Caesar 
temporized  while  he  built '  forts  to  block  the  fords.  Then  he 
refused  their  request,  and  beat  off  their  attempts  to  force  a 
passage.  They  had  to  travel  by  the  bad  route  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  river.  Caesar  left  his  lieutenant  Labienus  in  charge,  and 
hurried  back  to  bring  up  his  main  army  from  the  Cisalpine. 

526.  We  may  pause  here  to  note  that  Caesar  was  responsible 
for  the  administration  of  a  province  extending  from  the  border  of 
Macedonia  to  the  Pyrenees.  During  the  wars  in  Gaul  he  had  to 
discharge  many  of  his  civil  duties  by  deputy;  but  his  practice 
was,  at  the  end  of  each  campaign,  to  put  his  legions  into  winter 
quarters,  and  return  to  the  Cisalpine,  sometimes  to  Illyricum 
also.  There  he  not  only  held  his  assizes  {convenfus)  in  person, 
but  kept  an  eye  on  subordinates.  This  care  for  the  interests  of 
the  governed  was  most  important.  His  popularity  enabled  him 
to  draw  from  his  province  a  constant  supply  of  willing  recruits, 
and  he  was  never  more  popular  there  than  at  the  very  end  of 
his  government.  Moreover  his  winters  in  the  Cisalpine  brought 
him  nearer  to  Rome,  and  into  closer  touch  with  men  and  things 
at  the  centre.  Even  in  the  far  North  he  kept  up  regular  com- 
munications with  the  city  by  letters  and  agents,  but  in  the 
Po-country  he  was  able  to  receive  visitors.  At  the  present 
time  he  had  three  legions  at  Aquileia.  He  raised  and  equipped 
two  more,  took  the  whole  five  over  the  Alps,  joined  Labienus, 
and  caught  up  the  Helvetii  before  they  had  got  far  on  their 


4o8  Army  departments  [ch. 

journey.  Their  vast  caravan  of  rude  waggons,  conveying  the 
women  children  and  stores  of  a  whole  people  'trekking,'  could 
only  crawl  along.  Caesar  could  catch  them  as  Marius  caught 
the  Teutons.  At  this  point  Caesar's  Gallic  war  really  begins,  and 
we  may  well  forestall  matters  by  considering  briefly  the  compo- 
sition and  organization  of  the  great  army  which  was  still  new 
and  was  only  brought  to  perfection  in  the  campaigns  of  eight 
momentous  years. 

527.  Of  the  legions  we  need  only  remark  that,  as  time  went 
on,  they  were  losing  their  strictly  Roman  character.  Transpadane 
'Latins'  were  taken  into  the  ranks,  and  perhaps  Illyrians  also. 
When  he  raised  a  whole  legion  of  Transalpine  Gauls  is  uncertain. 
Cavalry  and  light  troops  were  drawn  from  various  parts  of  the 
Roman  empire.  In  the  later  stages  of  the  war  considerable 
auxiliary  forces  were  raised  among  the  Gaulish  tribes  faithful 
to  Rome,  but  it  was  never  safe  to  rely  much  on  their  loyalty  in 
a  struggle  with  their  countrymen.  Caesar's  great  military  dis- 
covery was  the  employment  of  mercenary  Germans,  who  did 
him  invaluable  service  in  the  last  campaigns  and  afterwards 
in  the  civil  war.  In  equipment  and  training  the  legionaries 
were  far  superior  to  their  adversaries,  and  able  to  face  tremendous 
odds.  The  artillery  of  the  time  {ballistae  etc.)  also  gave  the 
Roman  an  advantage  against  the  Gaul.  This  department,  and 
still  more  that  of  engineering,  had  not  only  a  material  effect  but 
a  moral  one,  even  more  important.  Siege-works,  bridges,  and 
the  building  of  large  fleets  of  ships,  were  all  calculated  both  to 
serve  some  immediate  military  end  and  to  create  an  impression 
of  irresistible  power.  Moreover,  the  work  carried  out  (such  as 
ship-building)  in  the  winter  camps  no  doubt  prevented  the  men 
from  losing  efficiency  in  dreary  idleness.  The  typical  Caesarian 
soldier  was  beyond  all  things  a  'handy  man.'  In  days  before 
maps,  scouting  exploring  and  surveying  were  of  extreme  import- 
ance, and  these  services  were  carried  to  a  high  degree  of  perfection. 
There  was  also  a  good  staff  of  interpreters.  But  beyond  all  these 
departmental  merits  the  spirit  of  the  army  was  the  main  thing. 
Discipline  and  enthusiasm  went  hand  in  hand  under  a  leader 
who  never  overlooked  good  service  in  others,  and  whose  own 
nerve  never  failed.  Caesar  had  some  experience  of  war,  but  it 
was  the  practical  work  of  the  northern  wars  that  made  him  a 
great  general.      Whether,  in  training  his  army  and  himself,  he 


Plate   VI 


14.     Gaulish  gold  coin,   imitated  from  a  Macedonian  stater. 
obv.    Head  of  Apollo. 
rev.    Chariot.     $IAinnOT. 
See  §  353. 


15.     Gold   coin   of    M.    Brutus,    coined    43—2  B.C.  by  one   of  his 
lieutenants. 
obv.    Head  of  Brutus  in  laurel  wreath.     BRVTVS  IMP. 
rev.    Trophy,  between  2  ships'  prows.     Cx\SCA  LONGVS. 
See  §§  625,  635. 


16.     Denarius  of  41  B.C. 

obv.    Head  of  Antony. 
rev.    Head  of  Octavian. 

The  two  chiefs  are  each  called  IH  vir  R(ei)  P(ublicae) 
C(onstituendae). 

See  §  634. 


xxxviii]  Caesar  and  the  Germans  409 

was  already  looking  forward  to  a  time  when  he  must  either  perish 
or  dictate  terms  to  the  Roman  world,  is  a  question  to  which  it 
is  hardly  possible  to  give  a  confident  answer. 

528.  The  Helvetian  migration  had  to  be  stopped,  and 
Caesar  did  stop  it.  This  much  is  certain.  After  much  slaughter, 
the  rest  of  the  wanderers  were  sent  back  to  their  old  homes. 
The  details  of  the  pursuit  and  the  fighting  are  doubtful  and 
obscure.  The  point  of  most  interest  is  the  relations  of  Caesar 
to  the  chiefs  of  parties  among  the  Aedui.  The  '  nationalists '  were 
powerful,  and  their  leader  Dumnorix  commanded  a  contingent 
of  Aeduan  cavalry  who  misbehaved  themselves  suspiciously  in 
action.  Even  more  serious  was  the  delay  in  furnishing  promised 
supplies  of  food.  The  Roman  army  had  to  depend  on  local 
supplies,  and  indeed  commissariat  difficulties  were  the  greatest 
obstacle  to  campaigning  in  Gaul.  Caesar  discovered  the  treachery 
of  his  Aeduan  allies,  but  after  getting  the  needful  corn  he 
smoothed  matters  over  for  ■  the  ■  present.  The  Helvetii  being 
driven  back,  Caesar  (so  he  says)  was  urged  by  envoys  from 
a  number  of  Gaulish  tribes  to  turn  his  victorious  army  against 
the  Germans  under  Ariovist.  New  swarms  were  joining  them 
from  beyond  the  Rhine :  was  he  going  to  let  them  spread  all 
over  Gaul  ?  The  truth  is,  Caesar  needed  nobody  to  teach  him 
that  the  Germans  must  be  kept  out  at  all  costs.  Negotiations 
were  no  more  than  a  decent  preliminary  to  war.  Neither  side 
meant  to  accept  the  other's  terms,  so  Caesar  set  out  to  settle 
matters  with  the  sword.  Ariovist  held  the  Alsatian  country; 
Caesar  marched  North-East  along  the  line  of  the  river  Doubs. 
The  campaign  nearly  came  to  a  shameful  end  at  Vesontio 
(Besangon),  owing  to  a  panic  in  the  army.  Stories  of  German 
strength  and  ferocity  quite  unnerved  the  young  gentleman-cadets 
who  according  to  custom  were  seeing  a  little  service  under  the 
proconsul.  Their  fright  infected  others,  till  even  the  ceriturions 
lost  their  heads,  and  the  army  was  utterly  demoralized.  Caesar 
was  not.  If  the  army  was  necessary  to  him,  so  was  he  to  the 
army,  and  he  knew  it.  By  sheer  magnetic  power  and  force  of 
will  he  restored  their  tone,  and  convinced  them  that  they  must 
fight  and  conquer.  Once  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  insincere 
negotiations  and  manoeuvres  caused  some  delay.  But  in  the 
ensuing  battle  Roman  skill  and  steadiness  prevailed  over  bar- 
barous valour.    After  great  slaughter  the  remnant  of  the  Germans 


4IO  Belgic  campaign   57   B.C.  [ch. 

fled,  and  for  the  present  there  was  peace  along  the  Rhine.    Caesar 
quartered  his  troops  for  the  winter  in  the  country  of  the  Sequani. 
Now  the  Sequani  were  not  included  in  the  Roman  province.     It 
was  naturally  inferred  that  a  further  advance  was  in  contemplation. 
529.     While   Caesar  was   busy  in  the   Cisalpine   during  the 
winter  of  58 — 57,  he  heard  that  the  Belgic  tribes  were  preparing 
for  war.     He  raised  two  more  legions,  and  sent  them  to  the  front. 
When  the  season  opened,  he  followed  himself,  and  at  once  set 
out  to  face  the  enemy.     A  number  of  strong  tribes  were  in  arms, 
but  as  usual  there  was   not  unanimity.     The  Remi,  mistrusting 
their  neighbours,  came  to  terms  with  Caesar,  and  provided  him 
with  a  base  of  operations.      Indeed  they  remained  the  steady 
friends  of  Rome,  and  contributed,   far   more  than  the   Aedui, 
to  the  Roman  conquest  of  Gaul.     The  first  part  of  the  campaign 
resulted   in   the   submission   of    the    Suessiones    Bellovaci    and 
Ambiani,   tribes  lying   to  the  West  of  the  Remi.      They  were 
not  really  conquered,  but  Caesar  had  an  object  in  granting  them 
mild  terms.      For   the    moment   their   pacification   isolated  the 
tribes  to  the  North,  Nervii  and  others,  from  the  coast-tribes  of 
the  far  West  in  Aremorica,  now  Normandy  and  Brittany.     And 
he  thereby  began  a  policy  to  which  he  steadily  adhered,  and  by 
which  he  was  enabled  to  justify  his  aggressions  from  a  Roman 
point  of  view.    By  placing  an  enemy  in  the  position  of  surrendered 
foes  {dediticii)  he  gained  two  things.     If  these  people  broke  the 
peace,  they  were  regarded  as  rebellious  subjects.     If  any  other 
people  molested  Roman  subjects,  Rome  was  bound  to  protect 
her   own.      In   punishing   rebels   and   defending   the   loyal   the 
proconsul  was  on  the  face  of  it  only  doing  his  duty.     His  rivals 
and  enemies  in  Rome  could  not  attack  him  for  acting  in  accord- 
ance with  Roman  traditions.     In  short,  Caesar  in  his  camp  never 
lost  sight  of  the  party  movements  and  gossip  of  the  Senate-house 
and  the  Forum. 

530.  The  campaign  in  the  North  was  a  hard  one.  A  piece 
of  carelessness  on  Caesar's  part  allowed  the  Nervii  to  take  him  at 
a  disadvantage.  The  steady  legions  averted  a  great  disaster,  and 
beat  off  the  enemy  with  immense  loss.  Again  submission  was 
accepted.  With  the  Aduatuci  (of  German  origin)  the  same 
course  was  followed;  but  they  tried  to  surprise  the  Romans 
after  surrendering,  and  Caesar  sold  the  whole  captured  population 
into  slavery.     For  slave-dealers  were,  as  usual  in  these  days,  in 


xxxviii]  Caesar  in  the  Cisalpine  411 

attendance  on  the  Roman  army.  Another  result  of  the  successful 
campaign  of  57  is  seen  in  the  mission  of  young  P.  Crassus  (son  of 
M.  Crassus)  to  the  West  with  a  single  legion.  He  was  sent  to 
require  the  submission  of  the  Veneti  and  other  Aremorican  tribes. 
They  thought  it  best  for  the  moment  to  acknowledge  the  sovranty 
of  Rome,  insincerely  no  doubt.  But  this  was  enough  for  Caesar's 
purpose.  He  had  by  this  time  resolved  to  attempt  the  conquest 
of  all  Gaul.  He  quartered  seven  legions  for  the  winter  in 
camps  along  the  river  Loire.  In  this  position  they  cut  off  the 
Aremorican  tribes  from  those  of  central  Gaul,  and  lay  con- 
veniently for  access  to  the  seaboard.  Meanwhile  the  annexation 
of  practically  unknown  lands  made  a  profound  impression  in 
Rome.  The  Senate  decreed  a  public  thanksgiving  of  the 
unprecedented  length  of  15  days.  Caesar's  agents  took  care 
to  remind  the  mob  of  their  absent  favourite  by  the  usual  means. 
The  proconsul  himself  spent  a  busy  winter  in  the  Cisalpine  and 
Illyricum.  Here  he  received  neWs  of  a  great  Aremorican  rising, 
headed  by  the  Veneti.  He  at  once  sent  full  orders  for  the 
building  of  a  fleet  on  the  Loire  and  preparations  for  a  naval 
campaign  in  the  following  summer.  His  own  return  to  the 
front  was  delayed  by  urgent  questions  of  Roman  politics.  In 
pausing  to  consider  these  we  shall  see  that  the  war  in  Gaul  was 
not  a  detached  episode  of  conquest,  but  closely  connected  with 
the  inner  history  of  Rome. 


CHAPTER   XXXIX 

AFFAIRS    IN    ROME   58—55  B.C.     THE   CONFERENCE 
OF   LUCA   56  B.C. 

531.  We  have  seen  that  Caesar  did  not  set  out  for  Gaul 
until  Clodius  was  well  started  on  his  career,  and  the  removal  of 
Cicero  and  Cato  assured.  Caesar's  departure  left  Clodius  to  act 
on  his  own  account.  Backed  by  a  gang  of  ruffians,  the  tribune 
was  for  the  time  master  of  Rome,  and  he  turned  his  opportunities 
to  his  own  profit.  The  consuls  could  do  nothing  with  him.  He 
treated  even  the  great  Pompey  with  contempt,  and  at  length 
drove  him  to  shut  himself  up  at  home.  Crassus  did  nothing, 
and  probably  was  in  secret  encouraging  Clodius.  The  truth  was 
that  Pompey  and  Crassus  could  do  nothing  without  Caesar.  The 
republican  constitution  had  been  superseded  by  the  power  of  the 
three  partners.  That  power  had  become  ineffectual  in  Caesar's 
absence,  and  the  result  was  confusion,  at  any  moment  liable  to 
become  sheer  anarchy.  Cicero's  friends  began  to  move  for  his 
recall,  but  no  practical  step  was  possible  while  Clodius  was 
tribune.  After  the  elections  for  57  the  prospect  was  brighter, 
for  most  of  the  new  magistrates  were  in  favour  of  his  restoration. 
The  matter  was  seriously  taken  up  at  the  beginning  of  the  new 
year.  To  ignore  the  proceedings  of  Clodius  as  illegal  would 
have  called  in  question  his  other  acts,  not  affecting  Cicero,  and 
might  have  caused  great  inconvenience.  Therefore  the  Senate, 
guided  by  Pompey,  wisely  decided  that  it  was  necessary  to 
proceed  by  a  special  law  for  Cicero's  recall.  And  this  necessity 
involved  delay,  for  Clodius,  no  longer  tribune,  was  still  at  the 
head  of  armed  bands  and  able  to  prevent  any  such  proposal 
becoming  law.    Rioting  and  bloodshed,  in  the  absence  of  Caesar's 


CH.  xxxix]  Recall  of  Cicero  413 

army,  could  only  be  met  by  the  same  use  of  force.  So  the  men 
opposed  to  Clodius  raised  armed  bands,  chiefly  slave-gladiators, 
and  fought  for  the  mastery.  The  most  notable  leader  was  the 
tribune  T.  Annius  Milo,  a  turbulent  unscrupulous  fellow,  well 
suited  for  the  work  in  hand. 

532.  The  recall  of  Cicero  was  now  a  sort  of  test-question  in 
politics.  Pompey  was  in  favour  of  it,  but  had  been  corresponding 
with  Caesar,  by  way  of  overcoming  his  own  irresolution.  Caesar, 
personally  attached  to  Cicero,  only  stipulated  that  the  orator, 
when  recalled,  should  not  make  himself  the  mouthpiece  of 
opposition  to  the  triumviral  policy.  Crassus  at  all  events  was 
not  actively  hostile,  and  his  son  PubHus  was  a  devoted  admirer 
of  Cicero.  In  the  streets  the  costly  warfare  went  on,  but  Milo 
began  to  get  the  upper  hand  of  Clodius,  and  it  became  possible 
to  get  something  done.  In  June  some  progress  was  made. 
Clodius  was  isolated  in  the  Senate,  and  the  House  proceeded 
boldly.  Voters  were  summoned  from  the  country  towns  to 
support  a  bill  in  an  Assembly  by  Centuries,  and  on  the 
4th  August  the  bill  became  law.  The  exile  had  for  some  time 
been  waiting  at  Dyrrachium,  and  was  well  informed  of  the  course 
of  events.  He  ventured  to  cross  the  Adriatic,  and  landed  at 
Brundisium  on  the  5th  August.  Three  days  later  he  heard  the 
news  of  his  formal  restoration.  He  had  a  grand  reception  as  he 
made  his  way  to  Rome,  and  in  the  city  itself.  After  an  absence 
of  about  a  year  and  a  quarter  he  returned  in  glory  to  the  scene  of 
his  former  triumphs,  and  was  a  Roman  public  man  once  more. 
He  began  life  again  with  speeches  of  thanks.  For  the  moment 
all  seemed  well.  But  he  had  to  learn,  and  soon  did  learn,  some 
unwelcome  truths.  He  had  been  restored,  not  in  defiance  of  the 
three  partners,  but  with  their  leave.  For  the  present  the  Three 
held  together,  and  the  real  power  was  in  their  hands.  In  Rome 
Pompey  was  the  chief  figure.  Cicero  was  no  longer  a  public 
man  free  to  plan  and  act  on  his  own  judgment,  so  far  as  he  could 
induce  others  to  follow  him.  He  had  no  following  of  his  own. 
He  soon  discovered  that  not  a  few  were  jealous  of  his  eminence, 
and  his  constant  harping  upon  his  exile  and  recall  was  both 
tiresome  and  unwise. 

533.  Meanwhile  Rome  was  as  usual  hungry,  and  short 
harvests  in  57  made  the  supply  of  corn  difficult.  Clodius 
imputed  this  to  divine  anger  at  the  recall  of  Cicero.     A  practical 


414  Disorders  in  Rome  [ch. 

remedy  was  sought  by  creating  another  grand  commission  with 
exceptional  powers.  Of  course  Pompey  was  appointed  to  this 
charge.  For  five  years  he  was  made  supreme  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  his  power  of  organization  was  again  equal  to  the 
task.  Corn  was  procured,  and  Clodius  now  declared  that  the 
scarcity  had  been  artificially  produced  in  order  to  furnish  an 
excuse  for  making  Pompey  commissioner.  No  doubt  Pompey 
had  welcomed  the  opportunity.  His  friends  had  suggested  the 
grant  of  even  wider  powers,  to  make  him  supreme  over  all 
provincial  governors,  in  fact  an  Emperor.  But  this  could  not  be 
carried,  for  the  republican  aristocrats  were  against  it.  So  Pompey 
was  again  put  to  the  front,  but  it  was,  as  Cicero  found,  not  yet 
possible  to  bring  him  into  effective  union  with  the  'best  men.' 
Cicero  himself  was  also  making  enemies  by  abusive  oratory.  His 
position  became  more  and  more  uncomfortable,  for  the  great  nobles 
would  not  be  led  by  him.  He  detected  in  them  a  want  of 
sympathy  with  his  claims,  and  set  it  down  to  their  jealousy.  He 
had  been  guaranteed  restitution  of  his  property,  but  the  consecra- 
tion of  the  site  of  his  town  house  by  Clodius  caused  him  much 
trouble.  When  the  pontiffs  cleared  away  this  difficulty,  the 
question  of  the  compensation  due  to  him  for  the  destruction  of 
this  and  other  houses  came  up,  and  he  thought  that  the  valuers 
appointed  to  assess  the  damages  treated  him  meanly.  Nor  was 
rebuilding  accomplished  without  bloody  combats  with  the  gangs 
of  Clodius.  Rome  was  in  utter  disorder.  There  was  no  govern- 
ment able  and  willing  to  enforce  its  will.  In  this  state  of  things 
the  aristocrats  were  able  to  fill  both  consulships  and  most  of  the 
praetorships  for  56  with  their  own  men.  But  the  power  of  the 
Triumvirs,  though  weakened,  was  not  really  overthrown.  Milo 
held  Clodius  in  check,  but  could  not  prevent  his  being  elected 
aedile. 

534.  Among  the  intrigues  that  went  on  in  this  time  of 
confusion  a  new  Egyptian  question  deserves  notice.  The  Piper 
king  was  begging  to  be  restored  to  the  throne  from  which  a 
rebellion  had  lately  driven  him.  A  deputation  from  Alexandria 
also  came  to  plead  against  his  restoration.  Bribery  went  on 
freely  as  usual.  The  restoration  was  agreed  to,  in  spite  of 
opposition.  The  question  then  was,  to  whom  should  the  business 
be  entrusted.  The  real  wish  of  the  Senate  was  to  leave  it  in  the 
hands  of  the  present  consul  Lentulus  Spinther,  who  was  to  be 


xxxix]  Egypt.     The  Campanian  land  415 

governor  of  Cilicia  (with  Cyprus)  in  the  coming  year  (56).  But 
Pompey  wished  to  be  employed.  Months  went  by,  and  no  final 
decision  was  reached.  A  passage  in  the  Sibylline  books  was 
cited  to  prove  that  the  intervention  in  Egypt  must  take  place 
without  an  army.  The  matter  dragged  on  into  the  spring  of  56. 
Lentulus  was  never  fully  instructed  to  act,  so  he  did  nothing. 
Pompey  did  not  care  to  go  without  a  suitable  force.  This  he 
could  not  have,  thanks  to  the  jealousy  of  the  nobles.  Crassus 
seems  to  have  joined  in  thwarting  his  ambition.  Such  was  the 
pitiful  state  of  Roman  politics  in  the  absence  of  the  only  man 
who  knew  what  he  wanted,  and  who,  if  present,  would  assuredly 
not  have  allowed  the  government  to  become  a  mere  scene  of 
deadlock  and  impotence.  In  the  early  months  of  56  things  were 
worse  than  ever  in  Rome.  Clodius  was  again  rampant.  He  and 
his  associates,  probably  encouraged  by  Crassus,  were  too  much 
for  the  hesitating  Pompey,  who  was  driven  by  their  insults  and 
violence  to  combine  with  Milo,  and  to  raise  armed  bands  of  his 
own.  Anarchy  could  hardly  go  further.  Cicero  was  helpless,  and 
knew  not  whither  to  turn.  He  was  disgusted  with  the  aristocrats, 
though  he  was  a  loyal  repubHcan.  So  he  was  gradually  drawn 
towards  Pompey,  whom  he  regarded  as  the  first  man  in  the  state. 
True,  Pompey  was  leagued  with  Crassus  and  Caesar.  But  the 
coalition  seemed  to  be  breaking  up.  Cicero  certainly  did  not 
mean  to  support  the  three  partners  in  a  policy  dangerous  to  the 
Republic.  But  he  soon  learnt  that,  if  he  were  unwilling  to  be 
their  open  enemy,  he  must  be  content  to  obey  their  orders. 

535.  In  the  joint  policy  of  the  Triumvirs  no  article  was  more 
important  than  the  land-law  by  which  Pompey  had  been  enabled 
to  quiet  his  veterans  with  allotments.  In  Campania,  the  district 
chiefly  affected,  there  seems  to  have  been  some  trouble.  We  do 
not  know  exactly  what  had  gone  wrong,  but  on  the  loth  Dec.  57 
one  of  the  new  tribunes  addressed  the  Senate  on  the  need  of 
some  change.  The  matter  was  adjourned  to  the  5th  April  56, 
that  Pompey,  who  was  away  on  corn- business,  might  be  present. 
Cicero,  who  was  charmed  to  note  the  justification  of  his  own 
resistance  to  the  allotment  of  the  ager  Campanus,  took  part  in 
advocating  a  change  of  policy.  To  Pompey  any  proposal  to 
disturb  his  veterans  was  surely  unwelcome,  but  according  to 
Cicero  he  made  no  open  objection.  The  matter  was  again 
adjourned  to  the  15th  May,  and  Pompey  again  left  Rome  on  the 


41 6  Conference  of  Luca  [ch. 

business  of  corn-supply.  The  15th  May  came,  and  the  debate 
on  the  Campanian  land  was  not  resumed.  In  seeking  the  reason 
for  the  abandonment  of  the  proposal  we  come  upon  the  most 
important  event  of  the  year  56,  an  event  by  which  all  the  remaining 
history  of  the  Roman  Republic  was  profoundly  influenced. 

536.  Caesar  had  despatched  his  administrative  business  in 
the  winter  of  57 — 56,  and  had  sent  orders  to  the  army  in  northern 
Gaul.  But  he  waited  for  a  time  in  the  Cisalpine.  It  was  high 
time  to  attend  directly  to  Roman  affairs,  if  he  meant  to  guide 
them.  Crassus  and  Pompey  could  not  by  themselves  work  in 
harmony.  Both  had  ambitions,  and  each  was  jealous  of  the 
other.  The  republican  nobles  were  gaining  ground.  Cato  had 
either  returned  or  was  just  returning.  Cicero  had  begun  to 
tamper  with  the  Julian  land-law.  Some  were  already  talking  of 
recaUing  Caesar  himself  from  Gaul.  Caesar  was  by  no  means 
ready  to  deal  with  all  these  troubles  single-handed,  if  indeed  he 
at  this  time  contemplated  the  possibility  of  his  ever  having  to  be 
the  master  of  Rome.  His  two  partners  were  at  present  necessary 
to  him.  Therefore  he  must  at  all  costs  revive  the  coalition.  He 
arranged  a  meeting  at  Luca,  a  town  in  northern  Etruria,  on  the 
border  of  his  province.  Here  there  were  no  Senate  or  Assemblies 
or  tiresome  magistrates.  Under  Caesar's  dexterous  management 
Pompey  and  Crassus  were  again  united  to  promote  their  common 
interest.  Their  several  ambitions  were  promptly  gratified.  Pompey 
was  to  have  the  two  Spains  for  five  years,  and  was  to  be  free  to 
govern  by  deputies,  in  case  he  preferred  to  remain  near  Rome. 
Crassus  was  to  have  Syria,  and  to  be  free  to  undertake  a  Parthian 
war,  though  Rome  and  Parthia  were  at  peace.  Both  were  to 
have  armies.  Caesar  was  to  have  his  command  prolonged  for 
five  years,  that  is  from  March  54  to  March  49.  All  this  rested 
on  the  assumption  that  the  constitutional  organs  of  the  Republic 
could  and  would  be  made  to  work  in  compliance  with  the  will  of 
the  Three.  Here  we  see  the  hand  of  Caesar.  He  knew  that 
the  government  as  conducted  by  the  aristocrats  was  a  mass  of 
corruption  and  sham,  and  was  quite  prepared  to  use  all  needful 
means  of  coercion  for  its  practical  improvement.  All  the  Three 
wanted  to  gain  their  own  ends :  Caesar  alone  was  masterful  or 
unscrupulous  enough  to  take  the  necessary  steps. 

537.  In  order  to  control  the  machinery  of  government,  it 
was  agreed  that  Pompey  and  Crassus  should  be  consuls  in  55, 


xxxix]  The  coalition  revived  417 

and  that  men  willing  to  serve  the  coalition  should  so  far  as 
possible  fill  the  other  offices.  Thus  the  bargain  about  the 
provinces  could  be  made  secure.  It  was  said  that  the  names 
of  consuls  for  years  to  come  were  also  settled  at  the  conference, 
and  that  Pompey  had  the  list  in  a  private  note-book.  Stubborn 
opponents,  such  as  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  and  Cato,  were  to 
be  thwarted  by  all  means.  In  particular  the  restless  Cicero  must 
be  brought  to  book.  This  Pompey  undertook  to  do.  Q.  Cicero 
was  serving  under  him  in  the  charge  of  the  corn-supply.  He 
warned  Quintus  that  his  own  prospects  would  depend  on  his 
brother's  behaviour,  and  Quintus  at  once  passed  on  the  warning 
to  Marcus.  Clodius  was  for  the  present  put  under  some  restraint, 
but  the  orator  did  not  wish  to  be  left  a  second  time  at  his  mercy. 
It  was  necessary  to  submit ;  so  no  more  was  done  in  the  matter 
of  the  Campanian  land.  Nor  was  this  concession  enough.  Cicero 
could  not  bear  to  retire  from  poUtics.  Though  he  had  much  in 
common  with  the  aristocratic  republicans,  he  was  now  disgusted 
with  them.  Though  he  knew  that  under  the  control  of  the 
coalition  his  beloved  Republic  was  no  more  than  a  name,  he  was 
drawn  bit  by  bit  into  the  position  of  servant  to  the  three  partners. 
Flattering  messages  from  Caesar  smoothed  the  unwelcome  transi- 
tion, and  as  time  went  on  it  was  a  source  of  gratification  to  hear 
of  the  respect  paid  to  his  letters  of  recommendation  at  head- 
quarters in  Gaul. 

538.  The  conference  of  Luca  had  also  a  notable  effect  in 
raising  the  position  of  Caesar.  Knowing  men  had  guessed  that 
it  would  be  an  important  occasion,  and  numbers  (among  them 
more  than  200  senators)  visited  the  town  in  hope  of  forwarding 
their  own  interests.  They  were  well  received.  Politicians  likely 
to  be  useful  were  treated  to  a  share  of  the  gold  of  Gaul.  Con- 
versation with  Caesar's  staff  convinced  many  that  there  were 
opportunities  of  winning  glory  and  profit  in  the  northern  war 
under  a  lucky  and  generous  commander.  Not  a  few  young 
nobles  were  eager  to  serve  a  campaign  or  two  in  Gaul,  and  every 
such  cadet  was  a  guarantee  against  the  active  hostility  of  his 
relatives  in  Rome.  But  the  ambition  was  not  confined  to 
striplings.  Quintus  Cicero  was  fired  with  it,  and  in  54  we  find 
him  one  of  Caesar's  trusted  lieutenants.  So  Caesar,  while  obliging 
his  two  partners,  quietly  gained  ground,  and  people  in  Rome 
learnt  to  look  with  more  and  more  interest  for  exciting  news  from 

H.  27 


41 8  The  consular  provinces  [ch. 

Gaul.  Meanwhile  the  first  half  of  this  year  56  was  a  busy  time 
for  Cicero  as  a  pleader.  In  the  earlier  speeches,  before  the 
conference  of  Luca  in  April,  he  was  still  more  or  less  free  to 
speak  his  mind  and  to  take  a  line  of  his  own  in  referring  to  public 
affairs.  After  his  warning  he  had  to  fall  in  with  the  general  poHcy 
of  those  who  were  now  virtually  his  masters.  It  was  a  relief,  in 
defending  M.  Caelius  on  a  criminal  charge,  to  be  free  to  abuse 
Clodia,  the  notorious  sister  of  his  old  enemy;  but  he  had  Crassus 
for  his  fellow-counsel.  Rome  was  still  a  good  deal  disturbed, 
but  popular  discontent  grew  less  as  time  went  by,  and  Pompey's 
organization  provided  a  better  supply  of  corn. 

539.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  compact  made  at  Luca 
was  a  private  affair.  Business  went  on  in  the  Senate,  and  votes 
were  passed  in  accordance  with  the  wish  of  the  Triumvirs,  but  it 
was  not  known  that  Pompey  and  Crassus  meant  to  be  consuls  in 
the  year  55.  By  the  law  of  C  Gracchus  the  provinces  to  be  held 
by  the  consuls  of  55  after  their  year  of  office  had  to  be  fixed  in 
56  before  the  election.  This  matter  was  debated  in  June,  and  it 
was  the  occasion  of  a  fine  speech  by  Cicero.  In  ignorance  that 
they  were  discussing  what  had  already  been  decided  at  Luca,  the 
House  treated  the  matter  seriously.  The  interesting  feature  of 
the  debate  was  the  attempt  to  provide  for  superseding  Caesar  in 
Gaul.  To  all  proposals  having  this  tendency  Cicero  offered  a 
strong  opposition.  He  had  to  explain  his  change  of  front,  and 
he  ingeniously  justified  his  support  of  Caesar  as  the  result  of 
a  reconciliation.  But  the  truth  was  that  he  had  made  submission 
to  Caesar,  and  in  letters  to  friends  he  confessed  that  he  was 
ashamed  of  himself.  It  seems  that  nothing  came  of  the  debate, 
which  was  from  first  to  last  an  illustration  of  the  unreality  of  the 
Republic  under  present  conditions.  Yet  the  republican  aristo- 
crats were  by  no  means  ready  to  submit  to  the  permanent  control 
of  an  informal  coalition.  Cicero  had  left  them,  but  in  the  spring 
of  56  Cato  returned  from  the  East,  and  paid  into  the  treasury  the 
vast  sums  of  which  he  had  taken  possession  on  behalf  of  the 
state.  In  him  the  Republic  recovered  an  undaunted  champion. 
He  soon  fell  out  with  Cicero,  and  for  some  time  these  two 
sincere  patriots  were  unhappily  at  variance.  The  orator  remained 
uneasily  obedient  to  his  new  masters.  Later  in  the  year  Balbus 
the  Spaniard  was  prosecuted  on  a  charge  of  illegal  assumption 
of    the    Roman    franchise.       It   was    really   an    attack    on   the 


xxxix]  Triumph  of  Caesars  policy  419 

Triumvirs,  and  Cicero  had  to  defend  him.     An  acquittal  was 
the   result. 

540.  The  republicans  evidently  hoped  to  give  a  new  turn  to 
public  affairs  by  success  at  the  elections.  But  the  three  partners 
had  agreed  to  prevent  an  election  being  held  in  the  current  year. 
Means  were  found  to  effect  their  purpose,  and  the  year  55  began 
without  consuls  or  praetors.  The  consular  election  was  held  in 
January  by  an  interrex.  L.  Domitius  was  the  only  rival  who 
persisted  in  his  candidature.  He  was  driven  off  by  armed 
violence,  and  Pompey  and  Crassus  became  consuls.  In  February 
they  held  the  praetorian  election,  and  with  their  armed  gangs  and 
Caesar's  gold  they  managed  to  keep  out  Cato  and  bring  in  their 
man  P.  Vatinius.  Caesar's  bold  policy  had  triumphed.  Before 
we  proceed  to  consider  the  momentous  events  that  led  up  to  the 
great  civil  war,  it  will  be  best  to  finish  the  story  of  Caesar's 
doings  in  Gaul. 


27 — 2 


CHAPTER    XL 

CAESAR   IN   GAUL   56— 50  B.C. 

541.  The  campaign  of  the  year  56  opened  late,  owing  to  the 
important  business  by  which  Caesar  was  detained  in  Italy.  His 
first  object  now  was  to  conquer  the  Aremorican  tribes  in  the 
North-West,  in  particular  the  rebellious  Veneti.  To  free  himself 
for  the  main  operations,  he  detached  forces  to  the  South  and 
South- West,  and  to  the  East,  while  another  body  invaded  northern 
Aremorica  (Normandy  and  N.E.  Brittany).  His  fleet  was  ready, 
commanded  by  Decimus  Junius  Brutus,  but  was  for  some  time 
weather-bound  in  the  mouth  of  the  Loire.  He  began  operations 
by  land,  but  could  make  little  progress.  The  enemy  were  sea- 
faring folk,  and  he  could  not  catch  them :  when  a  headland  fort 
was  no  longer  defensible,  they  gave  him  the  slip  by  water.  At 
length  the  Roman  fleet  appeared,  but  it  laboured  under  grave 
disadvantages.  The  local  waters  were  strange  to  the  Roman 
skippers,  and  the  galleys  were  of  the  Mediterranean  model,  ill 
suited  to  face  Atlantic  waves.  The  skilful  seamen  of  the  Veneti 
knew  every  channel  and  shoal,  and  their  stout  vessels,  impervious 
to  the  beaks  of  galleys,  were  specially  built  for  service  in  rough 
waters  and  able  to  take  the  ground  without  hurt.  But  they  were 
heavy  sailing  vessels,  while  the  Roman  galleys  were  propelled  by 
oars,  and  thus  able  to  manoeuvre  in  a  dead  calm.  Caesar  and 
his  men  ran  a  great  risk  by  depending  on  the  fleet  for  safety ;  but 
the  Veneti  staked  everything.  The  battle  was  a  decisive  Roman 
victory,  partly  won  by  cutting  the  slings  that  carried  their  yards, 
so  that  they  could  not  sail,  and  then  boarding.  The  wind  too 
died  out,  and  the  ships,  now  helpless,  were  taken  one  by  one. 
Fortune  had  favoured  a  rash  venture.  The  Veneti  had  to  submit, 
and  Caesar  treated  them  with  great  severity  as  a  warning  to  others. 


CH.  xl]    Caesars  campaigns  56  and  55  B.C.         421 

542.  His  lieutenants  were  also  successful.  The  northern 
Aremoricans  were  beaten  and  forced  to  surrender.  The  Aquita- 
nian  tribes  in  the  South-West,  though  helped  by  Spaniards  who 
had  served  under  Sertorius,  fared  no  better.  There  was  no  firm 
union  or  discipline,  and  they  easily  succumbed  to  Roman  skill. 
An  expedition  made  by  Caesar  hiniself  late  in  the  season  against 
the  Morini  and  Menapii  in  the  far  North  effected  little  beyond 
laying  the  country  waste.  The  eastern  operations  under  Labienus 
seem  to  have  served  their  purpose,  for  there  was  no  great  rising 
in  those  parts.  But  there  was  reason  for  some  uneasiness,  for 
some  German  tribes  were  known  to  be  restless.  Caesar  quartered 
his  army  for  the  winter  in  the  region  between  the  Seine  and 
Loire,  to  watch  the  new ,  conquests,  and  himself  returned  to  the 
Cisalpine.  In  the  year  55  news  from  the  North  brought  him 
back  to  the  front  earlier  than  usual.  Masses  of  Germans  were 
on  the  move,  and  the  terror  inspired  by  these  hardy  warriors  left 
no  doubt  that  he  would  have  to  fight  them.  Unless  he  could 
prove  without  delay  that  the  Roman  was  able  to  drive  out  the 
German,  the  Gauls  would  never  acquiesce  in  subjection  to  Rome. 
And  a  sharp  lesson  was  needed.  The  fertility  of  the  German 
race  was  prodigious.  They  were  ever  wanting  more  room,  and 
were  ever  ready  to  win  new  lands  with  the  sword.  The  stronger 
tribes,  or  confederacies  of  tribes,  were  ever  pushing  on  the  weaker. 
The  Suebi,  mightiest  of  all,  had  lately  dislodged  the  Usipetes  and 
Tencteri;  and  these  tribes,  driven  to  the  North,  had  passed  the 
Rhine,  seized  a  large  district  in  the  Menapian  country,  and 
wintered  there.  Early  in  55  they  began  to  spread  southwards, 
and  were  in  communication  with  some  of  the  Gaulish  tribes  of 
the  North-East. 

543.  Negotiation  was  of  course  vain.  The  Germans  meant 
to  stay  in  Gaul :  Caesar  could  not  allow  them  to  remain.  At  all 
costs  they  must  be  driven  out.  An  obscure  but  effective  cam- 
paign followed,  marked  by  misunderstandings,  and  perhaps 
treachery,  on  both  sides.  Caesar  found  himself  in  great  danger, 
owing  to  the  disloyalty  or  panic  of  his  Gaulish  auxiliaries.  From 
his  own  narrative  we  may  gather  that  he  stooped  to  gain  an 
advantage  by  treacherous  dealing.  He  seized  the  German  leaders 
who  had  come  to  deal  with  him,  and  fell  upon  their  main  body 
unawares.  They  were  either  cut  down  or  driven  into  the  river. 
So  he  saved  his  army.     In  Rome  his  victory  was  honoured,  but 


422  Expeditions  to  Britain  [ch. 

Cato  and  others  made  party-capital  out  of  the  affair,  urging  that 
his  barbarity  was  making  enemies  for  Rome,  and  ought  to  be 
stopped.  But  nothing  came  of  this  talk.  Caesar  resolved  to 
produce  a  moral  effect  on  the  Germans  by  passing  the  Rhine. 
For  this  purpose  he  refused  to  employ  boats,  and  displayed 
Roman  power  by  building  a  trestle-bridge.  The  army  did  the 
work  in  ten  days,  and  marched  over  dryshod.  After  a  short  stay 
the  demonstration  was  ended  by  returning  into  Gaul  and  breaking 
down  the  bridge.  A  dramatic  expedition  occupied  what  was  left 
of  the  season.  Caesar  ordered  his  fleet  to  meet  him  in  the  land 
of  the  Morini,  and  paid  a  short  visit  to  Britain.  The  direct 
result  of  this  venture  was  practically  nothing.  In  battle  he  could 
beat  the  natives,  but  he  could  not  catch  or  conquer  them.  After 
a  very  brief  stay  he  was  glad  to  return,  having  lost  some  of  his 
ships.  Further  operations  in  northern  Gaul  were  necessary  to 
quiet  some  of  the  Belgic  tribes,  among  whom  the  legions  were 
quartered  for  the  winter.  In  Rome  the  news  of  the  British 
expedition  caused  no  small  stir.  The  far-off  island  was  only 
known  by  name,  and  imaginative  gossip  freely  suggested  possi- 
bilities of  gain  and  glory  to  be  won  in  its  conquest.  So  Caesar 
had  no  lack  of  applicants  for  employment.  He  left  orders  for 
new  and  improved  transports  to  be  built  for  a  second  voyage, 
and  went  off  to  his  duties  in  the  Cisalpine  and  Illyricum. 

544.  That  600  ships  of  the  new  model,  with  all  accessories, 
were  turned  out  under  most  difficult  conditions  in  the  winter  of 
55 — 54,  may  give  us  some  notion  of  the  handiness  and  industry 
of  Caesar's  men.  But  before  they  could  set  out  for  Britain  in  the 
year  54  some  precautions  had  to  be  taken  in  Gaul.  The  powerful 
Treveri  (in  the  Rhine-Mosel  country)  were  said  to  be  intriguing 
with  Germans,  and  likely  to  rebel.  The  proconsul  went  to  them 
himself  with  an  army,  and  settled  a  tribal  quarrel  by  placing  the 
leader  of  the  Roman  party  in  power.  He  took  hostages  for  the 
good  behaviour  of  the  nationalist  leader.  But  he  found  that  in 
other  tribes  also  nationalist  chiefs  were  active.  There  was  much 
discontent  at  the  restraints  caused  by  Roman  overlordship,  at  the 
service  of  Gauls  in  Roman  armies,  at  Roman  consumption  of 
native-grown  corn.  He  resolved  to  take  the  malcontent  chiefs 
with  him  to  Britain  as  hostages.  But  Dumnorix  the  Aeduan  still 
plotted  to  arrange  a  general  refusal  of  these  suspected  men  to 
embark.     He  was  put  to  death,  and  the  armada   sailed.     The 


xl]  Society  at  headquarters  423 

second  expedition  was  made  with  a  stronger  force  (5  legions)  and 
several  months  were  spent  in  Britain.  Caesar  penetrated  some 
way  beyond  the  Thames,  and  gained  victories.  A  number  of 
tribes  made  a  show  of  submission,  but  there  was  no  real  conquest. 
For  form's  sake  a  yearly  tribute  was  imposed,  and  a  Roman 
protectorate  declared.  But  nothing  came  of  it.  The  expedition 
gave  Caesar  the  opportunity  of  learning  many  things  of  interest 
concerning  the  country  and  the  people,  which  he  recorded  for 
Roman  readers.  The  material  profit  of  this  costly  enterprise 
consisted  in  a  number  of  captives  carried  off  into  slavery.    - 

545.  We  are  speaking  of  the  war  in  the  North  as  a  part  of 
Roman  history.  It  is  therefore  important  to  remember  that 
Caesar  was  in  constant  communication  with  Rome,  and  that  his 
career  was  attentively  watched  by  Roman  society.  His  head- 
quarters were  not  a  mere  military  centre.  Much  of  the  business 
there  transacted  was  directly  connected  with  Roman  politics. 
His  correspondence  required  a  regular  mail-service.  The  wealth 
gained  in  Gaul  was  partly  spent  on  judicious  loans  and  gifts  in 
Rome.  A  few  influential  men  were  gratified  by  the  promotion  of 
their  friends  to  positions  of  trust.  The  case  of  Cicero  illustrates 
this  careful  'nursing.'  Caesar  read  the  orator's  works,  wrote  him 
flattering  letters,  lent  him  money,  and  in  54  gave  his  brother 
Quintus  the  command  of  a  legion.  In  short,  beside  the  direction 
of  his  military  staff"  and  the  deputies  engaged  in  the  administration 
of  his  provinces,  Caesar  had  a  private  staff"  of  faithful  assistants 
who  kept  him  in  touch  with  aff"airs  at  the  centre,  and  discharged 
his  commissions  with  intelligence  and  zeal.  Such  were  Matius, 
who  kept  up  the  social  life  at  headquarters ;  Oppius,  who  was  his 
resident  agent  in  Rome;  above  all  the  Spaniard  Balbus,  the 
trusty  factotum  who  travelled  to  and  fro  on  the  most  delicate 
errands,  and  enjoyed  his  master's  fullest  confidence.  Thus  the 
proconsul's  camp  in  Gaul  was  being  converted  into  a  political 
centre,  of  hardly  less  practical  importance  than  Rome  itself.  But 
we  must  note  two  events  by  which  the  coalition  revived  at  Luca 
was  severely  shaken.  Before  the  end  of  55  Crassus  had  started 
for  the  East.  Some  time  in  the  middle  of  54  Julia  died.  Pompey 
remained  in  Italy,  no  longer  watched  by  a  jealous  colleague,  and 
no  longer  attached  to  Caesar  by  a  beloved  wife.  No  rupture 
took  place  openly  as  yet,  but  the  gradual  cooling  of  relations 
between  Pompey  and  Caesar  had  momentous  consequences. 


424        Troubles  in  the  winter  54 — 53  B.C.         [ch. 

546.  After  the  British  expedition  of  54  Caesar  had  to  prepare 
for  the  winter.  A  short  harvest  compelled  him  to  quarter  his 
legions  in  camps  more  widely  scattered  than  usual.  One  was  in 
the  West,  watching  Aremorica :  the  rest  were  spread  over  the 
Belgic  North.  It  is  clear  that  there  was  cause  for  uneasiness  at 
this  time.  A  rebellious  spirit  was  abroad.  The  Carnutes  (between 
Seine  and  Loire)  even  broke  out  in  revolt^  and  murdered  the 
chief  placed  over  them  by  Caesar.  But  when  this  rising  was  put 
down,  and  when  all  the  legions  were  reported  safely  settled  in 
their  winter  quarters,  the  proconsul  still  did  not  set  out  for  Italy. 
His  delay  was  soon  justified.  In  the  far  North-East  the  Eburones, 
prompted  by  Indutiomar,  the  '  nationalist '  leader  of  the  Treveri, 
rose  and  beset  the  nearest  Roman  station.  The  senior  officer  in 
command  lost  his  nerve.  The  whole  force  were  induced  to  leave 
their  camp  and  march  to  join  another  legion.  On  the  march 
they  were  waylaid,  and  only  a  few  stragglers  escaped  the  massacre. 
The  camp  of  Q.  Cicero  in  the  Nervian  country  was  next  attacked, 
but  a  desperate  defence  against  enormous  odds  foiled  the  be- 
siegers. At  last  a  message  reached  Caesar  through  a  Gaulish 
slave.  He  arrived  with  a  relieving  force  just  in  time.  Thus  a 
great  general  rebellion  of  the  tribes  was  averted,  but  Caesar  had 
to  spend  the  whole  winter  at  the  front.  There  was  unrest  in 
various  quarters.  In  particular,  Indutiomar  raised  the  Treveri  in 
revolt,  but  was  defeated  and  slain  by  Labienus.  A  sort  of  quiet 
was  restored,  but  Caesar  thought  it  wise  to  increase  his  forces. 
He  had  lost  about  a  legion  and  a  half.  He  sent  orders  to  raise 
two  new  ones  in  the  Cisalpine,  and  borrowed  a  third  from 
Pompey,  who  had  more  than  he  needed.  By  the  end  of 
the  winter  of  54 — 53  he  seems  to  have  had  ten  legions  under 
arms. 

547.  The  work  of  the  year  53  may  be  briefly  described  as 
the  suppression  of  outbreaks  in  northern  and  north-central  Gaul. 
As  before,  the  connexion  of  the  north-eastern  tribes  with  Germans 
was  a  cause  of  trouble,  and  it  was  in  this  region  that  the  most 
serious  difficulties  arose.  A  fresh  rebellion  of  the  Treveri  was 
quelled  by  Labienus.  Caesar  ravaged  the  land  of  the  Menapii. 
But  the  arch-rebel,  Ambiorix  chief  of  the  Eburones,  was  still  at 
large.  In  the  hope  of  scaring  the  Germans,  Caesar  a  second 
time  bridged  the  Rhine  and  made  a  short  stay  beyond  the  river, 
but  evidently  to  little  purpose.     Then  he  turned  upon  the  Ebu- 


xl]  Changes  in   Rome.     Vercingetorix  425 

rones  and  destroyed  the  whole  tribe  to  the  best  of  his  power. 
These  operations  were  not  conducted  without  risks  and  losses, 
and  an  isolated  post  narrowly  escaped  annihilation  by  a  body  of 
German  raiders.  In  spite  of  vigorous  pursuit,  Ambiorix  again 
got  away  safe,  but  the  North  was  so  far  pacified  that  it  was  no 
longer  the  chief  seat  of  rebellion.  After  dealing  with  the  dis- 
affection of  the  Senones  and  Carnutes  in  the  Seine-Loire  country, 
Caesar  quartered  his  ten  legions  for  the  winter,  and  set  out  for 
the  Cisalpine.  There,  in  the  winter  months  of  53 — 52,  he  had 
no  season  of  rest.  The  political  situation  had  been  changed  by 
the  death  of  Crassus.  The  disorderly  broils  long  chronic  in 
Rome  at  last  in  January  52  led  to  the  murder  of  Clodius.  To 
relieve  the  anarchy  that  followed,  Pompey  was  entrusted  with 
exceptional  powers,  and  a  levy  of  troops  decreed  by  the  Senate. 
The  force  of  events  had  once  more  given  to  Pompey  a  pre- 
dominant position  in  Rome,  and  Caesar  was  doubtless  well  aware 
that  to  his  surviving  partner  he  must  now  stand  in  the  relation  of 
a  rival.  He  did  what  he  could  to  avert  a  rupture.  And,  before 
Pompey's  policy  had  time  to  unfold  itself,  Caesar  was  forced  to 
start  in  all  haste  for  the  North,  to  face  a  danger  that  threatened 
to  destroy  all  the  achievements  of  six  laborious  years. 

548.  The  central  or  '  Celtic '  Gaul  had  as  yet  hardly  felt  the 
pressure  of  Roman  conquest.  It  contained  several  strong  tribes, 
and  they  were  at  last  thoroughly  alarmed  at  the  progress  of 
Caesar.  Their  turn  would  soon  come.  And  at  this  juncture  a 
leader  appeared  in  the  tribe  of  the  Arverni.  We  have  seen^  that 
these  enjoyed  a  sort  of  primacy  because  of  their  numbers  and 
prowess.  Without  them,  a  large  union  of  tribes  against  Rome 
was  hardly  possible  in  the  central  region,  or  at  least  it  had  little 
prospect  of  victory.  But  the  Arverni  were  at  peace  with  Rome, 
of  whose  power  they  had  had  experience  long  ago,  and  their 
leading  nobles  were  opposed  to  a  rising,  A  young  noble'  named 
Vercingetorix,  at  first  thwarted  by  the  party  of  peace,  overcame 
their  opposition,  and  was  declared  king.  He  not  only  carried  his 
own  tribe  with  him  in  a  war  with  Caesar,  but  quickly  formed  a 
great  confederacy,  embracing  almost  all  the  tribes  of  central  Gaul, 
pledged  to  fight  for  Gaulish  freedom.  So  far  his  task  was  easy, 
for  Gaulish  enthusiasm  was  easily  roused.  But  to  carry  on  war 
with  an  army  of  tribal  contingents,  led  by  touchy  and  self-willed 

^  §  353- 


426  Cenabum.     Avarlcum.     Gergovia  [ch. 

chiefs,  was  an  enterprise  of  great  difficulty.  That  Vercingetorix 
did  gain  no  small  measure  of  success  proves  him  to  have  been  a 
man  of  exceptional  powers.  The  absence  of  Caesar,  and  rumours 
of  the  troubles  that  might  detain  him  in  Italy,  suggested  prompt 
action  in  the  hope  that  he  might  be  cut  off  from  his  army.  So 
about  the  beginning  of  52  the  signal  was  given  by  the  Carnutes, 
who  rose  and  massacred  the  Romans  among  them.  Even  in  the 
Aeduan  tribe  the  anti-Roman  faction  daily  grew  stronger.  Doubtful 
tribes  soon  joined  the  rebels,  and  there  was  more  unanimity  than 
had  yet  been  known  in  Gaul.  The  ordinary  campaigning  season 
had  not  yet  opened,  and  snow  lay  upon  the  hills. 

549.     The  daring  march  by  which  Caesar  foiled  the  plans  of 
Vercingetorix   was   perhaps   his   strategic   masterpiece.     With   a 
body  of  young  troops  he  forced  his  way  over  the  Cevennes  range 
into  the  Arvernian  country.     Having  drawn  the  Arvernian  chief 
southwards  to  its  defence,  he   gave  him   the  slip   and   hurried 
northwards  with  a  mounted  escort.     After  reaching  the  nearest 
legions,  he  sent  orders  to  the  rest,  and  in  a  few  days  had  con- 
centrated his  whole  army  in  the  land  of  the  Senones.     It  is  to  be 
noted  that  we  find  him  already  employing  a  few  Germans   as 
cavalry.     They  made  excellent  troopers,  and  later  in  the  year  he 
hired  more  of  them.     It  was  still  quite  early  in  the  year,  and  the 
great  hindrance  to  campaigning  was  the  difficulty  of  feeding  his 
army.     Vercingetorix  was  active  in  central  Gaul,  endeavouring  to 
draw  the  Aedui  over  to  the  national  cause,  when  Caesar  advanced 
on  Cenabum  (Orleans),  the  scene  of  the  recent  massacre.     The 
town  was  carried  with  a  rush,  and  a  full  revenge  taken.     He  next 
entered  the  country  of  the  Bituriges  and  made  for  their  chief 
town  Avaricum  (Bourges).     The  Gaulish  leader  had  to  meet  him, 
and  hoped  to   stay  his   progress   by  destroying   all   towns   and 
hamlets  and  laying  the  country  waste.     But  local  pride  thwarted 
this  plan.     It  was  agreed  to  hold  Avaricum,   a   fatal   blunder, 
which   sacrificed   the   true   general   interests  of  Gaul.     After   a 
desperate  defence   the  place  fell,  and  few  escaped  the  ensuing 
butchery.     A  tribal  dispute  among  the  Aedui  had  next  to   be 
settled  for  the  moment.     This  done,  Caesar  advanced  along  the 
river  Allier  towards  Gergovia,  the  Arvernian  capital.     The  town 
stood  on  a  hill  difficult  of  access.     Caesar  could  neither  blockade 
it  nor  carry  it  by  storm.     The  population  of  the  district  were 
hostile.     There  was  no  prospect  of  betrayal  from  within  :  mean- 


XL]  Alesia  427 

while  the  ferment  among  the  Aedui  might  at  any  moment  turn 
to  open  rebellion  and  cut  him  off  from  Labienus,  who  was 
operating  with  part  of  the  army  in  the  region  of  the  Seine.  And 
Vercingetorix  knew  better  than  to  come  out  and  face  the  legions 
in  a  pitched  battle. 

550.  Caesar  confessed  his  failure.  With  great  difficulty  and 
danger  (for  the  Aedui  now  openly  joined  the  revolt)  he  withdrew 
his  army,  and  managed  to  rejoin  Labienus,  who  had  meanwhile 
made  a  successful  campaign.  But  the  failure  at  Gergovia  had 
put  new  heart  into  the  Gauls,  and  the  revolt  was  now  more 
general  and  enthusiastic  than  ever.  Some  of  the  northern,  tribes 
now  joined  it.  Numbers  however  were  not  everything.  At  this 
critical  juncture,  when  unity  of  command  was  most  necessary, 
Vercingetorix  had  some  difficulty  in  maintaining  his  ascendancy, 
but  for  the  present  he  did.  The  real  tug  of  war  now  began. 
The  main  object  of  Gaulish  strategy  was  to  sever  Caesar's  com- 
munications with  Italy.  His  army  could  then  be  destroyed  by 
cutting  off  supplies.  The  plan  was  probably  a  good  one,  but  it 
was  not  possible  to  carry  it  out  effectually.  The  AUobroges  on 
the  upper  Rhone,  perhaps  too  much  Romanized,  refused  their 
cooperation.  The  Gaulish  cavalry,  whose  raids  embarrassed  the 
Roman  army,  proved  no  match  for  the  Germans  in  battle.  Caesar 
moved  southwards.  Vercingetorix  attacked  him  and  suffered 
defeat.  After  this  he  fell  back  on  Alesia,  a  town  perhaps  already 
held  as  a  military  base.  It  was  a  strong  position,  but  not,  like 
Gergovia,  incapable  of  being  blockaded.  Caesar  saw  his  chance. 
He  gave  up  the  march  to  the  South  and  closed  in  on  Alesia.  If 
labour  and  skill  could  do  it,  he  resolved  to  invest  this  stronghold, 
and  to  end  the  war  by  one  dramatic  stroke.  The  siege  of  Alesia 
was  a  supreme  effort,  not  only  on  his  part,  but  on  that  of  the 
Gauls,  who  raised  a  vast  army  to  relieve  it.  The  double  lines  of 
investment,  some  ten  miles  long,  were  a  prodigious  work.  The 
besieged  seem  to  have  outnumbered  the  besiegers  by  about  two 
to  one.  The  relieving  host  was  many  times  more  numerous.  Yet 
the  Romans  just  managed  to  beat  off  the  assaults  on  both  sides : 
Vercingetorix  had  to  surrender,  and  the  multitude  outside  melted 
away. 

551.  The  Gaulish  hero  was  reserved  for  a  cruel  fate.  After 
six  years  in  a  Roman  dungeon,  he  was  exhibited  and  put  to  death 
at  Caesar's  triumph  in  the  year  46.     Caesar  had  now  to  set  Gaul 


428  Temporary  settlement  of  Gaul         [ch.  xl 

in  order.  He  acted  on  the  old  Roman  principle  of  treating 
subjects  unequally,  so  as  to  make  combination  difficult.  Both 
Arverni  and  Aedui  were  favoured.  Some  local  risings  were  sup- 
pressed in  the  winter  of  52 — 51,  and  severe  punishments  inflicted 
in  some  cases.  The  conquest  was  now  fairly  complete.  In  the 
year  51  Caesar  settled  the  relations  of  the  Gaulish  tribes  to  the 
sovran  power  of  Rome.  All  were  to  pay  a  moderate  tribute.  All 
were  liable  to  furnish  military  contingents.  All  were  treated  with 
consideration.  But  faithful  allies,  such  as  the  Remi,  were  left 
fuller  freedom  than  others  in  their  internal  affairs.  In  this  pro- 
visional arrangement  the  sovranty  of  Rome  was  no  doubt  repre- 
sented by  the  governor  of  the  Narbonese  province,  at  present 
Caesar  himself.  His  aim  was  to  leave  the  new  dominion  quiet 
and  contented.  No  regulations  were  discussed  in  the  Roman 
Senate  and  applied  by  a  commission.  Events  moved  on  too  fast, 
and  it  was  Augustus  who  first  gave  a  regular  provincial  organiza- 
tion to  the  new  Gaul.  Ten  legions  were  quartered  for  the  winter 
of  51 — 50  in  suitable  spots,  and  the  proconsul  returned  to  the 
Cisalpine.  Among  other  occupations  he  probably  wrote  out  at 
this  time  his  seven  books  of  the  Gallic  War,  to  which  his  friend 
Hirtius  added  an  eighth.  This  work,  written  to  influence  public 
opinion,  naturally  gives  a  favourable  account  of  his  own  achieve- 
ments and  motives.  But,  for  a  partisan  narrative,  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  it  is  in  the  main  trustworthy. 

552.  Caesar  had  good  reason  to  feel  uneasy  as  to  future 
developments  in  Rome.  It  was  already  clear  that  the  aristocratic 
republicans  were  bent  upon  ruining  him  when  his  long  pro- 
consulship  ended,  and  he  became  a  private  citizen.  It  was 
therefore  clear  that  he  must  not  at  once  become  a  private  citizen. 
His  enemies  had  now  the  prestige  and  military  skill  of  Pompey 
at  their  back.  Was  he  to  be  coerced  ?  Was  it  coming  to  a  civil 
war?  He  went  back  to  his  legions  in  the  summer  of  50,  and 
kept  them  trained  in  manoeuvres.  Meanwhile  he  used  the  gold 
of  Gaul  with  effect  in  Rome,  and  waited  for  the  next  move. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

ROMAN  AFFAIRS  FROM  THE  CONFERENCE  OF  LUCA 
TO  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  GREAT  CIVIL  WAR. 
55—49   B.C. 

553*  We  have  seen  how  Pompey  and  Crassus,  prompted  by 
Caesar,  paralysed  constitutional  government  in  the  latter  part  of 
the  year  56,  and  became  for  the  second  time  consuls  in  55.  Most 
of  the  other  magistrates  were  their  creatures.  They  were  both 
concerned  to  have  the  bargain  arranged  at  Luca  carried  out,  and 
this  was  done  without  delay,  by  laws  assigning  the  Spains  .to 
Pompey  and  Syria  to  Crassus  for  five  years  each  with  very 
extensive  powers,  and  prolonging  for  the  same  term  Caesar's 
government  of  Gaul.  That  Pompey  did  not  mean  to  leave 
Italy,  but  to  govern  through  deputies,  seems  not  to  have  been 
known.  He  evidently  thought  it  advantageous  to  remain  close 
to  the  centre  of  affairs,  and  did  not  perceive  that  the  centre  of 
real  power  was  gradually  shifting  to  Gaul,  as  Caesar  became 
more  and  more  the  famous  conqueror,  master  of  a  devoted 
army.  Nor  indeed  was  the  significance  of  Caesar's  exploits  clear 
to  many :  Pompey  at  any  rate  was  deaf  to  warnings.  Rome 
continued  to  be  a  scene  of  violence  and  disorder,  for  the 
aristocrats  fought  for  the  Republic  as  best  they  could.  Gilds 
and  clubs  were  maintained  as  organs  of  intimidation  and  bribery. 
Caesar  was  away,  and  it  was  well  to  be  ready  for  opportunities 
that  might  occur. 

554.  For  the  present  relations  between  the  consuls  and  the 
Senate  were  strained.  An  attempt  to  deal  with  two  notorious 
evils,  the  misconduct  of  juries  and  corruption  at  elections,  was 
probably  a  party  move  of  the  consuls.     Pompey  carried  a  law 


430  Pompey  and  Crassus,   55  b.c.  [ch. 

enacting  that  the  yearly  Hst  of  jurors  {album  iudicum)  should  be 
made  up  from  all  the  35  Tribes,  so  many  from  each.  Thus  a  jury 
could  be  chosen  at  need  from  members  of  a  few  Tribes  only. 
As  electoral  corruption  was  organized  by  Tribes,  this  made  it 
possible  to  get  a  verdict  from  men  whose  Tribes  were  not  of 
the  number  corrupted.  A  law  of  Crassus,  aimed  at  the  clubs 
{sodalicia)  formed  for  election-purposes,  followed  the  same  lines. 
But  it  was  too  late  for  any  legislation  to  succeed  in  making 
elections  pure  or  jurors  honest.  The  government,  manipulated  by 
personal  interests  at  home,  was  impotent  abroad.  The  Egyptian 
question,  which  had  lately  given  so  much  trouble,  was  settled 
by  Gabinius  without  any  public  authority.  He  coolly  left  his 
province  of  Syria  and  restored  the  Piper  king  by  force  of  arms. 
It  was  certain  that  he  had  not  done  this  for  nothing,  or  without 
some  guarantee  for  his  own  protection  on  his  return  to  Rome. 
An  immense  bribe,  and  the  collusion  of  Pompey,  were  the 
explanation  of  his  reckless  conduct.  To  Cicero  it  was  very 
galling  not  to  be  able  to  denounce  his  old  enemy.  His  freedom 
of  speech  was  checked  by  his  r=;lation  to  the  Triumvirs.  It  was 
in  this  year  that  he  wrote  his  great  book  de  oratore.  Literature 
was  a  solace  in  this  season  of  deep  depression.  In  the  autumn 
Pompey  opened  his  great  stone  theatre,  the  first  permanent 
building  of  the  kind  in  Rome,  with  great  shows  and  a  wild-beast- 
fight  on  a  colossal  scale.  The  latter  was  too  revolting  for  even 
Roman  spectators,  used  to  the  exhibition  of  gladiators. 

555.  Crassus,  still  consul,  set  out  in  November  for  the  East. 
A  hostile  tribune  solemnly  cursed  him  as  he  left  the  city,  but  he 
went.  Pompey  remained,  a  mysterious  and  shifty  head  of  affairs, 
cramping  others,  but  himself  contributing  no  light  or  leading. 
Politics  drifted  along.  The  elections  for  54  had  included  some 
republican  successes.  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  Caesar's  bitter 
enemy,  was  chosen  consul.  His  colleague  was  Appius  Claudius 
Pulcher,  a  brother  of  P.  Clodius,  supported  by  Pompey.  And 
Cato  was  among  the  praetors.  When  the  new  year  (54)  came, 
Pompey,  now  proconsul,  could  not  reside  in  the  city,  the  sphere 
of  his  imperium  being  Spain.  But  he  remained  in  Italy,  and  his 
legati,  L.  Afranius  and  M.  Petreius,  carried  on  his  provincial 
administration.  He  never  went  out  to  his  province  at  all.  Thus, 
after  having  repeatedly  broken  the  rules  of  the  republican  con- 
stitution,   he    paved    the   way    for    the    coming    Empire.      The 


xLi]  The  Parthian  expedition  431 

continuous  government  of  provinces  by  deputy  was  the  most 
characteristic  mark  of  an  Emperor.  Pompey  was  far  from 
wishing  to  bear  the  responsibilities  of  an  autocratic  position. 
He  loved  to  be  the  First  Citizen,  and  to  appear  indispensable 
in  times  of  trouble ;  in  fact  to  be  imperial  without  being  an 
emperor.  But  Caesar,  by  his  expeditions  to  Britain,  and  his 
passage  of  the  Rhine,  kept  his  name  before  the  Roman  public, 
while  Pompey's  military  fame  was  growing  stale.  Caesar  was 
certainly  inferior  to  Pompey  in  dignity,  and  he  had  held  the 
republican  offices  in  the  order  prescribed  by  law.  But  it  was 
he,  not  Pompey,  who  was  building  up  the  military  strength 
necessary  for  asserting  himself  with  effect,  if  circumstances  made 
war  inevitable. 

556.  It  was  in  54,  the  year  of  the  Belgian  rising  in  Gaul, 
that  Crassus  began  his  war  with  Parthia.  He  underrated  the 
military  power  of  the  Parthians,  and  his  army  was  not  fitted  for 
its  work.  The  mounted  bowmen  of  Parthia  were  noted  for  their 
skill,  and  the  solid  Roman  legions  could  not  come  to  close 
quarters  with  an  enemy  of  such  remarkable  mobility.  It  was 
before  all  things  needful  to  conciliate  the  half-Greek  cities  still 
existing  as  protected  trade-centres  under  the  Arsacid  kings,  and 
to  avoid  campaigning  in  the  drought  and  dust  of  the  Mesopo- 
tamian  plains.  Crassus  did  neither.  He  passed  the  Euphrates 
into  northern  Mesopotamia,  where  the  '  Greek '  cities  submitted, 
and  some  of  them  he  treated  badly.  He  contrived  to  win  the 
hatred  of  Avgar,  prince  of  Osrhoene.  But  the  Parthians  were 
not  ready  for  war.  As  if  to  give  them  time,  Crassus  retired  to 
winter  in  Antioch,  and  set  about  raising  money  by  confiscations. 
Among  the  treasures  seized  were  those  of  the  temple  of  Jerusalem. 
A  Parthian  embassy  v/as  dismissed  with  a  refusal  to  discuss  terms. 
The  blind  confidence  and  pride  of  Crassus  was  perhaps  exagge- 
rated by  moralizing  writers  in  after  times,  but  the  main  facts  are 
not  to  be  doubted. 

557.  To  return  to  Rome.  The  events  of  the  years  54  to  42 
are  the  story  of  the  great  Republic's  last  illness  and  death.  They 
supplied  the  final  proof  that  a  change  of  system  was  inevitable. 
For  Rome  could  neither  do  without  a  master,  nor  find  a  master 
without  civil  war,  nor  submit  peaceably  to  the  master  set  over  her 
by  conquest,  nor  revive  the  republican  government  after  that 
master's  death.     The  first  stage  (54  tg  50)  has  its  scene  chiefly 


432  State  of  things  in  Rome  [ch. 

in  Rome,  and  the  gradual  change  of  relations  between  Pompey 
and  the  republican  aristocrats  form  a  sort  of  continuous  plot. 
For  the  present  these  two  forces  checked  each  other,  and  the 
result  was  confusion  and  impotence  worse  than  ever.  The  un- 
happiness  of  Cicero  has  left  us  in  his  letters  a  vivid  picture  of 
the  state  of  things.  He  found  some  relief  in  writing  his  work 
de  re  publica^  dwelling  on  the  period  of  Roman  history  in  which 
the  state,  under  the  rule  of  the  Senate,  passed  through  what  he 
regarded  as  its  golden  age.  The  conditions  of  public  life  were 
at  present  utterly  miserable.  There  was  plenty  of  speaking  to  be 
done  in  the  public  courts,  and  sometimes  in  the  Senate.  But  the 
Father  of  his  country  had  all  the  while  to  remember  who  were  his 
protectors,  and  to  deliver  speeches  to  order.  Corruption  and 
disorder  were  everywhere.  The  proceedings  of  candidates  for 
the  consulships  of  53  were  a  flagrant  scandal.  There  was  even 
talk  of  making  Pompey  dictator  to  ensure  the  holding  of  the 
elections.  But  the  Senate  ignored  the  hint,  and  matters  were 
allowed  to  drift, 

558.  Electoral  corruption  had  now  gone  so  far  that  the 
present  consuls  made  a  formal  compact  with  two  of  the  candi- 
dates to  promote  their  election  in  return  for  an  act  of  perjury. 
They  were  to  attest  on  oath  falsely  that  certain  formalitieSj 
necessary  for  the  consuls'  succession  to  their  provinces,  had  been 
completed  in  their  presence.  But  the  bargain  was  made  public, 
and  a  secret  inquiry  ordered.  The  only  election  held  in  54  was 
that  of  tribunes,  and  this  too  was  the  occasion  of  peculiar  scandal. 
A  sort  of  pooling  of  corruption  took  place,  with  Cato  as  umpire 
holding  a  sum  deposited  by  each  candidate,  with  power  to  declare 
it  forfeited  on  proof  of  unfair  play.  The  courts  were  busy  with 
trials.  Vatinius,  Cicero's  enemy,  and  Plancius,  his  friend,  were 
both  accused  of  corruption  through  clubs  under  the  law  of 
Crassus.  Cicero  had  to  plead  for  both  alike.  M.  Aemilius 
Scaurus  was  charged  with  extortion  in  Sardinia.  In  his  case 
there  was  an  extraordinary  union  of  various  interests  in  support 
of  the  accused,  who  was  a  son  of  his  namesake  noted  in  the  last 
generation,  and  connected  with  Pompey.  We  find  Cicero  and 
Clodius  counsel  on  the  same  side.  Scaurus  was  acquitted.  Later 
in  the  year  Gabinius  returned  from  Syria,  and  had  soon  to  face 
prosecutions  on  charges  of  treason  {maiestas)  and  extortion. 
Cicero  thirsted  to  prosecute  his  enemy,  but  Pompey  held  him 


xLi]  Disaster  of  Carrhae  433 

back,  and  screened  Gabinius.  The  first  trial  ended  in  an  acquittal. 
On  the  second  charge  Pompey  even  constrained  Cicero  to  con- 
duct the  defence;  but  all  efforts^  were  vain.  Gabinius  was  driven 
into  exile.  Thus  it  appeared  that  Pompey,  with  all  his  show  of 
power,  could  not  protect  his  associate.  Henceforth  Gabinius 
looked  to  Caesar  for  his  restoration.  Cicero  was  heartily  ashamed 
of  the  part  he  had  been  forced  to  take  in  the  affair. 

559.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  it  was  some  time  in  the 
middle  of  54  that  Pompey's  marriage-connexion  with  Caesar  was 
severed  by  Julia's  death.  He  felt  her  loss  severely,  but  had  not 
retired  from  public  life,  and  was  interested  to  make  the  general 
perplexity  and  deadlock  in  politics  a  means  of  increasing  his  own 
importance.  The  year  53  opened  with  only  tribunes  in  office, 
and  they  were  in  no  hurry  to  have  the  curule  magistracies  filled. 
There  were  no  praetors  to  hold  the  courts.  A  series  of  interregna 
went  on  for  months,  and  no  consuls  were  elected  till  July. 
Rioting  continued,  but  none  of  the  proposals  for  relieving  the 
situation  could  be  carried  out  till  the  Senate  and  Pompey  came 
to  terms.  At  last,  having  let  things  go  far  enough,  the  great  man 
came  near  the  city,  and  the  Senate  had  to  vote  him  full  powers 
to  deal  with  the  deadlock.  He  held  the  election  of  consuls,  and 
the  consuls  had  at  once  to  see  to  the  election  of  the  other  regular 
magistrates.  Before  they  could  get  their  own  successors  elected 
for  52,  there  came  the  alarming  news  of  the  great  disaster  in  the 
East.  Crassus,  scorning  the  advice  of  the  Armenian  king,  had 
taken  that  of  the  treacherous  Avgar,  and  entered  the  Mesopo- 
tamian  plain,  where  the  Parthians  were  now  ready  to  meet  him. 
Against  their  cavalry  the  legions  were  helpless.  Crassus  with  his 
son  Publius  and  a  great  part  of  the  army  perished.  Many  were 
taken  captive  and  spared  only  to  serve  the  Parthian  king.  A 
small  remnant  were  brought  off  safely  by  the  quaestor  C.  Cassius, 
and  this  able  soldier  was  doing  what  he  could  with  small-  means 
to  provide  for  the  defence  of  Syria.  He  did  eventually  beat  off 
a  Parthian  invasion.  But  there  could  not  be  any  real  security  on 
the  Euphrates  frontier.  Parthian  and  Armenian  were  now  at 
peace,  and  for  some  time  it  was  the  internal  troubles  of  the 
Parthian  dynasty,  rather  than  the  military  superiority  of  Rome, 
that  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  Syria. 

^  It  is  said  that  the  publicani  were  hostile  to  Gabinius,  and  that  he  did  not 
bribe  the  jury  enough. 

H.  28 


434  Pompey  and  the  republicans  [ch. 

560.  Later  generations  with  reason  viewed  the  death  ot 
Crassus  at  Carrhae  as  a  momentous  stage  in  the  story  of  the 
Roman  revolution.  Two  rivals  now  stood  face  to  face.  Pompey 
would  not  give  way.  Caesar,  with  many  enemies  waiting  to 
destroy  him,  dared  not.  Therefore  a  conflict  must  ensue.  The 
republicans,  having  to  make  a  choice,  naturally  preferred  Pompey. 
He  at  least  set  store  by  empty  dignities,  and  was  not  likely  to 
turn  them  out  of  their  iniquitous  but  profitable  privileges  with 
the  strong  hand.  So  they  began  to  draw  to  Pompey,  and  Pompey 
to  them.  Military  prestige  and  the  republican  machinery  were 
thus  combined.  Whether  these  two  forces  would  strengthen 
each  other  more  than  they  weakened  each  other  was  a  question 
which  only  experience  could  answer.  At  the  present  juncture 
the  elections  for  52  were  a  pressing  question,  and  the  change 
of  relations  between  Pompey  and  the  aristocrats  was  illustrated 
in  the  events  of  the  following  months.  For  the  consulship 
Milo  was  the  candidate  backed  by  the  republican  nobles.  Two 
others  were  Pompey 's  men.  Clodius  was  standing  for  the  praetor- 
ship.  Bribery  and  affrays  of  armed  bands  were  in  full  swing. 
The  Senate  was  powerless,  and  Pompey  would  do  nothing,  so 
the  year  ended  before  the  elections  could  be  held.  It  appear^ 
that  some  time  late  in  the  year  an  attempt  was  made  to  check 
this  scandal,  now  becoming  chronic.  The  Senate  passed  a  resolu- 
tion for  changing  the  system  of  succession  to  provinces.  Consuls 
and  praetors  were  to  pass  from  office  into  private  life,  and  not  to 
receive  provinces  till  after  an  interval  of  five  years.  This,  it  was 
said,  would  check  the  violence  and  bribery  now  employed  to  win, 
not  the  office,  but  the  province  after  it.  The  change  required  a 
law  to  effect  it,  so  for  the  present  it  had  to  wait.  But  we  shall 
see^  that  the  matter  came  up  again,  and  that  its  settlement  had 
very  important  consequences. 

561.  The  year  52  opened  in  confusion.  Even  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  interrex  was  prevented  for  a  time  in  the  interest 
of  Pompey,  who  was  wishing  to  extort  some  more  exceptional 
powers.  He  had  lately  married  Cornelia,  daughter  of  Q.  Caecilius 
Metellus  Scipio^  and  was  thus  connected  with  a  great  aristocratic 
family,  and  not  with  Caesar.  The  elections  were  still  delayed, 
when  news  came  of  the  death  of  Clodius.     One  day  in  January 

^  §  563. 

2  A  Scipio  adopted  by  a  Metellus.     See  Index  under  Caecilii. 


xLi]  End  of  Clodius  435 

he  and  Milo  met  on  the  Appian  way.  Both  had  armed  escorts, 
but  Milo's  was  the  stronger,  and  in  the  fight  that  followed  Clodius 
was  killed.  Rome  was  quickly  in  an  uproar.  The  mob  burnt 
the  body  in  the  Forum ;  the  fire  spread  and  did  much  damage, 
and  violent  demonstrations  were  made  against  Milo  and  his 
supporters.  The  fury  died  down,  but  the  affair  became  a  question 
of  politics.  Milo  went  on  canvassing,  but  the  Senate  was  forced 
to  pass  its  '  last  decree,'  practically  giving  Pompey  dictatorial 
power.  He  raised  troops  for  maintaining  order,  as  authorized. 
But  he  let  the  elections  wait,  and  went  on  playing  his  own  game. 
Meanwhile  there  were  two  conflicting  versions  of  the  late  tragedy. 
Some  declared  that  Milo  had  acted  in  self-defence,  others  alleged 
that  it  was  a  case  of  dehberate  murder.  To  deal  with  the  matter 
a  regular  government  was  needed.  The  aristocrats  were  resolved 
not  to  have  the  old  dictatorship  revived.  So  Cato  and  Bibulus 
devised  a  plan  for  avoiding  this  by  making  Pompey  sole  consul, 
and  this  was  done.  Thus  the  law  and  practice  of  the  constitu- 
tion were  broken  in  three  ways.  First,  the  consulship  implied  a 
colleague.  Secondly,  it  was  not  lawful  to  be  consul  and  proconsul 
at  once.  Thirdly,  it  was  not  ten  years  since  his  last  consulship. 
In  short,  the  strongest  republicans  were  destroying  the  Republic 
in  the  effort  to  preserve  it.  This  was  the  practical  alternative  to 
the  restoration  of  efficiency  and  order  by  the  strong  hand  of 
Caesar. 

562.  For  Caesar  was  not  forgotten.  It  had  been  suggested 
that  he  should  be  consul  with  Pompey,  an  alarming  prospect  for 
the  noble  republicans.  While  wintering  in  the  Cisalpine,  after 
putting  down  the  Belgic  rising  of  53,  he  himself  sent  to  decline 
the  proposal.  His  object  was  rather  to  provide  for  the  future. 
His  governorship  ended  on  the  first  of  March  49.  He  wanted 
to  be  consul  in  48,  and  not  to  return  to  Rome  until  he  was 
consul-elect.  To  do  this,  he  must  be  allowed  to  become  a 
candidate  in  absence.  Tribunes  acting  for  him  proposed  a  bill 
granting  him  the  needful  dispensation.  Pompey  gave  his  consent, 
and  the  bill  became  law.  But  Caesar  was  called  away  to  Gaul 
earlier  than  usual,  and  was  for  months  unable  to  attend  to  Roman 
affairs,  owing  to  the  rising  under  Vercingetorix.  Meanwhile  his 
enemies  were  not  idle,  and  Pompey  and  the  aristocrats  were 
steadily  drawing  together.  It  is  not  surprising  that  things  took 
a  turn  unfavourable  to  Caesar's  interests.     The  matter  of  Milo 

28—2 


436  Milo's  trial.     Pompey's  laws  [ch. 

was  urgent,  and  the  first  batch  of  Pompey's  new  laws  bore  directly 
upon  his  case.  One  provided  specially  for  the  trial  of  the  persons 
concerned  in  the  death  of  Clodius.  For  this  purpose  there  was 
to  be  a  special  court,  chosen  from  jurors  selected  by  the  sole 
consul,  who  thus  assumed  praetorian  functions.  In  the  Senate 
many  opposed  the  new  legislation,  for  Milo  was  a  sort  of  champion 
of  the  republicans,  who  were  glad  to  be  rid  of  Clodius.  But 
Pompey  persisted,  and  he  had  now  enough  troops  under  arms  to 
overcome  all  opposition,  so  the  laws  passed. 

563.  The  trial  of  Milo  is  famous  as  a  scene  in  the  drama 
of  the  Roman  revolution.  Pompey's  soldiers  held  the  Forum, 
and  repressed  the  violence  of  the  mob.  But  he  did  not  mean 
Milo  to  escape,  though  Cicero  conducted  the  defence.  The 
masses  of  armed  men  and  the  howling  of  the  mob  unnerved 
the  orator,  and  he  spoke  feebly.  Milo  was  found  guilty,  and 
went  into  exile  at  Massalia.  So  Pompey  was  relieved  of  a  person 
who  was  in  the  way.  His  removal  left  the  consul  and  the  Senate 
more  free  to  join  forces  against  Caesar,  of  whom  Pompey  was 
more  and  more  jealous.  Meanwhile  Pompey  was  in  practice 
every  bit  as  unrepublican  as  Caesar.  He  treated  rules  laid 
down  in  his  own  laws  as  not  binding  on  himself.  But  the  most 
significant  part  of  his  public  acts  is  to  be  found  in  the  legislation 
in  which  he  proceeded  to  deal  with  the  magistracies  and  the 
succession  to  provinces.  He  gave  effect  to  the  Senate's  recent 
vote^  by  enacting  that  a  magistrate  should  only  succeed  to  a 
province  after  an  interval  of  five  years.  This  rule  implied, 
or  expressed,  some  arrangement  for  providing  governors  in  the 
transition-period,  before  the  new  system  could  work  automatically. 
Probably  a  considerable  discretion  was  left  to  the  Senate.  It 
was  obvious  that  some  ex-magistrates,  who  had  not  governed 
provinces,  would  now  be  forced  to  take  their  turn.  Moreover, 
the  old  practice  had  been,  when  a  governor's  term  ended  in 
the  middle  of  a  year,  to  leave  him  at  his  post  till  the  end  of  the 
year,  when  his  successor  was  ready  in  the  ordinary  course.  The 
Senate  were  no  longer  to  be  bound  by  this  practice.  Accordingly 
Caesar  could  be  superseded  on  the  first  of  March  49.  By  another 
law  it  was  enacted  that  candidates  for  office  must  appear  in 
person.  This  took  no  account  of  the  exemption  lately  granted 
to   Caesar,  and  so  annulled  it.     Caesar's  friends  protested,  and 

1  See  §  560. 


xLi]  Caesar's  position  437 

it  is  said  that  Pompey,  to  pacify  them,  put  in  a  clause  reserving 
vested  interests,  thus  tampering  with  the  text  of  a  law  already 
passed.  There  could  be  no  mistake  as  to  the  spirit  and  intention 
of  these  measures.  Caesar  was  to  be  exposed  as  a  private  citizen 
to  the  attacks  of  his  enemies.  He  must  either  return  to  Rome, 
to  stand  trial  before  a  court  probably  selected  to  ensure  his 
condemnation,  perhaps  watched  by  Pompey's  troops,  or  go  into 
voluntary  exile.  This  was  a  belated  and  clumsy  device.  The 
man  in  Gaul  was  not  a  fool,  and  he  quietly  prepared  to  avoid 
the  necessity  of  accepting  either  alternative. 

564.  The  strength  of  Caesar's  position  was  probably  not 
understood.  In  Rome  his  agents  were  employing  the  gold  of 
Gaul  in  entertainments  and  in  public  buildings  to  adorn  the 
capital,  not  to  mention  private  favours.  The  mob  were  reminded 
of  their  absent  leader,  and  for  political  purposes  this  had  its 
value.  In  his  province  he  had  from  the  first  been  popular.  In 
particular,  the  Transpadane  'Latins '  were  devoted  to  him.  He 
had  (in  67)  encouraged  them  to  claim  the  Roman  franchise. 
He  treated  them  as  citizens,  enrolling  them  in  his  legions,  and 
they  hoped  to  gain  their  wishes  when  he  became  consul.  In 
the  new  Gaul  he  was  now  supreme,  and  by  judicious  management 
he  had  secured  the  loyalty,  and  at  need  the  help,  of  many  leading 
chiefs  and  tribes.  His  army  was  the  only  existing  force  of  the 
first  quality.  He  took  pains  to  gratify  them,  and  at  this  time 
probably  doubled  their  pay.  We  hear  that  he  also  found  oppor- 
tunities of  doing  favours  to  client  kings  and  important  cities  in 
Italy  and  the  provinces.  Such  was  the  man  whom  Pompey,  Cato, 
Bibulus,  and  the  rest,  were  hoping  to  overthrow  by  a  little 
legislative  trickery.  Meanwhile  Pompey  was  still  governing  Spain 
through  lieutenants.  He  procured  an  extension  of  his  command 
for  five  more  years,  and  obliged  many  in  the  exercise  of  his 
vast  patronage.  He  had  as  consul  a  force  raised  in  Italy.^  The 
maintenance  of  order  enabled  consuls  to  be  elected  in  time  for 
the  year  51.  These  were,  Servius  Sulpicius  Rufus  the  great  jurist, 
a  cautious  man,  chiefly  concerned  to  avert  a  serious  crisis;  and 
M.  Claudius  Marcellus,  a  heavy  aristocrat,  bitterly  hostile  to 
Caesar.     Cato  stood  and  was  defeated. 

565.  With  the  year  51  we  reach  a  new  stage  on  the  road  to 
civil  war.  Caesar  had  protested  against  the  steps  taken  to  his 
disadvantage,  requesting  the  Senate  to  leave  him  his  provinces  to 


438  The  succession-question  [ch. 

the  end  of  49,  and  not  to  apply  the  Pompeian  law  retrospectively 
to  his  case.  But  the  republicans  wanted  to  ruin  him,  in  order  to 
keep  themselves  in  power.  Relying  more  and  more  on  Pompey's 
secret  favour,  they  became  a  party  united  on  an  anti-Caesarian 
basis.  The  one  vital  question  of  policy  was  the  succession- 
question.  Marcellus  the  consul,  their  official  leader,  raised  it  in 
April  without  immediate  result.  As  a  challenge  to  Caesar,  he 
found  a  pretext  for  scourging  a  Transpadane  then  in  Rome.  The 
point  of  this  brutality  was  to  assert  that  the  man  was  not  a  Roman. 
In  July  an  attempt  was  made  to  draw  from  Pompey  an  open 
declaration  on  the  matter  of  Caesar,  but  he  only  replied  that  all 
should  obey  the  Senate.  Neither  he  nor  the  republicans  were 
eager  to  move  :  mutual  trust  grew  but  slowly.  The  elections  for 
the  year  50  were  important.  The  consuls-elect  were  C,  Claudius 
Marcellus,  cousin  of  the  present  consul,  and  L.  Aemilius  PauUusj 
a  Caesarian  candidate  was  defeated.  Both  were  apparently  anti- 
Caesarian,  but  Paullus  had  been  acting  for  Caesar  in  charge  of 
public  works.  Among  the  tribunes-elect  was  a  young  man  as  yet 
reckoned  a  safe  anti-Caesarian,  C.  Scribonius  Curio ;  the  rest 
were  all  or  mostly  Caesar's  men.  Things  went  on  quietly,  in 
spite  of  secret  uneasiness,  till  the  very  end  of  September,  when 
the  succession-question  came  up  again  in  an  acute  form. 

566.    M.  Marcellus  moved  that  on  the  first  of  March  next  (50) 
the  then  consuls  should  raise  the  question  of  the  consular  pro- 
vinces for  the  year  49.     This  the  Senate  passed,  and  agreed  to 
various  arrangements  for  securing  a  full  House  and  adjournments 
of  debate  to  attain  a  decision.     There  were  other  motions,  of  a 
more  significant  bearing.    One  was  an  attempt  to  bar  the  probable 
veto  of  Caesar's  tribunes  :  another  was  meant  to  outbid  Caesar's 
bounty,  and  undermine   his  soldiers'  loyalty.     The  third  was  a 
subtle  device  to  ensure  that,  in  discussing  provinces,  the  Gauls 
should  be  taken  into  account,  and  the  Senate  prevented  from 
shirking  the  one  great  issue.     These  motions  were  recorded  as 
informal  resolutions,  being  vetoed  by  tribunes  in  Caesar's  interest. 
We  have  seen  what  Caesar's  claim  was.     This  proposal  was  from 
his  point  of  view  iniquitous.     He  had  been  appointed  long  before 
Pompey's  new  law.     If  he  was  to  remain  to  the  end  of  49  under 
the  old  system,  the  time  to  discuss  the  succession  would  be  six 
months  before  the  vacancy,  that  is  in  June,  not  in  March.     It  is 
clear  that  his  views  and  those  of  the  party  now  dominant   in 


xLi]  Cicero  as  provincial  governor  439 

Rome  could  not  possibly  be  reconciled,  and  that  the  failure  of 
compromise  must  lead  to  a  civil  war.  The  main  body  of  the 
Senate  were  divided.  The  majority  desired  peace,  but  the  militant 
minority  were  more  resolute,  and  better  able  to  put  pressure  on 
others.  It  was  not  easy  for  them  to  draw  back,  and  they  were 
encouraged  by  the  attitude  of  Pompey.  His  utterances  were 
taken  to  imply  that  he  saw  his  way  through  the  perils  of  the 
situation,  and  that  they  might  stand  firm  without  serious  risk. 
This  was  a  mistake :  the  blind  was  leading  the  blind.  The 
general  effect  was  that  extreme  partisans,  Caesarian  or  anti- 
Caesarian,  were  committed  to  going  further  still :  and  the  coming 
question  was,  which  side  would  capture  the  waverers  ? 

567.  While  at  Rome  the  storm  was  brewing,  Pompey's  new 
law  had  sent  out  as  provincial  governors  two  men  to  whom  it  was 
a  sheer  penance  to  quit  the  centre  of  affairs.  Syria  fell  to  Bibulus, 
Cilicia  to  Cicero.  Bibulus  had  chiefly  to  deal  with  the  Parthian 
alarms  that  followed  the  disaster  of  Carrhae.  With  the  help  of 
C.  Cassius,  and  by  fomenting  dissensions  in  Parthia,  he  prospered 
fairly  well.  Cicero,  who  had  lately  published  his  treatise  de 
legibus,  was  drawn  from  literature  to  the  administration  of  an 
immense  province  for  about  a  year  from  the  end  of  July  51. 
The  duties  of  the  post  were  necessarily  laborious,  and  the  mis- 
deeds of  his  predecessor  Appius  Claudius  had  left  the  province  in 
a  wretched  state.  The  poor  man,  conscientiously  striving  to  do 
justice  and  ease  the  burdens  of  Rome's  subjects,  was  hampered 
by  the  urgent  necessity  of  doing  nothing  to  offend  either  Claudius 
or  the  capitalists  powerful  in  Rome.  For  he  was  ever  pining  for 
the  Senate-house  and  Forum,  and  afraid  of  having  to  face  hostile 
influences  on  his  return.  Pompey  and  M.  Brutus  were  among 
the  investors  whose  loans  to  client  kings  or  cities  gave  the  pro- 
consul trouble.  Do  what  he  mighty  circumstances  were  too  strong 
for  him,  and  in  the  end  he  had  to  compromise  with  evil  and  leave 
some  flagrant  abuses  unredressed.  Corruption  in  Rome  was  the 
root  of  the  sufferings  of  the  provincials.  No  central  power  existed 
able  and  willing  to  reform  the  central  government.  We  may  add 
that  Cicero  himself  was  a  strong  supporter  of  that  '  harmony  of 
the  Orders '  which  stood  in  the  way  of  reform.  He  would  not 
himself  oppress  and  plunder  the  subjects ;  but  he  was  the  cham- 
pion, and  at  length  the  martyr,  of  a  cause  which  was  bound  up 
with  such  iniquities.     The  one  bright  spot  in  his  governorship 


440 


Curio  and  the  manoeuvres  [ch. 


was  the  chance  of  winning  a  triumph  for  victory  in  the  field.  He 
had  good  officers  on  his  staff,  and  a  little  war  with  some  restless 
borderers  ended  successfully.  He  was  saluted  imperator  by  his 
army,  to  his  great  delight.  He  sold  his  captives  into  slavery  in 
the  usual  style.  The  triumph,  it  is  true,  never  came.  But  he 
was  able  to  start  for  Italy  in  August  50,  full  of  self-satisfaction. 

568.     During  Cicero's  absence  things  had  been  moving,   at 

first  slowly,  without  much  public  sign  of  the  change  going  on 

secretly  in  the  minds  of  men.     It  was  becoming  clear  that  on  the 

one  great  question  it  would  be  necessary  to  take  a  side.    Towards 

the  end  of  the  year  51  Caesar  judiciously  bought  the  services  of 

the  consul-elect  Paullus  and  the  tribune- elect  Curio.     The  latter 

was  a  very  able  and  quite  unprincipled  young  man^  deeply  in 

debt.     He   had   posed   as   a   true   repubHcan,    and   for   a   time 

operated  by  embarrassing  his  former  associates  without  shewing 

his  colours.     He  brought  forward  various  bills  which  he  knew  the 

republicans  must  oppose.    What  seemed  flightiness  was  calculated 

policy,  to  afford  pretext  for  a  quarrel.     The  mob,  recovering  from 

their  suppression  under  the  recent  maintenance   of  order,  and 

being  Caesarian  at  heart,  rallied  to  Curio  when  they  saw   him 

acting  to  the  annoyance  of  Pompey  and  the  aristocrats.     In  the 

year  50  none  served  the  cause  of  Caesar  better  than  this  famous 

turncoat.     Paullus  as  consul  was  able  to  help  quietly  in  various 

ways.     The  struggle  of  this  year  was  an  insincere  tug  of  war 

between  parties,  each  move  of  either  side  being  made  for  the 

purpose  of  putting  the  other  side  in  the  wrong.     In  March  and 

April  various  dates  were  proposed  for  Caesar's  retirement,  but 

none  of  these  satisfied  his  claim.     All  alike  provided  an  interval 

in  which   as  a  private  citizen  he  could   be   prosecuted   by  his 

enemies   and   ruined.     Curio  as   tribune  would   allow   no   such 

decree  to  pass.     Pompey  fell  sick,  and  his  serious  illness  evoked 

public  prayers  in  many  Italian  towns.     Curio  now  openly  opposed 

all  motions  for  the  recall  of  Caesar,  and  urged  that  both  he  and 

Pompey  should  be  required  to  resign  their  provinces  and  armies 

for  the  sake  of  peace.     This  the  republicans  would  not  accept,  so 

nothing  was  done.     Pompey  made  an  offer  to  resign  before  the 

end  of  his  term.     But  this  seems  to  have  been  a  mere  move  in 

the  game,  made  in  full  knowledge  that  the  Senate  would  not 

allow  it :  at  any  rate  he  could  not  be  induced  to  give  it  a  solemn 

and  binding  character. 


xLi]  in  the  succession-question  441 

569.  In  June  it  was  agreed  that  Pompey  and  Caesar  should 
each  furnish  a  legion  for  the  Parthian  war  foretold  in  a  despatch 
of  Bibulus.  Pompey  named  the  legion  lent  (in  53)  to  Caesar, 
and  Caesar  had  therefore  to  lose  two  legions.  Meanwhile  Curio 
went  on  with  his  worrying  proposals  for  enforcing  the  resignation 
of  both  rivals.  In  August  the  consular  election  was  held.  A 
Caesarian  candidate  was  defeated,  and  two  strong  republicans 
were  chosen  consuls  for  49.  C.  Claudius  Marcellus  was  a  cousin 
of  his  namesake  the  present  consul,  and  brother  of  the  consul  of 
51.  L.  Cornelius  Lentulus  Crus  was  a  bitter  anti-Caesarian, 
deeply  in  debt.  Caesar  however  had  two  resolute  partisans 
among  the  tribunes-elect,  M.  Antonius  and  Q.  Cassius.  The 
rest  of  the  year  50  was  passed  in  intrigues  and  futile  negotiations. 
Neither  side  could  really  afford  to  give  way.  Caesar  could  not 
abandon  his  claim  to  the  consulship  for  48.  The  republicans 
knew,  from  their  experience  of  his  former  consulship,  that  he 
would  not  hold  office  for  nothing.  Either  he  would  resume  his 
former  influence  over  Pompey,  or  Pompey  would  withdraw  to  his 
government  of  Spain.  In  either  case  they  would  lose  Pompey's 
support,  and  they  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  a  most  unwelcome 
master.  Nor  were  suggestions  of  sending  one  of  the  rivals  to 
face  the  Parthians  a  real  solution  of  present  difficulties.  The 
republicans  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  one  left  behind ;  and  it 
was  evident  that  these  great  commands  were  wrecking  the  repub- 
lican system.  A  keen  cynical  observer,  such  as  Cicero's  friend 
Caelius,  could  see  that  civil  war  was  inevitable,  and  that  Caesar's 
was  the  stronger  side.  It  was  only  in  the  Senate  that  Caesar's 
cause  was  weak ;  but  it  was  with  the  Senate  that  the  decision  of 
the  issue,  war  or  not  war,  now  rested. 

570.  In  September  a  false  rumour,  that  Caesar  was  moving 
legions  into  the  Cisalpine,  betrayed  the  nervous  vigilance  of  his 
enemies.  What  he  really  did  was  to  exercise  and  review  his  army 
in  Further  Gaul.  In  November  the  two  legions  for  Parthia 
reached  Rome,  and  were  sent  on  to  Capua,  being  no  longer 
wanted  for  the  East.  It  was  now  the  talk  that  Caesar's  veterans 
were  weary  and  discontented,  and  this  false  story,  too  easily 
believed,  only  increased  the  slackness  of  the  tardy  republicans. 
Another  fatal  encouragement  was  the  discovery  that  the  trusted 
Labienus,  who  was  acting  deputy  in  the  Cisalpine  during  the 
absence  of  Caesar,  was  disloyal  to  his  chief.     Labienus  appears  to 


442  Course  of  the  struggle  [ch. 

have  overrated  the  strength  of  Pompey's  side,  and  the  aristocrats 
to  have  taken  him  as  a  fair  specimen  of  Caesar's  adherents.  The 
truth  was  that  for  purposes  of  war  Caesar  could  rely  on  a  number 
of  effective  officers,  bound  to  him  by  their  own  interest.  Some 
had,  like  Labienus,  made  fortunes  in  his  service.  Others  were 
men  who,  having  been  condemned  by  a  court  or  otherwise  got 
into  trouble,  had  found  a  refuge  at  Caesar's  headquarters,  where 
efficiency  was  in  demand  and  no  awkward  questions  asked. 
Reckless  fellows  of  doubtful  reputation  might  be  embarrassing 
associates  in  civil  life.  But  the  immediate  business,  however 
much  men  might  dissemble  the  truth,  was  war.  Caesar  was  now 
ready  for  any  event.  His  adversaries  must  either  grant  his 
demands,  or  fight  at  a  disadvantage.  He  was  asking  something 
far  less  unconstitutional  than  the  series  of  special  privileges  by 
which  Pompey  had  been  placed  above  the  laws.  What  made  it 
impossible  for  the  Senate  to  grant  his  demands  was  the  well- 
grounded  conviction  that  under  Caesar  as  consul  the  mob-ruled 
Assembly,  still  in  strict  law  the  sovran  power  of  Rome,  would 
again  become  active.  The  leading  repubHcans,  whether  guided 
by  principle  like  Cato,  or  fearing  the  unpleasant  effects  of  a  fresh 
batch  of  Julian  laws,  were  determined  to  do  battle  while  they  had 
the  services  of  a  famous  soldier  at  command.  And  from  their 
point  of  view  they  were  right. 

571.  When  Cicero  reached  Italy  late  in  November,  it  did 
not  take  him  long  to  discover  that  civil  war,  and  with  it  probably 
disaster,  were  very  near.  He  urged  concession  to  Caesar,  as 
being  better  than  war.  He  saw  that  it  was  now  too  late  to 
compete  with  Caesar  in  the  field.  Hoping  for  a  triumph,  he 
could  not  enter  the  city,  but  by  letters  and  interviews  he  worked 
for  peace.  December  came,  and  it  was  the  turn  of  Marcellus  to 
preside  in  the  Senate.  He  at  once  began  a  vigorous  attack  on 
Caesar,  and  we  come  to  the  last  stage  of  the  struggle.  Curio  had 
still  nine  days  as  tribune,  and  he  met  the  consul's  motion  for 
coercing  Caesar  by  repeating  his  demand  for  the  simultaneous 
resignation  of  the  rival  proconsuls.  The  House  passed  resolutions 
{a)  that  Caesar  should  be  required  to  resign  (d)  that  Pompey 
should  not  (c)  that  both  should  resign  together.  No  formal 
decree  could  be  carried.  Meanwhile  Caesar  had  returned  from 
the  Further  Gaul,  and  was  watching  events.  Negotiations,  prob- 
ably insincere,   certainly  futile,  were  still   going   on   in  private. 


xLi]  Vantage  gained  by  Caesar  443 

Caesar  had  manoeuvred  his  opponents  into  such  a  position  that 
they  were  now  in  a  desperate  hurry.  Wavering  senators  must  be 
committed  to  a  bold  policy,  and  Pompey  (in  whom  they  had  no 
firm  trust)  irrevocably  engaged  in  the  republican  cause.  On  the 
9th  December  Marcellus,  finding  the  Senate  still  unwilling  to 
declare  Caesar  a  public  enemy,  took  the  matter  into  his  own 
hands.  He  went  off  to  Pompey,  gave  him  a  sword,  and  authorized 
him  to  take  command  of  the  troops  under  arms,  to  raise  further 
forces,  and  march  against  Caesar.  This  was  unconstitutional,  and 
virtually  war.  But  Pompey  accepted  the  commission.  It  was 
not  only  Cicero  that  was  staggered  by  this  sudden  stroke.  He 
and  others  saw  that  the  moral  vantage  had  thereby  been  lost. 
To  unreadiness  was  now  added  illegality.  And  there  was  no 
republican  enthusiasm  in  Italy,  or  even  in  Rome :  no  sign  of  a 
general  rally  to  withstand  Caesar.  Pompey  was  blindly  confident. 
Antony,  who  was  now  Caesar's  leading  tribune  in  place  of  Curio, 
was  uttering  threats  in  Rome.  Cicero  felt  that  he  would  be 
driven  to  take  the  side  of  Pompey  in  a  civil  war,  with  his  debt  to 
Caesar  unpaid,  and  with  the  dismal  prospect  of  defeat. 

572.  By  the  24th  December  Caesar  was  at  Ravenna.  The 
act  of  Pompey  put  an  end  to  his  waiting  policy.  He  at  once 
concentrated  the  single  legion  quartered  in  the  Cisalpine,  and 
sent  orders  for  two  more  to  join  him.  Meanwhile  he  wrote  to 
the  Senate,  offering  further  concessions,  but  insisting  on  his  main 
object.  He  would  be  content  to  keep  only  a  part  of  his  provinces, 
and  a  legion  or  two,  provided  he  might  step  into  the  consulship 
for  48  on  his  own  terms.  Doubtless  he  knew  that  Pompey  and 
the  Senate  could  not  accept  this  proposal.  They  were  too  deeply 
committed  to  each  other,  and  mutual  betrayal  would  be  nothing 
less  than  a  common  surrender.  The  letter  ended  with  a  threat ; 
— the  refusal  of  these  terms  would  compel  him  to  assert  his  own 
rights  and  the  freedom  of  the  Roman  people.  Thus  he  announced 
that  he  meant  to  pose  as  the  defender  of  the  constitution,  forced 
to  unsheath  the  sword  against  his  will.  The  only  possible  reply 
was  to  pass  the  Hast  decree'  and  thus  treat  him  as  a  public 
enemy.  But  this  could  not  be  done  without  overriding  the  veto 
of  his  tribunes,  which  was  a  suspension  of  the  constitution.  In 
short,  he  had  outgeneralled  them  in  the  campaign  of  legalities. 
Curio  hurried  to  Rome  with  this  ultimatum  in  time  for  the  sitting 
of  the  Senate  on  the  first  of  January  49.     Antony  read  it  out  in 


444  War  [ch.  xli 

the  House  amid  indignant  comments.  But  Lentulus  the  new 
consul  would  not  receive  any  motions  arising  directly  from  it, 
and  declared  the  general  debate  on  public  affairs  to  be,  according 
to  custom,  the  business  of  the  day. 

573.  A  number  of  motions  followed,  among  them  a  proposal 
by  a  Caesarian  senator  that  Pompey  should  avert  a  civil  war  by 
going  to  his  government  of  Spain.  In  the  end  the  motion  of 
Scipio  (Pompey's  father-in-law)  was  carried  almost  unanimously, 
naming  a  date  for  Caesar's  resignation,  and  declaring  non-com- 
pliance an  act  of  war.  This  was  vetoed  by  Caesar's  tribunes. 
The  adjourned  debate  on  the  2nd  was  equally  vain.  During  the 
3rd  and  4th  great  efforts  were  made  to  bring  timid  senators  to  the 
point  of  daring  to  vote  for  the  'last  decree.'  Even  now  some 
were  for  peace  on  Caesar's  terms,  but  there  were  a  number  of 
men  who  saw  no  chance  of  restoring  their  fortunes  if  Caesar  came 
into  power.  Debtors,  seeking  solvency  through  provincial  extor- 
tions, were  doubtless  found  on  both  sides,  but  their  influence  was 
not  for  peace.  A  meeting  on  the  5th,  held  outside  the  city 
precinct  that  Pompey  and  Cicero^  might  attend,  was  still  unable 
to  take  the  final  plunge.  It  was  not  till  the  7  th  that  the  reports 
of  Caesar's  bloodthirsty  intentions,  and  the  '  now  or  never '  argu- 
ment of  the  extreme  republicans,  had  their  full  effect.  Lentulus 
announced  that  he  would  take  a  vote  on  the  Mast  decree,'  and 
warned  the  obstructing  tribunes  that  their  lives  would  be  in 
danger  when  it  was  passed.  Antony  and  the  other  Caesarians 
fled  to  Ravenna,  after  a  dramatic  protest.  The  decree  was  passed. 
The  tension  of  the  last  few  days  gave  place  to  certainty.  Pompey 
was  instructed  'to  see  that  the  commonwealth  took  no  harm,' 
and  the  civil  war  opened  with  this  expression  of  unconscious 
irony. 

1  They  had   imperium  only  as  being  proconsuls,  and  would  lose  it  by 
entering  the  city.     See  Index. 


CHAPTER    XLII 

THE    CIVIL  WAR  TO   THE   BATTLE   OF   THAPSUS 

49 — 46  B.C. 

574.  The  fate  of  the  Republic  was  now  to  be  settled  in 
earnest.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  a  civil  war  could  not  be 
conducted  on  the  same  principles  as  a  foreign  war,  such  as  that 
in  Gaul.  Political  considerations  entered  into  it  from  the  first. 
Whether  Caesar  desired  it  or  not,  he  must  make  himself  supreme ; 
otherwise  he  could  neither  carry  out  his  policy  nor  secure  his 
person.  But  it  was  of  course  not  his  object  to  destroy  or  lessen 
the  resources  of  the  state,  which  would  be  at  his  disposal  in  the 
event  of  his  victory.  His  business  then  was  to  achieve  victory 
with  the  least  possible  waste  of  time  money  and  human  lives. 
He  had  a  veteran  army,  loyal  to  their  chief.  He  was  the  real 
master  of  subordinates,  who  depended  on  him  and  on  nobody 
else.  He  had  a  great  aim  in  view,  for  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  remodel  the  state  so  far  as  might  be 
necessary  for  a  thorough  reform  of  administration.  A  selfish 
aristocracy  were  no  longer  to  fill  their  own  purses  by  corruption 
and  plunder.  The  empire  was  to  be  ruled  as  an  empire  for  the 
general  good,  not  exploited  for  the  profit  of  individuals.  In 
short,  Caesar  was  prepared  to  end  what  could  not  be  mended, 
and  to  attempt  the  mending  of  the  rest.  Moreover  he  was  just 
now  at  his  very  best  in  body  and  mind.  On  the  other  side  there 
was  no  effective  army  in  a  position  to  deliver  sharp  strokes  at 
once.  Pompey  had  a  fairly  good  force  under  arms  in  Spain. 
The  troops  hastily  levied  in  Italy  were  raw  recruits,  unfit  and 
unwilling  to  fight.  Volunteers  were  few,  and  the  loyalty  of  the 
two  legions  drawn  from  Caesars  army  was  doubtful.     Nor  was 


44^  The  ready  and  the  unready  [ch. 

Pompey  undisputed  master  in  his  own  camp.  Noble  senators 
in  positions  of  trust  were  conceited  and  disobedient.  Those 
gathered  at  headquarters  gave  endless  trouble  by  their  jealousies 
and  intrigues  and  ill-timed  criticism.  They  were  there  to  employ 
Pompey,  not  to  serve  him.  Besides,  there  was  no  vital  unity  of 
aims.  The  aristocrats  wanted  to  destroy  Caesar  in  order  to  avert 
reforms  by  which  their  own  interests  would  suffer.  What  Pompey 
wanted  was  to  preserve  the  republican  system,  however  corrupt, 
as  a  system  under  which  he  could  still  be  the  one  indispensable 
man.  The  nobles  and  he  could  not  do  without  each  other,  but 
there  was  in  truth  no  love  lost  between  them.  He  was  needed 
only  to  give  them  victory ;  not  to  make  himself  their  ruler,  but  to 
enable  them  to  take  vengeance  on  their  enemies.  Now  Pompey 
himself  was  stale.  For  more  than  twelve  years  he  had  seen  no 
active  service  in  the  fields  and  recent  illness  had  impaired  his 
powers. 

575.  The  declaration  of  war  at  once  brought  over  Labienus 
to  the  republican  side.  JHere  was  a  practical  soldier,  fresh  from 
a  great  war.  But  he  was  not  entrusted  with  an  important  com- 
mand. After  the  7th  January  preparations  of  all  kinds  were 
pushed  on  in  a  desperate  hurry.  Italy  was  full  of  confusion. 
Pompey  still  professed  to  believe  that  Caesar's  troops  would  not 
stand  by  their  leader.  But  at  a  very  early  stage  of  the  war  he 
began  to  collect  a  fleet  at  Brundisium,  evidently  doubting  his 
ability  to  hold  Italy  at  all.  On  the  17th  he  summoned  the 
magistrates  and  senators  to  quit  Rome.  To  this  the  Senate  had 
to  consent.  With  threats  of  punishment  to  all  who  disobeyed  or 
joined  Caesar  they  withdrew,  and  for  the  time  Capua  was  made 
the  seat  of  government.  The  evacuation  of  Rome  was  caused  by 
the  news  from  the  North.  Caesar  had  waited  at  Ravenna  till 
Antony  and  the  others  arrived  from  Rome.  On  the  nth  he 
passed  the  frontier-stream  (Rubicon)  and  entered  Italy  at  the 
head  of  no  more  than  some  5,300  men.  Town  after  town 
surrendered  to  him  with  little  or  no  resistance.  The  bulk  of 
the  resident  population  cared  nothing  for  the  cause  of  the  Senate, 
and  Caesar  harmed  nobody.  In  a  few  days  he  occupied  northern 
Umbria  and  Arretium  in  Etruria.  A  vain  attempt  was  made  to 
stop  him  by  negotiations ;  but,  though  he  replied  by  counter- 
proposals, he  pushed  on.  The  answer  to  these  (sent  from  Capua) 
was  a  fresh  attempt  to  bargain  with  him.     Caesar  had  not  come 


xLii]  Corfinium  447 

to  argue,  but  to  impose  his  own  terms,  and  by  the  time  this 
answer  reached  him  he  had  advanced  further  without  any  serious 
check.  The  isolated  detachments  of  Pompeian  levies  made  no 
stand.  Some  fled  and  dispersed,  others  went  over  to  Caesar. 
By  the  end  of  January  he  held  most  of  Umbria  and  was  making 
his  way  in  Picenum.  There  was  no  local  opposition,  and  he 
began  to  receive  recruits.  The  Pompeian  officers  found  it  neces- 
sary to  fall  back  with  their  remaining  troops  and  to  concentrate 
at  Corfinium. 

576.  Meanwhile  Pompey,  sorely  hampered  by  the  nobles 
around  him,  was  learning  by  experience  the  difficulties  of  his 
task.  He  had  worked  hard,  but  Caesar  left  him  no  time  to  make 
an  army.  He  was  now  in  a  dilemma.  The  mountain  district 
about  Corfiniurh  was  the  best  recruiting  ground  in  Italy  proper, 
south  of  the  Rubicon.  It  was  important  to  hold  it.  Several 
towns  in  that  part  were  garrisoned,  and  in  Corfinium  there  were 
not  only  troops  enough  to  make  up  two  legions,  but  several 
precious  nobles,  who  must  be  kept  safe  at  all  costs.  The  com- 
mander there  was  the  man  destined  to  be  Caesar's  successor  in 
Gaul,  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus.  He  was  one  of  the  most 
obstinate  and  conceited  aristocrats,  and  a  bitter  enemy  of  Caesar. 
Now  Pompey  knew  that  Caesar  would  soon  be  reinforced.  He 
saw  that  it  was  not  pos^ble  to  stop  him  with  such  troops  as  were 
within  reach.  Therefore  he  wrote  and  ordered  Domitius  to 
evacuate  Corfinium  and  join  him  in  Apulia.  But  he  could  not 
enforce  his  order.  On  the  14th  February  Caesar  appeared.  The 
arrival  of  two  legions  and  other  forces  enabled  him  to  invest 
Corfinium  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Domitius.  By  the  21st  the 
situation  was  clearly  hopeless,  and  the  troops  surrendered  the 
place  and  all  within  it  to  Caesar.  Caesar  addressed  the  captured 
persons  of  quality  in  a  reproachful  speech,  and  let  them  go. 
The  soldiers  he  added  to  his  own  army.  There  was  now  no 
doubt  that  Pompey  could  not  hold  Italy.  The  question  was 
whether  he  could  withdraw  his  army  by  sea  before  Caesar  caught 
him  and  brought  him  to  battle.  This  he  succeeded  in  doing. 
When  Caesar  reached  Brundisium  early  in  March,  the  consuls 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  army  had  already  sailed.  An  attempt 
to  prevent  the  embarkation  of  Pompey  and  the  rest,  by  blocking 
the  harbour  mouth,  was  foiled.  On  the  1 7th  the  last  division  put 
to  sea,  and  on  the  next  day  Caesar  occupied  the  town. 


44^  Brundisium.     Rome.     Massalia  [ch. 

577.  Thus  Brundisium  became  a  Caesarian  port,  but  Caesar 
had  at  present  no  fleet.  He  gave  orders  for  ships  to  be  collected 
there,  but  this  was  no  easy  matter.  The  maritime  centres  were 
mostly  in  the  East  and  the  Pompeian  fleets  commanded  the  sea. 
Their  army,  quartered  on  the  opposite  coast,  was  sure  of  its 
victuals.  Meanwhile  they  held  Sardinia,  Sicily  and  Africa,  and 
hoped  to  starve  Rome  into  submission  by  stopping  the  corn- 
supplies.  To  recover  these  sources  of  supply  was  necessary,  and 
Caesar  selected  officers  and  forces  for  this  service.  The  main 
fact  of  the  strategic  position  was  that,  while  the  enemy  in  Epirus 
were  out  of  his  reach,  they  were  cut  off  from  their  legions  in 
Spain.  It  was  therefore  Caesar's  plan  to  deal  with  the  western 
army  first,  and  so  to  secure  his  rear  before  following  Pompey  to 
the  East.  He  did  not  dally  at  Brundisium,  but  moved  towards 
Rome,  making  many  arrangements  on  the  way.  At  the  end  of 
March  he  reached  the  city,  but  stayed  there  only  a  few  days. 
After  providing  for  the  government  in  his  absence,  he  set  out  for 
Spain.  He  had  before  leaving  emptied  the  so-called  sacred 
treasury  of  an  emergency-fund  which  had  been  accumulating  for 
perhaps  150  years,  and  had  been  overlooked  by  the  Pompeians 
in  the  hurry  of  their  flight.  This  and  other  high-handed  pro- 
ceedings are  said  to  have  caused  some  protests.  But  he  had  no 
time  to  stand  on  ceremony. 

578.  There  was  trouble  on  the  way  to  Spain.  It  was 
important  to  be  on  good  terms  with  Massalia,  but  the  Massaliots 
did  not  want  to  be  involved  in  a  Roman  civil  war.  They 
professed  neutrality,  but  were  preparing  for  war.  After  refusing 
to  admit  Caesar  into  the  city,  they  admitted  Domitius,  whom 
Caesar  had  spared  at  Corfinium.  Caesar  could  not  allow  this 
defiant  partiality.  He  made  his  arrangements  for  a  siege,  in- 
cluding the  building  of  a  fleet,  and  went  on  to  Spain.  Pompey 
had  divided  that  country  into  three  districts,  in  each  of  which  he 
had  a  deputy.  Afranius  and  Petreius  joined  forces  to  meet 
Caesar,  leaving  M.  Terentius  Varro  in  charge  of  the  South  and 
West.  They  were  well  posted  at  Ilerda  on  the  Sicoris,  a  tributary 
of  the  Ebro,  liable  to  floods.  The  operations  that  followed  were 
for  some  time  indecisive,  and  Caesar  was  in  great  straits.  But 
he  was  willing  to  take  risks,  and  Pompey's  lieutenants  were  n^t. 
Perseverance  and  the  skill  of  his  men  overcame  his  difficulties. 
At  last  he  drove  the  enemy  to  retreat,  and  by  cutting  them  off 


xLii]  The  disaster  in  Africa  449 

from  water  forced  them  to  surrender.  He  let  them  all  go  free, 
on  condition  that  the  soldiers  should  be  conducted  back  to  Italy 
and  disbanded.  Little  blood  had  been  shed  in  this  campaign  of 
40  days.  It  was  now  Varro's  turn.  Caesar  pushed  on  south- 
wards, and  in  a  very  short  time  was  master  of  the  country. 
Varro  submitted.  Caesar  arranged  affairs  for  the  time,  and  left 
Q.  Cassius  with  four  legions  in  charge.  The  mercy  and  modera- 
tion of  Caesar  in  Spain  were  an  effective  answer  to  the  slanders 
of  his  opponents,  who  had  asserted  that  he  was  coming  at  the 
head  of  savage  barbarians  to  deluge  Italy  with  Roman  blood. 
He  had  skilfully  and  gently  removed  the  Pompeian  army  of  the 
West. 

579.  As  soon  as  he  was  free,  Caesar  returned  to  the  siege  of 
Massalia.  The  city,  stoutly  defended  by  sea  and  land,  at  last 
yielded  under  stress  of  famine.  Caesar  disarmed  and  fined  tlie 
Massaliots,  but  left  them  'free,'  that  is  self-governing  under  their 
Greek  institutions.  While  at  Massalia  he  heard  that  he  had  been 
named  dictator  at  Rome^  and  late  in  September  he  was  able  to 
start  on  the  homeward  journey.  While  he  had  been  busy  in 
Spain,  Sardinia  had  been  easily  recovered.  Sicily  too  was  won, 
for  Cato,  who  was  in  command  there,  could  not  raise  a  force 
sufficient  for  its  defence.  So  Curio,  whom  Caesar  had  sent  out 
with  four  legions  to  recover  Sicily  and  Africa,  succeeded  thus  far. 
Later  in  tfefe  year  (Aug.)  he  rashly  landed  in  Africa  with  only  the 
two  doubtful  legions  ^from  Corfinium.  The  Pompeian  governor, 
P.  Attius  Varus,  was  supported  by  Juba  the  Numidian  king. 
The  disaster  that  followed  was  a  repetition  on  a  smaller  scale  of 
the  dreadful  affair  of  Carrhae.  Curio  and  his  army  perished. 
The  province  remained  in  Pompeian  hands,  but  the  victory  was 
the  victory  of  Juba.  This  failure  was  of  course  an  annoyance  to 
Caesar,  but  for  the  present  it  had  not  much  influence  on  the 
fortunes  of  the  war. 

580.  Caesar  was  busy  in  Rome  during  the  months  of  October 
and  November.  For  11  days  he  remained  dictator.  He  held  the 
elections,  and  became  himself  consul-elect  for  48.  He  filled 
other  offices  with  his  own  men^,  including  the  vacancies  in  the 
sacred  colleges,  and  held  the  Latin  Festival.  Laws  were  passed 
for  restoring  civic  rights  to  various  persons  hardly  treated  in  the 
past,  for  granting  the  full  franchise  to  the  Transpadanes,  and 
other  purposes.     An  urgent  need  was  some  measure  to  give  relief 

H.  29 


450         Caesar  in  Rome.      Pompey's  forces         [ch. 

to  debtors,  and  at  the  same  time  to  restore  credit,  much  shaken 
by  the  war.  There  was  talk  of  a  general  cancelling  of  debts. 
But  Caesar  meant  nothing  of  the  kind.  He  ordained  that  repay- 
ment should  be  made  of  the  capital  sum  owing,  minus  the  interest 
already  paid.  He  also  provided  that  a  debt  might  be  discharged 
by  surrender  of  the  debtor's  estate,  and  the  creditor  bound  to 
accept  it  at  a  valuation.  Arbitrators  were  to  value  it  at  the 
estimated  selling  price  according  to  the  state  of  the  market  before 
the  war.  The  creditors  might  well  submit  to  the  loss  of  a  part 
of  their  capital,  having  been  not  unlikely  to  lose  it  all.  The 
plan  seems  certainly  to  have  done  something  to  reheve  present 
stringency  and  set  money  in  circulation  once  more,  and  payment 
by  transfer  of  a  debtor's  estate^  became  in  later  times  a  regular 
part  of  the  legal  system  of  Rome.  Another  matter  calling  for 
attention  was  the  means  of  keeping  the  West  quiet  while  Caesar 
was  engaged  in  the  East.  New  governors  were  appointed  to  the 
provinces  already  won,  and  the  Mauretanian  kings  Bocchus  and 
Bogud  were  honoured  with  full  recognition,  to  hold  in  check  the 
Numidian  Juba.  There  was  of  course  no  opposition  to  Caesar's 
will.  The  remaining  senators  were  a  mere  Rump  ;  the  Assembly 
itself  was  not  more  completely  at  his  disposal. 

581.  Meanwhile  Pompey  had  got  together  a  great  army  of 
various  quality.  He  had  nine  full  legions,  and  two  more  were 
coming  from  Syria.  He  had  numerous  auxiliary  forces,  drawn 
from  the  eastern  peoples,  and  was  therefore  strong  in  cavalry  and 
light  troops.  The  Pompeian  fleets  commanded  the  sea,  and  a 
success  gained  against  a  Caesarian  force  at  the  head  of  the 
Adriatic  had  lately  encouraged  them.  Yet  there  was  something 
wanting.  The  legionaries  were  no  doubt  by  this  time  well  drilled, 
and  some  of  those  brought  up  from  the  eastern  provinces  were 
seasoned  troops.  But  the  forced  retreat  from  Italy  was  a  de- 
pressing fact.  Pompey  had  begun  badly,  and  the  victory  in 
Africa  was  nothing,  compared  with  the  total  disappearance  of 
the  Pompeian  army  in  Spain.  The  rank  and  file  probably  cared 
little  for  the  republican  cause.  The  foreign  troops  were  rather 
vassals  of  Pompey  the  conqueror  of  the  East,  than  retainers  of 
the  Roman  aristocracy,  prepared  to  risk  their  lives  in  doing  battle 
for  the  Senate.  To  impart  warm  enthusiasm  and  soldierly  tone 
to  an  army  composed  of  such  motley  elements  was  hardly  possible. 
^  The  so-called  cessio  bonofum. 


xLii]  Caesar  lands  in  Epirus  451 

And,  whatever  might  have  been  possible  to  a  general  of  Pompey's 
capacity,  if  free  to  act  for  the  best,  was  made  utterly  impossible 
by  the  magnates  at  headquarters.  They  played  at  Senate,  passed 
resolutions,  and  wasted  time  in  debate.  Cato  had  come  from 
Sicily,  Cicero  had  at  last  escaped  from  Italy.  The  former  was 
unpractical,  the  latter  worried  and  sarcastic.  The  great  nobles 
served  only  to  weaken  the  authority  of  the  general.  The  need  of 
money  was  extreme,  and  all  the  East,  client-princes  as  well  as 
provincials,  suffered  in  consequence.  The  rate  of  interest  being 
forced  up  by  the  general  insecurity  made  the  burden  greater. 
The  farmers  of  revenues  were  required  to  pay  up  what  was  due 
to  the  state,  and  to  make  advances  for  the  next  year.  In  short, 
the  fruit  of  Rome's  eastern  empire  was  squeezed  dry.  But  the 
Pompeians  reckoned  on  having  plenty  of  time  to  complete  their 
preparations  during  the  winter.  Pompey  quartered  a  good  part 
of  his  army  in  various  places,  and  was  himself  for  a  while  at 
Thessalonica.  The  naval  squadrons  under  commanders  subor- 
dinate to  Bibulus  were  thought  able  to  prevent  Caesar  from 
crossing  the  Adriatic  till  the  spring. 

582.  Caesar  had  12  legions  in  Italy,  but  war  and  sickness 
had  thinned  the  ranks.  It  was  in  the  quality  of  his  effective 
veterans  that  his  superiority  lay.  They  were  used  to  bold  advance 
and  victory.  He  had  Gaulish  and  German  cavalry.  His  great 
difficulty  was  how  to  make  the  sea-passage.  Two  trips  were 
necessary,  for  he  had  only  transports  enough  to  embark  seven 
thin  legions  and  a  few  horse.  But  it  was  most  important  to  get 
a  footing  on  the  further  coast  without  delay.  Quite  early  in 
January  48  by  the  official  calendar,  two  months  earlier  by  the 
solar  year,  he  gave  Bibulus  the  slip,  and  landed  with  the  first 
part  of  his  force  on  the  coast  of  Epirus.  The  winter  was  just 
beginning.  For  the  present  the  Pompeian  fleet  was  able  to 
prevent  his  troops  left  behind  from  joining  him,  but  the,  hard- 
ships of  constant  cruising  in  the  vessels  of  those  days  were 
great.  By  occupying  positions  on  the  coast  Caesar  could  cut 
them  off  from  the  land  at  many  points,  and  thus  add  to  their 
difficulties.  Oricum  and  Apollonia  quickly  submitted  to  him, 
and  a  large  part  of  Epirus  soon  did  the  same.  His  next  aim  was 
to  capture  Dyrrachium,  the  port-town  where  the  Pompeians  had 
their  chief  depot.  Pompey  was  on  his  way  westwards  from 
Thessalonica  when   he   heard   of  Caesar's   landing.     By  forced 

29 — 2 


452  Dyrrachium  [ch. 

marches  he  arrived  just  in  time  to  save  Dyrrachium.  But  the 
need  of  hurry  to  meet  Caesar's  unexpected  attack  was  of  itself 
enough  to  shake  the  nerve  of  his  untried  army.  The  two  armies 
now  lay  facing  each  other  along  the  river  Apsus.  Insincere 
negotiations  went  on  from  both  sides.  The  outposts  conversed 
under  a  sort  of  tacit  truce,  and  strong  measures  had  to  be  taken 
to  put  an  end  to  an  intercourse  dangerous  to  the  Pompeian 
cause. 

583.  The  winter  dragged  on.  Caesar,  hard  pressed  by  want 
of  supplies,  had  to  wait.  He  was  not  yet  strong  enough  to  take 
the  offensive.  Meanwhile  there  was  some  trouble  in  Italy.  The 
praetor  M.  Caelius  (Cicero's  friend)  was  restless,  and  entered  on 
wild  courses  tending  to  the  canceUing  of  all  debts.  At  length  he 
became  intolerable,  and  the  consul  Servilius  had  to  suppress  him 
by  force.  He  then  sent  for  Milo,  who  was  still  in  exile,  and  the 
two  attempted  a  brigand  rising  in  southern  Italy.  Both  perished, 
and  Caesar's  partisans  still  .held  Italy.  The  urgent  question  in 
the  early  months  of  the  year  48  was,  when  would  the  second 
division  of  Caesar's  forces  reach  him,  if  at  all  ?  He  had  staked 
all  on  a  bold  venture,  and  had  succeeded  so  far,  but  the  moral 
effect  of  his  forward  strategy  was  being  lost  by  inaction.  Fortune 
now  served  him  well.  Antony  broke  up  an  attempt  of  a  Pompeian 
squadron  to  blockade  him  in  Brundisium,  and  early  in  April  he 
put  to  sea.  Weather  favoured  him,  and  he  landed  north  of 
Dyrrachium  with  four  legions.  Pompey,  being  between  Caesar 
and  Antony,  tried  to  prevent  their  junction,  but  failed.  It  is  to 
be  noted  that  it  was  a  warning  from  friendly  natives  that  saved 
Antony.  Already  Caesar  was  gaining  goodwill  by  his  kindly 
treatment  of  all,  even  of  captured  enemies,  in  contrast  to  the 
brutality  of  the  Pompeians  on  several  occasions.  He  was  now 
able  to  take  the  offensive,  a  marked  advantage,  especially  in 
civil  war. 

584.  The  next  stage  was  to  send  out  detached  forces  to  win 
aid  and  supplies  in  Greece,  and  to  hold  in  check  Scipio,  who  was 
bringing  troops  to  Pompey  through  Macedonia.  These  moves 
were  more  or  less  successful;  but  he  could  not  get  into  Dyrra- 
chium. The  Pompeians  drew  supplies  by  sea,  while  he  was 
completely  isolated  in  a  poor  country.  Nevertheless  he  under- 
took to  blockade  them  by  land  with  a  starving  army  inferior  in 
numbers.     For  more  than  three  months  he  held  them  fast  by 


xLii]  Pharsalus  453 

fortified  lines  which  were  gradually  built  to  run  round  them  from 
sea  to  sea.  As  time  went  by,  the  loss  of  horses  and  the  impaired 
health  of  the  besieged  army  forced  Pompey  to  act.  But  he 
could  not  break  out  until  Gaulish  deserters  betrayed  to  him  the 
weakness  of  the  unfinished  works  at  the  southern  end  of  the 
lines.  By  a  sudden  attack  he  broke  the  investment,  and  indeed 
gained  a  real  victory  in  the  ensuing  battle.  But  he  did  not  follow 
it  up,  and  the  advantage  was  lost.  It  soon  became  a  disadvantage, 
for  the  Pompeian  army  was  unduly  elated  by  a  moderate  success, 
and  the  nobles  at  headquarters  were  convinced  that  nothing 
stood  between  them  and  final  victory  but  the  caution  of  their 
general,  and  his  unwillingness  to  come  down  from  his  position  of 
command.  It  was  found  that  Caesar  had  marched  inland,  and 
pursuit  was  vain.  To  return  at  once  to  Italy  and  reoccupy 
Rome  was  tempting,  but  it  meant  abandoning  Scipio.  It  was 
decided  to  rescue  him  and  to  crush  Caesar.  So,  while  Caesar's 
men  toiled  over  rough  mountains'  to  Thessaly,  recovering  their 
spirits,  the  Pompeian  army  moved  along  the  Egnatian  road  in 
easy  confidence,  and  descended  into  Thessaly  from  the  North. 
A  detachment  had  been  left  under  Cato  at  Dyrrachium.  But  of 
the  two  main  armies  that  now  were  meeting  to  decide  the  fate  of 
the  Roman  world,  the  Pompeian  seems  to  have  outnumbered  the 
Caesarian  by  about  two  to  one. 

585.  Pompey's  situation  was  pitiful.  As  a  soldier  he  knew 
his  business.  Delay  was  all  in  his  favour.  But  as  the  nominal 
chief  of  a  circle  of  conceited  aristocrats,  eager  to  return  in  triumph 
to  Rome  and  take  vengeance  on  their  adversaries,  he  was  at  a 
loss.  He  could  not  control  them,  for  he  wished  to  please  them. 
Therefore  they  controlled  him,  and  compelled  him  to  give  battle, 
against  his  better  judgment,  on  the  9th  August.  His  tactical 
scheme,  for  turning  his  superiority  in  numbers  to  account,  was 
a  good  one,  but  commonplace,  and  easily  divined  by  Caesar. 
The  '  battle  in  Thessaly '  as  Caesar  calls  it,  was  fought  near  the 
town^  of  Old  Pharsalus,  and  ended  in  the  rout  and  dispersion  of 
the  Pompeian  army.  The  number  of  killed  on  the  beaten  side 
is  said  to  have  been  large,  but  many  of  them  were  foreigners. 
Caesar  did  his  best  to  stop  the  slaughter  of  Romans.  A  great 
number  of  prisoners  were  taken,  and  kindly  treated,  but  a  con- 
siderable number  of  fugitives  escaped  from  the  field,  and  were 

^  Palaepharsalus. 


454  End  of  Pompey  [ch. 

afterwards  a  cause  of  embarrassment  to  Caesar's  officers  employed 
in  Illyricum.  While  several  of  the  most  stubborn  aristocrats 
died  fighting,  Pompey  fled.  When  Caesar's  men  burst  into  the 
enemy's  camp,  they  found  preparations  made  for  a  feast  in  honour 
of  the  victory  assumed  certain.  The  chief  significance  of  this 
dramatic  battle  is  that  a  single  general,  absolute  master  of  his 
own  movements,  overthrew  one  who  was  no  more  than  the 
chairman  of  a  self-satisfied  and  incompetent  clique.  In  politics 
this  was  the  tendency  of  the  revolutionary  age  :  the  decisive  battle 
expressed  this  tendency  in  simple  military  terms. 

586.  Two  main  features  of  Caesar's  strategy  were  a  readiness 
to  take  great  risks  and  promptness  in  following  up  a  victory.  He 
now  did  the  first  by  leaving  the  sea  still  commanded  by  the 
republican  fleets.  Perhaps  he  guessed  that  they  would  soon  be 
weakened  by  the  desertion  of  some  of  the  eastern  contingents, 
and  he  had  good  reason  to  expect  that  their  commanders  would 
prove  unable  to  conduct  naval  operations  on  a  large  scale  with- 
out Pompey.  He  did  the  second  by  starting  in  pursuit  of  Pompey 
at  once.  This  step  led  him  on  into  unforeseen  difficulties,  and 
soon  brought  him  into  imminent  danger  of  losing  all  that  his 
splendid  victories  had  won.  While  he  was  locked  up  in  the 
East,  the  republican  leaders  had  ample  time  to  concentrate  their 
remaining  strength  in  another  part  of  the  world,  and  the  really 
decisive  battle  had  to  be  fought  over  again. 

587.  But  Pompey  was  a  broken  man.  Without  any  certain 
plans  he  fled  to  the  East,  where  none  were  willing  to  receive  him. 
He  sought  a  refuge  in  Egypt,  hoping  for  protection  in  a  country 
ruled  by  children  of  that  Piper  king  whom  his  own  influence  had 
restored  to  the  throne.  But  the  young  Ptolemy,  to  whom  he 
appealed,  did  not  want  him,  and  the  king's  advisers  did  not  relish 
the  prospect  of  losing  their  present  power  and  profit  by  involving 
Egypt  in  a  Roman  civil  war.  The  end  of  it  was  that  they  enticed 
Pompey  to  quit  his  ship,  and  murdered  him.  Thus  they  got  rid 
of  a  tiresome  suppliant,  and  thought  themselves  now  safe  from 
the  conqueror's  unwelcome  interference.  So  died  the  man  who 
had  for  many  years  been  a  leading  figure  in  the  Roman  world. 
His  place  in  history  is  that  of  the  man  whose  ambition  was  to  be 
indispensable,  to  have  power  without  seizing  it.  The  conditions 
of  Roman  politics  in  his  time  made  this  impossible.  The 
republicans  did  not  really  trust  him ;  and  indeed  no  man  con- 


xLii]  Alexandria  455 

tributed  more  to  the  fall  of  the  Republic,  of  which  he  loved  to 
pose  as  the  dignified  patron.  He  had  become  a  dreamer,  bent 
on  combining  incompatible  things,  and  so  passed  helplessly  to 
a  tragic  end. 

588.  There  was  no  opposition  in  the  East  when  news  of  the 
battle  of  Pharsalus  arrived.  Caesar  passed  over  to  Asia,  and 
pushed  on  with  a  small  force  from  Rhodes  to  Alexandria.  He 
was  disgusted  at  the  murder  of  ^Pompey.  Misunderstandings 
soon  arose.  He  did  not  know  the  Alexandrian  mob.  He 
appeared  as  Roman  consul,  representing  the  sovran  power.  He 
undertook  to  settle  a  dynastic  dispute  between  young  Ptolemy 
and  his  sister-wife  Cleopatra.  It  is  fairly  certain  that  he  wanted 
to  exact  money,  of  which  he  was  in  great  need.  In  a  short  time 
he  found  himself  entangled  in  an  ignoble  conflict  with  the  city 
mob,  supported  by  the  mercenary  army,  a  motley  body  of  ruffians, 
headed  by  the  king's  ministers.  He  was  forced  to  occupy  and 
barricade  the  palace,  where  he  was  besieged  for  several  months. 
Few  reinforcements  reached  him,  and  he  had  great  difficulty  in 
keeping  open  his  communications  by  sea.  In  truth  he  was  never 
in  greater  danger  than  at  Alexandria.  Relief  did  not  come  till 
the  spring  of  the  year  47.  A  certain  Mithradates  of  Pergamum 
raised  a  force  in  Cilicia  and  Syria,  including  some  Jews.  With 
this  he  marched  into  Egypt  and  joined  Caesar.  The  war  was 
quickly  ended.  Submission  was  met  with  clemency,  but  the 
settlement  of  the  kingdom  took  some  time.  Cleopatra,  who  had 
been  with  Caesar  during  the  siege,  was  made  joint  ruler  with  her 
younger  brother,  to  whom  (the  elder  being  dead)  she  was  formally 
married.  Some  favours  were  granted  to  the  Alexandrian  Jews. 
To  maintain  order  for  the  present,  Caesar  left  behind  him  most 
of  his  troops  when  he  sailed  for  Syria  in  July. 

589.  The  Alexandrine  war  had  been  provoked  by  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  a  protected  kingdom.  Eastern  princes 
in  general  took  no  independent  part  in  the  Roman  civil  war. 
The  contingents  sent  to  Pompey's  army  were  furnished  only  for 
fear  of  the  risks  of  disobedience.  The  remnants  of  them  were 
soon  withdrawn,  even  as  the  Rhodian  and  Egyptian  squadrons 
had  left  the  Pompeian  fleet.  But  Pharnaces,  the  ruler  of  the 
Bosporan  kingdom,  took  the  opportunity  of  the  civil  war  to 
attempt  the  reconquest  of  the  territories  that  had  once  belonged 
to  his  father,  the  great  Mithradates.    The  new  Caesarian  governor 


45^  Zela.     The  Adriatic.     Spain  [ch. 

of  Asia  tried  with  insufficient  forces  to  stop  him,  and  suffered 
defeat.  For  some  months  Pharnaces  was  free  to  work  his  will. 
Caesar  could  not  afford  to  allow  this.  He  hurried  through  the 
arrangements  necessary  in  Syria  and  Cilicia,  and  marched  to 
meet  Pharnaces.  The  difficulty  of  raising  troops  was  very  great, 
for  he  had  very  few  Romans  with  him.  Some  Galatians  were 
sent  by  Deiotarus  their  principal  chief,  who  was  eager  to  win 
forgiveness  for  having  supported  Pompey.  On  the  2nd  August 
the  decisive  victory  of  Zela  put  an  end  to  the  pretensions  of 
Pharnaces.  Then  a  new  territorial  settlement  had  to  be  made  as 
a  guarantee  of  future  tranquillity.  Caesar's  presence  was  urgently 
needed  in  Italy,  but  he  was  not  able  to  arrive  till  near  the  end  of 
September. 

590.  In  turning  back  to  see  what  had  been  happening  in 
Caesar's  absence,  we  come  upon  a  series  of  operations  on  the 
coasts  of  the  Adriatic  and  Ionian  seas.  The  fleet  of  the 
republicans  was  still  strong,  but  was  not  effectively  concentrated 
and  employed  on  a  consistent  strategic  plan,  so  as  to  help  in 
deciding  the  main  issues  of  the  war.  In  Sicily  and  southern 
Italy  some  Caesarian  ships  were  destroyed.  In  the  parts  of 
Illyricum  a  more  serious  struggle  took  place  after  the  battle  of 
Pharsalus.  At  first  it  seemed  as  though  the  Pompeians  would 
become  masters  of  all  the  Illyrian  seaboard,  but  in  the  end 
Vatinius,  who  commanded  at  Brundisium,  prevailed.  He  got 
together  a  makeshift  fleet,  for  which  restored  invalids  provided 
good  fighting  crews,  and  gained  a  decisive  victory.  The  navies 
of  the  period  were  clumsy,  and  naval  strategy  in  general  a 
neglected  art.  From  the  later  course  of  the  war  it  would  seem 
that  the  superiority  of  the  republicans  at  sea  was  now  fast  wasting 
away.  Meanwhile  on  land  there  was  a  far  worse  trouble  in  the 
West.  Q.  Cassius,  Caesar's  deputy  in  the  Further  Spain,  had 
under  him  the  peaceful  southern  district,  already  much  Romanized. 
It  contained  many  thriving  cities,  and  was  a  centre  of  mining 
enterprise.  He  had  also  Lusitania,  less  civilized,  but  apparently 
not  now  rebellious.  By  arbitrary  and  extortionate  government, 
and  by  corrupting  the  discipline  of  his  troops,  he  made  his 
province  a  scene  of  confusion,  till  he  provoked  a  conspiracy,  and 
at  length  a  military  mutiny.  This  was  a  rising  against  Cassius, 
not  against  Caesar.  It  was  not  till  the  summer  of  the  year  47 
that  order  was  restored  by   Lepidus,   proconsul   of  the    Hither 


xLii]  Troubles  in  Rome  457 

Spain.     Cassius   was    removed,    but   the    mischief  done   in   the 
province  could  not  be  undone. 

591.  In  Rome  Caesar's  colleague  Servilius  kept  things  fairly 
quiet  during  the  year  48.  The  news  of  Pharsalus,  and  then  of 
Pompey's  death,  caused  great  honours  and  powers^  to  be  voted 
to  Caesar.  In  particular  he  received  (though  a  Patrician)  the 
grant  of  full  tribunician  power,  without  holding  the  office  of 
tribune.  He  was  also  named  dictator  a  second  time,  on  much 
the  same  footing  as  Sulla.  He  entered  on  this  office  while  at 
Alexandria,  and  named  Antony,  who  had  taken  back  some  veteran 
legions  to  Rome,  Master  of  Horse.  In  idleness  these  soldiers 
began  to  be  troublesome.  And  the  year  47  began  without  regular 
magistrates,  Caesar  not  having  been  able  to  send  his  orders. 
Some  of  the  tribunes  raised  disturbances  by  agitating  proposals 
for  cancelling  debts  or  violent  opposition  thereto.  At  last  Antony 
was  forced  to  act,  and  order  was  restored  with  much  shedding  of 
blood.  Caesar  was  badly  wanted.  Before  we  speak  of  his  return, 
we  must  note  the  dispersal  of  the  Pompeians  after  the  battle  of 
Pharsalus.  Beaten  on  land,  they  made  their  naval  station  at 
Corcyra  their  headquarters  for  a  time.  But  they  soon  broke  up 
and  went  different  ways.  Cicero  in  dejection  returned  to  Italy, 
where  Caesar's  men  treated  him  kindly.  Scipio  went  to  Africa ; 
and,  after  naval  operations  had  failed,  so  did  the  fleet  under 
M.  Octavius.  Cato  and  another  party  sought  Pompey  in  Egypt, 
and  at  the  news  of  his  death  separated.  Some  gave  up  the  cause, 
and  received  pardon  from  Caesar;  most  of  them  went  on  with 
Cato  to  Africa.  Africa  was  the  centre  to  which  other  fugitives 
rallied,  and  when  Caesar  reached  Rome  it  was  already  certain 
that  the  necessity  of  another  campaign  would  leave  him  but  a 
short  respite  for  the  despatch  of  urgent  business  in  the  capital. 

592.  Caesar  was  in  Rome  less  than  three  months,  and  there 
were  endless  things  to  be  done.  He  dealt  with  the  financial 
crisis  by  enforcing  the  rules  laid  down  by  him  in  the  year  49. 
There  was  no  remission  of  debts,  but  some  temporary  relief  in 
the  matter  of  house-rents.  We  hear  also  of  a  measure  to  encourage 
the  investment  of  capital  in  land,  and  of  an  edict  dissolving  some 
troublesome  clubs  or  gilds  which  Clodius  had  revived.  To 
establish  order  and  credit  was  his  object.     He  held  elections, 

^  Among  them  the  right  of  nomination  to  magistracies  and  governorships. 


458  The  great  mutiny.     Africa  [ch. 

and  filled  up  the  magistracies  for  the  small  remnant  of  the  year, 
thus  restoring  a  normal  state  of  things,  and  also  saw  to  the 
elections  for  the  next  year.  Money  was  his  greatest  need.  He 
is  said  to  have  been  driven  to  exact  forced  loans,  and  to  sell 
confiscated  estates  of  Pompey  and  others.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  this  policy  was  sorely  against  his  will.  But  what  was  he  to 
do?  The  veteran  legions,  waiting  in  Italy  for  their  promised 
rewards,  were  clamouring  for  cash.  Caesar  wanted  them  for  the 
war  in  Africa.  They  marched  on  Rome  and  claimed  their 
discharge.  Caesar  met  them  and  granted  their  request.  He 
could  not  satisfy  their  demand  for  payment,  but  promised  that 
on  his  return  from  Africa  he  would  pay  all  just  claims  in  full  with 
interest.  What  now  were  the  soldiers  to  do?  Their  hopes  of 
reward  depended  on  Caesar.  If  he  perished  or  conquered  at  the 
head  of  another  army,  their  prospect  of  reward  would  either  dis- 
appear or  be  subject  to  rival  claims.  What  Caesar  actually  did 
after  their  submission,  (for  they  did  submit)  is  uncertain.  The 
mass  of  them  at  least  were  sent  to  Sicily  on  their  way  to  Africa. 

593.  For  the  year  46  Caesar,  still  dictator,  was  also  consul 
with  Lepidus  for  colleague.  Lepidus  was  to  be  at  the  head  of 
the  home  government.  Among  the  many  appointments  made  at 
this  time  we  must  note  that  of  M.  Junius  Brutus  as  governor 
of  Cisalpine  Gaul.  He,  like  his  uncle  Cato,  had  been  a  strong 
republican,  but  had  sought  and  found  pardon  from  Caesar.  He 
was  now  left  in  a  most  important  charge,  while  Caesar  went  to 
fight  against  Cato  in  Africa.  Near  the  end  of  December  47 
Caesar  put  to  sea  from  Lilybaeum  with  six  legions  (only  one  of 
veterans)  and  a  small  body  of  horse.  Until  joined  by  the  rest  of 
his  old  troops,  he  was  not  able  to  meet  the  republican  army 
in  the  field.  In  the  space  of  about  a  year  and  a  half  his  adver- 
saries had  got  together  a  large  force  of  various  quality,  and  had  so 
cleared  the  country  of  supplies  that  an  invading  army  was  almost 
wholly  dependent  on  imported  food.  They  had  also  the  support 
of  Juba.  It  is  true,  the  pretensions  of  the  king  were  an  embarrass- 
ment to  the  Roman  leaders,  but  the  Numidian  army  was  no 
contemptible  auxiliary,  and  with  it  their  superiority  to  Caesar  in 
cavalry  and  light  troops  was  so  marked  that  he  could  only  move 
with  difficulty.  Of  leaders  there  were  plenty,  among  them 
Labienus.  But  the  republican  weakness  betrayed  itself  in  the 
choice  of  Scipio  as  commander  in  chief     He  was  a  man  of 


xLii]  Thapsus.     End  of  Cato  459 

ordinary  abilities,  not  really  fit  to  face  Caesar  or  to  guide  and 
control  the  erratic  strategy  of  Juba.  And  the  energies  of  Juba 
were  presently  diverted  by  an  invasion  of  Numidia  from  the 
West.  The  two  Mauretanian  kings,  Bocchus  and  Bogud,  had 
been  attached  to  the  Caesarian  interest  as  a  check  on  Juba.  At 
the  present  time  both  seem  to  have  been  under  the  influence  of 
P.  Sittius,  a  Roman  adventurer  who  was  strongly  opposed  to  the 
aristocratic  party.  Sittius  now  did  Caesar  a  very  timely  service 
by  leading  a  Mauretanian  army  into  Numidia. 

594.  Caesar  had  at  first  hard  work  to  hold  his  ground  after 
landing,  and  to  feed  his  men.  Even  when  supplies  began  to 
arrive,  and  the  missing  legions  came,  he  had  a  wearisome  cam- 
paign. That  his  convoys  were  allowed  to  reach  him  is  a  sign  of 
the  inefficiency  of  the  enemy's  naval  service.  Part  of  their  fleet 
was  under  Pompey's  elder  son  Gnaeus  cruising  in  the  West  to 
little  purpose.  Caesar's  main  object  was  to  force  on  a  decisive 
battle.  This  Scipio  avoided  for  some  time,  but  Caesar  attacked 
the  town  of  Thapsus,  and  Scipio  had  to  come  to  the  relief  of  his 
garrison.  On  the  6th  April  46  the  battle  of  Thapsus  was  fought. 
Caesar's  men  were  not  to  be  restrained,  and  the  rout  of  the 
republican  army  ended  in  wholesale  butchery.  The  war  was 
over.  Most  of  the  chief  republican  leaders  fled  and  perished  in 
their  flight,  but  Labienus  and  Varus  escaped  to  Spain,  where  we 
shall  find  them  with  Pompey's  two  sons,  making  one  more  stand 
against  the  fortune  of  Caesar.  The  most  famous  episode  of  the 
victorious  campaign  in  Africa  was  the  death  of  Cato.  He  was 
not  in  the  battle,  but  in  charge  of  Utica,  the  provincial  capital. 
He  thought  that  his  work  was  done,  and  that  it  was  time  for  him, 
acting  on  Stoic  principles,  to  leave  an  intolerable  world,  and  not 
to  survive  the  Roman  Republic.  He  read  again  Plato's  version 
of  the  Socratic  views  on  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  calmly 
killed  himself.  To  later  generations  Cato  was  a  hero,  and  his 
suicide  a  favourite  topic  of  literature. 

595.  Caesar  spared  the  lives  of  captured  officers,  but  sent 
them  into  exile.  Numidia  was  divided.  Part  was  given  to 
Bocchus,  and  Cirta,  with  the  district  round  it,  formed  into  a 
principality  for  Sittius.  The  rest  was  annexed  as  a  province 
under  the  name  of  New  Africa.  In  the  old  province  some  money 
was  raised  by  fines  levied  on  the  partisans  of  the  beaten  side,  and 
by  confiscations.  In  June  Caesar  sailed  for  Sardinia,  and  towards 
the  end  of  July  he  reached  Rome. 


CHAPTER    XLIII 


FROM    THE    BATTLE    OF    THAPSUS    TO    THE    DEATH 
OF   CAESAR.     46— 44B.C. 

596.  Rome  was  awaiting  Caesar's  return,  and  ready  to  confess 
her  subjection  to  a  single  will.  Honorary  distinctions  were  voted 
him,  so  that  on  all  public  occasions  he  was  recognized  as  sovran 
head  of  the  state.  He  accepted  most  of  these  honours  :  but  the 
grant  of  actual  powers,  by  which  his  position  was  rendered  more 
fully  monarchic,  was  to  him  no  doubt  more  important.  He  had 
great  designs  for  reforming  and  remodelling  the  government, 
which  the  African  war  had  interrupted;  and  time  was  slipping  by. 
There  was  still  one  department  which  had  so  far  not  been  placed 
under  his  control,  that  of  the  censorship.  The  office  had  long 
been  decaying,  and  since  Sulla  it  had  hardly  more  than  a  nominal 
existence.  Yet  for  Caesar's  purposes  it  could  be  made  useful. 
The  census,  the  state-contracts  and  other  matters  of  finance,  not 
to  mention  the  general  power  of  interference,  were  things  which 
it  was  surely  convenient  to  bring  under  the  master's  hand.  So 
he  was  made  '  guardian  of  manners  and  morals '  {praefectus 
moribus)  for  three  years.  Having  no  colleague,  he  had  the  full 
powers  of  two  censors,  and  for  twice  the  usual  term  of  function. 
Formal  scruples  were  evaded  by  the  change  of  title,  and  the  old 
office  was  not  abolished.  Caesar's  official  position  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  year  46  was  this.  He  was  dictator  on  the  Sullan 
footing.  He  was  also  consul  with  Lepidus.  He  had  the  domi- 
nant tribunician  power  and  the  rights  of  nomination,  granted  him 
in  47.  Moreover  he  was  chief  pontiff  for  life,  and  thus  the  chief 
authority    in    matters    of  religion.     Now  the   state    religion  was 


CH.  xLiii]  Caesar  autocrat  461 

intimately  connected  with  practical  politics,  and  the  charge  of  the 
state  calendar,  now  in  dire  confusion,  was  a  duty  of  the  pontiffs. 
The  total  of  these  powers  was  virtually  monarchy  as  autocratic 
as  the  tyranny  of  Sulla.  But  the  difference  of  the  two  men  was 
immense.  Caesar  reassured  the  public  by  promises  of  a  mild 
government,  and  he  kept  his  word.  But  there  is  no  reason  to 
think  that  he  contemplated  retiring  after  carrying  out  his  intended 
changes.  He  did  not  mean  to  resign  the  monarchy  in  favour  of 
the  Senate,  whose  incompetence  he  well  knew.  And  there  was 
no  other  possible  claimant.  We  cannot  know  all  his  motives, 
and  we  cannot  fairly  blame  him  for  overthrowing  the  republican 
system  in  the  interests  of  efficiency.  He  at  least  did  not  evade 
responsibility  when  assuming  power. 

597.  In  August  he  celebrated  four  triumphs,  Gallic,  Egyptian, 
Pontic,  African.  The  first  included  the  execution  of  Vercingetorix, 
the  last  was  nominally  over  Juba^  though  the  victory  of  Thapsus 
was  really  an  episode  of  the  civil. war,  and  Roman  sentiment  was 
shocked.  The  mere  bullion  displayed  in  these  shows  was  of  vast 
amount,  more  than  ;!^i 5, 000,000  according  to  one  story.  But 
the  charges  to  be  met  were  enormous.  We  hear  of  common 
soldiers  receiving  ;£^2oo  or  more  a  head.  Common  citizens  had 
a  bounty  of  ;£4  a  head.  A  general  feast,  followed  by  games, 
stage-plays,  shows  of  gladiators  and  wild  beasts,  kept  up  the 
entertainment  for  days  on  an  unexampled  scale.  A  novelty,  the 
exhibition  of  an  actual  sea-fight  {naumachia)  on  a  lake  dug 
specially  for  the  purpose,  was  a  very  popular  performance,  and 
no  doubt  a  very  costly  one.  Rome  was  thronged  with  visitors, 
but  even  during  this  mad  carnival  there  were  signs  of  discontent. 
That  a  Roman  knight  acted  on  the  stage  to  please  Caesar,  while 
others  fought  as  gladiators,  was  galling  to  men  of  position,  as 
reminding  them  that  all  alike  were  in  truth  slaves  of  a  master. 
Rough  soldiers  would  gladly  have  had  the  spending  of  money 
wasted  on  needless  splendour.  Some  force  had  to  be  used  to 
prevent  disorder.  But  the  time  of  excitement  ended,  and  business 
began  again.  It  was  then  that  patriotic  men,  such  as  Cicero,  felt 
the  real  weight  of  Caesar's  autocracy.  They  were  daily  reminded 
of  their  utter  powerlessness.  There  was  no  political  life  left  for 
them.  Caesar  was  considerate  and  polite,  but  he  was  master,  and 
the  views  of  republicans,  however  able  and  eloquent,  were  of  no 
importance  or  effect. 


462  Caesar's  difficulties  [ch. 

598.  No  one  could  tell  what  Caesar  might  choose  to  do. 
That  he  was  generous  and  fair,  active  and  wise,  could  not  be 
denied.  But  nothing  could  reconcile  republican  patriots  to  their 
own  political  extinction.  Caesar  took  pains  to  attract  the  coope- 
ration of  men  of  worth,  in  order  to  invest  his  usurpation  with 
dignity.  Such  a  man  was  Cicero,  at  whose  request  he  granted 
many  favours.  But  the  conflicts  of  public  life,  in  which  the 
orator  found  his  interests  and  won  his  triumphs,  had  ceased. 
The  sensitive  man  despised  himself  for  his  own  submission.  He 
turned  to  literature,  and  produced  a  number  of  treatises  dealing 
with  oratory  and  philosophy.  Others,  who  would  feel  their  servi- 
tude less  acutely,  would  also  have  less  resources  to  enable  them 
to  bear  the  yoke.  In  short,  the  republican  element  in  Roman 
society  was  conquered  for  the  moment,  but  not  finally  crushed  or 
tamed.  Even  the  men  pardoned  by  Caesar  resented  their  sub- 
jection. And  all  the  while  Caesar  was  becoming  more  and  more 
isolated.  He  was  losing  touch  with  men  of  independent  views, 
for  the  stress  of  business  kept  him  surrounded  by  subordinates 
and  flatterers.  This  result  could  not  be  helped.  It  was  under 
such  conditions  that  the  busy  benevolent  autocrat  set  about  his 
work  of  practical  reforms.  A  necessary  preliminary  was  the  dis- 
charge of  soldiers  and  provision  of  land-allotments.  This  was 
carried  out  on  principles  very  different  from  those  of  Sulla,  for 
care  was  taken  to  avoid  the  planting  of  military  settlers  in  con- 
tinuous blocks,  and  the  disturbance  of  existing  tenures.  It  seems 
that  the  allottees  were  incorporated  in  small  numbers  in  existing 
communities,  scattered  over  Italy  proper  and  Cisalpine  Gaul. 
It  is  probable  that  most  of  the  land  for  the  purpose  was  bought 
and  paid  for.  The  business  seems  to  have  gone  through  peace- 
ably and  equitably,  and  the  state  can  hardly  have  had  enough 
suitable  land  without  buying  it.  But  it  is  a  pity  that  we  have  not 
statistics  of  so  remarkable  a  transaction. 

599.  Some  of  Caesar's  reforms  were  embodied  in  laws, 
others  not.  His  censorial  power  enabled  him  to  lessen  the  abuse 
of  the  corn-doles,  an  old-established  evil.  He  revised  the  list, 
and  cut  down  the  number  of  receivers  to  150,000.  It  is  said  that 
he  had  found  it  320,000.  In  this  matter  also  the  details  are 
obscure,  but  it  would  appear  that  his  main  object  was  to  reduce 
the  numbers  of  the  urban  mob.  The  servile  element  was  always 
being  recruited  by  manumissions.     Slaves  no  longer  worth  their 


xLiii]  Measures  of  reform  463 

keep  were  cheaply  provided  for  as  state-paupers.  Caesar  intro- 
duced a  better  alien  element  by  enfranchising  many  medical 
practitioners  and  other  specialists  (teachers  etc.),  and  thus  en- 
couraged clever  Greeks  to  settle  in  Rome.  We  hear  of  laws  to 
check  luxury,  and  to  enforce  the  employment  of  more  free  labour 
in  rural  districts :  vain  efforts,  which  recorded  evils  that  they 
could  not  cure.  To  meet  financial  needs,  the  customs-duties 
abolished  in  the  year  60  were  now  restored.  An  important 
measure  was  the  lex  Julia  municipalise  probably  drafted  now  and 
passed  in  45.  Part  of  it  dealt  with  internal  affairs  of  Rome, 
regulating  various  rights  and  duties  with  a  view  to  improving  the 
administration  of  the  city,  among  them  roadways,  traffic,  and  the 
corn-doles.  Another  part  enacted  normal  rules  for  the  self- 
government  of  Italian  municipalities.  This  combination  of  topics 
is  surely  a  mark  of  Caesar's  imperial  views.  We  may  fairly  say 
that  to  him  the  difference  between  Rome  and  other  cities  of  Italy 
was  merely  that  between  the  .capital  and  local  borough-towns,  not 
a  difference  in  kind,  but  in  place  and  degree.  Whether,  if  he 
had  lived  longer,  he  would  have  taken  the  further  step  of  making 
the  subject-peoples  politically  Romans,  we  cannot  tell.  But  the 
coming  of  an  imperial  master,  with  his  eye  on  the  empire  as  a 
whole,  pointed  to  a  general  incorporation  some  day.  That  Rome 
was  the  capital  was  not  a  matter  of  doubt.  When  chatterers 
suggested  that  Caesar  meant  to  move  the  centre  of  government  to 
Alexandria,  this  was  idle  talk. 

600.  Among  the  evils  to  be  remedied  was  the  ineffectiveness 
of  legal  penalties  for  public  crimes,  such  as  public  violence  and 
treason.  The  unpleasantness  of  exile  was  not  enough  to  deter 
offenders.  They  kept  their  properties,  and  found  pleasant  places 
to  live  in.  Caesar  now  imposed  a  forfeit  of  5o7o  of  their 
property,  100° j^  in  cases  of  parricide.  Other  laws  dealt  with 
the  composition  of  juries,  removing  the  tribuni  aerarii^  or  with 
restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  foreign  travel,  and  on  the  length  of 
tenure  of  provincial  governorships.  It  is  chiefly  as  indicating  the 
points  in  which  he  desired  reform  that  these  measures  are 
interesting,  for  he  did  not  live  to  carry  out  his  policy.  His 
relations  with  the  Senate  were,  in  their  effect  on  the  sequel,  more 
important  than  his  laws.  It  seems  certain  that  decrees  were 
drawn  up  in  the  Senate's  name,  and  liberties  taken  with  the 
names  of  well-known  members  without  their   knowledge.     The 


464  The  Calendar  [ch. 

House  valued  its  privilege  of  debate,  but  Caesar's  time  was 
precious,  and  he  fell  into  the  habit  of  consulting  only  a  sort  of 
select  Cabinet  of  leading  senators  or  private  friends.  Meanwhile 
his  censorial  action  in  filling  vacancies  was  a  further  cause  of 
discontent.  Men  who  had  lost  their  seats  owing  to  condemnations 
or  political  troubles  were  restored.  Thus  the  remnant  of  the 
republican  aristocrats  was  weakened  by  the  inclusion  of  members 
who  owed  their  rehabilitation  to  Caesar.  Later,  in  45,  he  went 
further  in  this  direction.  But  already  he  shewed  that,  while 
recognizing  the  Senate  as  a  necessary  organ  of  government,  he 
did  not  mean  to  let  it  resume  its  former  power  as  an  aristocratic 
clique. 

601.  We  now  come  to  the  reform  of  the  calendar.  Two 
year-systems  were  in  use.  It  was  by  the  official  calendar-year,  as 
ordered  by  the  pontiffs,  that  days  of  fixed  festivals  and  days 
available  for  transaction  of  public  business  were  ascertained.  It 
began  with  March.  The  official  year  of  the  regular  magistracies 
had  ever  since  153  B.C.  begun  with  January.  Beside  these,  there 
was  a  roughly-computed  solar  year,  followed  by  farmers,  a  sort  of 
year  of  seasons.  The  problem  was  how  to  combine  the  principles 
of  a  lunar  and  a  solar  year.  The  pontiffs  attempted  it  clumsily 
by  a  system  of  intercalation,  adding  an  extra  month  in  alternate 
years.  Thus  in  a  cycle  of  four  years  they  could  make  the  average 
very  nearly  correct.  Unfortunately  the  inequality  of  years  affected 
business  and  politics..  Terms  of  office,  nominally  annual,  were 
lengthened  or  shortened.  Trials  in  court  were  hastened  or 
delayed  in  date,  and  contracts  ran  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period. 
The  pontiffs  were  tempted  to  use  their  power  irregularly,  inter- 
calating or  not  intercalating  to  suit  the  convenience  of  their 
friends.  Thus  the  official  year  was  now  in  utter  confusion,  for 
the  management  had  of  late  been  peculiarly  arbitrary.  Caesar 
resolved  to  put  an  end  to  this  scandal.  For  this  as  for  his  other 
reforms  he  employed  qualified  specialists,  of  whom  there  were 
plenty.  The  chief  was  the  Greek  astronomer  Sosigenes.  The 
official  year  was  to  be  the  same  for  calendar  and  magistracies, 
and  the  new  system  to  be  binding  as  from  the  Calends  (ist)  of 
January  in  the  following  year  (45).  By  adding  days  to  most  of 
the  present  months  a  year  of  365  days  was  made  up,  and  the 
addition  of  a  day  to  February  every  fourth  year  made  a  normal 
average  of  365J  days.     Thus   the   knowledge   long   current   in 


xLiii]  Acts  of  mercy  465 

Egypt  was  turned  to  account  in  Rome.  To  effect  the  transition 
from  the  old  system  to  the  new,  67  days  were  added  to  the 
calendar-year  46  B.C.  These  few  details  must  suffice  here.  By 
this  bold  introduction  of  order  in  place  of  disorder  Caesar  con- 
ferred a  boon  not  only  on  Rome  but  on  the  whole  civilized  world. 
In  carrying  it  out  great  care  was  taken  to  respect  old  scruples  as 
far  as  was  possible,  in  particular  to  avoid  disturbing  festivals  held 
on  traditional  dates. 

602.     While  Caesar  was  busy  in  Rome,  and  needing  for  his 
work  a  respite  from   unwelcome  war,   there  was  trouble  in  the 
West.     Labienus  and  Varus  had  escaped  from  Africa  to  Spain, 
where  they  joined  Pompey's  two  sons,  Gnaeus  and  Sextus.     They 
were  a  desperate  and  savage  crew,  and  they  soon  found  the  means 
of  raising  a  rebellion  in  the  Further  province,  which  had  not  fully 
recovered  from  the  misdeeds  of  Q.  Cassius.    The  troops  quartered 
there,  some  of  them  remnants  of  the  old  Pompeian  armies,  went 
over  to  the  rebels.     Caesar's  Heutenants  could  not  put  down  the 
rising.     While  the  preparations  were  being  made  for  a  campaign 
which  the  master  loathed  but  could  not  shirk,  there  were  matters 
to  be  settled  in  Rome.     Two  acts  of  grace  were  specially  notable. 
Among  the  numerous  republican  exiles  were  the  bitter  and  sulky 
M.  Marcellus,  Caesar's  old  adversary,  and  Q.  Ligarius,  one  of  the 
men  pardoned  in  Africa.     Both  were  interceded  for,  and  both 
allowed  to  return.     The  sequel  illustrates  the  temper  of  the  anti- 
Caesarian  nobles.     Marcellus  at  first  scorned  the  favour ;  when 
at  last  persuaded  to  return,  he  perished  on  the  way  home  in  a 
private  quarrel.     Ligarius  took  advantage  of  Caesar's  grace  only 
to  become  soon  after  one  of  his  murderers.     Both  these  cases 
were  the  occasions  of  speeches  by  Cicero,  who  had  for  some  time 
been  silent.     Another  affair,  the  subject  of  Roman  gossip,  was 
the  enrolment  of  Cleopatra  and  her  boy-husband  among  the  allies 
and  friends  of  the  Roman  people.     The    queen    had    come  to 
Rome,  and  was  lodged  in  Caesar's  garden-residence  beyond  the 
Tiber.     The   scandal   ran  that  Caesar   meant   to    marry  her,   a 
foreigner  and  a  queen,  and  to  rule  as  king  at  Alexandria.     And  it 
is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  Rome  the  imputation  of  regal 
ambition  was  the  traditional  preface  to  a  public  murder. 

603.  Before  quitting  the  capital  Caesar  provided  for  the 
government  in  his  absence.  He  would  be  dictator  for  the  third 
time  in  45,  and  he  meant  to  be  sole  consul  also.     His  Master  of 

H.  30 


466  Munda  [ch. 

Horse,  Lepidus,  held  the  election  for  this  purpose.  But,  while 
Lepidus  was  to  be  the  nominal  head  of  the  home  administration, 
the  duties  of  the  ordinary  magistrates  (praetors  etc.)  were  entrusted 
to  praefecti,  deputies  of  Caesar.  This  was  an  arbitrary  arrange- 
ment, of  course  not  popular.  Its  imperial  nature  was  manifest, 
all  the  more  as  the  real  power  lay  with  Caesar's  confidential 
agents  Balbus  and  Oppius,  who  watched  all  proceedings  on  their 
master's  behalf.  The  position  of  republicans  was  now  a  peculiar 
one.  No  respectable  patriot  could  wish  to  see  the  desperate  gang 
in  Spain  masters  of  the  Roman  world.  Yet  there  were  still  those 
who  would  gladly  be  rid  of  the  present  master,  and  so  far  wished 
well  to  the  rebels.  It  was  not  easy  for  malcontents  at  that  time 
to  discern  the  truth,  that  order  and  prosperity  depended  on  the 
control  of  the  one  strong  master. 

604.  Caesar  started  in  December  46  and  travelled  post-haste 
to  Spain.  He  had  to  meet  an  army  more  numerous  than  his 
own,  but  including  native  levies  and  liberated  slaves.  It  was  in 
fact  a  rebellion  rather  than  a  civil  war  with  which  he  had  to  deal. 
The  fortresses  in  the  South  and  West  were  held  by  the  enemy, 
and  supplies  were  scarce.  The  hardships  of  a  winter  campaign 
were  great,  and  the  barbarity  of  Cn.  Pompey  and  his  lawless 
troops  provoked  reprisals,  and  gave  a  savage  character  to  the  war. 
At  last  Caesar  was  able  to  bring  on  a  battle.  It  was  at  Munda, 
not  far  from  Corduba,  on  the  17th  March  45,  that  he  won  his 
last  victory.  Of  the.  Pompeian  leaders  only  Sextus  Pompey  got 
away  safe,  to  give  trouble  later.  The  rebellion  was  put  down, 
but  there  was  work  to  be  done  in  reconstructing  the  province,  in 
rewarding  and  punishing,  and  in  exacting  much-needed  money. 
To  some  communities  Caesar  granted  the  Roman  franchise.  He 
had  now  with  him  his  grand-nephew  C.  Octavius,  a  youth  of  less 
than  18  years,  whose  discretion  and  capacity  impressed  the 
dictator.  Caesar  returned  to  Italy  early  in  September,  but  did 
not  enter  the  city  for  about  a  month.  It  was  at  this  time  that  he 
made  his  will,  and  left  Octavius  his  heir.  But  this  decision  was 
a  secret  from  the  Roman  public,  whatever  certain  persons  may 
have  guessed. 

605.  To  devise  any  practical  extension  of  Caesar's  autocratic 
powers  was  no  longer  possible.  In  granting  him  the  entire  control 
of  the  state  treasury  and  the  monopoly  of  the  military  imperium, 
the  Senate  and  Assembly  were  recognizing  facts.      These  and 


xLiii]  Honours  regal  and  divine  467 

other  privileges  were  voted  him  as  a  result  of  the  news  of  Munda. 
Some  of  the  honorary  distinctions  are  to  us  more  interesting, 
from  two  points  of  view.  The  right  to  wear  the  all-crimson  gown 
on  public  occasions,  with  other  distinctions  of  dress,  traditionally 
regal,  suggested  the  revival  of  the  ancient  kingship.  The  right  to 
bear  the  title  imperator^  not  as  an  exceptional  military  honour, 
but  as  a  first  name  {praenomen)  to  descend  to  his  family,  suggested 
the  more  modern  type  of  military  monarch.  A  house  on  the 
Palatine,  to  be  built  with  a  pediment  or  gable,  provided  a  palace, 
and  by  its  temple-model  suggested  deification.  An  inscription 
on  the  base  of  a  statue  of  Caesar,  set  up  in  a  temple,  spoke  of 
him  as  a  god.  In  a  polytheistic  system  one  new  divinity  was  no 
great  matter ;  but  these,  with  other  ceremonial  honours,  suggested 
the  deification  of  kings  long  known  in  the  East.  We  are  told 
that  all  this  invidious  adulation  was  by  many  of  its  promoters 
deliberately  meant  to  create  odium  against  Caesar.  On  his 
return  he  accepted  nearly  everything  voted  him,  and  soon  after 
he  unwisely  affronted  public  sentiment  by  not  only  holding  a 
triumph  himself  but  allowing  two  of  his  lieutenants  to  do  the 
same.  Spain  was  a  Roman  possession,  and  these  triumphs  out- 
raged patriotic  feelings.  Caesar  was  in  short  more  than  ever  an 
isolated  autocrat,  whose  friends  were  dependants.  Cut  off  from 
the  advice  of  independent  judgments  freely  expressed,  he  could 
only  judge  for. himself  on  imperfect  information,  and  he  was  not 
infallible.  He  had  also  great  difficulty  in  dealing  with  claims  to 
preferment.  His  partisans  looked  for  their  reward.  But  he 
wanted  to  conciliate  the  pardoned  Pompeians  as  well.  Jealousy 
tended  to  breed  discontent,  and  discontent  to  turn  both  parties 
against  himself.  Such  was  the  unhappy  dilemma  created  by  a 
policy  of  mercy. 

606.  To  satisfy  some  claims,  Caesar  resigned  the  consulship, 
and  had  two  successors  elected  for  the  rest  of  the  year ;  and  by 
raising  the  number  of  praetors  to  14,  and  of  quaestors  to  40, 
further  openings  were  found.  But  to  unfriendly  critics  he 
seemed  to  be  treating  the  magistracies  with  levity.  He  watched 
the  provincial  governors  carefully,  and  made  various  arrangements 
for  the  following  year.  He  was  still  forgiving;  a  number  of 
political  exiles  were  pardoned  and  restored  to  their  civic  rights. 
But  his  health  was  not  what  it  had  been.  He  was  weary  and  at 
times  ill-tempered.     And  every  hasty  act  or  word  was  made  the 

30—2 


468  Projects  of  Caesar  [ch. 

most  of  by  malignant  gossip.  Thus  the  number  of  secret  mal- 
contents was  increased,  and  to  them  each  added  honour,  such  as 
the  title  of  Father  of  his  country,  was  but  an  added  provocation. 
Among  the  privileges  voted  him  was  one  which  in  some  form 
confirmed  and  extended  the  personal  inviolability  which  was 
already  a  part  of  his  tribunician  power.  In  view  of  what  was 
soon  to  happen,  this  solemn  guarantee  of  his  safety  deserves 
remark. 

607.  The  great  projects  attributed  to  Caesar  bear  the  stamp 
of  his  imperial  views.  His  plans  for  roads,  reclamation  of  marshes, 
harbour- works,  and  so  forth,  shew  his  designs  for  the  improvement 
of  Italy.  He  meant  also  to  make  Rome  a  capital  worthy  of  the 
empire.  He  had  already,  as  we  saw^  above,  done  something  in 
the  way  of  public  buildings,  and  no  compliment  now  pleased  him 
better  than  when  the  Senate  voted  the  construction  of  further 
works  under  his  direction,  of  course  destined  to  bear  his  name. 
A  grand  scheme  for  building  on  the  campus  Martius^  and  providing 
a  new  Campus  beyond  the  river,  must  have  implied  one  or  more 
new  bridges.  Some  of  these  works  were  begun,  and  finished  by 
Augustus,  others  had  to  wait  much  longer.  One  of  his  designs 
was  the  foundation  of  two  public  libraries,  Greek  and  Latin. 
Greatest  of  all  was  a  projected  Digest  of  the  law,  in  which  he 
would  have  employed  a  staff  of  skilled  jurists.  But  this,  and  the 
amendment  and  codification  to  follow,  were  stopped  by  his  death, 
and  were  not  seriously  taken  in  hand  for  more  than  550  years. 
Caesar  had  already  shewn  his  readiness  to  extend  the  Roman 
franchise  beyond  the  bounds  of  Italy,  and  this  policy  he  probably 
meant  to  continue.  He  had  plans  for  a  general  census,  and  a 
survey  of  the  empire :  also  for  planting  colonies  of  Roman  citizens 
abroad,  to  promote  the  Romanizing  of  the  provinces.  With  this 
last  scheme  a  good  beginning  was  made  before  his  death.  All 
tends  to  shew  that  he  contemplated  a  grand  reorganization  of  the 
empire.  Indeed  it  was  urgently  needed,  for  its  vast  area  could 
only  be  effectively  governed  and  defended  by  a  better  organization 
of  its  powers  than  was  any  longer  possible  under  the  chaotic 
arrangements  of  the  Republic. 

608.  But  this  great  undertaking  was  only  possible  under 
conditions  of  public  security  and  peace.  Foreign  policy  therefore 
demanded  his  attention,  and  on  the  north-eastern   and  eastern 

^  §§  564.  565- 


xLiii]  Preparations  for  eastern  war  469 

frontiers  there  were  signs  of  trouble.  The  Macedonian  province 
had  long  suffered  from  the  inroads  of  barbarians  from  beyond  the 
Danube,  and  a  recent  union  of  these  rude  peoples,  Getae  or  Daci, 
under  a  vigorous  prince  had  made  them  more  dangerous  neigh- 
bours than  ever.  For  the  present  the  anxiety  in  this  quarter  was 
relieved.  The  Getic  king  Burebistas  died,  the  kingdom  broke 
up,  and  the  territories  of  Rome  and  her  Thracian  allies  were  no 
longer  in  serious  peril.  On  the  side  of  Parthia  things  looked 
badly.  Since  the  disaster  of  Carrhae  the  Parthians  had  been 
restless,  and  they  were  just  now  tempted  to  invade  Syria.  A 
Pompeian  officer  had  raised  a  mutiny  among  the  troops  quartered 
there,  and  had  destroyed  the  governor  left  there  by  Caesar  in  the 
year  47.  Now  that  Caesar  was  supreme,  this  man  was  a  rebel; 
and,  to  hold  his  ground,  he  invited  the  aid  of  an  Arabian  prince 
and  also  of  the  Parthian  king.  Forces  already  sent  to  recover  the 
province  had  failed,  and  Caesar's  presence  was  really  needed. 
The  duty  of  avenging  Crassus  was  put  forward  to  justify  the  enter- 
prise. Vast  preparations  were  made  for  effecting  a  thorough 
settlement  of  the  eastern  question.  An  army  was  raised  and  sent 
over  to  Macedonia  for  training,  and  young  Octavius  placed  in 
touch  with  it  as  a  student  at  Apollonia.  Meanwhile  it  was 
rumoured  that  a  passage  in  the  so-called  Sibylline  books  affirmed 
that  a  king  was  needed  to  conquer  the  Parthians.  This  was  of 
course  taken  as  a  proof  that  Caesar  meant  to  be  king  of  Rome. 

609.  Before  setting  out  for  the  East,  Caesar  took  precautions 
to  hinder  malcontent  senators  from  making  mischief  during  what 
was  likely  to  be  his  long  absence.  He  had  already  put  some  new 
members  into  the  House,  and  now  he  made  a  thorough  revision  of 
the  roll.  He  struck  off  some  unworthy  members,  and  added 
many  new  ones,  disregarding  old  prejudices.  Soldiers,  sons  of 
freedmen,  even  enfranchised  Gauls,  were  included,  and  the  total 
(it  is  said)  raised  to  900.  Roman  gossip  sneered  at  this  levelling 
policy.  He  also  had  a  law  passed  to  authorize  a  fresh  creation 
of  Patricians.  The  genuine  Patricians  were  now  very  few,  and 
there  were  still  purposes  for  which  they  were  formally  required. 
The  chief  pontiff  then  carried  out  the  law.  Among  the  new 
Patricians  was  young  Octavius ;  according  to  one  tradition, 
Cicero  was  another. 

610.  Among  the  cases  heard  by  Caesar  (for  he   assumed 
judicial  functions)  was  one   of  some  note.     It  was  that  of  the 


470  Last  stage  of  Caesar's  rule  [ch. 

Galatian  king  Deiotarus,  who  was  tried  in  absence,  on  an  old 
charge  of  plotting  against  Caesar.  Caesar  wanted  a  pretext  for 
deposing  him.  It  seems  that  all  Cicero's  eloquence  could  only 
avail  to  get  sentence  deferred.  The  affair  was  a  mark  of  the  dictator's 
arbitrary  power.  Even  when  he  dined  with  the  favoured  Cicero, 
he  avoided  talking  of  politics,  to  the  disgust  of  his  host,  who 
was  bursting  with  good  advice,  and  galled  to  feel  himself  of  no 
importance.  The  elections  for  44  were  interesting,  as  an  indica- 
tion of  Caesar's  policy.  Antony  had  of  late  been  out  of  favour. 
He  was  forgiven  his  offence,  and  Caesar,  in  taking  a  fifth  consul- 
ship, took  him  as  his  colleague.  To  provide  more  posts  of 
honour,  the  number  of  praetors  was  raised  to  16  and  that  of 
aediles  to  6,  and  the  same  course  was  followed  with  some  minor 
offices.  Among  the  praetors  were  two  pardoned  republicans, 
M.  Brutus  and  C.  Cassius.  Caesar  himself  was  to  be  for  the 
fourth  time  dictator.  Early  in  44  he  exchanged  the  yearly  tenure 
for  a  life-tenure.  Meanwhile  Octavius,  now  18,  was  pushed  to 
the  front.  He  was  already  a  pontiff,  and  it  was  now  arranged 
that,  when  Caesar  went  to  the  East,  he  should  succeed  Lepidus 
as  Master  of  Horse  and  act  as  his  great-uncle's  representative. 
Clearly  Caesar  meant  to  found  a  dynasty  in  the  person  of  this 
youth. 

611.  We  now  come  to  the  last  stage  of  Caesar's  life,  when 
those  who  desired  to  make  an  end  of  him  must  either  act  quickly 
or  miss  their  chance.  A  last  batch  of  honours,  the  invention  of 
ingenious  servility  or  malignity,  opened  the  new  year  44,  and  laid 
further  stress  on  his  position,  regal  and  divine.  It  was  now  that 
the  name  of  the  month  Qu'mtilis  was  changed  to  lulius  by  decree 
of  the  Senate.  But  in  truth  the  relations  between  the  serious  and 
over-busy  autocrat  and  the  solemn  but  grovelling  Senate  were 
more  strained  than  ever.  He  could  not  always  interrupt  business 
to  receive  them  as  politely  as  they  expected.  And  he  was  induced 
to  dismiss  his  bodyguard.  Indeed,  if  votes  and  oaths  meant 
anything,  he  was  safe  enough,  at  least  from  senators.  But  there 
was  by  this  time  a  conspiracy  on  foot,  and  no  pains  were  spared 
to  make  the  common  people  regard  him  as  a  tyrant  prepared  to 
assume  even  the  hated  title  of  King.  He  was  soon  involved  in  a 
quarrel  with  two  tribunes,  who  had  intervened  to  stop  demonstra- 
tions in  favour  of  his  regal  power.  They  alleged  that  such 
suggestions  were  contrary  to  Caesar's  own  wish :  but  Caesar  would 


xLiii]  The  Ides  of  March  471 

have  preferred  to  repudiate  them  himself,  and  was  annoyed.  He 
arranged  to  have  these  tribunes  deposed,  and  the  transition  from 
indulgence  to  severity  was  unpopular.  So  bit  by  bit  he  was 
driven  into  a  false  position.  On  the  15th  February  occurred  the 
famous  scene  at  the  festival  of  the  Lupercalia,  when  Antony 
repeatedly  offered  him  a  crown,  and  the  crowd  cheered  when  he 
refused  it.  Of  course  his  refusal,  rightly  or  not,  was  represented 
as  insincere. 

612.  The  prime  mover  of  the  plot  against  Caesar's  life  was 
C.  Cassius,  the  man  who  had  saved  Syria  after  the  disaster  of 
Carrhae,  and  had  been  pardoned  by  Caesar  for  his  share  in  the 
civil  war.  He  was  a  bitterly  jealous  man,  whom  no  favours  could 
reconcile.  The  actual  conspiracy  began  when  M.  Brutus  was 
induced  to  become  its  respectable  figure-head.  He  too  owed  his 
life  and  his  promotion  to  Caesar.  He  was  a  solemn  and  pedantic 
being,  and  professed  philosophic  principles.  As  a  Roman,  he 
was  one  of  the  greediest  of  usurers  ;  as  a  student,  he  was  familiar 
with  Greek  views  of  '  liberty  '  and  the  duty  of  tyrannicide.  Above 
all,  he  was  immensely  vain ;  and  the  appeal  to  his  vanity  drew 
him  to  bear  a  leading  part  in  the  treacherous  murder  of  his 
benefactor.  Among  the  conspirators,  more  than  60  in  all,  were 
Caesarians  such  as  D.  Brutus,  a  man  enjoying  Caesar's  peculiar 
favour,  and  ex-Pompeians,  such  as  Ligarius.  The  dictator  had 
already  disregarded  rumours  of  mischief  on  foot,  and  he  did  so 
still.  At  last  a  day  was  fixed  for  the  deed.  On  the  Ides  (15th) 
of  March  the  Senate  was  to  vote  on  a  proposal  to  grant  Caesar 
the  formal  title  of  King  for  the  purpose  of  the  Parthian  war. 
It  was  agreed  that,  as  senators,  here  was  their  chance.  No 
warnings  availed  to  deter  Caesar  from  coming  to  that  meeting. 
Even  a  written  information  he  laid  aside  unread.  The  assassins 
surrounded  him  and  slew  him.  On  his  body  23  wounds  inflicted 
by  their  daggers  were  afterwards  counted.  The  senators  who 
were  not  partners  in  the  plot  at  once  fled.  It  remained  to  be 
discovered  whether  the  death  of  the  '  tyrant '  meant  the  ending 
of  the  tyranny. 

613.  It  was  in  Caesar  that  the  great  confused  movement, 
which  we  call  the  Roman  Revolution,  reached  a  logical  result. 
Reformers  and  agitators  had  failed.  They  had  weakened  the 
aristocrats,  whose  corrupt  and  inefficient  government  was  making 
a  republican  system  impossible,  but  had  not  overthrown  them. 


472  Caesar's  career  '^  [ch. 

On  the  other  hand,  Sulla's  reaction  had  also  failed,  and  no  one 
had  done  more  to  undermine  the  institutions  of  the  Republic 
than  Pompey.  The  career  of  Caesar  is  remarkable  for  its 
consistency.  He  was  first  and  foremost  a  politician,  and  from 
first  to  last  he  was  opposed  to  the  republican  nobles,  who  were 
exploiting  the  empire  of  Rome  for  their  own  profit  and  glory. 
Experience  had  shewn  that  reform  could  only  be  achieved,  and 
efficiency  restored,  through  the  continuous  possession  of  power, 
and  that  the  necessary  power  could  only  be  attained  by  the 
pressure,  and  at  need  the  use,  of  military  force.  Otherwise  there 
was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  acquiesce  in  things  as  they  were. 
This  Caesar  would  not  do :  therefore  he  sought  in  political  life 
enough  power  to  overcome  opposition.  For  a  time  the  coalition 
with  Pompey  and  Crassus  served  his  turn.  When  it  came  to  an 
end,  and  his  enemies  were  seeking  to  destroy  him,  he  had  to 
prepare  for  destroying  them,  in  case  they  would  not  give  way. 
He  had  to  lay  aside  the  demagogue  for  the  soldier.  Whatever 
may  or  may  not  have  been  the  scope  of  his  personal  ambition,  he 
had  now  no  choice  but  either  to  become  a  hunted  exile  or  to  win 
supremacy  with  the  sword. 

614.  We  shall  see  that  Caesar  overthrew  the  aristocracy  so 
thoroughly  that  it  was  impossible  to  restore  the  government  on 
the  old  footing.  He  might  spare  the  vanquished,  and  then  fall 
by  their  daggers ;  they  could  not  really  revive  the  Republic. 
Granting  his  many  signal  merits,  Roman  opinion  tended  on  the 
whole  to  justify  his  murder,  as  guilty  of  treason  to  his  country. 
But  this  view  we  can  hardly  accept  now.  A  later  generation 
might  idealize  the  republican  system,  and  ignore  the  corruption 
and  iniquities  that  made  it  utterly  intolerable  in  Caesar's  time. 
It  might  represent  him  as  the  sole  author  of  its  overthrow.  We 
can  see  that  he  merely  gave  effect  to  causes  long  at  work.  We 
have  seen  economic  changes  undermining  the  whole  fabric  of 
society,  and  the  decay  of  the  moral  forces  which  had  of  old  been 
the  very  life-blood  of  the  state.  Greek  influences  had  destroyed 
the  old-fashioned  simplicity  and  obedience  in  most  of  the  upper 
classes :  the  intellectual  gain  was  the  property  of  few,  of  none 
more  than  Caesar.  He  had  caught  the  inquiring  and  critical 
attitude  of  Greek  thinkers  with  great  thoroughness,  and  no 
man  was  better  able  to  detect  shams.  It  was  surely  in  part  his 
contempt  for  shams  that  prevented  his  becoming    not  only  the 


xLiii]  ""  and  character  473 

founder,  but  the  builder,  of  the  Empire.  The  sequel  of  his  death 
shewed  clearly  that  he  had  underrated  the  practical  obstacles  to 
the  establishment  of  a  lasting  monarchy.  After  the  long  and 
bloody  agonies  were  over,  and  his  grand-nephew  was  left  supreme, 
it  was  necessary  to  return  to  the  old  ways  of  sham  and  make- 
believe  before  the  New  Monarchy  could  be  secure. 

615.  Our  record  depicts  Caesar  as  tall  wiry  and  handsome, 
in  fact  as  looking  what  he  was,  r  Patrician  descended  from  the 
old  nobility  of  birth.  Even  his  enemies  confessed  his  charm  of 
manner.  Soldiers  and  women  alike  worshipped  him.  In  an  age 
of  excess  he  was  temperate.  In  a  polished  society  he  was  a 
prince  of  politeness.  In  literary  company  no  man  was  more 
at  home,  and  his  whole  career  shews  that  he  was  well  able  to 
hold  his  own  with  specialists  of  many  kinds.  But  no  characteristic 
is  more  clearly  marked  in  him  than  his  calmness  of  nerve  and 
freedom  from  vanity.  He  seems  to  have  had  no  fear  of  death. 
He  certainly  took  no  pains  to  avoid  it.  Of  his  own  loyalty  and 
honour  he  gave  frequent  proofs,  and  from  his  own  point  of  view 
he  was  surely  a  true  patriot.  But,  when  once  resolved  on  any 
course  of  action,  he  knew  few  scruples,  and  went  straight  to  his 
end.  Take  him  for  all  in  all,  he  was  indeed  one  of  the  greatest 
men  known  to  us  in  the  history  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER   XLIV 

FAILURE   OF   THE   ATTEMPT   TO    RESTORE 
THE   REPUBLIC.     44—42   B.C. 

616.  It  is  impossible  to  give  here  more  than  a  very  brief 
sketch  of  the,  events  by  which  it  was  made  clear  {a)  that  the 
Roman  Republic  was  not  really  aHve,  and  (3)  that  there  was  no 
power  able  to  revive  it.  These  two  points  are  the  subject  of  the 
present,  chapter.  The  later  struggle,  in  which  it  was  decided  who 
was  to  be  master  of  the  Roman  world,  does  not  come  within  the 
scope  of  this  book.  We  may  begin  by  stating  the  main  topics 
on  which  our  attention  will  have  to  be  fixed.     They  are 

(i)  the  rise  and  predominance  of  Antony, 

(2)  the  return  and  progress  of  Octavian, 

(3)  the  relations  between  Antony  Octavian  and  Cicero, 

(4)  the  collapse  of  Cicero's  policy,  and  the  formation  of  the 

Triumvirate,  and 

(5)  the  doings  of  the  Triumvirs. 

Our  record  of  these  years  comes,  directly  or  indirectly,  from 
violently  partisan  authorities.  To  ascertain  the  truth  is  therefore 
a  matter  of  the  greatest  difficulty. 

617.  While  the  conspirators,  having  no  plans  for  further 
action  and  finding  no  spontaneous  support,  occupied  the  Capitol, 
the  consul  Antony  was  not  idle.  He  could  rely  on  a  number 
of  discharged  veterans,  and  he  joined  forces  with  Lepidus,  who 
had  a  legion  at  hand.  Caesar's  widow  gave  up  to  him  all  the 
memoranda  and  the  cash  left  by  the  dictator.  On  the  17  th  March 
the  Senate  met.  Many  were  interested  in  the  maintenance  of 
Caesar's  arrangements,  but  most  were  in  favour  of  the  murderers. 
The  result  was  a  compromise.     A  general  amnesty  was  decreed, 


CH.  xLiv]  The  sequel  of  the  murder  475 

but  the  acts  of  the  dictator  were  declared  valid.  Thus  Antony, 
who  held  Caesar's  note-books,  was  left  in  a  position  of  vantage. 
It  was  also  agreed  that  the  will  of  the  deceased  should  be  read 
in  public,  and  that  he  should  have  a  public  funeral.  No  steps 
were  taken  to  punish  the  murderers.  These  inconsequent  pro- 
ceedings stultified  the  policy  of  assassination.  Caesar,  it  appeared, 
was  after  all  no  'tyrant.'  Antony  made  sure  of  Lepidus  by 
promising  him  the  vacant  chief  pontificate.  Dolabella,  who  was 
to  have  succeeded  to  the  consulship  when  Caesar  departed  for 
the  East,  and  had  been  hindered  by  Antony,  was  now  conciliated 
by  the  withdrawal  of  opposition.  Thus  a  strong  anti-republican 
combination  was  formed. 

618.     Soldiers  and  mob  were  uneasy  at  the  removal  of  Caesar, 
and  the  reading  of  his  will  only  excited  them  more.      He  had 
left  his  pleasure-gardens  as  a  public  park,  and  a  gift  of  money 
(about  ;£2i)  to  every  citizen.    By  the  will  C.  Octavius  was  adopted 
as  his  son,  and  made  his  chief  heir.     Among  others  mentioned 
was  D.  Brutus.     The  trust  shewn  in  this  man,  and  others  of  the 
murderers,   roused    popular   indignation.      Antony   in   a   funeral 
speech  inflamed  the  rage  of  the  multitude.     The  body  was  burnt 
in  the  Forum,  and  great  riots  followed.     The  m.urderers  fled  for 
their  lives,  and  the  republican  majority  in  the  Senate  were  left 
in  a  difficult  position.     They  had  lost  their  more  resolute  leaders, 
and  could  do  little  to  check  the  proceedings  of  Antony.    Antony's 
policy  was  to  defer  the  coming  struggle.     He  pleased  the  Senate 
by  proposing  the  perpetual  abolition  of  the  dictatorship,  by  sup- 
pressing disorders  in  the  city,  and  other  measures.    But  meanwhile 
he  was  preparing  to  make  profit  out  of  Caesar's  papers.     He  is 
said   to  have  forged   additional   documents.      Thus   he   had   at 
disposal  a  vast  number  of  grants  of  privileges  and  immunities, 
for    which    he   could   exact  bribes    and    so    strengthen    himself 
financially.     He  also  seized  a  large  sum  of  public  money  stored 
in   a   temple.     Dolabella   had   a   share,  and    the   two   acted   in 
harmony.    Recent  disturbances  gave  Antony  an  excuse  for  raising 
a  military  bodyguard.     But  in  April  young  Octavius  arrived  in 
Italy,  bent  upon  taking  up  his  inheritance  at  all  risks.     From  this 
boy  (as  they  thought  him)  men  feared  and  expected  little   or 
nothing.      Even   Cicero    had   no  suspicion    that    the    cool   and 
subtle  youth  was  more  than  a  match  for  an  old  and  experienced 
consular. 


476  Octavius  appears  in  Rome  [ch. 

619.  Cicero  had  left  Rome,  already  disgusted  with  the  turn 
of  events.  The  death  of  the  '  tyrant '  had  not  restored  the 
RepubHc.  The  Senate  had  blundered.  The  '  heroes  '  (Brutus 
and  Cassius)  were  helpless.  Though  praetors,  they  dared  not 
appear  in  Rome.  Caesar's  acts  were  valid,  for  instance  the 
appointment  of  D.  Brutus^  to  Cisalpine  Gaul,  of  which  province 
he  had  gone  to  take  possession.  There  was  still  trouble  in  Syria, 
and  Sextus  Pompey  had  not  only  a  strong  fleet  but  was  now 
master  of  the  Further  Spain.  So  alarming  was  the  progress  of 
Sextus  that  Antony  sent  Lepidus  to  pacify  him  by  great  con- 
cessions. The  armies  abroad  were  commanded  by  nominees  of 
Caesar.  In  the  event  of  war  all  depended  on  their  attitude; 
and  war  was  in  prospect,  for  Antony  did  not  mean  to  leave 
D.  Brutus  in  the  Cisalpine.  The  veterans  in  Italy  could  not 
be  neglected,  and  Antony  tried  to  meet  their  wishes  by  planting 
a  colony  in  Campania.  But  he  soon  had  to  return.  Octavius 
had  reached  Rome  at  the  end  of  April,  and  was  making  way 
fast.  He  accepted  Caesar's  liabilities  and  claimed  his  inheritance. 
Finding  that  he  could  not  recover  what  Antony  had  already  spent, 
he  sold  his  own  properties  and  raised  loans.  Then  he  made  a 
start  with  payment  of  legacies.  By  this  and  other  instances  of 
discretion  he  inspired  T:onfidence  and  gained  popularity.  In 
short,  he  was  already  a  dangerous  rival  to  the  careless  Antony, 
whose  generosity  to  dissipated  associates  was  apt  to  be  a  mere 
waste  of  resources.  There  was  much  friction  produced  by  the 
quarrel  over  Caesar's  estate.  Meanwhile  Octavius  was  commonly 
recognized  as  Caesar  (C.  Julius  Caesar  Octavianus),  though  his 
formal  adoption  was  not  completed  till  August  of  the  following 
year. 

620.  Antony  now  wanted  to  get  the  provincial  appointments 
made  for  the  year  43.  Caesar  had  meant  Macedonia  for  him  and 
Syria  for  Dolabella.  But  Antony  wanted  to  have  both  Gauls. 
He  also  wanted  a  tenure  of  more  than  the  two  years  allowed 
to  ex-consuls  by  Caesar's  recent  law.  He  doubted  the  com- 
pliance of  the  Senate,  and  turned  to  the  Assembly,  which  he 
was  able  to  overawe.  On  the  ist  June  the  two  Gauls  were 
granted  to  him,  and  Syria  to  Dolabella,  for  six  years  each;  he 
was  probably  also  given  the  command  of  Caesar's  legions  now 
in  Macedonia.  He  was  in  a  very  strong  position.  But  his  main 
strength  lay  in  the  support  of  the  veterans  in  Italy,  and  it  was 


xLiv]  Antony  in  power  477 

most  important  to  keep  his  hold  on  them.  No  serious  republican 
movement  was  on  foot.  Cicero  was  seeking  an  excuse  to  go 
abroad.  The  two  *  heroes '  claimed  credit  for  their  peaceful 
behaviour,  but  the  truth  was  they  had  no  means  of  resisting 
Antony.  Brutus  did  not  even  dare  to  shew  himself  in  July  at 
the  games  of  Apollo,  which  he  was  bound  to  conduct  as  city- 
praetor.  His  outlay  was  to  no  purpose :  Antony's  brother 
C.  Antonius  presided  in  his  stead.  Antony  had  already  contrived 
to  have  unimportant  provinces  assigned  them  for  the  year  43. 
Meanwhile  they  were  offered  the  duty  of  procuring  corn,  Brutus 
in  Asia,  Cassius  in  Sicily.  They  were  very  angry,  but  in  the  end 
they  had  to  use  the  commission  as  a  way  of  escape  to  the  East. 
There  was  in  fact  nothing  to  be  done  in  Italy  or  in  the  West. 
In  the  struggle  now  imminent  the  two  '  heroes '  bore  no  part. 
Cicero,  who  was  in  Italy  till  the  middle  of  July,  sought  some 
relief  from  the  worries  of  the  time  in  literary  work.  But  he  had 
not  yet  broken  with"  Antony  and  Dolabella :  indeed  he  did  not 
scruple  to  accept  favours  from  them,  though  he  deeply  regretted 
that  Antony  had  not  shared  the  fate  of  Caesar  on  the  Ides  of 
March. 

621.  There  were  the  faint  beginnings  of  a  hope  that  young 
Octavian  might  take  up  the  republican  cause  in  order  to  get 
the  better  of  Antony.  At  present  nothing  came  of  it.  In  the 
summer  there  was  a  kind  of  lull.  The  manifold  affairs  of  private 
life  went  on.  Antony  was  busy  exploiting  the  'acts  of  Caesar' 
to  his  own  profit.  Brutus  was  vainly  dreaming  of  regaining 
popular  favour  and  returning  to  Rome.  His  folly  and  narrow- 
minded  bitterness  moved  the  contempt  of  Cicero,  who  sailed 
for  Greece  on  the  17  th  July.  The  voyage  was  stopped  by  foul 
winds.  News  of  a  rally  of  republicans,  and  of  a  great  meeting 
of  the  Senate  to  be  held  on  the  first  of  September,  drew  Cicero 
back  to  Tusculum.  In  Rome  the  shadow  of  the  coming  conflict 
was  disturbing  the  money-market,  and  there  was  much  uneasiness. 
To  this  we  shall  presently  return.  Meanwhile  Antony  and  his 
two  brothers,  Gaius  and  Lucius,  were  in  power.  The  Senate 
could  not  check  his  proceedings.  But  Octavian  still  firmly 
pressed  his  claims  as  Caesar's  heir,  and  the  name  of  Caesar 
was  popular  with  the  veterans.  For  his  designs,  Antony  wanted 
more  troops,  so  he  sent  for  the  four  legions  from  Macedonia. 
To  strengthen  himself  in  Rome,  he  embarked  on  various  projects, 


47^  Antony,   Cicero,  [ch. 

in  most  cases  with  little  or  no  result.  Two  laws  were  notable  as 
being  contrary  to  Caesar's  legislation.  One  restored  the  third 
panel  idecuria)  of  juries,  and  made  it  consist  of  centurions ;  a 
shameless  introduction  of  the  military  into  the  public  courts. 
The  other  allowed  persons  condemned  by  juries  to  appeal  to  the 
Assembly;  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  principle'  on  which  the 
authority  of  the  jury-courts  rested.  Whatever  little  good  the 
quaestiones  might  be  able  to  do,  would  be  annulled  by  this  mad 
resumption  of  a  solemnly  delegated  power. 

622.  On  the  31st  August  Cicero  entered  Rome,  and  on  the 
first  of  September  the  struggle  with  Antony  began,  famous  in 
literary  history  as  the  occasion  of  the  series  of  speeches  to  which 
the  name  'Philippics'  is  given,  borrowed  from  that  of  the  speeches 
in  which  Demosthenes  assailed  Philip  of  Macedon.  On  that 
day  Cicero  did  not  appear.  In  proposing  further  honours  to 
the  deified  Caesar,  Antony  uttered  a  sharp  warning,  that  Cicero 
would  not  be  allowed  to  hold  back.  In  short,  the  old  statesman 
must  shew  his  colours.  Next  day  the  Senate  met  again,  and 
Cicero  criticized  the  absent  Antony.  But  his  efforts  to  avoid 
abuse  could  not  hide  the  fact  that  the  two  were  irreconcileably 
opposed.  He  contrasted  Antony's  earlier  acts  with  his  later  ones, 
his  misuse  of  Caesar^  note-books,  his  arbitrary  destruction 
of  the  public  courts.  It  was  quite  impossible  for  Antony  to  put 
up  with  such  an  attack.  On  the  19th  he  replied  by  a  scathing 
denunciation  of  Cicero,  exposing  all  the  inconsistencies  and  errors 
of  the  orator's  public  career.  Cicero  feared  assassination,  but 
remained  for  the  present  in  Rome,  corresponding  with  some  of 
the  governors  in  command  of  armies  abroad,  and  trying  hard  to 
induce  them  to  lend  their  support  to  the  Republic.  He  hoped 
to  make  it  once  more  a  reality,  and  without  the  aid  of  the 
commanders  of  troops  he  did  not  see  his  way. 

623.  At  the  end  of  September  Brutus  started  for  the  East, 
and  Cassius  soon  after.  Till  they  made  head,  the  only  hope  of 
the  remaining  republicans  lay  in  the  chance  of  a  breach  between 
Antony  and  Octavian.  Rumours  abounded :  the  truth  was  that 
Octavian,  dissembling  more  cleverly  than  Antony  the  intention 
to  punish  Caesar's  murderers,  allayed  the  fears  of  many,  and 
gained  favour.  Meanwhile  he  was  tampering  with  Antony's 
veteran   bodyguard :    in   short,   the  young   Caesar,   and   Caesar's 

1  See  §§  290,  442. 


xLiv]  and  Octavian  479 

great  marshal,  were  rivals.  In  October  Antony  went  to  meet 
his  four  legions  at  Brundisium.  Octavian  responded  by  raising 
troops  in  Campania.  Money  was  the  chief  thing  needed  for  the 
purpose,  and  it  is  evident  that  he  received  financial  support.  He 
not  only  raised  large  numbers  of  men,  but  sapped  the  loyalty 
of  Antony's  troops,  by  his  liberal  largesses,  far  greater  than  those 
his  rival  was  offering.  On  their  way  northwards,  two  of  the  four 
legions  openly  declared  for  Octavian.  When  the  leaders  met 
in  Rome,  there  was  no  fighting.  Octavian  formed  a  depot  in 
Etruria,  where  his  men,  young  soldiers  and  veterans,  were 
embodied  and  trained.  He  meant  to  make  use  of  the  Senate, 
and  professed  a  wish  to  cooperate  with  that  body.  It  was  now 
November.  Cicero,  who  was  in  the  country,  mistrusted  his 
intentions,  and  was  not  yet  prepared  to  come  and  lead  the 
House  on  the  lines  of  a  joint  policy.  Antony,  who  was  in  a 
hurry  to  eject  D.  Brutus  from  the  Cisalpine  before  the  opposition 
became  serious,  and  who  had  still  difficulty  in  satisfying  the 
demands  of  greedy  soldiery,  left  Rome  for  the  North  about  the 
end  of  the  month.  The  republicans  could  now  take  action, 
provided  they  found  an  armed  force  at  their  disposal. 

624.  Now  Octavian  had  a  force,  and  was  willing  to  appear 
as  defender  of  Rome  by  coalescing  with  the  Senate.  And  the 
Senate  was  willing  to  use  Caesar's  heir  against  Antony.  Cicero 
had  just  put  the  last  touches  to  his  Second  Philippic,  a  written 
reply  to  Antony's  attack  on  him.  But  this  most  famous  of 
Roman  pamphlets  could  do  little  more  than  provoke  applause. 
The  question  of  the  moment  was  the  policy  of  combination  with 
Octavian.  Cicero  and  the  rest  saw  no  other  course  open,  and 
evidently  had  no  notion  that  the  'boy'  was  coolly  using  them 
for  his  own  purposes.  The  republicans  had  meant  to  employ 
a  tool :  they  had  really  accepted  a  master.  So  December  went 
by ;  Cicero  busily  writing  to  confirm  the  loyalty  of  provincial 
governors,  such  as  L.  Munatius  Plancus  in  the  Further  Gaul, 
and  urging  D.  Brutus  to  stand  firm  in  the  Cisalpine.  As  to  the 
feeling  of  Italy  he  was  under  delusions.  There  was  no  real 
republican  enthusiasm  among  the  mass  of  the  free  population, 
and  the  wealthier  burghers  of  the  country  towns  were  of  small 
importance  in  a  time  of  war.  On  the  20th  December  Cicero 
openly  took  the  lead  of  policy  in  the  Senate.  He  carried 
resolutions  in  which  a  state  of  war  was  recognized  and  opposition 


480  The  situation,   East  and  West  [ch. 

to  Antony  provided  for,  with  a  vote  of  thanks  to  Octavian  and 
the  two  legions  that  had  gone  over  to  him.  In  short,  Antony 
was  defied,  Cicero  had  (as  he  says)  'laid  the  foundations  of  a 
Republic/  and  was  at  last  to  all  appearance  the  first  man  in 
Rome.  But  all  this  was  hollow ;  it  meant  no  real  strength.  It 
was  not  for  the  patriot  orator  to  confess  that  the  Republic  was 
virtually  dead,  and  to  sit  down  tamely  without  a  struggle.  His 
effort  was  splendid  but  futile.  Even  the  Senate  only  followed 
him  timidly,  and  there  was  a  Caesarian  minority.  The  one  gainer 
by  his  policy  was  Octavian. 

625.  Meanwhile  Antony  had  driven  back  D.  Brutus  and 
shut  him  up  in  the  fortress  of  Mutina.  With  the  new  year 
A.  Hirtius  and  C.  Vibius  Pansa  became  consuls.  From  the  first 
to  the  4th  January  43  a  debate  went  on  in  the  Senate.  Cicero 
fought  hard  for  a  forward  policy,  encouraging  D.  Brutus  and 
preparing  for  his  relief,  praising  the  young  Caesar  as  their  loyal 
champion  and  granting  him  the  imperium  of  a  propraetor  to 
legalize  his  command  of  state  troops.  But  the  House  was 
nervous  and  in  the  end  it  was  agreed  to  send  an  embassy  to 
warn  Antony  out  of  the  Cisalpine  on  threat  of  war.  Antony 
replied  by  contemptuous  proposals,  not  meant  to  be  accepted, 
and  early  in  February  it  was  at  last  voted  that  a  state  of  war  in 
Italy  {tumultus)  existed.  Cicero  tried  to  rouse  the  Senate  to 
prompt  and  decided  action,  but  they  were  not  easy  to  move. 
Nor  was  there  much  sign  of  help  from  provincial  governors.  No 
one  was  inclined  to  run  great  risks  for  the  cause  of  the  Republic. 
Plancus  in  Further  Gaul  would  not  cross  the  Alps  to  rescue 
D.  Brutus.  He  was  waiting  to  see  what  was  most  to  his  own 
interest.  Lepidus,  who  held  the  Hither  Spain  and  Narbonese 
Gaul,  had  been  in  league  with  Antony  after  Caesar's  death,  and 
was  suspected  of  leaning  towards  him  still.  Others  were  either 
isolated  or  doubtful.  And  so  the  West  was  waiting.  In  the  East 
Brutus  and  Cassius  were  making  great  progress.  The  governors 
in  general  were  not  disposed  to  become  Antony's  men.  Caesar 
was  dead,  and  Octavian's  position  not  clearly  defined  or  under- 
stood. The  governors  were  senators,  and  the  real  wishes  of  the 
Senate  were  represented  by  Brutus  and  Cassius.  The  two  had 
as  yet  no  formal  commission  to  raise  troops  and  occupy  provinces 
in  the  name  of  the  Republic.  But,  in  default  of  an  autocratic 
master,  the  moral  support  of  the  Senate  was  just  now  of  value, 


xLiv]  Mutlna  4^1 

and  it  soon  appeared  that  some  of  the  men  in  command  were 
loth  to  oppose  the  republicans.  Brutus  was  to  secure  Macedonia, 
which  he  did  with  surprising  ease.  In  a  short  time  he  held  the 
whole  Balkan  peninsula  with  a  strong  army.  The  forces  stationed 
there  had  joined  him,  and  he  raised  more.  Cassius  had  equal 
good  fortune  in  Syria.  Early  in  May  43  he  had  11  or  12  legions. 
A  strong  fleet  was  being  got  together,  and  vast  sums  of  money 
wrung  from  the  peoples  of  the  East.  The  province  of  Macedonia 
had  been  assigned  to  C.  Antonius,  and  Syria  to  Dolabella.  But 
the  republicans  treated  these  appointments  as  null,  and  ignored 
the  minor  provinces  (?  Crete  and  Cyrene)  assigned  to  themselves. 

626.  Meanwhile  Cicero  was  facing  the  Caesarians  in  the 
Senate.  He  carried  a  motion  for  appointing  Brutus  to  a  general 
command  in  Macedonia  and  the  adjoining  countries,  and  hoped 
to  find  in  his  army  a  support  against  Antony  in  Italy.  He  seems 
to  have  been  blind  to  the  fact  that  Octavian  was  playing  his  own 
game,  and  would  not  wish  to  see  the  Republic  saved  by  an  army 
under  Brutus.  The  Senate  was  hard  to  manage.  They  voted 
Dolabella  a  public  enemy  on  the  ground  of  his  high-handed 
proceedings  in  Asia  on  his  way  to  Syria;  but  Cicero  could  not 
get  them  as  yet  to  recognize  Cassius  in  the  same  position  of  wide 
command  as  Brutus.  In  the  early  months  of  the  year  the  war 
in  the  Cisalpine  dragged  slowly  along.  Mutina  was  still  besieged. 
Hirtius  and  Octavian  could  as  yet  make  no  impression  on  Antony. 
In  March  Pansa  also  went  to  the  seat  of  war.  Cicero  and  his 
party  were  nervous,  not  without  reason.  Letters  from  Lepidus 
and  Plancus  advised  peace :  but  things  had  gone  too  far  for 
compromise.  Antony  was  defiant,  and  a  letter  of  his,  commented 
on  by  Cicero,  shewed  that  he  well  understood  the  situation.  To 
Cicero  it  proved  that  no  terms  could  be  made  with  Antony. 
But  its  main  point  was  to  warn  others  (above  all  Octavian)  that 
a  revival  of  the  Republic  under  Cicero  would  not  suit  their 
interests.  It  was  a  clever  move,  though  it  had  no  immediate 
effect.  The  war  went  on.  Cicero  still  trusted  Octavian,  and 
hoped  for  some  help  from  the  young  Pompey.  The  old  statesman 
was  beset  with  troubles.  Tiresome  republicans  worried  him  by 
obstruction  in  the  Senate.  And  Mutina  was  now  (in  April)  nearly 
starved  out. 

627.  Yet  the  place  did  not  fall.  On  the  15th  a  battle  on 
the  line  of  the  Aemilian  road  ended  in  the  defeat  of  Antony  by 

H.  31 


482  Victory  means  defeat  [ch. 

the  armies  of  Hirtius,  Pansa,  and  Octavian.  Pansa  was  wounded. 
On  the  2 1  St  Antony  was  utterly  beaten  before  Mutina,  and  the 
siege  raised.  But  Hirtius  fell  in  battle,  and  soon  after  Pansa 
died.  It  might  seem  that  the  republican  cause  had  triumphed : 
in  truth  it  was  simply  ruined.  The  three  armies  looked  to 
Caesar's  heir  as  their  real  head.  Caesar's  heir  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  Caesar's  murderer,  D.  Brutus.  The  men 
released  from  Mutina  were  quite  unfit  to  move.  Octavian  would 
not  move.  Therefore  Antony  escaped.  In  his  retreat  westward 
toward  Genua  he  was  even  joined  by  a  force  of  three  legions, 
raised  in  Italy  by  an  adventurer.  But  the  men  in  Rome  fancied 
that  they  had  now  only  to  gather  the  fruits  of  victory,  and  they 
went  to  work  under  a  complete  misunderstanding  of  the  situation. 
They  declared  Antony  and  his  men  public  enemies.  Their 
blindness  was  shewn  in  the  treatment  of  the  two  surviving  com- 
manders. The  highest  honours  were  voted  to  D.  Brutus,  who 
was  to  command  the  armies  of  Hirtius  and  Pansa,  and  to  pursue 
Antony.  Octavian  was  to  have  only  the  ovatio  or  minor  triumph. 
Cassius  was  recognized  as  ruler  of  the  further  East,  and  Sextus 
Pompey  appointed  to  the  charge  of  the  naval  forces.  So  the 
republicans  shewed  their  hand.  To  complete  their  victory  they 
summoned  Lepidus  and  Plancus  to  close  in  on  the  beaten  Antony 
from  the  West  and  North.  The  one  thing  they  succeeded  in 
doing  was  in  giving  a  warning  to  Octavian.  The  young  man 
must  either  put  up  with  a  humble  position,  or  shift  for  himself. 
They  were  rash  enough  to  offer  him  further  humiliations.  Vainly, 
for  the  soldiers  adhered  to  him,  and  scorned  D.  Brutus.  There 
was  a  temporary  deadlock  in  the  North,  and  secret  negotiations 
were  carried  on,  by  which  the  whole  situation  was  dramatically 
changed. 

628.  The  truth  was  that  the  republicans  had  no  army  at 
their  disposal.  The  death  of  the  two  consuls  both  hampered 
the  government  and  transferred  their  two  armies  to  the  young 
Caesar.  The  rank  and  file  cared  nothing  for  political  differences. 
A  commander  they  must  have,  and  their  present  commander, 
from  the  first  devoted  to  his  own  interest,  was  now  estranged 
from  the  republicans  by  ill-timed  provocation.  D.  Brutus  was 
helpless,  indeed  in  great  danger :  this  the  men  in  Rome,  mis- 
judging the  intentions  of  Octavian,  could  not  see.  Plancus  was 
waiting.     He  did  not  relish  the  prospect  of  Antony  in  supreme 


xLiv]  M.   Brutus  483 

power,  but  he  would  incur  no  risk.  Lepidus  was  already  in 
treaty  with  Antony,  and  actually  joined  him  at  the  end  of  May. 
The  army  of  M.  Brutus  was  far  off,  but  Cicero  talked  of  sending 
for  it  to  protect  Italy.  Two  legions  were  expected  from  Africa. 
In  short,  the  game  was  up.  For  Octavian  was  secretly  treating 
with  Antony  and  Lepidus,  while  M.  Brutus  had  made  up  his 
mind  not  to  come  over  from  Macedonia  to  the  support  of  Cicero. 
In  ignorance  of  these  things  the  Senate  declared  Lepidus  a  public 
enemy.  His  property  was  forfeited  to  the  state.  Money,  it  is 
true,  was  desperately  needed ;  but  this  open  declaration  of  war  to 
the  death  was  the  still  more  desperate  act  of  a  losing  cause. 

629.  Why  would  not  Brutus  come?  Partly  because  a  dis- 
agreement on  a  question  of  policy  had  come  between  him  and 
Cicero.  He  did  not  share  the  latter's  extreme  hatred  of  Antony. 
He  disliked  the  coalition  with  Octavian,  and  objected  to  the 
young  Caesar's  promotion.  He  was  a  pedant  judging  things 
from  a  distance,  unable  to  make  allowance  for  the  circumstances 
that  had  made  concessions  necessary.  So  there  was  a  grave 
misunderstanding  between  the  two  republicans.  Brutus  blamed 
Cicero  for  his  real  or  rumoured  dealings  with  Octavian :  Cicero 
blamed  Brutus  for  lenient  treatment  of  his  prisoner^  C.  Antonius. 
Meanwhile  their  common  cause  was  perishing  in  the  summer 
of  43.  There  was  another  influence  telling  on  Brutus.  A  half- 
sister  of  his  was  married  to  Lepidus.  In  Roman  society  these 
family  connexions  were  powerful.  Brutus  heard  that  Lepidus 
was  outlawed,  and  he  was  more  concerned  to  protect  the  interests 
of  his  relatives  than  to  march  boldly  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  back 
up  Cicero's  policy,  in  which  he  detected  blunders.  And  now,  in 
July,  it  was  doubtless  too  late,  for  things  in  Italy  had  gone  too 
far.  There  were  now  three  great  forces  under  arms,  waiting  and 
watching.  D.  Brutus  had  at  last  managed  to  join  Plancus.  They 
had  13  or  14  legions  of  various  quality  and  doubtful  temper. 
Antony  and  Lepidus  were  at  least  as  strong,  and  they  could 
afford  to  wait,  having  more  confidence  in  their  men.  Octavian 
in  the  Cisalpine  had  also  a  great  army.  He  was  popular  with 
the  troops,  and  negotiations  with  Antony  went  on.  The  one 
thing  that  all  the  soldiers  wanted  was  money.  Now  the  republican 
government  in  Rome,  despite  frantic  efforts  to  raise  money,  was 

^  Captured  by  Brutus  in  Macedonia.  Antony  had  made  over  that  province 
to  this  brother. 

31—2 


484  Octavian  in  Rome  [ch. 

practically  bankrupt.  There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  cash 
abounded  in  the  camps  of  Antony  or  Octavian.  The  question 
was  rather,  whose  promises  offered  the  best  security  in  the  event 
of  their  victory  ?  Clearly  it  was  more  easy  to  fix  responsibility 
on  individuals  than  on  a  body  like  the  Senate.  Therefore  it  was 
more  easy  for  an  Antony  or  an  Octavian  to  retain  the  loyalty  of 
his  army,  than  it  was  for  the  republican  D.  Brutus  or  the  wavering 
Plancus. 

630.  August  came.  A  military  deputation  appeared  in  Rome, 
to  demand  payment  of  promised  bounties,  and  the  consulship  for 
Octavian.  They  also  claimed  the  repeal  of  Antony's  outlawry. 
These  claims  were  refused  or  evaded.  The  return  of  the  deputa- 
tion enraged  the  army,  and  Octavian  marched  upon  Rome  with 
about  40,000  men.  His  coming  was  the  sign  for  a  general  collapse. 
Concessions  made  in  the  flurry  of  impotence  were  futile.  The 
troops  in  the  city  went  over  to  Octavian,  and  multitudes  poured 
out  to  welcome  him.  Cicero  fled  to  Tusculum.  The  forces 
of  Brutus  and  Cassius  were  all  that  remained  to  represent  the 
Roman  Republic.  The  young  Caesar  took  matters  in  hand  at 
once.  A  special  arrangement  was  devised  for  holding  an  election, 
at  which  he  was  made  consul  with  Q.  Pedius,  his  relative.  Some- 
how money  was  found  and  the  soldiers  received  their  bounties. 
His  adoption  was  formally  completed,  and  Caesar's  outstanding 
legacies  paid  off.  A  lex  Pedia  set  up  a  special  court  for  the 
trial  of  all  concerned  in  the  dictator's  murder.  Prosecutions  at 
once  began,  resulting  in  outlawries  and  confiscations,  for  the 
accused  mostly  did  not  appear.  Among  the  accusers  was  a 
young  man  afterwards  famous,  M.  Vipsanius  Agrippa.  Octavian 
was  now  consul,  though  not  quite  20  years  of  age.  The  Senate 
'voted  him  the  legions  of  D.  Brutus,  and  urged  him  to  raise 
more,  and  to  march  against  Antony  and  Lepidus.  There  was 
now  only  one  practical  solution  of  the  present  problem,  how  to 
meet  the  immense  forces  collected  by  Brutus  and  Cassius.  This 
was  a  coalition  with  Antony.  So  he  returned  northwards,  leaving 
Pedius  in  charge.  Plancus  abandoned  D.  Brutus,  who  perished 
in  an  attempt  to  escape  to  the  East.  Pollio,  from  the  Further 
Spain,  came  to  terms  with  Antony.  Antony  reentered  the  Cisal- 
pine at  the  head  of  17  legions.  Under  careful  precautions  (for 
there  was  mutual  mistrust)  he  with  Lepidus  met  Octavian  near 
Bononia.     Their  interest  was  to  agree,  and  two  days'  discussion 


xLiv]  triumviri.     End  of  Cicero  485 

sufficed  to  complete  a  scheme  for  taking  possession  of  the  Roman 
world. 

631.  Their  programme  was  as  follows.  The  three  were  to 
be  united  as  triumviri  rei piiblicae  constituendae  formally  appointed 
by  law  as  joint  holders  of  arbitrary  power.  Their  functions  and 
shares  of  empire  were  for  the  present  fixed.  Lepidus  was  to 
have  Narbonese  Gaul  and  the  whole  of  Spain.  He  was  to  be 
consul  in  42,  and  to  remain  in  Italy,  while  Antony  and  Octavian 
went  to  meet  Brutus  and  Cassius.  Antony  took  the  Cisalpine 
and  the  Further  Gaul.  Octavian  was  assigned  Africa  and  the 
islands,  a  poor  share  at  this  juncture.  These  provinces  were  not 
yet  in  their  power,  and  Sextus  Pompey's  fleet  was  a  serious  bar 
to  their  occupation.  Yet  to  command  an  army  on  equal  terms 
with  Antony  was  for  him  more  important  than  a  better  territorial 
share.  Antony  was  of  course  for  the  moment  the  chief  partner, 
so  he  took  the  provinces  strongest  in  military  resources.  The 
soldiers  were  promised  great  rewards ;  particularly  18  Italian 
towns,  in  which  they  could  find  homes  by  ejecting  present 
possessors.  Italy  was  thus  marked  for  treatment  as  a  conquered 
country.  The  armies  were  delighted  with  all  these  arrangements, 
which  were  publicly  announced.  But  the  measure  designed  for 
effecting  two  of  their  main  objects  was  not  at  once  made  public 
by  the  Three.  They  meant  to  prevent  any  republican  reaction 
by  removing  all  possible  leaders :  they  would  not  err,  as  Caesar 
had  erred,  by  an  unpractical  clemency.  Moreover,  they  needed 
vast  sums  of  money  to  discharge  their  debts  and  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  coming  war.  Therefore  they  had  agreed  on  a  proscription. 
A  first  list  of  a  few  inveterate  opponents  was  sent  to  Rome :  tliese 
men  were  to  be  put  to  death  at  once,  and  among  them  was 
Cicero.  The  orator  met  his  death  bravely  at  the  last.  He  had 
indeed  run  his  course.  In  the  coming  autocratic  government 
there  was  no  place  for  such  a  man.  As  to  his  public  career  there 
has  in  modern  times  been  much  difference  of  opinion.  I  have, 
as  occasion  offered,  tried  to  set  forth  fairly  his  merits  and  defects 
as  a  statesman.  In  the  last  stage  of  his  political  Hfe  he  staked 
his  all  on  the  effort  to  revive  a  Republic  dominated  by  the  aristo- 
cratic class  who  had  already  deserted  him  once  in  time  of  trouble. 
The  great  houses  had  never  any  real  love  for  the  clever  'new 
man ' :  that  he  should  die  in  their  cause,  after  suffering  from  their 
timidity  and  neglect,  was  one  of  the  most  tragic  of  historical  ironies. 


486  Proscription  [ch. 

632.  Late  in  November  the  triumvirs  entered  Rome,  and 
carried  out  their  programme  deliberately.  The  chief  business 
was  the  proscription.  The  methods  of  Sulla  were  followed  and 
improved  upon  in  some  details.  An  edict  stated  the  reasons  that 
had  made  a  thorough  clearance  necessary,  and  guaranteed  the 
public  against  disorderly  massacre.  All  would  be  done  in  order. 
Black-lists  appeared  in  due  course.  The  impossibility  of  telling 
when  the  end  had  been  reached  both  intensified  and  kept 
alive  the  terror.  It  is  said  that  in  all  about  300  senators  and 
2000  knights  were  doomed  to  death.  The  need  of  money  was 
the  underlying  fact  of  this  horrible  business.  Malice  and  revenge, 
selfish  cowardice,  the  desire  to  earn  rewards  or  to  acquire  coveted 
properties,  all  played  a  part  as  in  the  days  of  Sulla.  Instances 
of  treachery  and  loyalty,  in  freemen  and  slaves  alike,  supplied  the 
same  striking  contrasts.  Some  were  killed  in  mistake  for  others. 
Some  of  the  destined  victims  managed  to  escape  and  join  Sextus 
Pompey  or  Brutus  and  Cassius.  Among  those  who  perished  was 
old  Verres  in  his  exile  at  Massalia.  Among  those  who  escaped 
was  the  learned  Varro.  A  notable  fact  of  the  time  was  the  safety 
of  the  wealthy  Atticus.  His  policy  had  long  been  one  of 
neutrality  in  this  age  of  revolutionary  changes.  He  had  kept 
on  good  terms  with  the  party  at  any  time  in  power,  and  had 
earned  the  gratitude  of  the  beaten  side  by  timely  help.  He  had 
protected  Antony's  family  from  the  republicans.  He  had  sent 
money  to  Brutus  in  trouble.  So  this  judicious  Friend  in  Need 
was  able  to  be  useful  to  others  ;  and  this  was  his  practice  to  the 
end  of  his  life. 

633.  But  to  confiscate  estates  was  one  thing;  to  sell  them 
for  a  good  cash  price  was  another.  Holders  of  ready  money 
were  naturally  shy,  and  the  sum  reaHzed  by  the  sales  was  far 
short  of  the  estimate.  To  meet  the  deficit,  it  was  decided  to 
tax  the  properties  of  wealthy  ladies.  This  led  to  an  indignant 
demonstration  on  their  part,  and  a  great  speech  of  protest  by 
their  leader  Hortensia,  daughter  of  the  orator.  And  they  actually 
gained  some  abatement  of  the  tax.  But  the  need  of  money  was 
still  not  met,  and  a  number  of  other  measures  were  devised  to 
exact  more.  Meanwhile  Italian  towns  were  suffering  from  the 
presence  of  troops  billeted  in  them,  inconsiderate  and  irresistible. 
Villainous  creatures  of  the  triumvirs,  freedmen  and  others,  were 
for  the  time  the  ministers  of  absolute  power  :  whatever  evil  deeds 


xLiv]  Civil  war  487 

might  be  done  here  or  there,  unhappy  citizens  had  little  prospect 
of  redress. 

634.  In  arranging  for  the  administration  of  provinces  and 
the  home  government  in  42,  the  rulers  acted  arbitrarily.  Further 
steps  were  taken  to  emphasize  the  deification  of  Caesar.  On  the 
spot  in  the  Forum  where  his  body  had  been  burnt  a  temple 
(aedes  divi  lull)  was  erected  in  his  honour,  and  various  special 
observances  decreed.  The  coinage,  on  which  in  Caesar's  last 
days  his  head  had  been  placed  by  the  Senate,  was  now  stamped 
by  the  triumvirs,  first  with  their  family  symbols,  and  then  with 
their  heads.  This,  as  in  the  eastern  kingdoms,  was  destined  to 
be  the  normal  assertion  of  supreme  power.  Meanwhile  great 
preparations  went  on  for  the  coming  war,  and  Octavian  tried  to 
take  possession  of  his  provinces.  Africa  was  gained  by  the  help 
of  a  Numidian  prince,  but  Sicily  fell  into  the  hands  of  Sextus 
Pompey,  whose  fleet,  manned  by  refugees  robbers  and  desperadoes 
from  all  quarters,  made  all  the  western  Mediterranean  unsafe. 
An  expedition  to  dislodge  him  from  Sicily  was  a  failure.  He  had 
to  be  left  in  possession  when  Antony  and  Octavian  set  out  for 
the  East. 

635.  Brutus  had  raised  more  forces  in  the  Balkan  country, 
and  with  his  strong  army  had  occupied  Asia.  Cassius  had 
destroyed  Dolabella,  and  was  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Parthians. 
The  two  met  in  Asia  Minor,  and  were  masters  of  all  the  Roman 
East.  Their  fleets  commanded  the  sea,  and  their  war-chests  were 
filled  with  the  money  extorted  from  the  subject  peoples.  They 
were  ready  to  meet  their  adversaries,  but  the  matters  above 
mentioned  kept  Antony  and  Octavian  long  employed  and  delayed 
the  final  struggle.  Brutus  and  Cassius  were  aware  that  a  naval 
campaign  would  be  in  their  favour.  Indeed  a  republican  squadron 
did  operate  in  the  Adriatic  so  as  to  annoy  the  triumvirs.  But  the 
republican  leaders  could  not  wait  for  concerted  action  with  the 
freebooter  Pompey.  Their  legionaries  would  not  have  under- 
stood such  strategy,  and  would  have  imputed  it  to  fear.  To 
retain  the  confidence  of  the  men  it  was  necessary  to  fight  a 
pitched  battle.  So  it  was  decided  to  cross  the  Hellespont  and 
meet  the  enemy  in  Macedonia.  Brutus  and  Cassius  were  an 
ill-assorted  pair,  but  they  worked  together  better  than  might 
have  been  expected.  The  triumvirs  were  able  to  take  their 
forces  over  the  Adriatic  in  two  trips,  but  had  afterwards  much 


488  Philippi  [ch. 

difficulty  in  feeding  them.  So  great  was  the  advantage  of  the 
repubUcans  in  this  respect,  owing  to  the  support  of  their  fleet, 
that,  when  the  armies  at  length  lay  facing  each  other  near  Philippi, 
Cassius  was  in  favour  of  delaying  the  battle.  Antony,  for  the 
same  reason,  was  eager  to  bring  matters  to  an  issue  at  once. 
The  camps  were  close  to  the  coast,  stretching  across  the  great 
Egnatian  road.  Cassius  on  the  left  faced  Antony,  and  it  was  on 
this  side  that  the  result  was  decided.  Cassius  had  the  worst  of 
the  first  battle,  and  a  misunderstanding  led  him  to  take  his  own 
life  under  the  impression  that  Brutus  too  was  beaten.  Brutus 
had  been  victorious  on  the  right.  But  with  the  death  of  Cassius 
the  republicans  lost  their  best  soldier.  Then  followed  about 
20  days  of  waiting,  which  was  still  in  favour  of  the  republicans. 
Brutus  however  had  no  longer  the  authority  needed  to  control 
his  officers  and  men.  About  the  middle  of  November  he  gave 
way  to  pressure.  The  second  battle  of  PhiHppi  ended  in  the 
victory  of  the  triumvirs  after  a  fierce  struggle.  Brutus  and  others 
who  were  past  mercy  killed  themselves  or  each  other.  Of  the 
captured  officers  some  were  put  to  death  :  others,  for  instance 
Horace,  were  spared.  The  surviving  soldiers  were  added  to  the 
armies  of  Antony  and  Octavian. 

636.  The  republicans  had  now  fought  their  last  battle.  The 
settlement  of  the  question,  who  was  to  be  master  in  the  Roman 
world,  is  part  of  the  story  of  the  Empire.  A  few  points  in  the 
sequel  of  Philippi  call  for  brief  notice.  Lepidus  soon  fell  into 
the  background.  In  41  his  sphere  of  government  was  limited 
to  Africa.  The  two  chief  partners  shared  the  rest.  Antony  took 
the  East,  and  followed  the  oriental  precedents  of  the  Successors 
of  Alexander.  It  was  agreed  that  he  should  extort  more  money 
from  the  subject  peoples,  and  his  exactions,  following  those  of 
Brutus  and  Cassius,  were  the  cause  of  much  misery.  He  was  to 
have  remitted  large  sums  to  Rome,  to  enable  Octavian  to  meet 
the  cost  of  disbanding  troops  and  other  liabilities.  But  his  own 
extravagance  and  the  pilfering  of  his  worthless  favourites  left  an 
insufficient  surplus.  He  became  the  slave  of  Cleopatra,  and 
gradually  lost  the  qualities  by  which  he  had  risen.  His  partner 
returned  to  Italy,  and  faced  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the 
situation.  Of  these  the  greatest  was  the  provision  for  the  peaceful 
discharge  of  more  than  150,000  soldiers,  some  of  them  barbarians 
in  Roman  service.     There  was  not  the  money  to  satisfy  their 


xLiv]  The  soldiers  and  the  land  489 

claims  in  cash.  They  insisted  on  allotments  of  land  in  Italy,  and 
refusal  was  impossible.  There  was  not  the  money  to  buy  lands 
for  the  purpose.  So  there  was  no  choice  but  to  extend  the 
promises  of  towns  for  occupation  to  the  whole  of  Italy,  including 
the  Cisalpine,  now  formally  recognized  as  Italian.  It  had  to  be 
done.  A  general  expropriation  followed.  We  have  no  lack  of 
references  to  this  cruel  business.  Vergil  and  Horace  have  left  a 
record  of  their  losses.  But  we  have  no  statistics  of  the  wholesale 
robbery  which  seems  to  have  gone  on  in  most  parts  of  Italy.  We 
may  infer  that  the  interruption  of  tillage  added  to  the  widespread 
distress.  Nor  surely  was  it  from  the  economic  point  of  view 
a  gain  that  so  much  of  the  best  land  in  Italy  changed  hands. 
Even  if  great  estates  were  broken  up,  we  find  them  again  in  the 
imperial  age. 

637.  It  remained  to  create  an  effective  and  consistent  govern- 
ment, under  which  the  empire  might  recover  from  the  wasteful 
mismanagement  of  the  past.  In  Italy  peace  was  the  first  necessity. 
The  military  system  urgently  needed  a  complete  remodelling.  It 
was  in  the  frontier  provinces,  not  in  Italy,  that  armies  were 
required.  There  it  was  a  duty  to  assert  the  power  of  Rome; 
for  the  peoples  that  had  looked  on  at  the  Roman  civil  wars  would 
not  wait  passively  for  ever.  A  standing  army  under  suitable 
conditions  of  regular  service  and  provision  for  retirement  was  the 
only  way  of  meeting  the  need.  The  provincial  administration 
called  loudly  for  reform.  Individuals  must  no  longer  be  allowed 
to  make  a  temporary  private  profit  by  destroying  the  permanent 
resources  of  what  were  (as  Cicero  said)  the  'landed  estates  of 
the  Roman  people.'  To  carry  out  these  and  other  necessary 
changes,  a  central  and  continuous  control  was  indispensable. 
The  coming  problem  was  how  most  surely  to  establish  such  a 
control.  This  problem  the  coming  ruler,  once  he  was  found, 
must  try  to  solve.  The  experience  of  Caesar  was  a  warning 
against  too  frank  and  hasty  a  procedure.  In  the  year  31  the 
battle  of  Actium  gave  the  empire  to  Octavian.  We  will  briefly 
consider  below  his  method  of  creating  an  Empire  by  transforming 
the  Republic,  so  far  as  it  comes  within  the  scope  of  this  book. 


CHAPTER   XLV 

LITERATURE  AND  JURISPRUDENCE  AS  ILLUSTRATING 
THE    LIFE    OF    THE    REVOLUTIONARY   PERIOD 

638.  The  story  of  the  revolutionary  period^  particularly  the 
later  part  of  it,  differs  from  that  of  earlier  times  in  one  important 
respect.  Surviving  literature  furnishes  contemporary,  or  very 
nearly  contemporary,  evidence  of  the  events  and  feelings  of  that 
troubled  age.  Some  of  it  gives  us  a  vivid  day-to-day  picture  of 
public  and  private  life.  Such  are  many  of  the  letters  of  Cicero 
and  certain  of  his  friends  ;  such  are  some  of  the  poems  of  Catullus. 
The  personal  and  partisan  bias  of  these  utterances  is  of  course 
extreme,  and  they  need  to  be  used  with  caution,  but  it  is  always 
instructive  to  learn  how  things  appeared  to  prejudiced  observers, 
when  the  nature  of  their  prejudices  is  not  a  matter  of  doubt. 
We  have  also  more  information  as  to  the  jurists  who  flourished 
in  this  period.  And  it  is  necessary  to  call  attention  to  this  most 
worthy  class  of  men,  whose  quiet  usefulness  may  easily  be  over- 
looked in  reviewing  the  long  noise  and  disorder  of  the  revolution. 

639.  The  treatise  on  rhetoric  addressed  to  Herennius, 
produced  soon  after  the  death  of  Marius  in  86,  is  a  practical 
technical  work.  The  fact  of  its  production  is  in  itself  important. 
It  reminds  us  of  the  growing  demand  for  oratorical  training  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  senatorial  debates,  pleadings  in  court, 
and  popular  harangues.  The  book  contains  many  references  to 
events  of  Roman  history  from  the  '  popular '  point  of  view.  As 
most  of  our  authorities  are  on  the  aristocratic  side,  the  survival 
of  this  witness  is  a  welcome  help,  especially  in  the  period  from 
the  Gracchi  to  Sulla.  In  connexion  with  this  topic  we  may  note 
the  unfortunate  loss  of  the  works  of  the  Roman  orators  other 


CH.  xLv]  Cicero  as  author  49 1 

than  Cicero.  No  department  of  Roman  literature  was  so  fertile 
as  this.  A  few  little  fragments  remain,  quoted  by  later  writers. 
But  (to  mention  only  a  few  great  names)  we  can  form  no  notion 
of  the  oratory  of  the  great  rivals  M.  Antonius  and  L.  Crassus, 
contemporaries  of  Marius,  or  of  Hortensius  and  Julius  Caesar. 

640.  There  is  no  need  to  say  much  of  the  speeches  of 
Cicero.  As  historical  evidence,  the  utterances  of  a  skilled 
advocate  are  always  to  be  received  with  suspicion,  for  the  needs 
of  the  moment  are  supreme,  and  we  are  not  to  look  for  im- 
partiality accuracy  or  consistency.  Nor  need  we  dwell  on  his 
letters  more  than  to  note  the  wide  difference  of  tone  between 
those  written  in  confidence  to  such  an  intimate  friend  as  Atticus 
and  the  guarded  or  formal  epistles  addressed  to  persons  with 
whom  he  felt  less  at  ease.  His  treatises  are  to  be  noted,  not 
only  from  the  point  of  view  of  literary  merit  and  intrinsic  value, 
but  also  as  being  his  refuge  and  occupation  in  seasons  of  distress. 
They  belong  almost  entirely  to  the  years  55 — 44.  For  the  greater 
part  of  that  period  he  had  little  scope  for  oratory :  helpless  and 
cast  down  by  the  aspect  of  public  affairs,  he  sought  relief  in  his 
books  and  pen.  His  treatises  are  on  various  subjects.  The 
rhetorical  works  deal  with  practical  oratory  rather  than  technical 
rhetoric,  and  are  peculiarly  valuable  from  the  unrivalled  experience 
embodied  in  them.  Historically  they  are  of  great  importance. 
He  has  large  views  as  to  the  mental  training  needed  for  ensuring 
great  and  genuine  success.  No  industry  is  too  much.  Among 
other  objects  of  study,  the  formation  of  a  pure  and  unaffected 
Latin  style  holds  a  high  place.  This  was  also  a  hobby  of  Caesar, 
and  on  this  ground  the  two  men  could  meet  in  sympathy.  They 
fixed  the  standard  of  classical  Latin.  But  we  are  not  to  forget 
that  classical  Latin  was  the  language  of  a  very  few. 

641.  Political  theory  was  another  of  his  subjects.  In  treating 
topics  of  this  kind  his  remains  (for  no  complete  work  survives) 
are  of  much  less  value.  He  is  too  full  of  Roman  traditions  and 
prepossessions  to  be  a  satisfactory  theorist ;  yet  much  of  interest 
is  to  be  gleaned  from  these  writings,  which  enjoyed  a  great  vogue 
in  Roman  society  just  before  the  great  civil  war.  But  most  of 
his  philosophical  discourses  are  concerned  with  the  moral  and 
theological  questions  on  which  he  sought  to  enlighten  his  country- 
men by  presenting  Greek  thought  in  a  Latin  dress.  His  own 
earlier  choice  had  led  him  to  the  New  Academy,  a  school  content 


492  Caesar  [ch. 

to  aim  at  probabilities  and  prefer  doubt  to  dogma.  This  suited 
an  orator  in  training :  as  a  Roman  public  man  he  needed  some- 
thing more  positive.  In  later  life  he  inclined  to  the  so-called 
Old  Academy,  an  eclectic  blend  of  the  views  of  several  schools. 
The  two  schools  most  influential  in  Rome  were  the  Stoic  and 
Epicurean.  Cicero's  position  as  a  writer  was  that  of  a  critic. 
He  had  no  hesitation  in  condemning  the  school  of  Epicurus,  but 
he  did  not  become  a  Stoic.  He  had  a  deep  sympathy  with  the 
Stoic  pantheism,  and  loathed  the  agnostic  Epicurean  theology. 
Epicurean  ethics  seemed  to  him  unmanly  :  the  lofty  moral  system 
of  the  Stoics,  despite  its  perversity,  he  admired.  So  he  treated 
of  such  questions  as  the  Supreme  Good  and  Happiness  in  the 
spirit  of  a  patriot,  conveying  in  readable  form  to  Romans  what 
he  judged  to  be  most  wholesome  in  the  philosophy  of  Greece. 
These  works  were  produced  in  a  great  hurry  and  in  circumstances 
of  sorrow  and  depression.  That  he  was  not  a  profound  thinker, 
and  that  much  of  his  interpretation  was  superficial,  is  generally 
admitted.  But  the  general  tone,  even  of  his  minor  essays,  is 
good  and  noble,  and  his  enduring  reputation  as  a  moral  writer 
is  due  in  no  small  degree  to  the  fact  that  the  great  Roman  was 
something  more  than  a  mere  copyist  of  Greeks. 

642.  Of  Caesar  as  politician,  soldier,  statesman,  and  language- 
reformer  we  have  spoken  above.  Among  his  lost  works  it  is 
worth  noting  that  he  wrote  Antzcato,  a  counterblast  to  the 
panegyrics  on  Cato  that  appeared  after  that  worthy's  death. 
Such  was  Caesar's  method  of  encountering  political  opposition ; 
for  he  was  not  a  Sulla.  We  have  only  to  consider  him  here  as 
a  witness  to  the  events  of  his  time  and  his  own  part  in  them. 
First,  I  would  freely  admit  that  he  makes  the  best  of  his  own 
case.  But,  while  making  large  allowance  for  this  bias,  we  must 
not  lose  sight  of  his  frank  recognition  of  his  own  errors  and  of 
the  good  luck  by  which  he  was  on  occasion  enabled  to  retrieve 
them.  His  ingenuous  manner  may  be  a  delusive  effect  of  con- 
summate art.  But  we  have  no  right  coolly  to  assume  that  stray 
details  more  or  less  loosely  reported  by  later  writers,  and  somewhat 
differing  from  Caesar's  own  version,  are  drawn  from  contemporary 
sources  not  tainted  by  prejudice.  These  notices  must  be  judged 
as  critically  as  the  story  of  Caesar.  As  to  the  main  facts  of  his 
wars  there  is  no  reasonable  doubt.  Hirtius  and  the  unknown 
writers  who  wrote  the  later  narratives  are  far  inferior  in  literary 


xLv]  Varro  493 

merit.     They  are  useful  witnesses,  and  of  interest  also  as  giving 
specimens  of  the  sort  of  Latin  written  by  commonplace  Romans. 

643.  No  writer  illustrates  the  transition  of  Republic  into 
Empire  better  than  the  learned  M.  Terentius  Varro.  Born  in 
the  Sabine  country  116  B.C.,  he  died  27  B.C.,  and  saw  through 
the  whole  course  of  events  from  Marius  to  Augustus.  His  public 
life  was  one  of  departmental  duty,  military  and  civil.  In  private 
he  was  an  omnivorous  student,  a  man  of  facts.  He  was  a 
republican,  though  pardoned  by  Caesar  in  Spain  and  afterwards 
treated  with  honour,  but  was  not  one  of  the  murderers.  Pro- 
scribed in  43  for  the  sake  of  his  wealth,  he  escaped  with  his  life. 
When  the  Republic  was  clearly  at  an  end,  he  conformed  to  the 
new  ruler,  and  was  protected  by  Octavian.  His  later  years  were 
passed  in  study,  and  he  was  confessedly  the  most  learned  man  of 
his  time.  Industry  and  efficiency  were  his  great  qualities.  He 
was  never  on  intimate  terms  with  Cicero  :  their  two  temperaments 
were  indeed  mutually  incompatible. 

644.  The  works  of  Varro  were  numerous,  and  many  of  them 
bulky.  In  the  earlier  part  of  his  life  he  produced  a  number  of 
occasional  pieces  in  verse  or  prose  or  mixed,  under  the  general 
name  of  saturae  Menippeae^  miscellanies  modelled  more  or  less 
on  the  writings  of  the  Greek  Menippus.  From  the  fragments 
we  gather  that  he  was  a  severe  critic  of  contemporary  society,  as 
satirists  are.  But  there  is  plenty  of  other  evidence  to  bear  out  his 
charges.  Most  of  his  books  were  special  treatises  in  various 
departments  of  knowledge,  historical,  antiquarian,  technological. 
From  these  later  writers  quarried  ready-made  erudition.  Part  of 
his  work  on  the  Latin  language  has  come  down  to  us,  bringing 
many  details  of  great  interest  to  students  of  the  institutions  of 
early  Rome.  We  have  one  treatise  practically  complete.  Fortu- 
nately this  is  that  on  rural  industries,  from  which  we  are  able  to 
learn  facts  of  importance  concerning  the  state  of  rural  Italy.  He 
wrote  it  in  his  80th  year,  and  he  drew  from  three  sources,  his 
own  wide  experience,  the  works  of  predecessors  Roman  Greek 
and  Punic,  and  the  conversation  of  practical  men. 

645.  The  de  re  rustica  is  divided  into  three  books  (i)  on 
tillage  (2)  on  ordinary  stock-farming  (3)  on  the  rearing  of  fancy- 
animals  for  profit.  Profit  is  from  first  to  last  Varro's  object. 
The  villa  is  to  be  an  old-fashioned  country  house  and  farm,  not 
a  fine  modern  country  seat.     Like  old  Cato,  he  is  a  foe  to  all 


494  Roman  husbandry  [ch. 

waste.  In  all  appliances  due  proportion  must  be  observed,  and 
precautions  taken  to  keep  off  disease  and  vermin.  On  the  farm 
order  and  thrift  must  prevail.  The  precepts  for  actual  manage- 
ment of  the  estate  include  medical  and  legal  rules  for  avoiding 
loss.  In  the  first  two  books  the  progress  made  since  Cato's  time 
is  seen  mainly  in  a  wider  knowledge  of  the  products  and  usages 
of  foreign  lands,  and  the  introduction  of  new  species,  particularly 
of  animals.  But  it  is  to  the  kind  of  farming  described  in  the 
third  book  that  the  great  economist  looks  for  his  solid  profits. 
What  really  pays  is  to  keep  and  fatten  for  market  the  birds, 
minor  quadrupeds,  and  fish,  desired  by  the  gourmands  of  Rome. 
The  luxury  of  the  age  was  to  Varro  a  deplorable  fact.  But  there 
it  was.  To  a  man  able  to  execute  at  short  notice  a  large  order 
for  (say)  peafowl  or  edible  snails,  the  extravagance  of  public  and 
private  banquets  promised  handsome  returns.  So  Varro  took 
things  as  he  found  them. 

646.  The  treatise  clearly  contemplates  large-scale  husbandry 
as  normal.  Small  farmers  are  briefly  referred  to,  and  one  instance 
of  success  on  a  small  scale  is  given,  that  of  a  bee-farm.  But  the 
typical  farm  is  not  a  broad  plantation  tilled  by  gangs  of  chained 
slaves,  the  crude  system  of  which  we  hear  so  much  in  the  days 
of  the  Gracchi.  The  spread  of  knowledge  had  evidently  done 
something  to  improve  agriculture,  and  great  proprietors  commonly 
owned  several  estates  in  different  parts  of  Italy,  and  in  the 
provinces  also.  Variety  of  soil  and  cHmate  acted  as  some 
guarantee  against  total  failure  in  any  year.  But  the  labour 
employed  was  almost  wholly  that  of  slaves.  The  free  wage-earner 
only  appears  as  employed  where  some  special  intelligence  is 
required,  or  where  unhealthy  surroundings  would  damage  the 
property  of  the  master  in  the  person  of  the  slave.  The  bailiffs 
and  overseers  are  all  slaves,  and  the  discipline  of  the  whole 
company  is  strict.  For  fear  of  slave-mutinies  it  is  well  not  to 
keep  too  many  of  the  same  nationality.  Yet  it  is  on  hope  rather 
than  fear  that  Varro  would  chiefly  rely  for  efficient  labour.  The 
upper  slaves  should  have  something  to  lose ;  for  the  rest,  the  less 
use  of  the  lash  the  better. 

647.  In  short,  the  system  of  Varro  offers  no  prospect  of 
reviving  the  old  race  of  Italian  yeomen.  The  past  was  past,  and 
after  a  century  of  agrarian  legislation  and  civil  wars  Italy  was 
both  economically  and  politically  very  different  from  what  it  had 


xLv]  Lucretius  495 

been  in  the  days  of  the  great  Punic  war.  The  increase  of  slavery 
had  degraded  free  labour.  Choice  spots  were  often  occupied  by 
the  mansions  and  parks  of  the  rich,  who  visited  them  only  now 
and  then.  To  such  landlords  Rome  was  the  centre  of  all  things  : 
a  country-house  was  a  fancy,  and  some  perferred  a  marine  villa 
with  costly  fishponds  on  the  bay  of  Naples.  Those  who  did 
keep  farms  were  doubtless  wiser,  and  for  them  Varro  wrote.  But 
we  are  not  to  think  of  Italy  as  all  under  cultivation,  whether  for 
pleasure  or  profit.  There  were  in  the  wild  uplands  large  areas  of 
summer  pasture.  Flocks  and  herds  had  to  be  ever  protected 
from  wolves,  and  brigandage  was  one  of  the  recognized  perils  of 
the  country  side.  Against  this  pest  the  farmer  had  to  defend  his 
own,  for  the  government  gave  him  no  help.  Such  in  outline  is 
the  Italy  depicted  by  Varro. 

648.  An  observer  of  a  different  type,  who  yet  confirms  in 
various  points  the  notices  of  Varro,  is  the  poet  Lucretius.  He  is 
said  to  have  lived  96 — 55.B.C.  His  poem  on  the  'nature  of 
things '  is  a  splendid  attempt  to  convert  Romans  to  rational 
principles  of  life  according  to  the  system  of  Epicurus.  To  him 
the  evils  of  contemporary  society  seemed  the  fruit  of  inordinate 
desires  of  every  kind,  desires  created  by  an  utter  ignorance  of  the 
nature  of  the  universe  and  the  conditions  of  human  happiness. 
Happiness  depends  on  maintaining  mental  repose,  which  alone 
makes  men  capable  of  the  refined  pleasure  that  is  to  the  Epicurean 
the  one  pure  good,  the  guide  of  life.  Man  is  made  up  of  body 
and  soul,  and  his  life  is  nothing  but  their  union.  Both  body  and 
soul  are  material,  and  mortal.  Death  is  their  separation.  The 
man  is  dead  for  ever,  but  the  matter  of  his  body  and  soul  does 
not  die.  It  passes  on  to  form  part  of  other  things,  which  are 
subject  to  dissolution  in  their  turn.  What  is  true  of  man  is  true 
also  of  the  earth.  The  alternating  process  of  destruction  and 
construction  never  ceases.  The  sum  of  matter  ever  remains  the 
same,  infinite  and  eternal.  Two  things  only  have  a  real  existence, 
Atoms  and  Void.  Atoms  account  for  the  solidity  of  material 
objects,  Void  for  the  fact  of  motion.  Their  mixture  in  varying 
proportions  explains  the  various  degrees  of  hardness  softness  etc. 
detected  by  our  senses.  Now,  if  death  and  birth  are  merely  steps 
in  a  never-ending  series,  and  if  man's  wants  are  (as  experience 
shews)  very  small,  why  should  we  not  calmly  bow  to  the  inevit- 
able?    Why  do  we  not  content  ourselves  with  kindly  Nature's 


496  Catullus  [ch. 

boons,  and  pass  our  allotted  span  of  life  in  rational  comfort 
and  joy? 

649.  To  Lucretius  the  vain  superstitions  of  the  popular 
mythology  appeared  the  chief  poison  of  humanity.  To  remove 
these  delusions,  and  clear  the  ground  for  rational  principles  of 
life,  he  preached  the  gospel  of  Epicurus.  Under  the  Atomic 
system  all  need  of  supernatural  activity  is  eliminated,  and  a 
cool  scrutiny  reveals  the  unreality  of  popular  myths.  A  calmer 
attitude  of  mind  is  the  result.  We  shall  be  able  to  repress  the 
passions  that  now  make  havoc  of  our  lives.  In  an  atmosphere  of 
Epicurean  serenity  the  mad  and  bloody  competition  of  modern 
Rome  will  cease,  the  excesses  of  luxury  and  the  extravagances  of 
foolish  love  will  pass  away.  We  have  no  reason  to  think  that 
the  doctrines  set  forth  in  this  philosophic  poem  had  any  serious 
effect  on  Roman  society.  Its  sublimity  in  parts  reaches  the 
highest  level  attained  by  any  Roman  author,  and  there  is 
evidence  that  its  merit  was  recognized.  But  to  a  historian  its 
chief  importance  lies  in  the  bold  exposure  of  contemporary  evils. 
Lucretius  was  a  free-spoken  patriot,  at  times  a  sharp  satirist.  To 
judge  the  worth  of  satirists  as  witnesses  is  usually  difficult.  In 
the  case  of  Lucretius  we  have  some  help.  As  an  observer  of  the 
phenomena  of  animate  and  inanimate  nature  he  impresses  the 
reader  by  the  alertness  and  intensity  of  his  study.  We  may  guess 
that  he  carried  his  watchful  love  of  truth  with  him  when  taking 
notes  among  the  Romans  of  his  day.  His  picture  strongly 
confirms  the  accuracy  of  those  drawn  by  other  writers  of  the 
restless  and  unsatisfactory  life  of  the  revolutionary  age. 

650.  In  the  occasional  poems  of  C  Valerius  Catullus  we  see 
Roman  life  from  another  point  of  view.  Catullus  came  of  a 
Roman  family  settled  at  Verona  in  Transpadane  Gaul.  He  went 
as  a  youth  to  Rome,  and  was  soon  absorbed  into  the  gay  and 
dissolute  society  of  the  capital.  Reckless  amours  were  the 
fashion,  and  he  soon  attached  himself  to  a  lady  whom  he  calls 
Lesbia.  There  is  little  doubt  that  she  was  Clodia,  the  fascinating 
and  notorious  sister  of  P.  Clodius.  Catullus  was  but  one  of 
a  train  of  '  fast '  youths  whom  this  fickle  charmer  drew  after  her ; 
but  with  him  passion  ran  deep,  and  the  affair  had  a  fatal  effect 
on  his  whole  life.  Directly  or  indirectly,  love  is  the  motive  of 
most  of  his  poems.  His  freely-expressed  feelings  range  from 
hope  and  elation  to  disillusionment  and  despair.     He  lived  about 


xLv]  Sallust  497 

87 — 54  B.C.  In  his  later  years  the  shameless  profligacy  of  Lesbia 
filled  him  with  pain  and  disgust.  He  began  to  take  more  interest 
in  public  matters,  and  his  sympathies  were  with  the  republican 
aristocrats.  One  of  his  notable  lampoons  is  a  coarse  and 
vehement  attack  on  the  coalition  of  Caesar  and  Pompey.  But 
his  chief  historical  importance  is  as  a  painter  of  fashionable 
society  from  the  inside.  He  depicts  not  only  its  serious  vices, 
but  also  its  follies  and  trifling,  and  its  minor  social  crimes  and 
failings ;  and  has  no  mercy  for  literary  pretenders  and  bores. 
Short  pieces,  among  them  epigrams,  were  the  staple  of  his 
writing :  such  was  the  taste  of  the  day.  Like  others,  he  was 
greatly  influenced  by  Greek  models,  and  he  boldly  adapted  Latin 
to  a  number  of  Greek  metres.  But  his  wit  and  warmth,  his 
freshness  and  grace,  were  all  his  own.  His  gross  personalities 
and  frank  obscenity  were  the  habit  of  the  age  :  men  claimed  the 
right  to  say  anything  of  anybody  without  regard  for  truth  and 
decency.  Orators  like  Cicero,  poets  like  Catullus  and  his  friend 
Calvus,  must  needs  use  their  freedom,  and  they  did.  A  time 
was  coming  when  the  expression  of  men's  opinions  and  feelings 
would  be  bridled  by  irresistible  power.  For  the  present  there 
was  social  anarchy.  Literary  freedom  ran  to  licence,  and 
put  no  restraint  upon  the  utterance  of  love  and  hate,  of  grief 
and  joy. 

651.  In  another  department  of  literature  Greek  models  were 
awaiting  Roman  imitation.  History  had  as  yet  hardly  in  Latin 
got  beyond  mere  annals  or  narratives  of  a  very  simple  kind.  In 
Greek  many  readable  works  existed,  in  which  dramatic  structure 
and  moral  effect  were  a  great  part  of  the  writer's  design.  None 
was  of  more  universal  repute  than  the  history  of  Thucydides. 
It  was  this  famous  composition  that  Sallust  attempted  to  rival. 
He  at  least  set  the  fashion  of  writing  history  as  a  work  of  art,  and 
of  placing  moral  purpose  before  detailed  accuracy.  He  was  born 
in  the  Sabine  country,  and  lived  86 — 35  B.C.,  from  Sulla  to 
Octavian.  There  were  stains  on  his  character,  but  he  was  a 
successful  man,  thanks  to  his  connexion  with  Caesar,  and  very 
wealthy.  In  retirement  after  Caesar's  death  he  wrote  his  works 
dealing  with  Roman  history.  How  far  and  in  what  sense  his 
claim  to  impartiality  is  to  be  admitted,  is  matter  of  some  doubt. 
He  was  in  many  respects  a  typical  man  of  the  transition-period. 
It  is  characteristic  that  he  feels  the  degeneracy  of  the  age,  and 

H.  32 


498  Civil  Law  [ch. 

laments  the  decay  of  the  farmer  class  in  Italy,  though  he  has 
himself  a  hearty  contempt  for  agriculture  and  rural  life.  He 
was  evidently  one  of  those  whose  interests  were  centred  in 
Rome. 

652.  That  our  record  of  Roman  history  is  very  imperfect 
and  onesided,  admits  no  doubt.  How  little  we  know  of  the 
common  everyday  interests,  the  ordinary  concerns  of  ordinary 
men,  is  manifest  when  we  reflect  that  the  narratives  of  ancient 
historians  very  seldom  refer  to  the  civil  law-courts  and  that  only 
four  of  Cicero's  surviving  speeches  deal  directly  with  civil  cases. 
Yet  it  is  certain  that,  with  a  few  interruptions,  the  administration 
of  the  civil  law  was  in  full  activity  all  through  the  turmoil  and 
strife  of  the  revolutionary  age.  The  civil  law  in  the  strict  sense 
consisted  of  the  Twelve  Tables,  supplemented  by  such  additions 
and  changes  as  had  been  made  by  later  statutes.  But  these 
taken  together  seem  to  have  been  but  a  meagre  body  of  law, 
most  of  it  expressed  in  very  general  terms.  By  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  growth  of  the  law  was  due  not  to  legislation  but  to 
interpretation.  Whenever  an  old  principle  was  extended  so  as 
to  cover  a  new  class  of  cases,  there  was  growth.  The  interpreters 
were  originally  the  pontiffs,  for  ancient  law  and  religion  were 
closely  connected.  In  course  of  time  non-pontifical  jurists 
appeared,  but  the  pontiffs  still  held  a  leading  place  in  what  was 
perhaps  the  most  consistently  honoured  of  Roman  professions. 
The  skilled  jurist  as  such  held  no  office.  He  was  a  private 
adviser.  If  he  happened  to  be  a  praetor,  he  might  use  his  official 
powers  to  make  some  improvement  in  practical  legal  remedies, 
which  would  hold  good  during  his  year  of  office.  But  praetors 
were  many,  jurists  comparatively  few.  The  ordinary  way  by 
which  the  influence  of  jurists  became  operative  was  this.  A 
praetor  destined  for  juridical  duty  in  the  coming  year  had  to 
issue  a  public  notice  {edictum)  setting  forth  the  principles  by 
which  he  would  be  guided  in  administering  the  law.  Considera- 
tions of  his  own  convenience  and  credit  warned  him  not  to  take 
this  important  step  without  the  advice  of  a  skilled  jurist. 

653.  It  was  through  the  edicts  that  most  of  the  development 
of  the  civil  law  took  place.  The  process  was  very  gradual.  The 
power  of  precedent  was  great,  and  praetors  were  slow  to  depart 
from  the  policy  of  their  predecessors.  So  the  bulk  of  the  edict 
(probably  often  the  whole)  was  simply  copied  from  that  of  the 


xLvJ  and  Jurisprudence  499 

last  praetor.  When  a  change  did  creep  in,  it  was  only  of  force 
for  the  year;  but,  if  adopted  by  successive  praetors,  it  soon 
became  itself  a  precedent,  and  passed  into  the  legal  system.  The 
changes  made  under  the  influence  of  the  jurists  were  generally 
in  the  direction  of  removing  the  hardships  arising  from  verbal 
quibbles  and  too  pedantic  construction  of  the  law.  It  was  a 
great  work  unobtrusively  carried  out  by  men  intellectually  and 
morally  above  the  average.  We,  have  above  noted  the  attraction 
that  the  Stoic  philosophy  possessed  for  Roman  lawyers.  Now 
and  then  we  have  come  upon  cases  of  such  men  setting  noble 
examples  in  various  departments  of  public  life.  No  more  honour- 
able characters  appear  in  Roman  history  than  the  pair  of  Stoic 
lawyers,  Scaevola  the  pontiff  and  Rutilius  Rufus,  who  for  a  brief 
space  ruled  the  province  of  Asia  on  principles  of  justice.  Equity 
then  was  the  child  of  jurisprudence,  destined  to  a  great  develop- 
ment in  later  times.  The  jurist's  influence  was  also  felt  in  the 
present  practice  of  the  courts;  In  any  case  where  technical 
points  of  law  were  involved,  the  opinions  of  legal  specialists 
could  be  cited  or  given  in  person.  The  weight  of  such  an 
opinion  would  depend  on  the  reputation  of  the  expert  who  gave 
it.  It  was  private  advice,  not  official  ruling,  whether  the  jurist 
appeared  to  support  the  contention  of  a  party  to  the  suit,  or  acted 
by  invitation  as  assessor  to  the  magistrate. 

654.  Among  the  topics  that  engaged  the  attention  of  jurists 
we  may  note  all  questions  connected  with  property,  matters  of 
contract,  transfer,  title,  and  successions  intestate  or  testamentary. 
The  last  often  involved  questions  of  religious  obligation,  though 
the  object  in  view  was  often  to  devise  a  decent  way  of  evading 
the  performance  of  sacra  at  the  tombs  of  forgotten  ancestors. 
An  important  subject  in  ancient  Rome  was  the  law  relative  to 
the  status  of  persons,  such  as  women_,  minors,  and  freedmen. 
The  names  of  many  of  the  eminent  jurists  of  the  revoJutionary 
period,  and  the  special  departments  in  which  they  severally 
laboured,  are  known.  It  is  enough  here  to  mention  Cicero's 
friend  Servius  Sulpicius  Rufus,  who  was  the  first  to  produce  large 
systematic  treatises,  in  which  he  began  the  process  of  generaliza- 
tion, a  stimulus  to  later  writers.  C.  Trebatius  Testa,  also  a  friend 
of  Cicero,  was  an  authority  on  wills.  He  was  a  younger  man, 
and  lived  to  be  a  friend  of  Horace.  So  the  civil  law,  soundest 
and  best  of  Roman  institutions,  was  kept  alive,  and  handed  on  to 

32—2 


5CXD  Capacity  for  reform  [ch.  xlv 

its  development  under  the  Empire,  by  the  force  of  its  practical 
usefulness  and  its  capacity  for  change.  In  the  latter  respect  it  is 
in  striking  contrast  with  the  political  institutions,  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  were  overthrown  by  the  sword.  The  obsolete  con- 
stitution of  a  city-state  had  to  go ;  for  it  contained  no  mechanism 
for  achieving  its  own  reform. 


CHAPTER   XLVI 

FROM    REPUBLIC   TO    EMPIRE 

655.  It  is  now  well  to  consider  briefly  the  state  of  Rome 
and  the  Roman  dominions  at  the  time  of  the  fall  of  the  Republic. 
Taking  a  few  main  points,  let  us  see  what  sort  of  conditions  the 
new  government  inherited  from  the  old,  and  in  what  respects  the 
disguised  monarchy  changed  them.  It  will  be  convenient  to 
begin  with  the  city  of  Rome  and  pass  on  to  Italy  and  the 
provinces. 

One  would  expect  to  learn  that  the  capital  of  the  civilized 
world  was  a  splendid  city.  For  more  than  150  years  Rome  had 
been  the  centre  to  which  the  tribute  of  subjects  had  been  drawn. 
In  recent  years  the  progress  of  annexation  had  been  accelerated 
under  the  influence  of  greedy  financiers,  and  the  Romeward 
stream  of  money  flowed  in  ever-increasing  volume.  Fines,  war- 
indemnities,  and  the  produce  of  looting,  in  greater  or  less  amount 
accompanied  the  advance  of  conquest.  Organization  brought 
with  it  the  imposition  of  yearly  dues,  whether  fixed  payments  or 
percentages  farmed  out  to  speculative  collectors.  Yet  it  is  certain 
that  republican  Rome  was  still  a  city  of  mean  appearance,  com- 
pared with  the  ancient  splendours  of  Athens  or  the  magnificence 
of  later  royal  capitals  such  as  Antioch  or  Alexandria.  Even  the 
statues  robbed  from  Tarentum  or  Syracuse,  Corinth  or  Pergamum, 
must  have  lost  much  of  their  charm  for  lack  of  appropriate 
setting :  moreover  they  were  not  all  exhibited  in  public,  for  the 
great  nobles  had  appropriated  some  to  decorate  their  courts  and 
gardens.  Here  we  touch  the  reason  why  no  amount  of  wealth 
was  able  to  make  Rome  a  capital  worthy  of  a  great  empire.  It 
was  not  merely  that  in  artistic  sense  the  Roman  was  inferior  to 
the  Greek.    There  was  also  a  political  cause  at  work.    In  principle 


502  The  city  of  Rome  [ch. 

the  Roman  government  might  be  based  on  popular  sovranty. 
We  have  seen  that  in  practice  it  was  normally  aristocratic.  We 
have  traced  the  steps  by  which  it  became  utterly  corrupt,  and 
noted  how  the  new  nobility  of  rank  and  wealth  ruled  by  manipu- 
lating an  Assembly  that  more  and  more  came  to  consist  of  an 
urban  mob.  This  process  was  inevitably  costly.  In  course  of 
time  it  became  ruinous.  Coupled  with  the  growth  of  private 
extravagance,  it  drove  the  Roman  nobles  to  lay  their  hands  on 
every  resource  of  enrichment  lawful  or  unlawful,  and  in  the  fierce 
competition  of  pubHc  life  supply  could  not  keep  pace  with 
demand. 

656.  Legislation  was  powerless  to  check  this  evil.  The 
revival  of  activity  in  the  Assembly  under  demagogic  leaders  only 
led  to  more  bribery  and  corruption,  while  the  increase  of  luxury 
and  refinement  stimulated  the  rich  to  spend  more  on  their  own 
mansions  and  establishments.  But  this  outlay  did  little  or 
nothing  to  improve  the  aspect  of  the  Roman  streets.  The  new 
splendour  was  all  on  the  inside.  Houses  might  occupy  larger 
sites  and  consist  of  more  than  a  single  court.  The  normal  front 
was  a  dead  wall  with  a  single  entrance  guarded  by  a  slave-porter. 
Behind  it  was  a  little  kingdom  to  which  the  public  were  not 
admitted,  a  sphere  in  which,  despite  the  relaxation  of  the  old 
family-law,  the  pater  familias  was  still  supreme.  Meanwhile  the 
need  of  providing  for  the  accommodation  of  a  growing  pauper 
population  was  fast  changing  the  poorer  quarters  of  the  city, 
mostly  on  the  lower  ground.  Tenement-blocks  of  flats  or  chambers 
were  rising,  to  find  room  for  more  persons  on  a  given  area.  The 
upper  storeys  of  wood  were  liable  to  the  risks  of  fire,  the  ground- 
floors  of  sun-baked  brick  were  liable  to  give  way  when  soaked  by 
a  flood :  and  both  these  dangers  were  real  enough.  Huddled 
together  in  these  '  islands '  {insulae)  the  poor  lived  as  best  they 
might.  The  blocks  were  owned  by  rich  capitalists,  who  drew 
substantial  rents  from  cheaply-built  tenements.  So  marked  a 
feature  of  the  city  were  they,  that  Caesar  took  them  as  convenient 
units  when  ascertaining  by  inquiry  the  number  of  persons  in 
present  receipt  of  the  doles  of  corn. 

657.  Small  comfort  was  surely  the  lot  of  the  dwellers  in 
these  '  islands '  opening  on  narrow  streets,  crowded  with  a  noisy 
throng.  The  rich  more  and  more  monopolized  the  better  sites 
on  the  Roman  hills,  which  then  rose  far  more  abruptly  from  the 


xLvi]  Public  works.     Forum  503 

lower  levels  than  they  do  now.  In  the  matter  of  public  works 
the  revolutionary  period  was  a  time  of  slackness.  The  public 
treasury  was  drained  by  the  expense  of  the  corn-supply  as  well  as 
by  the  cost  of  armies.  The  revenues  derived  from  the  provinces 
might  have  been  much  larger  than  they  were  in  fact.  It  was  not 
the  Senate's  policy  to  burden  the  subjects  with  excessive  tributes. 
It  was  the  policy  of  individual  senators  to  leave  a  good  margin, 
from  which  they  when  their  turn  came  could  wring  out  fortunes 
for  themselves,  while  enough  remained  to  glut  the  appetite  of  the 
capitalist  revenue-farmers.  The  mob  got  their  share  by  bribes 
and  entertainments  which  were  now  carried  out  with  reckless 
extravagance.  Economy  had  to  be  practised  somewhere.  There 
were  four  aqueducts,  of  which  only  one  {^Tepula  127  B.C.)  comes 
within  this  period.  The  building  of  stone  bridges  went  on  very 
slowly.  Only  one  of  the  public  halls  {basilicae)  belonged  to  this 
age,  for  Caesar's  basilica  lulia  was  completed  by  Augustus.  The 
conservative  opposition  to  the  erection  of  stone  theatres  actually 
promoted  extravagance,  without  checking  the  taste  of  the  people 
for  excitement.  Temporary  wooden  structures  were  very  costly 
to  put  up  and  take  down ;  above  all,  costly  to  decorate.  Won- 
derful stories  are  recorded  of  scandalous  outlay  on  such  things. 
Pompey  at  last  overcame  the  opposition,  and  erected  in  55  a 
permanent  stone  theatre. 

658.  Omitting  many  details,  we  must  refer  to  the  very 
crowded  state  of  the  Forum.  In  and  around  this  low-lying  space 
most  of  the  events  of  public  life  occurred.  Courts  of  law.  Assem- 
blies for  legislation,  speeches  addressed  to  mass-meetings,  all 
took  place  there.  It  was  far  too  small  for  the  Rome  of  the  later 
Republic.  And  the  increase  of  banking  establishments  (for  it 
was  the  chief  centre  of  business),  with  offices  planted  in  every 
available  corner,  served  to  cramp  movement.  Yet  it  was  in  the 
Forum  that  gladiators  still  fought  and  stands  were  erected  for 
privileged  spectators.  The  extension  of  public  buildings  and 
enclosures  to  the  campus  Martins  beyond  the  walls  was  begun, 
but  had  not  gone  far  as  yet.  One  department  of  pubHc  building 
calls  for  special  remark.  Not  only  were  the  temples  built  in  the 
period  of  revolution  few  in  number :  those  existing  were  sadly 
neglected,  and  some  were  falling  into  decay.  Even  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Capitoliiie  temple,  burnt  in  the  time  of  Sulla,  was 
scandalously  slow. 


504  Rome  and  the  Empire  [ch. 

659.  It  was  the  work  of  the  Empire  as  established  by 
Augustus  to  improve  and  adorn  the  imperial  capital.  With  the 
cessation  of  outlay  on  electoral  corruption  a  great  source  of  waste 
was  closed.  With  better  administration  of  the  provinces  the 
state  enjoyed  a  larger  and  more  regular  revenue.  Augustus  not 
only  employed  public  funds  in  the  execution  of  public  works,  but 
encouraged  wealthy  men  to  come  forward  as  benefactors  in  the 
same  kind.  Many  of  his  successors  followed  his  example,  and 
by  the  middle  of  the  second  century  a.d.  Rome,  that  is  the 
public  parts  of  the  city,  was  splendid  enough.  To  enlarge  on 
this  topic  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  book.  But  the  spirit  in 
which  Augustus  began  the  building-movement  is  to  be  noted  as  a 
comment  on  the  apathy  of  the  preceding  century.  We  find  it 
expressed  in  the  utterances  of  the  poets,  such  as  Horace  and 
Vergil,  who  enjoyed  imperial  favour  through  the  great  minister 
Maecenas.  It  was  their  function  to  represent  the  new  system  as 
a  golden  age,  a  return  to  older  and  nobler  ways,  in  contrast  to 
the  selfish  neglect  of  public  duty  characteristic  of  more  recent 
times.  The  emperor  himself  boasted  of  his  achievements,  and 
before  his  death  placed  them  on  record  in  an  inscription  of  which 
the  greater  part  has  survived.  In  no  department  was  his  policy 
more  clearly  marked  than  in  that  of  the  restoration  and  building 
of  temples.  In  this  he  went  beyond  the  schemes  of  his  great- 
uncle  :  in  utilitarian  works  the  designs  of  Julius  the  chief  pontiff 
were  more  directly  his  model.  The  provision  of  an  organized 
fire-brigade,  and  measures  to  lessen  the  evil  of  floods  by  removing 
obstructions  from  the  bed  of  the  Tiber,  were  corollaries  of  his 
building-policy.  In  limiting  the  height  of  buildings  he  followed 
a  principle  which  a  republican  reformer^  had  vainly  sought  to 
enforce.  In  short,  the  repubUcan  government  had  left  the 
emperor  everything  to  do  for  the  improvement  of  the  city  of 
Rome. 

660.  The  political  condition  of  Italy  in  general  was  what 
the  results  of  the  great  war  of  90 — 89  B.C.  and  the  civil  war  of 
Sulla  had  made  it.  Italians  had  now  a  double  franchise ;  the 
Roman,  exercised  at  Rome  only,  and  the  local,  exercised  in  their 
several  places  of  domicile.  Of  the  former  few  could  make  regular 
use,  and  its  value  mainly  consisted  in  the  privileges  attached  to 
it,  such  as  the  qualification  for  public  office,  and  the  legal  status 

1  P.  Rutilius  Rufus. 


xLvi]  Italy  505 

which  gave  to  a  civis  Romanus  a  favoured  position  in  all  parts  of 
the  Roman  world.  The  latter  made  him  a  burgess  of  his  own 
local  community,  with  a  voice  in  its  affairs.  In  practice  the 
Roman  franchise  now  went  with  the  local.  Local  governments 
had  been  established  even  where  they  did  not  previously  exist, 
and  the  country,  unified  as  Roman,  was  well  provided  with 
administrative  centres.  Differences  of  title,  due  to  past  history, 
remained.  But  the  general  style  was  municipiu7n,  and  the  adjec- 
tive in  use  for  '  local '  was  mimicipalis.  The  normal  type  of 
constitution,  with  its  magistrates  senate  and  assembly,  was  of  the 
Roman  model,  and  in  practice  worked  as  a  selfish  aristocracy  of 
wealth.  The  central  government  seldom  intervened  in  disputes 
between  the  local  Boroughs,  and  there  was  in  fact  little  or  no 
central  control.  The  reliance  of  the  republicans  in  the  great  civil 
war,  and  of  Cicero  in  the  struggle  with  Antony,  on  the  support  of 
the  munictpia,  was  not  justified  by  results.  The  local  burgesses 
were  locally-minded,  and  mostly  unwarlike.  Nor  had  Roman 
pride  sincerely  accepted  perfect  equality  with  citizens  of  municipal 
origin  :  the  remains  of  old  feeling  now  and  then  betrayed  them- 
selves in  sneers. 

661.  Some  change  in  the  direction  of  increased  central 
control  was  certain  to  come  with  the  establishment  of  the  new 
system.  But  for  some  time  Augustus  did  not  interfere  with  the 
Senate  in  its  general  oversight  of  the  affairs  of  Italy.  He  only 
took  matters  in  hand  when  compelled  by  necessity.  But  in  the 
restoration  of  order  it  was  impossible  to  overlook  the  chronic 
evils  by  which  the  prosperity  of  the  rural  districts  was  impaired. 
They  were  the  outcome  of  slavery.  Brigandage  was  an  ordinary 
risk  of  country  life.  Footpads  sometimes  plied  their  trade  near 
Rome  on  the  high  roads.  We  have  seen  that  runaway  slaves 
were  the  army  of  Spartacus.  But  another  horrid  abuse  was 
created  by  the  demand  for  more  labour  than  the  slave-market 
could  supply.  Freemen  as  well  as  slaves  were  kidnapped,  and 
added  to  the  slave-gangs.  That  Augustus  should  have  had  to 
deal  with  such  abominations  shews  us  how  completely  the  selfish 
neglect  of  the  ruling  aristocrats  had  made  the  republican  system 
a  monstrous  anarchy.  The  rich  man  travelled  with  a  slave-escort : 
the  poor  must  take  their  chance.  In  the  matter  of  the  great 
land-question  the  chief  point  to  be  noted  is  the  change  in  its 
character.     The  Gracchan  movement  aimed  at  planting  the  poor 


5o6  Provinces  [ch. 

on  public  land  resumed  by  the  state.  Its  failure  was  followed  by 
a  great  extension  of  private  property.  Then  agrarian  projects 
took  the  form  of  purchase-schemes.  Civil  wars  introduced  a  new 
phase,  the  confiscation  of  private  property.  In  this  process,  with 
all  its  cruelty,  Augustus  in  his  earlier  years  had  borne  no  incon- 
siderable part.  Things  had  now  to  be  left  to  settle  themselves, 
as  death  or  arrangements  between  old  and  new  holders  bit  by  bit 
removed  friction,  and  a  stronger  government  gave  titles  more 
permanence. 

662.  This  is  not  the  place  to  describe  the  changes  brought 
about  in  provincial  government  by  the  establishment  of  the 
Empire.  What  the  state  of  things  was  in  the  latter  days  of  the 
Republic,  we  have  seen  above.  Speaking  generally,  the  abuses 
of  the  old  system  arose  from  the  lack  of  effective  control  over  the 
men  in  authority.  This  control  the  new  system  to  a  great  extent 
supplied.  Augustus  shared  the  provincial  patronage  with  the 
Senate.  That  the  Senate  was  less  able  than  the  Emperor  to 
control  the  governors  of  its  provinces,  was  due  to  its  own  weak- 
ness :  that  it  did  so  at  all  was  mainly  due  to  the  irresistible 
pressure  of  the  Emperor.  The  provinces  had  been  public  pro- 
perties exploited  by  temporary  despots  for  their  private  profit :  to 
convert  them  into  well-managed  estates  under  trusty  agents, 
prosperous  and  bringing  in  a  steady  income  to  the  central 
government,  was  not  the  work  of  a  day.  Governors  had  to  be 
kept  in  their  posts  for  longer  terms ;  they  had  to  be  paid  salaries, 
and  forbidden  to  plunder.  The  system  of  farming  out  the 
collection  of  state-dues  had  to  be  ended.  The  middleman  must 
give  place  to  the  official,  and  the  official  taught  to  act  as  the 
servant  of  the  state.  On  the  whole  the  strong  central  power, 
conscious  of  its  own  interest,  did  effect  these  reforms.  So  far 
as  an  improved  machinery,  promoting  continuity  of  administration 
and  confidence,  could  add  to  the  happiness  and  security  of  the 
provinces,  the  change  of  system  was  an  unmixed  boon.  An 
important  step  in  the  process  of  unifying  the  empire  was  the 
improvement  of  communications.  This  meant  not  only  the  ex- 
tension of  the  roads,  but  the  proper  regulation  of  their  use. 
Under  the  Republic  influential  persons  procured  licences  to 
travel  free,  as  though  on  state  service,  though  their  journey 
was  really  for  private  purposes.  This  was  a  grievous  burden 
on    the    provincials  who    had   to  find    the    means  of  transport. 


xLvi]  Army  507 

This  abuse  also  Augustus  remedied.  He  organized  a  posting- 
service  on  a  military  model,  with  strict  regulations,  the  beginnings 
of  a  regular  Imperial  Post.  The  gradual  development  of  an  im- 
perial Civil  Service  was  promoted  thereby,  and  another  need, 
neglected  under  the  Republic,  was  supplied. 

663.  Closely  connected  with  the  provincial  arrangements 
was  the  army-question.  From  the  lack  of  taking  large  imperial 
views  the  republican  government  had  never  organized  a  standing 
army  for  purposes  of  defence.  Armies  were  raised  by  proconsuls 
for  some  immediate  object,  and  kept  under  arms  for  many  years. 
The  men  became  professional  soldiers,  and  the  ever-recurring 
problem  was  how  to  reabsorb  them  peaceably  into  the  civil 
population.  This  drifting  policy  was  a  wretched  adherence  to 
old  notions  of  enlistment  and  service,  quite  out  of  date  since 
the  time  of  Marius.  Veterans  made  endless  trouble  in  Rome 
and  Italy,  while  the  frontiers  of  the  Roman  dominions  were  left 
open  to  invasion.  This  state  of  things  could  not  have  lasted 
long.  Augustus,  probably  just  in  time,  ended  it.  He  created 
a  standing  army,  quartered  in  strong  detachments  at  important 
strategic  points,  and  provided  a  system  for  regular  retirement 
after  fixed  periods  of  service.  This  plan  not  only  stationed  the 
imperial  forces  where  they  could  be  most  useful :  it  was  an  im- 
mense relief  to  Italy,  which  had  suffered  so  much  and  so  long 
from  the  presence  both  of  armies  and  of  disbanded  soldiers. 
Only  a  guard  for  the  Emperor  as  Commander-in-chief  was  kept 
near  Rome.  Under  Augustus  they  were  few,  and  not  all  quar- 
tered together.  His  successor  brought  them  all  to  Rome,  where 
they  learnt  their  power.  The  doings  of  these  famous  Praetorians 
are  a  part  of  the  imperial  history. 

664.  It  is  most  difficult  for  us  to  grasp  the  situation  in  the 
Mediterranean  world  at  the  time  of  the  fall  of  the  Republic,  and 
to  bear  it  constantly  in  mind.  From  the  Euphrates  to  the  strait 
of  Dover  Rome  had  no  rival.  The  conquered  peoples  had  waited 
during  the  great  civil  wars  to  ascertain  with  whom  the  supreme 
power  in  the  Roman  dominions  was  to  rest.  They  could  not 
stand  alone  and  prosper;  and  there  was  no  other  organized 
government  to  command  their  respect  and  to  give  them  pro- 
tection. Before  circumstances  could  force  them  to  shift  for 
themselves  as  best  they  might,  Augustus  took  the  empire  in 
hand,  and  restored  the  direct  control  of  Rome.     This  he  did 


1 


5o8        The   Empire  and   Roman  sentiment        [ch. 

so  effectively  that  his  system  remained,  with  small  modifications, 
for  nearly  300  years.  That  is,  the  empire  remained  one,  and  was 
ruled  from  Rome.  But  we  must  never  forget  that  this  union  was 
mechanical.  No  Roman  nation  was  ever  formed.  The  empire 
was  not  a  blending  of  peoples  sharing  common  traditions  and 
hopes,  a  vital  unity  from  which  no  part  could  be  torn  without 
fatally  weakening  the  whole.  Incorporation  by  conquest  had 
been  the  work  of  the  Republic,  at  first  unwilling,  then  willing : 
under  the  Empire  it  continued  for  some  while  yet.  The  true 
nature  of  the  system  was  shewn  when  decay  had  gone  so  far  that 
loss  of  territory  was  inevitable.  Provinces  had  to  be  abandoned, 
but  the  main  fabric  of  the  empire  remained.  Constantinople  be- 
came the  capital.  The  one  civilized  power  was  still  the  greatest 
of  single  powers,  and  proved  capable  of  more  than  one  notable 
revival  of  efficiency. 

665.  But  outside  Rome  (now  including  Italy)  Roman  senti- 
ment was  an  artificial  thing.  It  had  really  nothing  in  common 
with  the  stolid  loyalty  of  early  Romans,  the  race  whose  sterling 
qualities  had  built  up  the  Roman  state  under  free  institutions, 
and  whose  degeneration  or  dispersion  had  made  the  v  Republic 
impossible.  As  the  armies  were  more  and  more  filled  with  men 
of  alien  blood  (and  the  process  went  on  fast)  Italy  became  more 
and  more  conscious  of  her  own  unimportance.  The  weakness 
already  to  be  detected  in  the  time  of  the  civil  wars  gradually 
became  sheer  impotence.  Augustus,  a  conservative  wherever 
possible,  made  it  his  policy  to  favour  Italy.  But  he  could  not 
stay  the  course  of  tendency;  the  central  imperial  land  was  cut 
up  into  provinces  at  last.  In  Rome  as  the  capital  Roman  senti- 
ment of  a  kind  lingered  long  among  the  upper  classes.  But  it 
mainly  rested  on  a  basis  of  delusions.  The  republican  freedom 
of  speech  was  of  course  at  an  end,  and  men  who  found  restriction 
galling  in  the  present  were  led  to  idealize  the  past.  Not  content 
with  worshipping  Cato,  who  was  out  of  date  in  his  own  day,  some 
honoured  the  memory  of  Brutus  and  Cassius  and  their  contemp- 
tible accomplices.  A  milder  folly  was  the  attempt  to  make  Pompey 
into  a  republican  hero,  and  to  discover  in  the  corrupt  Senate  of 
the  later  Republic  a  pure  and  dignified  patriotic  council.  High- 
minded  men,  who  would  surely  have  loathed  the  abominations  of 
Cicero's  time,  deceived  themselves  with  these  partial  misconcep- 
tions, and  gave  respectability  to  the  vain  discontents  of  an  Oppo- 


xLvi]  Cosmopolitan  population  509 

sition  which  Emperors  could  not  tolerate.  Conspiracies  began 
under  Augustus,  and  suspected  treason  was  the  cause  of  the  cruel 
persecution  of  literature  under  Tiberius.  A  last  outbreak  of  re- 
publican madness  led  to  the  deaths  of  Seneca  and  Lucan  under 
Nero.  So  long-lived  was  the  fond  belief  in  the  virtues  of  the 
Republic  for  which  Cato  and  Cicero  had  died. 

666.  In  the  latter  days  of  the  Republic  Rome  was  already 
on  the  way  to  become  a  cosmopolitan  city.  Manumission  of 
domestic  slaves  added  numbers  of  aliens  to  the  ranks  of  the 
civic  body,  and  these  freedmen  were  a  class  of  whom  it  is  not 
easy  to  form  a  clear  notion.  We  may  assume  that  they  were  as 
a  rule  past  the  middle  of  life,  and  that  they  were  mostly  Orientals, 
with  the  temperament  and  superstitions  of  tbe  Hellenistic  East. 
It  was  mainly  the  slaves  of  this  supple  and  ingenious  type  that 
were  able  to  win  the  favour  of  their  Roman  lords.  Under  the 
Empire  there  was  certainly  no  falling-off  in  the  numbers  of  this 
class.  And  the  number  .of  free  Greek  adventurers,  medical 
practitioners,  technical  specialists,  and  teachers  of  all  sorts,  not 
to  mention  astrologers  and  impostors  in  general,  increased  rapidly 
when  once  the  great  market  for  their  talents  was  securely  open 
to  them  in  an  age  of  Imperial  peace.  Among  the  upper  classes 
Hellenism  had  gone  far  under  the  Republic.  Learning,  literature, 
arts,  morals,  all  were  under  Greek  influences.  Yet  the  Roman 
nobles  in  general  despised  Greeks,  and  upheld  the  superiority  of 
the  Roman  character.  Civil  wars  and  childless  marriages  thinned 
out  the  repubhcan  nobility.  The  surviving  great  houses  could 
not  play  a  great  part  in  the  Imperial  system.  The  demand  was 
for  industrious  and  able  men  willing  to  be  obedient  and  contented 
in  a  secondary  position.  Men  of  humbler  origin  fell  more  readily 
into  place  in  the  civil  and  military  services,  and  the  subordinate 
business-duties  were  more  and  more  monopolized  by  Greek  freed- 
men, who  by  sheer  usefulness  rose  sometimes  to  great  heights  of 
power. 

667.  Greek  influences  meant  specializing  influences,  and  the 
transition  from  Republic  to  Empire  is  perhaps  most  clearly  to  be 
noted  from  this  point  of  view.  What  had  been  a  tendency  long 
at  work  in  the  affairs  of  individuals  now  became  operative  in  affairs 
of  state.  The  assumption  that  any  citizen  (in  practice  any  noble), 
so  long  as  he  could  secure  enough  votes,  might  safely  be  entrusted 
with  any  important  duty,  had  been  the  guiding  principle  of  the 


5IO  Principate  [ch. 

Roman  aristocrats  from  the  first.  The  growth  of  the  state,  and 
the  greater  complexity  of  public  interests,  had  made  this  principle 
more  fatally  inadequate  in  proportion  as  it  became  more  established 
as  their  rule  of  policy.  The  whole  story  of  the  revolutionary  period 
shews  the  need  of  efficiency  expressed  in  popular  indignation  at 
failures.  Marius  and  Pompey  were  brought  to  the  front  when 
aristocratic  mismanagement  could  be  borne  no  longer.  Caesar 
made  efficiency  the  first  qualification  for  trust,  and  the  central 
power,  once  established,  was  of  course  directly  interested  in  the 
fitness  of  its  subordinates.  It  was  therefore  on  the  whole  far 
(better  served  than  the  old  government  had  ever  been.  The 
danger  of  the  new  system  lay  in  its  tendency  to  crystallize,  to 
become  too  rigid,  and  unable  to  adapt  itself  to  changed  circum- 
stances, as  it  departed  further  and  further  from  the  republican 
pattern. 

668.  Augustus  did  not  destroy  the  Republic.  Practically 
it  had  come  to  an  end  under  Caesar's  autocracy  and  the  trium- 
virate. He  transformed  it  by  reverting  to  the  old  Roman  method 
of  Make-believe.  He  was  First  Citizen  {princeps).  The  term 
was  not  new :  men  had  used  it  of  Pompey  in  the  days  of  his 
predominance.  Nor  was  it  an  official  title,  but  use  soon  made 
it  virtually  so.  The  Principate  expressed  itself  by  concentrating 
in  a  single  person  the  essence  of  powers  extracted  from  the  chief 
republican  magistracies,  and  supplementing  them  by  a  few  pre- 
rogatives specially-conferred  as  needed.  Caesar's  method  of 
holding  several  offices,  in  particular  the  Sullan  dictatorship,  was 
judiciously  avoided.  But,  when  the  same  man  held  the  full 
tribunician  power  in  Rome  and  the  full  proconsular  imperium 
throughout  the  empire,  the  actual  holders  of  office  were  placed 
in  a  position  wholly  different  from  that  of  their  republican  pre- 
decessors. They  changed  from  time  to  time.  The  princeps,  who 
took  the  style  of  imperator  as  his  personal  first  name  {praenomen)^ 
went  on.  Augustus  (to  give  him  his  honorary  title)  might  disguise 
the  fact  of  his  supremacy  in  a  mass  of  fictions.  The  truth  re- 
mained that  he  was  the  real  source  of  the  driving-power  that  kept 
the  imperial  machine  at  work,  and  that  he  could  at  will  turn  it 
off  or  on  at  any  point  in  the  vast  empire.  Meanwhile  he  shrank 
from  engrossing  functions  that  others  seemed  able  to  perform. 

669.  The  Senate  not  only  remained,  being  indeed  at  first 
indispensable,    but   even   received   the   added  dignity  of  direct 


xLvi]  Senate,     equites.     Mob  511 

legislative  and  judicial  power.  Its  administrative  powers  have 
been  referred  to  above.  Augustus  treated  it  with  great  respect, 
and  was  very  unwilling  to  interfere  with  it.  But  by  a  right  of 
precedence  in  speech  he  could  give  the  House  a  lead  in  all 
matters  of  moment,  and  he  could  block  any  proposal  by  tribuni- 
cian  veto.  In  form  an  honoured  member,  in  reality  he  was  its 
master.  The  Equestrian  Order  had  some  compensation  for  the 
lost  gains  of  revenue-farming.  A  system  of  useful  offices  in  the 
imperial  service,  distinct  from  those  tenable  by  senators,  was  re- 
served for  them.  The  Assembly  ceased  to  pass  laws.  Of  its 
judicial  power  it  was  formally  deprived.  It  still  nominally  elected 
magistrates  under  Augustus,  but  this  power  was  transferred  to  the 
Senate  by  Tiberius.  These  few  details  are  enough  to  shew  how 
effectually  the  republican  constitution  was  converted  into  a  virtual 
monarchy.  Modern  writers  often  speak  of  it  as  a  Dyarchy,  or 
rule  of  two  coordinate  authorities.  Emperor  and  Senate.  This 
is  correct  enough,  provided  we  bear  in  mind  that  there  were  not 
really  two  sovrans.  The  one  could  always  override  the  other  in 
case  of  a  difference.  How  loth  the  Emperor  was  to  seem  arbitrary 
is  well  seen  in  the  matter  of  the  chief  pontificate.  The  post  was 
desired  by  Augustus,  who  was  bent  on  reviving  the  observances 
of  the  state  religion.  Yet  he  left  Lepidus  in  possession  till  his 
death  in  12  B.C. 

670.  There  was  one  institution,  inherited  from  the  Republic, 
which  the  Empire  could  neither  abolish  nor  reform.  It  was  the 
city  mob.  It  could  not  be  abolished,  A  lifeless  capital  of  the 
great  world-power  would  have  been  an  absurdity.  In  the  head- 
quarters of  sovranty  a  populace  was  necessary  :  it  was  out  of  the 
question  to  erect  more  and  more  splendid  buildings  only  to  look 
down  upon  silent  streets^  Emperors  had  therefore  to  continue 
the  practice  of  feeding  and  amusing  the  rabble,  and  soon  began 
to  build  great  permanent  structures  for  popular  entertainment 
and  luxury.  Cirjcjjs^  amphitheatre^  baths^^the  imperial '7^;^^  with 
their  colonnades,  are  specimens.  The  presence  of  many  thou- 
sands, however  idle  and  worthless,  had  its  value  in-  the  mere 
turmoil  and  applause  tha,t  impressed  provincial  or  barbarian 
visitors,  whose  reports  of  the  doings  in  the  great  and  wicked 
city  were  carried  into  far-off  lands.  It  was  only  necessary  to  see 
that  this  mob  of  loungers  did  not  take  themselves  seriously  as 
populus  Romanus  and  meddle  with  affairs  of  state.     A  few  com- 


512  Conclusion  [ch.  xlvi 

panics  of  city-troops  were  enough  to  secure  this,  and  the  Emperor 
had  his  Guard.  So  order  was  better  maintained  than  under  the 
Republic.  To  reform  the  city  mob  was  impossible,  owing  to  in- 
dustrial conditions.  The  city  swarmed  with  slaves,  many  of  them 
pampered  domestics ;  probably  a  larger  number  were  employed  in 
manual  labour  of  various  kinds ;  there  were  also  many  public  slaves, 
serving  under  departmental  officials.  The  inevitable  degradation 
of  free  labour  forbade  the  growth  of  an  industrial  spirit.  The  free 
multitude  were  content  to  live  as  state-paupers,  with  help  of  doles 
at  a  rich  man's  door. 

671.  We  have  now  traced  in  brief  outline  the  sequel  of  the 
events  narrated  in  the  foregoing  chapters.  I  have  tried  to  shew 
how  the  Roman  Republic,  having  won  a  great  empire,  had  at 
length  to  produce  an  Emperor  to  rule  it.  I  have  tried  to  give 
some  notion  of  the  process  by  which,  after  horrible  agonies,  this 
result  was  attained,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  imperial  Founder 
used  or  discarded  the  old  repubhcan  materials.  On  the  vast  im- 
portance of  Rome,  her  unique  central  position  in  the  known  history 
of  the  world,  it  is  not  needful  here  to  enlarge.  It  is  time  to  bring 
my  story  to  a  close. 


INDEX 


[The  numbers  refer  to  Sections.] 


Achaeans,  see  Leagues. 
Acilii. 

M'.   Acilius  Glabrio     207,  208. 
M'.   Acilius  Glabrio     473. 
acta  Caesaris     617,  618,  621,  622. 
acta  senatiis     511. 
act  tones    90. 
Adoption     13,    223,   283,    462,    508, 

514,   561,  618,  619,  630. 
Adriatic,  interest  of  Rome  in     no, 
118,    140,    146,    151,    239,    240, 
268,   326. 
adsidui  (landholders)     20,  35,   55. 
Aediles    30,  50,   56,  278,   304,  486. 
Aemilii. 

L.  Aemilius  Paullus     130,   131. 
L.    Aemilius     Paullus     223 — 225, 

23i»  232,  233,  243,  296,  298. 
M.    Aemilius    Scaurus      355,    356, 

359,  361,  403. 
M.  Aemilius  Lepidus     451. 
M.  Aemilius  Scaurus     558. 
L.  Aemilius  Paullus     565,   568. 
M.    Aemilius    Lepidus     590,    593, 
596,  603,  617,  619,  625—629. 
Aequi     32,  33,  46,  71,  72. 
Aetolians     118,   151,   159. 

(See  Leagues^ 
Afranius,   L.     555,  578. 
Africa     92,   165,   255. 
Africa,   Roman  province     261,   433, 
437,    577^    579'    59i»    631,  634, 
636. 
Agathocles     67,   74. 
ager  Campanus     150,  339,  516,  535, 

537-  . 
ager  G alliens     75,  78,  no. 
age7'  peregrinus     81. 
ager  privatus  18,  65,  315,  316. 
ager  publicus     18,    26,    50,    51,   65, 

i7i>   172,   315—318,  350,  490- 

H. 


ager  Ronianus     19,    28,  45,   78,   81, 

171,  400. 
Agriculture     87,  172,   173,  261,  272, 

302,  645—647. 
Agrigentum  (Girgenti)     98. 
Alba  Fucens     71. 
Alba  Longa     8,  19. 
album  iudicum     446,   554. 
Alexander  the   Great     67,    91,    188, 

257.  380- 
Alexander's     Successors     (Diadochi) 

76,   186 — 190,  380,  464,  636. 
Alexander  of  Epirus     67. 
Alexandria     79,   91,    189,   588,   599, 

602. 
Allies,  Italian,  see  Rome  and  Italian 

confederates. 
Allobroges     498,  506,  550. 
ambitus     293,    445,    473,    474,    484, 

493'  494- 
amici  of  Rome,     81,  no,  198,  215, 

216,   226,  227,  229,  230. 
Andriscus     243. 
Anicius,  L.  Gallus     224. 
Annii. 

T.  Annius  Milo  Papianus     531 — 

533'  534'  560—563,   583- 
anno  suo     279. 
Antium     31. 
Antioch     188,  217,   556. 
Antonii. 

M.  Antonius  (the  orator)     379,  416. 

M.Antonius  ('  Creticus)     453,  463. 

C.   Antonius     487,  488,  498,  501, 
502,  514. 

M.  Antonius  (Mark  Antony)     569, 

571—3'     583,     59I'     610,    611, 
chapter  XLIV  passim. 
C.  Antonius     620,  621,  629. 
L.  Antonius     621. 
Apollonia     79,  582,  608. 

3Z 


SH 


Index 


Appeal,  see  provocatio. 
Appuleii. 

L.     Appuleius     Satuminus      373, 

383-388. 
Apuha     69,  70,  73,   128— 131,   141, 

144,  400. 
Aquae    Sextiae    (Aix    en    Provence) 

326,  354,  373. 

Aqueducts       55,      89,      306,      388, 

657- 
Aquihi. 

M'.  Aquilius     324,  325,  331. 

M'.  Aquilius     376,  377,  419,  420. 

Aratus     183. 
'Archias  the  Greek  poet     504. 

Archimedes     142,  145. 

Archidamus     67. 

Ariminum  (Rimini)     78,  116,  238. 

Aristion     420. 

Aristocracies  of  wealth  favoured  by 
Rome  64,  70,  78,  103,  133, 
135,  201,  219,  238,  247,  399. 

Aristocratic  nature  of  Roman  govern- 
ment 2,  23,  32,  54,  86,  119, 
161,  166,  168,  169,  227,  271, 
277—280,  327,   330,    348,    368, 

435.   448,    456,    478,  483.   505. 
.  655,  667. 
Aristocratic  republicans  overcome  by 

the    Coalition      509 — 518,    and 

later  chapters  passim. 
Aristocratic    and    partisan    spirit    of 

Roman    annalists     55,    61,    68, 

123,   152,   155,  385. 
Aristonicus     324. 
Aristotle     96,  424. 
Armenia     380,    382,   464,   466,  468, 

479,  481,  559. 
Army,  primitive     18,  20. 
Army,    'Servian'     20,  21. 
Army  448—367  B.C.     43,  44. 
Army  366—265  B.C.     61,  68,  81. 
Army  264 — 201   B.C.     99,  104,  117, 

120,    131,    132,    138,    148,    157, 

158,  169. 
Army  200 — 168  B.C.     193,  195,  203, 

212,  219,  221,  232. 
Army  167—134  B.C.     259,  260,  263, 

264,  266,  272. 
Army  133—79  B.C.     324,  326,  338, 

340»   .345.    357.    361—364,    37©. 

371.  374.  376,   378,   401.  411— 

413,  419—423,  425—428. 
Army   becomes   supreme     346,    348, 

349,  364,  450,  456,  459. 
Army  after  79  B.C.     450,  454,  455, 

467—469.   482,    507,    526,    527, 

549.    550,    556,   564.    574.    581, 


Army  after  79  B.C.  (continued) 

582,    584,    585,    592,    593,    597, 
623,  629,  636,  637,  663. 

Army  of  Pyrrhus     76,  195. 

Army,  Carthaginian     94. 

Army  of  the  Barcids     113,   120. 

Army,  Seleucid     205,  209. 

Army,  Macedonian     195,  219. 

Arretium  (Arezzo)     240,  575. 

Asculum  Picenum  (Ascoli)  400, 403, 
404,  406. 

Asia,    Roman    province      250,    288, 

3^4.    325.    336,   417.    419—423. 

466,  467,  481,   508,  517,  589. 
Asinius,  C.  Pollio     630. 
Assembly,    popular,   in   general     14, 

25.  27,    59,  86,   168,  273,   274, 

280,    295,    314,    334,   348,    390, 

450.  475.  669. 

Assembly  by  Curies     18,  25,  41. 

Assembly  by  Centuries  25,  29,  33, 
34.  41.  57.  60,  III,  191,  276, 
277.  290,  341,  387,  411,  412, 
449*  474.  492.   520,  532. 

Assembly    by    Tribes     35,    41,    60, 

290,    327,    330.    334.    344.  387. 

411,  472,  475. 
Assembly,    trials   before     147,    276, 

289,  290,  334,  372,   387,  442. 
Athens     i,    33,    49,    95,    181,    247, 

248,  420,  421,  424. 
Atii  or  Attn. 

T.  Atius  Labienus     525,  542,  546, 

547.    549.    550.    570.   575.   593. 
594,  602. 

P.  Attius  Varus     579,  594,  602. 
At  Hit. 

M.  Atilius  Regulus    99. 
Attalids,  see  Pergamum. 
atutoritas  in  general     11,  40,  59. 
Aurelii. 

L.  Aurelius  Orestes     326. 

C.  Aurelius  Cotta     452. 

M.  Aurelius  Cotta    453,  465,  466. 
Aurunci     63,  65,  66. 
Auspices  and  Augury      12,    25,    27, 

41,  42,  295. 
Autronius,  P.     484. 
auxilium  of  tribunes     26,  27,  435. 

Bacchanalia,  affair  of  the     297. 

Balearic  isles     326,  370. 

Banking    and    exchange      286,    417, 

.  473.  658. 
basilicae     306,  657. 
Baths     307. 
Battles  named 

Lake  Regillus     32. 


Index 


515 


Battles  named  (continued) 

AUia    47. 

Sentinum     73. 

Heraclea     76. 

Ausculum     76. 

Beneventum     76. 

Mylae     98. 

Ecnomus     99. 

Aegussa     102. 

Telamon     it  6. 

Ticinus     125. 

Trebia     125. 

Trasimene     126. 

Cannae     131. 

Metaurus     157. 

Zama     164. 

Cynoscephalae     196. 

Thermopylae     207. 

Myonnesus     209. 

Magnesia     209. 

Pydna     225. 

Scarphea     245. 

Leucopetra     245. 

Arausio     369. 

Aquae  Sextiae     373. 

Vercellae     374. 

Chaeronea     421. 

Orchomenus     422. 

Tenedos     422. 

Sacriportus     428. 

Colline  Gate     428,  437. 

Chalcedon     465. 

Coracesium     476. 

Pistoria     501. 

Carrhae     559,  560. 

Ilerda     578. 

Dyrrachium     584. 

Pharsalus     585. 

Zela     589. 

Thapsus     594. 

Munda    604. 

Mutina     627. 

Philippi     635. 

Actium    637. 
Bithynia  and  Bithynian  kings      159, 
215,    216,   219,    251,    324,    325, 
37i»    380,    382,   419,    453>    465. 
481. 
Blossius     322,  324. 
Boeotia     181,  206,  220,  421,  422. 
Bona  dea     504. 
Bononia  (Bologna)     240,  630. 
Bosporan   (Crimean)   kingdom     381, 

468,  478,  481,  589. 
Bricks     88,  306,  656. 
Bridges     19,  306,  498,  657. 
Brigandage     301,  376,  439,  647,  661. 
Britain    543,  544. 


Brundisium  (Brindisi)  78,  108,  149, 
424,  427,  504,  532,  575—577* 
590,  623. 

Bruttians     49,  67,  74,   171. 

Building     47,  88,  656 — 659. 

Byzantium     185,  420,  521. 

Caecilii  Mete  Hi    329,  352. 

L.  Caecilius  Metellus     100,   107. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  {Macedonicus) 

243.   245,  329. 
Q.   Caecilius  Metellus  [Balearicus) 

326. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  {Numidicus) 

361—363,  365,  383,  386,  389. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  {Pius)     415, 

416,    427,  428,    447,    456,    460, 

461,    493. 
Q.    Caecilius    Metellus    [Creticus) 

470,  476,   507. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  Celer    488, 

511. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  Nepos     503, 

508. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  Scipio     561, 

573>  5845  59i»  593>  594- 
Caelius,  M.   Rufus     538,  569,  583. 
Caere  (Cervetri)     62. 
Caesar  in  Gaul 

58    B.C.       525—528. 

57  B.C.     529,  530. 

56   B.C.       541  —  542. 

55  B.C.  542,  543. 
54  B.C.  544—546. 
53  B.C.     546,  547. 

52   B.C.       548—550- 
51    B.C.       551. 
50   B.C.       552. 

Succession-question    562 — 566,  568 

-573- 
Calendar     14,  90,  263,  582,596,601. 
Calpurnii. 

L.  Calpurnius  Piso     289,  308,  313. 

L.  Calpurnius  Bestia     359 — 361. 

C,    Calpurnius    Piso     470,    472 — 

474>  475-  . 
Cn.   Calpurnius  Piso     484,  489. 
M.   Calpurnius  Bibulus     486,  509, 
511,    512,    516,    517,    518,    561, 
564,   567,  581,  582. 
L.     Calpurnius     Piso     Caesoninus 
518—520. 
Campanians     49,  63 — 65,  68,  74,  94, 

281,  401. 
campus  Martins     27,  607,  658. 
Capitalists  (see  publicani)     172,  173, 
227,    249,   255,    261,    271,    272, 
286,    312,   324,   325,    336,   346, 

33—3 


5i6 


Inde 


X 


Capitalists  (continued) 

347»  353>  3545  357>  3^0,  363* 
367.  37 1.  379'  388,  392—396, 
403,    410,   419,    423,   424,    429, 

433^  436,  438*  450j  453,  459' 
466,  467,  469,  471,  473,  477, 
487,    5^3,    521,   567.    580,   656, 

657- 
capite  censi     ^64.. 
Cappadocia     210,212,  251,  324,  325, 

380,  382,  419,  464,  469,  481. 
Capua  (S.  Maria)      48,  64,  129,  134, 

135,    I4i»    144'   147,    149'    15O' 

339'  454,  516,  575- 
(:apui     7,  29,  34,  334. 
Carthage     i,  32,  49,  65,  67,  71,  74, 

76,  77'  79'  91—96,  109,   113— 

115,  120,  139,  145,  158,  162, 
164,    165,    199,   205,    207,    218, 

255j  339'  342,  343j  35o. 
First  Punic  war     97 — 102. 
Second  Punic  war     119 — 164. 
Third  Punic  war     255 — 261. 
Carthago    nova    (Carthagena)      113, 

152. 
Casilinum  (Capua)     135,   144,   149. 
Cassii. 

Spurius  Cassius     30,  32. 
L.  Cassius  Longinus     369. 
C.    Cassius    Longinus      559,    567, 
610,    612,    619,    620,    623,    625, 
626,    627,    635. 
Q.    Cassius    Longinus     569,    578, 
590,   602. 
Caudine  Forks     69. 
Celtae,  name     522. 
Celtiberians     127,  233,  264,   265. 
Censorship  and  censors     37,  52,  55, 

116,  163,    168,    221,   275—277, 

315'   3^9'    332,    383'   393,   409' 
441,  485,  519,  596. 
census    21,   37,   55,    iii,    163,  276, 

277,  39^'  418,  457'  470- 
centuriae,  see  Assemblies     20,  25,  37, 

43,  409,  441. 
Centurions     44,   143,  169,  219,  528, 

621. 
cessio  bonorum     580. 
Chrysogonus     432,  447. 
Cilicia  and  Cilicians     189,  379,  463, 

476. 
Cilician  province     379,  453, 481,  521, 

534,  567- 
Cimbri,   see  Northern  Barbarians. 
Cincius,L.  Alimentus  (annalist)     123. 
Cities,  dependent,  in  the  East     185, 

187,    188,    189,    198,    210,    251, 

381,  479,    480,  556. 


Citizen  and  alien     i,  9,  16,  274. 
Citizen  and  soldier     43,  44,  87,  232, 

272,   301,  303,  435,   564. 
Citizens,  old  and  new     409,  411,  413, 

414,    415,    418,    424,    426,   427, 

449'  456,  457- 
City-states     t,  67,  96,  181,  183,  185. 
City  precinct     26,  27,  54,  573. 
Civil   service,  lack   of  regular     287, 

662. 
civitas     7,  9,  78,  81,  135,  274 — 277, 
281,   331,   384,  386,   391,  394— 
396,  405—409,  660. 
civitas^    rise   in   value   of    240,   273, 

281,  282. 
civitas^  Roman  and  local     449,  660. 
civitas  sine  suffraglo     46,  62,  64,  (i(>^ 

71,   74,  81,   134,   281. 
classes,   *  Servian  '     20,  37,  341. 
Claudii  or  Clodii. 
Appius  Claudius  (Attius  Clausus)  32. 
Appius  Claudius  (decemvir)     33. 
Appius  Claudius  (censor)     55,  90. 
P.   Claudius  Pulcher     loi. 
M.  Claudius  Marcellus     116,   135, 

137'   145'  156. 
Appius  Claudius  Pulcher     145. 
C.  Claudius  Nero     151,  156,  157, 

163. 
Appius  Claudius  Pulcher    268,320. 
C.   Claudius  Pulcher     276. 
P.  Clodius  Pulcher     504,  505,  508, 

514,   517—521,    531—534,    558, 
560,  561. 
Appius  Claudius  Pulcher    555,  567. 
M.  Claudius  Marcellus     564 — 566, 

602. 
C.   Claudius  Marcellus     565,  571. 
C.   Claudius  Marcellus     569. 
Cleonymus     72. 
Cleopatra     588,  602,  636. 
client es     10,   18,  25. 
Client-kingdoms     and     principalities 

357'  37O'  479—481,  579'  589- 
cloaca  niaxitna     19. 
cloacae    89. 
cohortes     370. 
Coinage,  see  Money, 
collegia,  gilds,  religious     14,   15,  29, 

52,  130,  176,  295,  372,  436,  493, 

580. 
collegia,    sham     gilds,    for    political 

purposes     519,   553,  592. 
coloni     19,  31.  82. 
coloniae  of  Roman   citizens     19,  64, 

66,    73,    75,    81,  83,    108,    236, 

240,    241,    273,    281,    331,    354, 

355- 


Index 


517 


coloniae  Latinae  31,  45,  46,  d^,  70, 
71.  72,  73.  75.  78,  81—83,  108, 
116,  122,  128,  133,  154,  T63, 
171,  236,  240,  241,  281,  331, 
398.  400. 

coloniae  militares     389. 

Colonial  schemes  of  the  revolutionary 
age  (see  land- settlements)  339 — 
.343.   386,  394,  607,  619. 

comitia,    see    Assembly     18,    25,    30, 

35,  41- 
commercium     16,    46,    64,    82,    103, 

228,  247,  261,  312. 
concilia  plebis     30,  35,  41,  60,   168. 
conscripti    24. 
consilium  in  general     11. 
consilium  of  magistrate     442. 
constil,  name     23. 
Consular   provinces     341,    359,   383, 

488,  515.  518,  519.  537,  539,  566. 
Consuls  and  Consulship     23,  26,  27, 

28,  33,  37,  38,  50,  51,  52,  53, 
258,    263,    266,    268,    271,  278, 

279'  343—346.  357,  363,  3845 
385,  487,  498,  537,  540,  561, 
596,  603,  606,  617,  628,  630. 

contio     25,  88. 

conubium  16,  34,  42,  46,  64,  82, 
228. 

conventus     526. 

Corfinium  (S.  Pelino)     402,  575,  576. 

Corinth  (see  Fetters)     183,  194,  245. 

Corn,  importation  and  distribution 
of  112,  153,  160,  172,  304,  335, 
337,  350,  439,  451,  454,  471, 
472,  474.  504,  533,  538,  599' 
620. 

Corn,  provincial  tribute  of    233. 

Corn-laws     335,  350,  386,  394,  396, 

454,  519- 
Cornelii. 
P.  Cornelius  Scipio    125,  127,  136, 

146. 
Cn.    Cornelius   Scipio      125,    127, 

136,  146. 
P.    Cornelius    Scipio    {Africanus) 

152,   157,   158,   161,   162,   164— 

166,  209,   214. 
L.  Cornelius  Scipio  [Asiagemis  or 

Aslaticus)     log,  214. 
P.     Cornelius     Scipio    Aemilianus 

257 — 261,    263,    266,    267,    277, 

279,    299,    307,    309'    314,    322, 

328,  329. 
Cornelia    mother    of    the    Gracchi 

298,  314. 
P.   Cornelius   Scipio   Nasica     321, 

322. 


Cornelii  (continued) 
L.  Cornelius  Sulla  {Felix)     364 — 

367,  371,  373,  382,  39O'  403, 
406,  407,  410—413,  418,  421— 
424,  chapters  xxx — X.-K.X.I passim. 

L.  Cornelius  Cinna  412,  chapter 
XXVIII  passim,  §  425. 

L.  Cornelius  Scipio  Aslaticus  426, 
427. 

L.  Cornelius  Balbus  (of  Gades) 
461,  506,  539,   545,  603. 

C.  Cornelius     471,  473 — 475,  485. 

P.   Cornelius  Sulla     484,   504. 

P.    Cornelius  Lentulus     496,  498, 

499- 
C.  Cornelius  Cethegus     490,  498, 

499-  ^  .    , 

P.    Cornelius     Lentulus     Spmther 

534- 
L.  Cornelius  Lentulus  Crus     509, 

572,  573. 
P.  Cornelius  Dolabella     617,  618, 

620,  625,  626,  635. 
Corsica      92,     99,     109,     171,     218, 

234. 
Country  and  Town     160,   273,   319, 

320,  335,  49I'  647- 
Cremona     116,    125,    160,  238,  240. 
Crete    and    Cretans     185,    215,   221, 

345'  37O'  463,  470,  471,  476. 
Crimes  and  Wrongs     14 
Criminal  Law,  development  of    442 

—444. 
Croton  (Cotrone)     135. 
curiae,  see  Assembly     18,  25. 
Curii. 

M'.  Curius  Dentatus     75,  87,  89. 
Custom  (see  mos),  power  of    23,  40. 
Cyprus     189,  254,  481,  521. 
Cyrene  and  Cyrenaica     79,  92,   189, 

254,  380,  453. 
Cyzicus     420,  465. 

Dalmatia     355. 

Dearth     42 . 

Debt,    pressure   of    26,  42,   50,    51, 

60,  86,  175,  410,  417,  483,  487, 

493,    568,   573,    580,    583,   591, 

592. 
Debts  of  provincials,   client   princes 

etc.      423,   466,   467,   473,    498, 

521,  567,  581. 
Decemvirate  (451—0  B.C.)      33,  34. 
Decii. 

P.  Decius  Mus  (cos  339  B.C.)     63. 
P.  Decius  Mus  (cos  295  B.C.)     73. 
decretum     39. 
decumae,  tithes     103,   288,  336. 


5i8 


Index 


dediticii    529. 

Deification     605,  622,  634. 

Deiotarus     481,  589,  610. 

Delegation  of  powers     18,  28,  603. 

Delos  224,  226,  230,  247,  249,  379, 
420. 

Dictatorship  28,  32,  33,  38,  54,  69, 
126,  129,  137,  168,  (?  579),  580. 

Dictatorship,  new  style  (Tyranny) 
434»  59i>  5965  603,  610,  618. 

dies  fasti  and  nefasti     14,  90. 

Diplomacy  and  foreign  policy  15, 
32,  40,  59,  68,  81,  113,  115, 
151,  159,  165,  178,  192,  193, 
201,  203,  208,  210 — 213,  215, 
227,    228,    244—249,    251,   252, 

255,    270,    353— 355>   357—367 
passi77i^  380,  382,  419,  524,  608. 
discessio     24. 

Dispensation  from  laws    474,  475. 
Divorces     112,  433,  437,  504. 
dominium     315. 
Domitii. 

Cn.   Domitius  Ahenobarbus     209. 
Cn.   Domitius   Ahenobarbus     354. 
Cn.    Domitius   Ahenobarbus     372. 
L.    Domitius    Ahenobarbus      537, 
540,  555.  576,  578. 
Drepana  (Trapani)     98,  10 1. 
DuiLii. 

C.  Duilius     107. 
Dyrrachium     (Durazzo)      520,     532, 
582—584. 

East  and  West     179. 

East,  influence  of,  on  Rome    212,  292. 

Education     85,  88,  223,  298,   314. 

Egypt  and  the  Ptolemies  79,  153, 
171,  189,  198,  205,  207,  217, 
219,  222,  224,  226,  254,  380, 
481,  485,  490,  513,  534,  554, 
587,  588. 

Elections  18,  23,  25,  41,  54,  60, 
126,  130,  137,  143,  320,  321, 
332,  384,  388,  474»  487,  488, 
493.  494,   559.  565,   569,  610. 

Elephants  76,  94,  100,  120,  165, 
212. 

Ephesus     207,  421. 

Epicureans     641,  648,  649. 

Epidemics     89,  160,  217. 

Epirus  67,  76,  206,  220,  231,  577, 
582. 

equester  or  do     338,  see  Order. 

equites  20,  21,  25,  37,  43,  338,  370, 
470. 

Etruscans  and  Etruria  4,  5,  12,  32, 
47,  48,  62,  71,  73,  78,  89,   148, 


Etruscans  and  Etruria  (continued) 
156,    160,    163,    400,  404 — 406, 

439,  494- 
exercitus     1 1 . 

Fabii. 

Q.  Fabius  Rullianus     69. 

Q.  Fabius  Pictor  (annalist)     123. 

Q.    Fabius     Maximus     {cunctator) 

126,   129,   132,  137,   154. 
Q.  Fabius  Maximus  {Allobrogicus) 

354- 
Fabricii. 

C.  Fabricius  Luscinus     75,  85. 
Faesulae  (Fiesole)     494,  495,  496. 
'Faith  of  the  Roman  people'     207. 
Family,     Roman,     and     Successions 

9,  12,  13,  85,  293,  294. 
Fannii. 

C.  Fannius  Strabo     337,  342,  343. 
Farming  of  state-dues,  contracts  etc., 

see  publicani. 
fasces  23,  27,  28. 
Federal    unions,   nature   of     5,    84, 

182,  184,  201,  208,  244,  245. 
Festivals  and  shows     7,   8,    28,   56, 
147,    160,    305,    437,    498,    554, 
580,  597,  60T,  6ri,  620. 
fetiales     15. 
Fetters,   the   3  fortresses     187,   194, 

196,  201. 
Finance     37,  40,  104,  137,  141,  163, 
232,    335>    339»    410,  417,   439, 
508. 
Financial  difficulties  of  the  Civil  wai 
period     577,  581,  588,  592,  595, 
599,  604,  623,  628,  629—633. 
Fines  (fnultae)     34,  35,  51,  214,  442. 
Fires     88,  306,  657,  659. 
Flaminii. 

C.  Flaminius  (the  reformer)     no, 
III,   116,    126,   168. 
Flavii. 

Cn.  Flavius     90. 
C.  Flavius  Fimbria     418,  422. 
foedus     16,  81,  82. 
Foreign  policy,  see  Diplomacy, 
formula  togatorum     81,  87. 
Forum     89,  658. 
Franchise,  see  civitas. 
Freedmen     iii,  170,  219,  432,  599, 

633,  666. 
Freedmen  and  the  franchise     273 — 

277,  283. 
Freedmen  Cornelii    436. 
'Freedom'   granted  by  Rome     197, 

208,  228,   246,  324,   380,  480. 
Fregellae     331. 


Inde 


X 


519 


Frentani     70,  400. 
'  Friends,'  see  amici. 
Fufius,  Q.  Calenus     514. 
Fulvii. 

M.  Fulvius  Nobilior    211,  213,  214. 
>        C  Fulvius  Flaccus     313. 

M.  Fulvius  Flaccus     326,  327,  331, 

337j  342,   344.  345- 
Funerals     85,    107,    305,    448,   471, 

617,  618. 
Furii. 

M.  Furius   Camillus     38,    43,  47, 

50. 

Gabinius,  A.  471,  472,  473,  474, 
518—520,  554,  558. 

Gades  (Cadiz)  91,  113,  152,  158, 
203,  461,  506. 

Galatians,  see  Gauls  in  the  East. 

Gaul,   Gallia  and  Galli     522,  523. 

Gaul,  Cisalpine  48,  116,  124,  125, 
136,  157,  202,  237—240,  268, 
301.  355.  408,  426—428,  440, 
453.  488,  515,  593.  619,  623— 
63  T  passim. 

Gaul,  Cispadane     408,  440,  522. 

Gaul,    Transalpine      124,    157,    326, 

353.    354.   369.    373.  451.   498. 

506,  508,  515,  chapters  XXXVIII 

— XL  passim  t  631. 
Gaul,   Transpadane     408,   440,    471, 

485.    515.    522,    564.   565.    580, 

650. 
Gauls  in  Italy    45,  47,  48,  62,  73, 

75,  no,  116,  121. 
Gauls  in  the  East     182,  190,  211 — 

213,    229,    251,    380,    382,   421, 

465,  481,   589. 
gens  Claudia     32. 
gens   Cornelia     152,  448. 
gens  Fabia     32. 

gentes^  clans  9,  13,  18,  24,  25,  41. 
Genua  (Genoa)  236,  268,  355,  627. 
Germans      508,  522,  524,  525,   527, 

528,    530,    542—544,    547,  549, 

550.  582._ 
Getae  or  Daci     608. 
gladiators     T07,   300,   305,  343,  454, 

597.  658. 
Greek  colonies     17,  381. 
Greek,  court-language     186. 
Greek,    dominant    literary   language 

123,  308,  393,  479,  482. 
Greek  nautical  skill     78,  95,  98,  99, 

123,    127,    170,    230,    379,    381, 

422,  465. 
Greek    philosophy    and    rationalism 

296 — 299,  641. 


Greek  politics     i,  91,  92,  299,  314, 

334- 

Greek  states,  connexion  of  Rome 
vi^ith  no,  194,  197,  198,  200, 
201,  204 — 208,  213,  215,  217, 
218 — 222,  231,  244 — 249,  420 — 
422. 

Greek  specialists  112,  189,  298,  393, 
599,  601,  666,  667. 

Greeks  and  Phoenicians  32,  79,  91, 
92.  94.  95.  98.   122,  189. 

Greeks,  Eastern  i88,  248,  251,  422, 
464,  478 — 480,  6(i(i. 

Greeks,  their  influence  106,  176, 
177,  223,  248,  261,  298,  299, 
380,  612,  614,  ^(id,  667. 

Greeks,  Western  4,  32,  48,  49,  67 
—70.  74.  79.  89,  91,  92,  98, 
122,  282,  312,  339,  439. 

Half-franchise,  see   civitas  sine  suf- 

fragio. 
Hamilcar  Barcas     102,  105,  109,  113. 
Hannibal  Barcas     114,  115,  chapter 

XIII  passim,  183,  199,  203,  205, 

209,  210,  215. 
Hanno  the  'Great'     105,   109. 
Harbours     78,    108,    122,    134,    135, 

148,  149,  401. 
Hasdrubal    Barcas      124,    136,    153, 

157- 
Hasdrubal  (Barcas?)     113,   114. 
Helvetii     508,  525,   526,  528. 
Heraclea  Pontica     185,  420,  466. 
Hemici     32,  44,  62,   71. 
Hiero  I  of  Syracuse     32. 
Hiero  H   of  Syracuse     77,    92,   97, 

112,  130,  132,  142. 
Hirtius,  A.     551,  625 — 627. 
honor es     278. 
Horatii. 

Horatius  Codes     32. 

M.  Horatius  Barbatus     33,  35. 

Q.  Horatius  Flaccus     635. 
Hortensii. 

Q.  Hortensius  Hortalus     447,  458, 
470,  472,  477,  498. 
hospes,  hospitium     16. 
Hostilii. 

A.  Hostilius  Mancinus     221. 

C.  Hostilius  Mancinus     265. 
hostis,  meaning  of    16. 
Houses     17,  88,  292,  306,  656. 

lapygians  or  Messapians     4,  72,  77. 
Illyria  and  Illyrians     no,  118,  151, 

219,  221,  224,   225,  239,  326. 
Illyricum     515,  585,  590. 


520 


Index 


imagines,  portrait-masks    85,  471. 
imperator,  title     567,  605,  668. 
imperium  in  general     11,  14,  18,  23, 

26,  42,  346. 
imperium  of  magistrates     23,  26,  29, 

33,  37,  50,   168. 
imperium  of  Caesar     605. 
imperium  domi  and  militiae     27,  35, 

282,  344,  499. 
imperium  pro  consule  or  /r^  praetore 

53,  372,    432,    441,    452,    463, 
491,  509,  555,  573>  625. 

Initiative     29,  35,  53. 
mj-^/a^jblocks  of  dwellings    656,  657. 
intercessio     26,  38,  50,  290,  435. 
interrex,    interregnum     18,    23,    35, 

54,  59,  434,  54°,  559,  561. 
Islands,  annexation  of    208,  2 1 1 ,  2  30, 

326,  463. 
Istria     116,  239. 
Italy,  geography  of    3. 
Italy,  limits  of    237,  268,  440,  575, 

576. 
Italy,  races  of    4. 
Italy,  Caesar's  schemes  for     607. 
Italy,  Roman  organization  of    81 — 83. 
Italy  in  90  B.C.     398 — 402. 
Italy  in  42  B.C.     660 — 661. 

Jews  189,  226,  253,  479,  480,  556, 
588. 

iudex  quaestionis    446. 

judicial  corruption  336,  393,  395, 
453,  458,  485,  486,  505,  508, 
514,  554. 

iudices,  name     33,  290. 

iudices  of  the  standing  courts  289 — 
291,  331,  338,  341,  392,  393 
—5,  410,  436,  442,  446,  450, 
452,  456—459'  475,  498,  554, 
600,  621. 

iudicia  puhlica  (see  quaestiones)  289 
— 291. 

Jugurtha     267,  358. 

Jugurthine  war     358 — 367. 

[ulii. 

L.  Julius  Caesar  Strabo  403 — 405. 
C.  Julius  Caesar  (see  Caesar  in 
Gaul)  433,  452,  454,  470—472, 
477,  chapters  xxxv — xxxvii 
passim,  525,  545,  547,  chapters 
XLI — XLiii  passim, 

C.  Julius  Caesar  Octavianus  {Au- 
gustus^ see  Octavii)  618,  619, 
and  chapter  xliv  passim. 

Julius,  the  month  named     611. 
Junii. 

D.  Junius  Brutus     264 — 267. 


lunii  (continued) 

M.  Junius  Silanus     369,  372. 

C.  Junius    Norbanus     392,    426 — 
428. 

D.  Junius  Silanus     493,  494. 

M.  Junius  Brutus     521,  567,   593, 

610,    612,    619 — 621,    623,    625, 

626,  628,  629,  635. 
D.  Junius  Brutus     54  c,  612,  618, 

619,  623—630. 
Juries,  see  iudices     290. 
Jurisprudence    and   Jurists      14,    34, 

90,   308,    391,  493,  607,    652— 

654. 
iura  privata  and  pub  lie  a     7,  46. 
ius  a.ndi  fas  14. 

Kidnapping     371,  379,  463,  661. 
Knights,    see    Order,    equites.    Capi- 
talists. 

Laelii. 

C.  Laelius  the  elder     162,  299. 
C.  Laelius  the  younger     279,  299, 
310,  328. 
Land,  see  ager     t8,   19,  21. 
Land  allotments     30,  31,  38,  45,  51, 
65,    66,    72,    82,   86,    no,  281, 

315,  317,  386. 
Land-bills  of  RuUus  and  others     490, 

49I'  508,  535- 
Land-laws,  see  leges. 
Land-question     (see     Country     and 

Town)     26,  30,  45,  50,  51,  172, 

173,   272,    279,    315—319'   327, 

350,  661. 
Land-settlements  of  the  revolutionary 

period     (see     Colonial    schemes) 

438,    439,   449'    507,    516,   535, 
598,  636. 
latifundia     261,  272,  300 — 303,  350, 

.439- 
Latin    becomes    a   literary  language 

308,  640 — 642. 
Latin    League      7,    8,    31,    32,    46, 

62 — 64,  82. 
Latins    4,  6,  7,   10,  32,  44,  65. 
Latins,  proposal  to  put  into  Senate 

137- 
Latins,  status  of    45,  dd,  81,  82,  135, 

137,  171,  240,  273—277,  281  — 

283,    331,    340,    342,   343,   391, 

398,  522,   527,  564. 
Law  and  legal  system    13,  14,  34,  90. 
Law  of  the  Twelve  Tables     33,  34, 

35,  652. 
Law,  scheme  of  Caesar     607. 


Inde 


X 


521 


Laws  declared  invalid     396. 
Leagues,    Italian,    in  general     i,    3, 

5,   7,   16,  68,  71. 
Leagues,  Greek  (see  Federal  Unions) 
181,   187,  217,   247,  248. 
Achaean     183,  184,  187,  194,  198, 
200,    204 — 206,    208,    213,    215, 
217,  220,  231,  244 — 247. 
Aetolian     159,  182,  184,  187,  192, 
196,    198,    200,    204 — 209,    211, 
231. 
Lycian     217,  481. 
legationes  liber ae     492. 
Legends     8,   22,  31—33,  36,  46,  47- 
leges. 

Valeriae  Horatiae    35,  60. 

Camdeia     42. 

Liciniae  Sextiae    50,  51,  52,  316 — 

318. 
Ogulma     52. 

Valeria  (300  B.C.)     54,  86. 
Publilia     60. 
Hortensia     60,  86. 
Claudia  (218  B.C.)     112,   172. 
Oppia     143. 
Villia     278,  279,  435. 
law  forbidding  reelections     279. 
Porciae     282. 
Claudia  de  sociis     283. 
Calpurnia  de  repetundis    289 — 291. 
Baebia  de  ambitu     293. 
sumptuary  laws     293. 
Furia  testamentaria     294. 
Voconia     294. 
Aelia  et  Fufia     295. 
Senipronia  \agraria)    Tib.   Gracchi 

318—320. 
lunia  Penni     330. 
Semproniae    C.    Gracchi     chapter 

XXII  passim. 
Acilia     341,  443. 
Liviae  Drusi  (122  B.C.)     340,  342. 
Laws   upsetting   Gracchan  legisla- 
tion    350. 
Servilia    de   repetundis     356,    383, 

443-. 
Dofuitia     372,   436. 
Appuleiae     386,  387. 
Caecilia  Didia     390. 
Licinia  Mucia     391. 
Liviae  Drusi  (91  B.C.)     394 — 396. 
Varia     403. 

lulia  (90  B.C.)     405,  408. 
Calpurnia  (89  B.C.)     408. 
Plaiitia  Papiria  (89  B.C.)     408. 
Pompeia  (89  B.C.)     408. 
Plautia  iudiciaria     410,  417. 
Siilpiciae  (89 — 8  B.C.)     41 1. 


leges  (continued) 

Valeria  Flacci  de  a  ere  alieno     417. 
Valeria  Flacci  de  dictahira  Sullae 

434- . 

Corneliae  Sullae    434 — /^^6  passim. 

Plautia  de  vi    446. 

Terentia  Cassia     454. 

Aurelia  L.  Cottae    459. 

Gabiniae  (67  B.C.)     472,   473. 

Corneliae  (67  B.C.)     473 — 475. 

Calpurnia  de  ambitu     473,  474. 

Manilla     477. 

Papia     485. 

Tullia  de  ambitu     494,  498. 

Strange  bribery-law     505. 

luliae  (Caesaris,  59  B.C.)     chapter 
XXXVII  passim. 

Fufia  (59  B.C.)     514. 

Vatijiiae  (59  B.C.)     514,  515. 

lulia  repetundarum     518. 

Clodiae  (58  B.C.)     519 — 521. 

Pompeia  (55  B.C.)     554. 

Licinia  Crassi  (55  B.C.)     554,  558. 

Pompeiae  (52  B.C.)     562,  563. 

luliae  (49  B.C.)     580. 

Luliae  (46 — 45  B.C.)     599,   600. 

Antoniae  (44  B.C.)     621. 

Pedia    630. 
legio     20,  43. 
Legions,  see  Army     370. 
Legislation     14,   15,  25,   33,  35,  41, 
59,  60,  III,  278,  279,  283,  293, 
295,    386—388,    396,  472—474, 
512,  514,  516,  519,  562,   563. 
lex,  charter     81,  285,  313. 
liberti  and   libertini  (see  Freedmen) 

III. 
Libraries,  public     607. 
Licinii.' 

C.   Licinius  Stolo     50,  51. 

P.  Licinius  Crassus     220. 

L.  Licinius  Lucullus     263. 

P.  Licinius  Crassus  Mucianus    322, 
324. 

L.    Licinius    Crassus    (the    orator) 

35ij  39I'  39^'  395-^ 
C.  Licinius  Nerva     376. 
L.    Licinius    Lucullus      421,   422, 

448,   4535    462,   465—469,   478, 

504»  507'  5ii>  513- 
L.  Licinius  Murena     423,  447. 
M.    Licinius    Crassus      427,    428, 

455— 457>  470>  484.  485*  487— 

489,    496,  498,    499,    505,    506, 

508,    509,  513,    531,    532,   534, 

536—540,  545,    547,    555,    556, 

559- 
M.  Lucullus,  see   Terentti     462. 


522 


Index 


Licinii  (continued) 

C.  Licinius  Macer     454. 

L.  Licinius  Murena    493,  494,  498. 

P.  Licinius  Crassus    530,  532,  559. 
lie  tores     23. 

Ligarius,  Q.     602,  612. 
Liguria  and  Ligurians     4,   no,   158, 
202,    218,    235,    236,    268,    326, 
370,  400. 
Lilybaeum    (Marsala)     76,    98,    loi, 

103,   138,   145,  593. 
Literature  (see  Oratory,  Rhetoric). 

Livius  Andronicus     112. 

Cn.  Naevius     112. 

T.  Maccius  Plautus     177,  308. 

Q.    Ennius      177,    281,    297,    308, 

309- 
P.  Terentius  Afer     298,   308. 
M.  Porcius  Cato     298,   302,  308. 
M.  Pacuvius     308. 
L.  Accius     308. 
C.  Lucilius     309. 
Cicero's   writings     458,    554,   557, 

567,^598'  624,  640,  641. 
Caesar's  writings     551,  642. 
Varro     643 — 647. 
Lucretius     648,   649. 
Catullus     650. 
Sallust     651. 
Livii, 

M.    Livius    Salinator      156,    157, 

163. 
M.  Livius  Drusus     339,  340,  342, 

343;  . 
M.  Livius  Drusus     394 — 396. 
Local   governments     103,    134,    247, 

284,  449,  516. 
Local  independence     5,  68,  81,  270, 

33i»  342. 
Locri  in  Italy     135,   161. 
Lot,  use  of    23,  .58,  233,  341,  359, 

372,    411,    44i»    446,   453»   47o» 
488,  505. 
Luca  (Lucca)     236,  536. 
Lucanians     49,  67,  69,  74,  400,  408. 
Luceria     69,  70. 
ludi  (see  Festivals)     278. 
Lusitanians     263,  264,  460,  590. 
lustrum^  lustratio     21,   37,  277. 
Lutatii. 

C.  Lutatius  Catulus     102,  107. 
Q.    Lutatius    Catulus      373,    374, 

432. 
Q.    Lutatius    Catulus      451,    470, 
472.  477'  485.  486,   503,  511. 

Macedon   and   the  Antigonid  Kings 
67,  no,  ri8,  140,  151,  159,  164, 


Macedon  etc.  (continued) 

i8t— 183,    187,    197,    198,    204, 

206 — 208,    209,    210,    215,   216, 

228. 
Second    Macedonian    war      192 — 

196. 
Third  Macedonian  war     218 — 225. 
Macedonia  a  province     243,    247, 

355j    378,    421,    422,    454»  462, 

488,  519,  608,  620,  625,  626. 
Maelius,  Spurius     42. 
magister  populi,  see  Dictatorship    28. 
Magistracy,  equal  power  of  colleagues 

23.  26,  29,  37,  58,  276,  383. 
Magistracy,  numbers  of  the     58,  107, 

112,  203,  435,  606,  610. 
Magistracy,    term   of  office     23,   26, 

37,  601. 
Magistracy,    rules    as    to    qualifying 

age,   reelection,   etc.     258,    266, 

278,    279,    320,    328,    333,   366, 

372,  384,  388,  435,  456. 
Magistracy  and   Pro- Magistracy,  see 

Fro  -  Mag  istracy . 
Magistrate's    year      102,     263,    314, 

333»   343,  489,   571. 
Magistrate,  presiding,  power  of    24, 

25,  39,   168,  558. 
Mago  Barcas     158,   162,   163. 
Mago  the  writer  on  agriculture     303. 
maiestas  [minuta,  treason)    387,  389, 

392,  403,  444'  445,  485,  558. 
Make-believe     11,  13,  668. 
Mamertini     74,   76,  77,  92,  97. 
Mamilius,  C.  Limetanus     361. 
Manilius,  C.     477. 
manipuli    43,  195,   370. 
Mania. 

M.  Manlius  (Capitolinus)     42,  47. 

T.  Manlius  (Torquatus)     62,  63. 

Cn.  Manlius  Vulso     211 — 214. 

Cn.  Manlius  (or  Mallius)  Maximus 

369- 

C.  Manlius     494,  495 — 497. 
manus  (power,  control)     13,  294. 
Marcii. 

Q.  Marcius  Philippus     220,  222. 

L.    Marcius    Philippus     375,    394, 

395'  396. 
Mam. 

C.  Marius  267,  352,  361—367, 
chapter  xxiv  passim,  383 — 390, 
403,   404,    411,    412,    415,    416, 

432.  _ 
C.  Marius  the  younger     428,  429. 
Marriage,  see  conubium     13,  16,  42, 

294,  .437,  514- 
Marrucini     72,  400. 


Index 


523 


Mar  si     71,  72,  400,  406,  408. 
Masinissa     146,  157,  158,   162,   164, 

165,    169,    171,    194,    199,    207, 

218,  219,  255—258. 
Massalia    (Marseilles)     79,    98,    125, 

127,    152,    171,    235,    268,    326, 

353»   354>    458.    522,    523,    563, 

578,  579- 
Matius,  C.     545. 
Mauretania      357,     365—367,     376, 

580,  593. 
Medicine    and    surgery      112,    292, 

298,  599. 
Memmii. 

C.  Memmius     359. 
mercatores     286,  357,   523, 
Mercenary  soldiers     49,   72,  74,   76, 

94,  99,  100,  102,  103,  105,  109, 

145,   164,    181,    182,    185,    189, 

205,    211,    219,    251,    254,    345, 

523,   588. 
Mesopotamia     479,  556,  559. 
Messana  (Messina)     74,  92,  97. 
Mines     203,   228,  267,  590. 
Minucii. 

M.   Minucius  Rufus     129. 
Mithradates    Eupator    (see    Pontus) 

381,  407,  447,  461,  478. 
Mithradates  of  Pergamum     588. 
Monarchy     i,    179,    186—189,    228, 

270,  464,  465,  468,  478,  480. 
Monarchy,  early  Roman     11,  18,  19, 

22. 
Money,  metallic     34,   89,    100,   104, 

175,  396,  402,  4io>  417'  634. 
Moral   force,    strength   of,   in   Rome 

58,  84,  85,  614. 
mos  maiorum     11. 
Mucii. 

Q.    Mucins    Scaevola     391,    392, 
428,  653. 
Mummii. 

L.  Mummius  (Achaicus)    245,  246. 
Munatii. 

L.    Munatius   Plancus      624,    625, 
627 — 630. 
Municipal  system  in  Italy     408,  449, 

516,  660. 
Municipal  statute  of  Caesar     599. 
municipia     81. 

Murder  etc..  Court  of    445,  447,  486. 
Mutina  (Modena)     240,  625 — 627. 

Names,  Roman    9,  605. 

Narbo  Martius  (Narbonne)  354, 
522. 

Narbonese  Gaul,  see  Gaul,  Trans- 
alpine   474,  522,  551,  625,  631. 


Navy  and  naval  affairs  56,  68,  74, 
98,  99,  loi,  102,  120,  125,  127, 
138,  143,  145,  153,  163,  170, 
192,  209,  219,  224,  230,  379, 
420—422,  463,  465,  466,  474, 
476,  53O'  54^5  5435  544'  575. 
577.  578,  581—583,  586,  590. 
594,  627,  631,  634,  635. 

Neapolis  (Naples)  49,  53,  68,  82, 
134,  141,  144,  241,  401,  428. 

negotiaiores     286. 

'New  men'  278,  363,  369,  458, 
470,  483,  487,  488,  489,  631. 

nobilis     52. 

Nobility    of   birth     6,    10,    13,    20, 

24—5.  32- 
Nobility,  new,   of  wealth  and  office 

52,  60,  86,  271,  277 — 280,  327, 

329. 
Nobility,  post-Sullan     448,  473. 
Nola     70,   135,   141,  407,  411,  413. 
Nomination     29,  37,  54. 
Noricum     369. 
Northern      barbarians       355,      366, 

chapter  xxiv  passim^  462. 
Nuceria     70,   83. 
Numantia     265 — 267. 
Numidia  and  Numidians     146,   158, 

162,    169,    194,    220,    258,   332, 

357—367.  404.  433.  437.  579» 
580,  593.  595.  634. 

Octavii. 

M.  Octavius  Caecina     319. 

M.  Octavius     350. 

Cn.  Octavius     412,  414,  416. 

C.  Octavius  (see  lulii)     604,  608, 
609,  610,  618,  619. 
Octavian,  see  lulii. 
Oligarchy  not  Roman  but  Greek    84. 
Opimii. 

Q.  Opimius     268. 

L.   Opimius     331,   337,  342—345, 

351- 
Oppius,  C.     545,  603. 
optifuates  and  popular es     327,  329 — 

332,  351,  363.  372,  383.  478, 
483,  484,  486—489,   502. 

Oracle  of  Delphi     135,   176. 

Oratory  308,  443,  447,  458,  470, 
491,  492,  538,  539,  622,  633,  639. 

Order,  Patrician,  see  Patricians. 

Order,  senatorial    59,  338,  394—396, 

436,  458,  459- 
Order,    equestrian      338,    346,    383, 

393—396.  431.  4365  450.  453. 
458,  459.  470,  475.  492.  597. 
669. 


524 


Index 


Orders,  harmony   of  the     390,    475, 

483,  488,  504,  508,  517,  567. 
Oscan   dialect     4,  49,  64,  398,  402, 

439- 
Ostia     19,  415,  471. 

Outlawry  [aquae  et  ignis  inferdictio) 
334,   386,  445»  520. 

Paeligni     71,  72,  400,  402. 

Palaepharsalus     585. 

Panhormus  (Palermo)     98,  100,  102. 

Paphlagonia     324,  380,  382,  481. 

Papirii. 

L.  Papirius  Cursor     69. 

C.  Papirius  Carbo     327,  331,  350, 

351. 
Cn.   Papirius  Carbo     369. 
Cn.     Papirius    Carbo      415,    418, 

425—428,  433,  437. 
Papius,  C.  Mutilus     402,  404. 
Parthia    and    Parthians      253,     380, 

382,    464,    468,   479,    536,    556, 

559'  567'  608,  635. 
patres     11,  24,  59. 
Patricians     10,    12,    13,    18,    19,   20, 

24,  25,  26,   32,  33,  34,   37—42, 

50.    52,    57,    59,    78,    271,    356, 

364,   412,    433,    470,    497,    508, 

591,  609. 
Patricians    become    Plebeians      411, 

514- 

patroni    25,   iii,  443. 

peculattts     445. 

pecunia     34. 

Pedius,  Q.     630, 

perduellis,  perduellio  14,  147,  276, 
387,  442,  492.  _ 

peregrinus  (see  hostis)     107,  330. 

Pergamum  and  the  Attalid  kings 
151,  159,  171,  190—193,  205, 
207,  209 — 212,  218,  219,  222, 
224,   229,    250,   (see  Asia)    320, 

324- 
Perpernae  (or  Perpennae). 
M.  Perperna     324. 
M.     Perperna       451,     452,     460, 

461. 
Petreius,  M.     501,  555,  578. 
Pharnaces     478,  480,   589. 
Philopoemen     183,  205,  213,  215. 
Phoenicians     91,  93,  96,  97. 
Phrygia     325. 
Picentes   and    Picenum     72,   75,    77, 

406,  427,  497,  575. 
Pirates   and    Piracy     no,    118,    185, 

236,    239,    249,    371,    379,    423, 

447,    451,    455,    461—463,    471, 

472,  474,  476. 


Placentia  (Piacenza)     116,   125,   160, 

238,  240,  268,  355. 
Plancius,  Cn.  520,  558. 
Plebeian  claims     10,  24,  25,  26,  35, 

37—42,  50,  51,  52,  57,  60,  107. 
phbs     10,   18,   J  9,   26,   30,  60. 
Polybius     95,  96,  104,  rT7,  123,  163, 

182,    219,    222,    224,    232,   244, 

248,  260,  267,  297,  299. 
poffierium     27. 
Pompaedius,  Q.  Silo    402,  404,  406, 

413- 
Pompeii. 

Cn.  Pompeius  Strabo  404,  406, 
411,  412,  415,  416. 

Q.  Pompeius  Rufus     411,  412. 

Cn.  Pompeius  (Magnus)  406,  427, 
428,  433,  437,  447,  448,  451, 
452,  455—457,  461,  chapter 
XXXIV  passifn,  483, 484, 490,  491, 
chapters  xxxvi,  xxxvii,  xxxix 
passim,  545— 547>  552,  chapter 
XLi  passim,   574 — 587  passim. 

Cn.  Pompeius  (the  younger)  594, 
602,  604. 

Sex.  Pompeius     602,  604,  619,  626, 
627. 
Pomponius,  T.  Atticus     424,  632. 
Pontiffs     14,    29,    34,   90,    107,    130, 
32X,    324,    356,    372,    437,   493, 
533,  596,  601,  617,  652,  669. 
Pontius  the  Samnite  (4th  cent.  B.C.) 

69,  73- 
Pontius  the  Samnite  (ist  cent.  B.C.) 

428. 
Pontus  and  Pontic  kings     251,  324, 
325,    380—382,   419—422,   462, 
464 — 466,  480. 
Popilii. 

C.  Popilius  Laenas     226. 
P.  Popilius  Laenas     334,   351. 
populus    7,  18,  27,  30,  35,  41,  50,  60. 
Porcii. 

M.  Porcius  Cato  (the  censor)    203, 

207,    213,    230,    233,    255,   258, 

275,    276,    289,    296,    298,   302, 

303,  308. 

M.    Porcius  Cato     483,  486,   494, 

500,    50.3—505,    507,    508,    5", 
512,    516,    518,    519,    521,    536, 

537,    539,    540,   543,    555,    558, 
561,    564,    571,    579,   581,   584, 

591—594/ 
possessio,  possidere      50,    172,    315  — 

319,  328,  350. 
Postumii. 

Sp.  Postumius  Albinus     268. 

Sp.  Postumius  Albinus     360,  361. 


Index 


525 


praefecti  [iuri  dicundd)     81. 
praefecH,  Caesar's  deputies     603. 
praefectiis  fnoribiis     596. 
praefecHis  urbi     28. 
Praeneste    (Palestrina)      46,    6^^   82, 

282,  428,  429. 
praerogativa     341. 
praetor,  name     23,  50. 
Praetors    and    Praetorship      50,    52, 

54,    107,    112,    147,    203,    233, 

234,    410,   435,   440,    446,    475, 

606,  610,  620. 
Praetor's  edict     475,  652,  653. 
Precedent,  creation  and  force  of    40, 

59,  282,  288,  653. 
princeps    668. 
princeps  senatus     356,  434. 
Prodigies     12,  130,   153,  495. 
Pro -magistracy    53,  54,  68,  143,  280, 

341,    346,    440,   441,    555,    560, 

563- 
proscripti    and     Proscriptions      431, 

432,  436,  486,  631—633. 
proscriptonwi  fiUi     436,  489,  492. 
Provinces,    Roman      103,    112,    178, 

203,    233,    234,    243,   285—288, 

354,  440,  526. 
Provinces,    the    5    years    interval   in 

succession   to     560,    563,    565 — 

567- 
Provinces,  abuses  in  the     233,  286 — 

288,    347,    392,    454,    517,    518, 

662. 
Provinces,  staff  of  governor     286. 
provincia     103,    112,   178,    235,   341, 

47  2/ 
Provincial    policy      227,    228,    237, 

243,    247,    262—267,    325,   354, 

379,    380,    440,   441,   453,    461, 

462,  476,  477,  480,  481,  524. 

Provincial  taxation  261,  267,  287, 
288,  336,  655. 

provocatio  14,  27,  29,  33,  34,  35,  54, 
282,  290,  331,  342,  442,  621. 

publica  (state  contracts)  37,  276, 
601. 

publicani  (see  Capitalists)  37,  141, 
i43»  i47>  i74>  227,  271,  276, 
286,    287,    336,    352,    508,   513, 

558,  581. 
Publilii. 

Q.  Publilius  Philo     68. 
Puteoli    (Pozzuoli)       144,    241,    438, 

448. 
Pyrrhus     76,  91. 

guaestiones  extraordinariae  (special 
judicial  commissions)     289.  322, 


quaestiones  etc.   (continued) 

33i>   332,    334,    356,    361,    372, 

387,   403,    442,    504,    505,    562, 

630. 
quaestiones  perpetuae  (standing  courts) 

289—291,    338,    387,    442—446, 

458,  459'  621. 
quaestiones,  reform  of  procedure   514. 
Quaestorship  and  Quaestors     29,  30, 

37,  56,  286,  326,  364,  426,  435, 

458,  470,  471,  520. 
Quinctii. 

T.  Quinctius  Flamininus    193,  194, 

196,  200,  201,  205,  206,  208. 
quirites     7. 

Rabirius,  C.     492 

Ravenna     572,  573,  575. 

Records     47,  163,  486,  511,  518. 

Religion  and  religious  affairs  12,  14, 
20,  21,  23,  25,  29,  37,  41,  42, 
52,  60,  126,  130,  135,  137,  147, 
160,  176,  295—297,  356,  372, 
437'  493'  504'  5i9'  59^,  605, 
654- 

Reporting     499. 
k  Republics  and  monarchies     i,  2,  80, 
166,    185,    230,    270,    299,   420, 
465,  466,  478. 

Responsibility     29,  35,  37,  57,  214, 

344'  387- 
rex  sacrorum     23. 
Rhegium   (Reggio  di   Calabria)     76, 

77'  i5o>  241- 

Rhetoric,  teaching  of    393,  639. 

Rhodes  71,  79,  159,  171,  185,  189, 
191,  192,  205,  207,  209,  210, 
217,  218,  220,  222,  226,  230, 
249'   379'   420,   422,    428,    588, 

589- 
Rich  and  Poor     20,  25,  29,   30,  38, 
42,    50'   5I'    52,    86,    184,    219, 
271,    306,    307,    420,    421,   475, 
656,  657,  670. 
Roads     78,  237,  240,  267,  337. 
via  Appia^    55,  70,  471,  561. 
via  Flaminia     116. 
via  Aemilia  Lepidi     240,  627. 
via  Fostumia     268,  355. 
via  Domitia     354. 
via  Aurelia     355. 
via  Aeviilia  Scauri     355. 
via  Egnatia     584,  635. 
Roads,  travelling  on     662. 
rogatio     38. 

Roman  conservatism     11,  23,  41,  60. 

Roman  constitution  and  its  vi^orking 

52,  60,  86,   104,   108,   119,  168, 


526 


Index 


Roman  constitution  etc.  (continued) 
271—283,  310,  317,  319—321, 
344—348,  384,  385,  390,  392— 

-  396,   418,    450— 453>    456— 459> 

474,  475,  cha.Tpter  xviu passim. 

Roman  mob      160,    273 — 275,    303, 

304>   335»    343.    346,    399»   561, 
568,  599,  655,  657,  670. 
Roman  people,   habits   and  occupa- 
tions of    8,  17,  87,  89,  304,  305, 

307- 

Roman  population     304. 

Roman  private  life  85,  292,  299, 
307,  392.  .  , 

Roman  public  life,  corruption  of 
213,  214,  229,  267,  278,  287, 
291,  292,  293,  334,  348,  356, 
358—361,  367,  473,  518,  557, 
558,  567*  655,  656. 

Roman  thrift    85. 

Rome  and  Italian  confederates  (to 
201  B.C.)  5,  16,  32,  44,  45,  46, 
48,  62,  68,  70,  71,  72,  77,  78, 
80 — 83,  93,  103,  104,  114,  116, 
117,  121,  122,  128,  133,  135, 
i37>  147'  i54>  163,  171. 
(after  201  B.C.)  191,  203,  232,  241, 
270,  273 — 277,  281—284,  316, 
319,  328,  330,  331,  340,  342, 
343.  347.  370,  384.  39i»  394— 
396.  . 

(the    great    Italian    war    and    its 
sequel)     chapter  xxvil  passim. 

Rome  champion  of  Italy  against 
Gauls  48,  72,  73,  75,  80,  116, 
117,  121,  239. 

Rome  protector  of  Greeks  68,  77, 
79,  122,  130,   133. 

Rome,  limits  of  history  of     i. 

Rome,  origin  of    6. 

Rome,  policy  of  incorporation  2,  8, 
10,  12,  19,  32,  36,  62,  64,  78, 
277,  281,  284,  398. 

Rome,  early  government     15. 

Rome,  regal  period     18 — 22. 

Rome,  the  Coalition  or  '  First  Trium- 
virate' 509 — 518,  chapter  XXXIX 
passim,  545,  547,  553—556. 

Rome,  fall  of  the  Republic    555,  557, 

561,  569.  570.  57I'  572,  585, 
587,  596—598,  613,  614. 

Rome,  the  second  or  formal  Trium- 
virate, 631 — 634,  636. 

Rome,  city  of,  position  and  site    3,  6. 

Rome,  city  of,  appearance  88,  306, 
655'  656. 

Rome  as  Head  of  Italy  80 — 83, 
284. 


Rome  imperial     171,  178,  a  10,  226, 

227,    241,    242,    281,    357,  398, 
402. 
Rome  capital  of  empire     599. 
Rupilii. 

P.  Rupilius     313. 
Rutilii, 

P.  Rutilius  Rufus     267,  361,  365, 

370.  392»  393'  653,  659. 
P.  Rutilius  Lupus    403,  404. 

Sabellians    4,  5,  49,  69,  71,  72. 

Sabines    4,  6,  7,  8,  32,  33,  74,  78. 

sacra     12,  654. 

sacramenium  (military  oath)     44. 

sacramentum  (deposit  in  court)     289. 

sagum     87. 

Saguntum     113,   115. 

Sallentini,  see  lapygians. 

saltus     315. 

Samnites  4,  48,  49,  62,  63,  67 — 71, 
73>  76—78,  398,  400—402,  404, 
407,    408,    413,  415,   427—429, 

439- 
Sardinia     92,  99,  109,  139,  140,  171, 

218,234,326,433,451,577,579. 

Scipionic  Circle     299. 

Scribonii. 

C.    Scribonius    Curio      565,    568, 

569,  571.  572,  579- 
secessio  plebis     26,  33,  60. 
Seleucids,  see  Syrian  kingdom. 
Sempronii. 

Tib.  Sempronius  Longus     125. 
Tib.    Sempronius   Gracchus      137, 

233.  234,  263,  276. 
Tib.    Sempronius   Gracchus      257, 

265,  267,  chapter  XX  passim. 
C.  Sempronius  Gracchus    267,  320, 
326,    330 — 332,    chapter     xxii 
passim.. 
C.  Sempronius  Tuditanus     326. 
Senate,  growth  of  power  of    40,  53, 

57,   59,  86,   119,   168. 
Senate  of  early  Rome     11,   i8. 
Senate   509 — 449  B.C.     24,  28,  29. 
448—367  B.C.     37—40. 
366—265  B.C.      53—55'    57, 
59,  68. 

264 — 201  B.C.  103,  104,  108, 
112,  119,  130,  132,  137, 
166,    168,    176. 

201 — 168  B.C.  191,  201,  and 
chapters  XV,  xvi  passim. 

167 — 134  B.C.  chapter  xvii 
passim,  270,  271,  274, 
276,  280,  285,  295,  297, 
298,  303. 


Index 


527 


Senate  (continued) 

133—79  B.C.  314,  320—322, 
327.  334.  338,  339»  34i» 
344— 347.  35 1»  357—364, 
376,  cha-ipter  XXYI  passim, 
403,  412,  425,  426,  434— 
436,  44T. 

after  79  B.C.  chapter  xxxii 
passim,  469,  492,  495 — 
497,  499,  500,  chapter 
XXXVI  passim,  511,   559, 

560,  565.  566,  569— 573> 
596,     600,    609,    chapter 
YAAN  passim,  661,  669. 
senatus  auctoritas     39. 
senattts  co7tsuUum     39. 
senatus  consultiim  ultimwn^  last  order 
or  decree     344,   351,   388,   492, 
496,  499,  561,  572,  573. 
sententia77i  dicere     24. 
Sentius,  C.     378,  421. 
Setgii. 

L.  Sergms  Catilina     431,  chapter 
XXXV  passim. 
Sertorius,    Q.     371,   415,    416,    426, 

427'    433j    447»   45i>  45^,    460, 

461. 
Servilii. 

Cn.   Servilius  Geminus     126. 

Q.  Servilius  Caepio     264. 

C.   Servilius   Glaucia     356,    383 — 

388. 
Q.  Servilius  Caepio    369,  372,  392. 
Q.  Servilius  Caepio     404. 
P.  Servilius  Vatia  {Isauricus)    451, 

463- 
P.  Servilius  Rullus     490. 
P.  Servilius  Vatia  Isauricus     583, 

591- 

Sexiii. 

L.  Sextius     50. 
C.  Sextius     326. 
Sibylline  books     534,  608. 
Sicily     4,  32,  49,  67,  74,  76,  77,  91, 

92,  97 — 102. 
Sicily  a  Roman  province     103,  112, 
132,    151,    171,    172,    204,    218, 

377.   433.   437.   454.   458.  577. 
.579.. 634. 
First  Sicilian  slave-war     311 — 313. 
Second    Sicilian    slave-war      376, 

377- 
Sidicini     63. 

Signet  rings  and  seals     156,  499. 

Sittius,  P.     489,  593,  595. 

Slaves  and  slavery  7,  9,  85,  94,  95, 
99,  III,  170,  172,  173,  231,  234, 
236,   249,    271,    272,    292,    300, 


Slaves  and  slavery  (continued) 

311— 313,  371,  375—377.  379. 
416,  454,  455,  463,  495,  530, 
544.   567.  599.  661,  670. 

Slaves  as  soldiers     132,  604. 

Slave-agriculture  172,  173,  261,  272, 
300—303,  312,  335,  371,  375, 
376,  439,  454,  599,  646,  647. 

Slaves  employed  in  political  rioting, 
civil  war  etc.  321,  345,  388, 
412,  415,  495,  519,  531. 

socii  (non-Italian)     103,   230, 

socii  (Italian)  and  cives  81 — 83,  128, 
281,  398. 

sodalicia     554,  558. 

Spain  91,  109,  113— 115,  124,  127, 
136,  139,  146,  151,  152,  157, 
158,  171,  203,  218,  233,  262— 
267,  326,  352,  369,  373,  378, 
460,  461,  471,  484,  489,  506, 
536,  578.  59O'  602,  604. 

Sparta  181,  200,  204,  205,  208,  213, 
215,  244,  245,  247. 

Spartacus    455. 

Statues     89,  261,  306,  655. 

stipendium  (see  decumae)     261,  287. 

Stoicism  and  Stoics  297,  299,  361, 
392,   393.   483.   498.    594.   641, 

653- 
Struggle  of  the  Orders,  see  Plebeian 

claims     36,  37. 
Successor-kingdoms,  see  Alexander. 
Sulpicii. 

Servius  Sulpicius  Galba  263. 
P.  Sulpicius  Rufus  411,  412. 
Servius  Sulpicius  Rufus     493,  494, 

498,  564,  654. 
Survivals     23,  28,  59. 
Syracuse     32,  49,  67,  76,  77,  92,  98, 

103,   T42,  145. 
Syria,  province     479—481,  519,  536, 

567,   608,  620,  625. 
Syrian  kingdom  and  Seleucids     188, 

192,    193,    198,    199,   215—217, 

219,    222,    226,    251 — 253,    380, 

464,  479. 

Tarentum  (Taranto)     49,  67,  69,  70, 
72,  74,  76,  77,  78,  82,  144,  147, 
148,  153,  154,  339. 
Tarquins,  the     22,  32. 
Temples     88,    163,    282,    306,    345, 

447.  503.  618,  658,  659. 
Terentii. 
C.  Terentius  Varro    130 — 132,  168. 
M.  Terentius  Varro  Lucullus    454, 

456,  462. 
M.  Terentius  Varro    578,  632,  643. 


528 


Index 


Teutoni,  see  Northern  Barbarians. 

Theatres     554,  657. 

Thessaly     181,    182,    187,   206,    207, 

220,  584,   585. 
Thessalonica    (Saloniki)      520,    581, 

582. 
Thrace    and    Thracians      188,     198, 

212,    213,    219,    455,    462,   468, 

608. 
Tiber,   river,  and   floods     3,    8,    47, 

88,  306,  656,  659. 
Tibur  (Tivoli)     62,  66,  82. 
Tigranes,  see  Armenia     464. 
Tigurini,  see  Northern  Barbarians. 
Timoleon     67. 
toga     87,  522. 
Transplantation  of  conquered  people 

236,  264. 
Trebatius,   C,  Testa     654. 
Trials  of  public  men     214,  233,  263, 

372,    376,    377,    392,    458>   484, 

485^  514'  517.  558,  562,  563. 
Tribes,  3  primitive     18. 
Tribes,  'Servian'     21. 
Tribes  509—449  ^-c     30,  35- 
448—367  B.C.     41,  45. 
366—265  B.C.     55,  72,  81. 

264 — 201  B.C.       III. 

200 — 134  B.C.      273 — 277. 

133—79  B.C.     409,  410,  441. 

after  79  B.C.     449,  554- 
Tribes,   17  of  35     372,  493. 
tribuni  plebis  and  Tribunate     26,  27, 

30»  33>  35'  38,  39'  41,  42,  57' 
168,    271,   274,    279,    314,    319, 

321.  329'  335'  337'  .H3'  344' 
346,  348,  359—361,  373'  435' 
452,  456,  457,  469—475,  489, 
503.  508,  566,  571—573'  611. 

tribunician  power  (without  the  office) 
591,   596,   606. 

tribuni  aerarii     459,  600. 

tribuni    militum    consulari  potestate 

37—39'.  42. 

tribuni  militum     44,  56,  219. 

tribus,  urbanae  and  rusticae  55, 
III,  273. 

tributum     138,  232. 

Tullii. 
M.  TuUius  Cicero     447,  458,  470, 
477,  chapters  XXXV,  XXXVI /a^ 
sim,   511,    514,  517,  520,  531 
535'   537—539'    545,    554.   567. 


Tullii  (continued) 

571,    581,    591,    597,    598,    602, 

610,  618 — 631  passim. 
Q.   Tullius  Cicero  (brother  of  the 

orator)     537,  538,  545,  546. 
tiimultus    48,  625. 
Tusculum  (Frascati)     46,  621,  630. 
ttitor     294. 

Umbrians     4,  71,  72,  73,  77. 
Utica     256,  261,   594. 

Valerii. 

L.  Valerius  Potitus     33,  35. 

M.  Valerius  (Corvus)     62. 

L.  Valerius  Flaccus     276. 

L.  Valerius  Flaccus    417,  418,  422. 

L.  Valerius  Flaccus     434. 

L.  Valerius  Flaccus     517. 

C.  Valerius  Catullus     650. 
Varius,  Q.  [Hybrida)     403. 
Vatinius,  P.     514,  515,  540,  558,  590. 

'^^^^   .32,  43'  45'  47- 

venatio     305. 

Veneti     48,  116,  125,  160,  238,  239. 

Veneti  of  Gaul     530,   541. 

Venusia     73,  131,  400,  404. 

Vercingetorix     548—551,   597- 

Verres,  C     426,  454,  458,  632. 

Vestini     69,  72,  400. 

Vettius  the  informer     517. 

Vibius,  C,  Pansa     625 — 627. 

villa     302,  645. 

Vipsanius,  M.,  Agrippa     630. 

Viriathus     264. 

Volsci     31,  32,  45,  46,  62—65,  66. 

Voting   in   groups     18,    25,    35,    93, 

III,   184,  275—277,  334,  409. 
Voting  by  ballot     293,  446. 
Voting  of  juries     446,  514. 

Wall,   'Servian'     19,  47. 
Weapons     20,  44,  195,   326,  370. 
Wills     34,  293,  294,  604,  617,  618. 
Women,   position  and    habits  of    9, 

13,  85,  87,  293,   294,   307. 
Women  taxed,  B.C.  43     633. 
Wood,    use   of    88,    305,    306,    656, 

657- 
Writing,  use  of    33—35,  39. 


—       Xanthippus     99. 


CAMBRIDGE:    PRINTEP   BY  JOHN   CLAY,    M.A.    AT   THE   UNIVERSITY   PRESS. 


4857  .075 


University  of 
Connecticut 

Libraries 


